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THOMAS J. BLAKELEY

SOVIET PHILOSOPHIC METHOD: THE CASE OF B. M. KEDROV

It is often assumed in the Western literature on the subject that Soviet philosophers are nothing more than puppets of the Party, that they always say and write what is ordered by the Party authorities. There is, as a matter of fact, overwhelming evidence in support of this interpretation – and this evidence pertains to cases not only before 1947 but also now. And yet, this view appears to be an oversimplification of a rather complex situation.

We here offer an analysis of that complexity on the basis of one example, that of Professor Bonifatij Mixajlovič Kedrov, vice-president of the Institute of Philosophy of the Academy of Sciences of the Soviet Union and one of the foremost thinkers in the Soviet Union today.

I

B. M. Kedrov came to philosophy through the natural sciences and his first love seems to have been the history of chemistry. He was the first editor-in-chief of the *Voprosy filosofii* and, although he was removed from this position in 1948, he has always remained a member of the editorial staff. He is a Doctor of Philosophy and, until his current appointment to the Department of the History of Marxist-Leninist Philosophy at the University of Moscow, he was in the Department of Dialectical and Historical Materialism of the School of Social Sciences in Moscow. As mentioned above, he is one of the vice-presidents of the Institute of Philosophy. In addition to questions on the history, methodology and classification of the natural sciences, Kedrov's works reveal his great interest in the laws and categories of the dialectic; and more recently he has been preoccupied with questions of logic – for example, he contributed articles both to the *Logical Investigations* which was published in 1958, and to *Application of Logic in Science and Technology* which appeared in 1960. Here we will limit our considerations to those works which Kedrov published immediately before, during and immediately after his ouster as editor-in-chief of the *VF*.[2]

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There has been some discussion as to whether Kedrov was ousted because of his implication in the 'Markov affair' or because he allowed Z. A. Kamenskij's article on 'The Question of Tradition in Russian Materialist Philosophy'[3] to be published in the second volume of the *VF*. Kedrov himself; in his auto-critique, attributes it clearly to the former. He says: "In the line of self-criticism I must admit with full responsibility that as editor-in-chief of this journal I committed a serious error: I undertook the defence of and cooperated in the publication, in the second number of 1947, of an article offered for discussion by Professor M. A. Markov and entitled 'On the Nature of Physical Knowledge'.[4] There appeared in this article an incorrect and essentially subjective-idealist view of the so-called 'Copenhagen school' regarding physical reality, the microcosm and the quantum mechanics which studies its laws."[5]

Kedrov's principal antagonist in the 'Markov affair' was A. A. Maksimov[6], a reactionary of the Rozental' or Mitin variety. Whereas for Kedrov and the progressive wing in contemporary Soviet philosophy the 1947 discussion and the founding of the *VF* meant the beginning of a new era and, among other things, of the possibility of entering into discussion with non-dialectical-materialist philosophers and scientists, for Maksimov and his group it meant that Russian philosophy and science were to be unceasingly brought to the fore and forced to the attention of the world-public, even at the cost of sacrificing the truth. Maksimov made his challenge in regard to M. A. Markov's article which presents certain 'bourgeois' scientific views in an almost sympathetic manner. This article, which was published in the second number of the *VF*, was followed by an extensive discussion in the third number.[7] In the same issue Kedrov published his article entitled 'Critical Remarks on a Philosophic Theme'[8], an indictment of some contemporary Soviet philosophers for failure to put into practice the lessons on the correct (Marxist) treatment of the history of philosophy, which were taught to them by the "Central Committee and Comrade Stalin" through A. A. Ždanov.[9] The aspects of the 'style of Soviet philosophic work' on which Kedrov dwells are both interesting and significant.

In the introduction Kedrov briefly outlines the guiding principles of Marxist-Leninist history of philosophy and contrasts them with those of the 'metaphysical approach'. These principles are:

1. The Marxist historian of philosophy deals with the 'facts as they are'

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not as he would wish them to be. 2. These facts must be investigated in all their contradictory complexity. In this domain, "simplification is falsification". 3. Since these facts are elements of a contradictory, complex and developing situation, the instrument of investigation must correspond to them. This instrument is the 'Marxist dialectic'.

Characterizing the 'metaphysical approach' in general, Kedrov points out that to isolate certain sides of complex questions and to treat them in complete abstraction from the other sides of the same questions leads to 'one-sidedness' which Lenin characterized as the 'gnoseological core of idealism'. According to Kedrov, too many contemporary Soviet philosophers, through factual ignorance of the dialectical method, have fallen into 'deviations' and 'departures' from the 'true line' in Soviet history of philosophy.

The first section of Kedrov's article, 'On Deviations (*peregibax*) and Oscillations (*šaraxan'i*) from Extreme to Extreme', begins with the assertion that oscillations from extreme to extreme are a logical consequence of the metaphysician's one-sided approach. But the contemporary Soviet philosopher, using the dialectical method, has no excuse for such shortcomings. To show that the oscillations do exist in contemporary Soviet history of philosophy, Kedrov cites four instances: 1. Before the discussion of 1947 Hegel's dialectic was hailed as the 'core of Marxism'; now there are those who label anyone who dares introduce anything Hegelian 'menševiking idealist'. 2. Before the war, many defended Kant, especially the Kant of the pre-critical period; now there are those who condemn even the Kantian cosmological hypothesis, although it is well-known that Engels rated it highly. 3. Again, before the war, formal logic was considered foreign to dialectical logic; after the 1946 decree, the two were identified; finally, many are back to absolute separation of the two. 4. The most extreme of the extremes occurred in the treatment of the question of the position of Russian scientists and philosophers in world science and philosophy. The same people who preached 'sycophancy before foreigners (*nizkopoklonstvo pered inostranščinoj*)' in science prior to 1947, are the same who now maintain the absolute sterility of foreign science and go to absurd extremes in an effort to attribute each and every discovery of any value to some Russian.

Kedrov dwells at great length on the fourth example of 'oscillation from extreme to extreme' and his special target is A. A. Maksimov's *Essays*

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on the History of the Battle for Materialism in Russian Natural Science.[10] He says: "Continuing such operations, the author, in the section 'Conclusion', makes the general observation: 'The revolutionary-democrat-intellectuals, i.e., Belinskij, Dobroljubov, Černyševskij, depended in their activity on the natural science both of foreign countries and of the leading Russian scientists such as Sečenov, Mečnikov, Mendeleev, Timirjazev.' ...But even a school-boy (*škol'nik*) might easily reckon that in 1848 (date of the death of Belinskij) Mečnikov, on whom A. A. Maksimov contends that Belinskij depended, was only three (3!) years old. Timirjazev – 5, Mendeleev – 14, Sečenov – 19." And in a footnote to this passage Kedrov adds: "When criticised for this, A. A. Maksimov explained it very simply by 'vexing misprints'. Sad to say, the whole book could be characterized by the word 'misprints'."[11]

Kedrov concludes this section by pointing out that these oscillations which lead to such stupid errors are caused by factual ignorance of the dialectical method on the part of the authors of works in Soviet history of philosophy.

In the second section of the article, 'On the Circumstances and Predecessors of the Up-Springing of Dialectical Materialism', Kedrov accuses some contemporary Soviet philosophers of resurrecting the old 'mechanist' conception of the nature of dialectical materialism. By considering only certain aspects of the question these 'mechanists' arrive at the metaphysical formula: 'dialectical materialism = the Hegelian dialectic + Feuerbachian materialism'. Ignorance of the dialectical method prevents them from analyzing the 'true causes' of philosophic development and the specific characteristic of each stage.

But, the bulk of this second section of Kedrov's article is devoted to a consideration of the absurd consequences which result from the oscillation from 'sycophancy before foreigners' to the 'complete sterility of foreign science'. Again it is A. A. Maksimov who is selected to represent those who have gone to absurd extremes. Kedrov says: "Thus, for example, it is well-known that the relation of mass and energy was introduced by Einstein in 1905 on the basis of the theory of relativity and that the so-called 'mass-defect', connected with it, was discovered only later in the 20th century. Nevertheless, a number of authors (A. A. Maksimov, S. A. Balezin) try, in one way or another, to connect this discovery with the name of the famous Russian scientist, M. V. Lomonosov, who lived in

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the middle of the 18th century when there was neither existing nor possible any concrete representation even about energy, not even to mention its connection with mass."[12]

Kedrov presents enough examples to convince the reader that the above is not the exception and then he concludes that from the 'deviations' and 'oscillations' of these contemporary Soviet historians of philosophy it does not follow that the 'general line' is false. These 'oscillators' are ignorant of the factual applicability of the 'materialist dialectic' and, consequently, cannot represent the 'line' which contains the correct use of this instrument as an integral part.

The third section of Kedrov's article, 'Dialectical and Metaphysical Versions of Leaps (*skačok*) in the Development of Philosophy', focuses the attention of the reader on those 'fiats' of the 1947 discussion which have not been implemented by contemporary Soviet historians of philosophy. The pre-1947 mode of contemporary Soviet historians of philosophy was to treat each system in isolation from the others. This is typical of 'bourgeois, metaphysical' historians of philosophy and has as consequence that Marxism appears as just another in the long line of philosophic systems. The discussion of 1947 resulted in a rash of 'oscillations' to the other extreme whereby Marxism was cut off from any connection with any previous philosophic systems. Excerpts from the courses of Z. Ja. Beleckij at the University of Moscow are contrasted, step by step, with quotations from Ždanov's speech at the 1947 discussion.

These extremes, concludes Kedrov, are due to the same 'factual ignorance of the materialist dialectic'; in this case, the dialectic of the 'evolutionary' and 'revolutionary' aspects of the history of philosophy.

Kedrov concluded his article by affirming that the following steps must be taken to rid contemporary Soviet history of philosophy of 'oscillations': 1. Implementation of the decree of the Central Committee, resulting from the 1947 discussion; 2. Real comprehension of the materialist dialectic and fruitful application thereof; 3. Elimination of 'deviations' from the 'true line'.

The unsophisticated Western observer would more than likely term Kedrov's 'oscillators' merely the '*ukaz*-happy intellectuals of a totalitarian regime'. But, from Kedrov's point of view, what precisely is the defect? Obviously, he is objecting to the fact that Soviet philosophers are, more often than not, in flagrant contradiction with themselves, their colleagues

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and the scientific facts. To the first two contradictions the author is not too strongly opposed, but the third seems to him inadmissible even in the defence of the most fundamental theses of Marxism-Leninism. And, here is the heart of his criticism; these 'deformations of the truth' in the defence of the 'scientific world-outlook' are not necessary because, if they were, there would necessarily be a serious doubt as to the integrity of this 'true world-outlook'. It would not be stretching the facts to call Kedrov's 'Critical Remarks...' an appeal for common sense within the framework of dialectical materialism, even though the author himself would probably object to equating his 'dialectical method' with 'common sense'.

The climax of the 'Markov affair' came through an article by Maksimov entitled 'Marxist Philosophic Materialism and Contemporary Physics'[13] in which he launches a vicious attack against Markov and the editors of *VF*. This article was initially to appear in the fourth number of *VF* but was not accepted by the editors when they found out that it had already been published in the *Literaturnaja Gazeta* on the 10th of April. In the next number of the *VF* D. I. Česnokov replaced Kedrov as editor-in-chief; the last number of *VF* for 1948 did not appear until June of 1949; and, Kedrov made the customary auto-critique which ended with the words: "I consider it a serious fault that I did not follow the criticism of the Party immediately and did not give up my false views right away."[14]

Kedrov remained in eclipse until the publication of Stalin's 'Letters on Linguistics'. In the same issue of the *Bulletin of the Academy of Sciences*[15] in which Stalin's letters were published, Kedrov reintroduced himself into Soviet philosophic life with the following attack on the editorial policy of the *VF*: "Issue after issue the journal *VF* constructed a 'theoretical foundation' for the erroneous contentions of the linguists and, in essence, supported an Arakčeevian regime. The articles of Comrade Stalin sound the battle-call against vulgarizers of Marxism not only in linguistics but also in other sciences, especially in natural science and logic."[16]

A. A. Maksimov[17] joined the editorial staff of the *VF* in 1949 but disappeared in 1955 as a result of his position on the theories of Einstein.[18]

II

An examination of Kedrov's published works shows that those of the period of his eclipse differ fundamentally from those of the editorship

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period and from those which followed Stalin's 'Letters on Linguistics'. There are many differences but, for convenience, they may be classed under the five headings which provided the backbone of Kedrov's speech to the 1947 discussion[19]:

1. On the question of the use of quotations, Kedrov is very much to the point: "Merely to offer some quotations from the works of the classics – this is not a real application of the Marxist method".[20]

2. Kedrov affirms the necessity of maintaining the "fundamental barrier between Marxist and Russian, pre-Marxist, classical philosophy".[21]

3. On the character of philosophy in general, Kedrov puts the stress on the determinative influence of the base. "The position of the Marxist dialectic consists in the restoration of the true interrelation, destroyed by the historians of philosophy, between base and superstructure, between the development of philosophic thought and the material conditions of life; this position consists in the recognition of the determinative role of the latter and, at the same time, the recognition of the relative (but, only relative) self-sufficiency of the former."[22]

4. In reference to the significance of Russian scientists and philosophers in the general framework of world-wide progress in these fields, Kedrov recognizes the immense significance of the contributions of the Russians but he refuses to espouse the extreme view which insists on attributing every significant step forward to the Russian who first made reference to it.

5. In logic, Kedrov defends the view that formal logic is a 'dialectical moment' of the all-pervasive 'dialectical logic'. He tends to attribute the 'metaphysical' and 'mechanist' failings of contemporary Soviet philosophers to an "exclusively formal-logical approach".[23]

In the period of his editorship of *VF* Kedrov published the following articles: 'On the Leninist Notebooks of Philosophy'; 'The Atomic Theory of Dalton and its Philosophical Significance'; 'The Leninist View on the Electron and Modern Physics'; 'Critical Remarks on a Philosophical Theme'; 'Bold Book of a Progressive Greek Scholar'; 'Unfortunate Book on the History of Physics'; and 'On the Relation of Logic to Marxism'.[24]

The first article reveals a refreshing (in comparison with the pre-1947 situation in Soviet philosophy[25]) attitude toward the exegesis and employment of the works of the 'classics of Marxism-Leninism'. Lenin's *Philo-*

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sophical Notebooks are to be read in the context of other works of the epoch in which they were written, and lose all meaning if one does not remember that they are 'pre-publication drafts' which in no way reflect the definitive views of the author. Kedrov says: "...all the materials of the Leninist *Philosophical Notebooks* can be provisionally distributed into the following groups which are of unequal significance: (1) quotations, (2) extracts from quotations, (3) evaluation remarks, (4) interrogative remarks, (5) interpretative remarks, (6) aphoristic remarks, (7) fragmentary generalizations, (8) planification notes, (9) fragments with a generalizing character. In the passage from one group to the other there is an increase in the specific weight given by Lenin to his own original and specifically new thoughts and propositions, and by the same token there is an increase in the pertinence of the corresponding remarks for clarifying and understanding Lenin's own views."[26] To show how ludicrous the results can be, Kedrov quotes contemporary Soviet authors who have ignored these distinctions.

Although Kedrov is willing to give the devil his due by admitting the value of 'bourgeois' scientific contributions, he is, nonetheless, firm in maintaining the privileged position of dialectical materialism as the only philosophical elaboration of the achievements of modern science. In 'The Leninist View...' he treats eight aspects of the interpretation of modern physics and his mode of argumentation is standard. In each and every case he presents the 'idealist' version of the aspect under consideration, then the scientific facts involved, finally, the 'true' dialectical-materialist elaboration which is reinforced by a quotation, where necessary.

In this first period Kedrov does not make too much mention of the 'class-bound' character of philosophy. But, under pressure from Maksimov, Kedrov comes out in 'Critical Remarks...' against all forms of one-sidedness. And, in the course of this polemic, he contends that deviations from the 'line' in philosophy result from undue stress on base or on superstructure, the first leading to 'mechanicism', the second to 'metaphysics'.

The second, third and fourth articles in the above list are marked by a balanced view on the relative importance of the scientific discoveries of Russian and 'foreign' scientists. Kedrov concludes that "The special significance of the atomic theory of Dalton consists in the fact that it was a path-finder for the theory of Mendeleev; it was the link between New-

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tonian mechanics and the periodic law of Mendeleev."[27] Later events show that it was on this 'balanced view' that Maksimov concentrated his attack which brought about Kedrov's downfall.

The last article, although it might be included in the succeeding period, develops Kedrov's own view on the problems of logic and contains the distribution of quotations from Engels and Lenin which one expects in such an article.

The effects of Kedrov's demotion from chief editorship as result of the 'Markov affair' begin to be apparent already in 'Unfortunate Book...' where the criticism centers on the fact that the author departed from the 'class-bound' interpretation of the history of science. The full effects of the 'Markov affair' appear in: 'On the Philosophic Significance of the Scientific Discoveries of M. V. Lomonosov'; 'Against Idealism and Mechanicism in Organic Chemistry'; 'On the Pronouncements of D. I. Mendeleev on Philosophic Questions of Science'; 'Against Talmudism and the Vulgarisation of Marxism in the Logic Texts for Middle Schools': and 'On the Materialist Conception of the Laws of Nature'.[28]

Viewed in the perspective of Kedrov's attitude toward the use of quotations and the attribution of credit for scientific discoveries to Russians rather than to foreigners, the first of these articles is a complete *volte face*. The article contends that Lomonosov was the discoverer of a multitude of scientific laws and the founder of a number of the branches of natural science; and that these discoveries are unjustly attributed to others. Kedrov uses a single procedure to establish each of the seventeen points which he proposes for consideration: each point is succinctly characterized, a quotation from Engels localizes its value and significance, and Lomonosov's contribution is shown to be decisive *in function of the aspect which Engels' quotation shows to be determinative*. In 1948 Kedrov had said in reference to the law of the conservation of energy: "But Lomonosov lived in the middle of the 18th century when the *fact* of the transformation of movement had not been demonstrated, and consequently, the discovery of the *law* of the conservation of energy was simply impossible..."[29] And, in the early part of 1951: "The full import of Lomonosov's genial idea, foreshadowing the discovery of the law of conservation and conversion of energy which was made in the middle of the 19th century becomes especially clear in the light of Engels' pronouncement relative to this law."[30] Now, we find: "... Lomonosov ... and no

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other, first (in 1748) discovered and formulated *the basic law of chemistry, the law of the conservation of matter*."[31] and, "All that has been said confirms the fact that the 'Universal Law of Science' of the conservation of matter and motion should by rights be acknowledged as Lomonosovian."[32]

The second article of this series finds the 'bourgeois theory of resonance' in chemistry condemned by means of the 'guilt by association' technique which Maksimov used so successfully against Markov and Kedrov. The argument runs: the resonance theory tends to introduce the subjective element into the scientific picture of the world; but, the introduction of the subjective element is a characteristic of Machism; therefore, the Leninist arguments against Machism are valid against the resonance theory.

In the third article we find a commentary on the scientific diary of Mendeleev. The structure is similar to that of 'On the Leninist Notebooks...' but the development is more cautious. The conclusion reads: "Therefore, the entire content of Mendeleev's philosophic notes shows him to be a materialist and spontaneous dialectician, coming very close to the general theoretical base of dialectical materialism."[33]

The fourth and fifth articles mark the beginning of a transition to the next period. The fourth criticizes the logic text from a principally pedagogical point of view. The fifth is made up of reflections on the nature of the laws of nature, most of which are introduced by "Comrade Stalin teaches..." (*tov. Stalin učit...*).

III

As mentioned above, Stalin's 'Letters on Linguistics" opened a breach in the then-prevailing dogmatic wall and Kedrov was not slow in taking advantage of it. The articles of this period are: 'Progression as one of the Forms of Transition from an old Quality to a new Quality'; 'On the Classification of Sciences'; 'On the Relation of Marxism to Darwinism in the Problem of the Formation of Species'; 'The Scientific Method of D. I. Mendeleev'; 'The Triumph of Human Reason'; and '"Natural" and "Artificial" in the Knowledge and Activity of Man'.[34]

These articles are marked by a complete return to the five points of Kedrov's contribution to the 1947 discussion. But, in reference to the third point (the general character of philosophy) there is a perceptible and

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significant shift of emphasis from the strictly theoretical side of the question of base and superstructure to the more mundane, practical, every-day implications of this essential category of historical materialism.

The first article is a clear and interesting exposition of the difference between the *skačok* (leap) and the *vzryv* (bursting). This distinction is the philosophic foundation of the famous Marxian distinction between 'antagonistic' and 'non-antagonistic' contradictions in nature and society. In this context we find an interesting statement on the use of quotations from the works of the 'classics'. "If the natural sciences provide concrete material for the confirmation of the correctness of the general theses of the Marxist materialist dialectic then, in its turn, the dialectic in the concrete form in which it is developed in conformity with any specific branch of knowledge (e.g., with political economy as obvious in Marx' *Capital*) serves as the universal and sole true instrument of scientific investigations in *all* branches of scientific knowledge. This is why, though many works of the classics of Marxism-Leninism seem at first glance to apply directly only to one set of questions, they have always had and will have a tremendous significance for all branches of science."[35]

The second article is a further development of the speech which Kedrov presented before the Philosophical Congress at Zurich in 1954. The classification of the sciences is made along the lines of the classification of Engels' *Dialectics of Nature*, the two principles being that one should view nature 'as it is' and 'in development'.

In the third article Kedrov uses the 'classics' to refute those who would stigmatize Darwin as a 'metaphysician'. Here we find a return to the 'rational exegesis' of the first period.

'The Scientific Method of D. I. Mendeleev' allows us to appreciate the extent to which Kedrov's balanced attitude toward Russian scientists and their contributions has been restored. The spirit and procedure of this work differ as radically from 'On the Philosophical Significance of the Scientific Discoveries of M. V. Lomonosov' as does this latter from the article on Dalton in the first period.

The last two articles of this period show the mark of the increased emphasis on the practical side of the question of base and superstructure and, in consequence, the clarity and depth of the genuinely philosophical aspects of the two articles suffers.

Grouping the variations of the three periods under the five guide-lines

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of Kedrov's philosophic production, we are able to come to the following conclusions:

1. The 'rational exegesis' of the first period returns in the third after a relapse into 'pre-1947 commentary' style which marked the 'period of disgrace'.

2. In the first and third periods the 'privileged position' of Marxism-Leninism in reference to science is established by appeal to the 'essentially materialistic nature of modern natural science' whereas the second period finds this thesis confirmed by quotations, especially of Engels.

3. Kedrov's insistence on the danger of treating philosophy and science along national lines weakened in the second period but at no time was there a radical change. "If an attempt is made to promulgate the line of Maksimov and Balezin, then it becomes easy to logically arrive at the contention that if materialism and dialectic (tendency to synthesis) are only national traits of the soul of the Russian people and its representative scholars, then dialectical materialism is not the revolutionary outlook of the Party of the proletariat..."[36]

4. The change of method traced through the articles on Dalton, Lomonosov and Mendeleev, plus the latest defence of Darwin, reveal Kedrov's natural penchant toward a balanced attitude in the 'Russia *vs.* the world' question in science.

5. Kedrov's view that formal logic is a 'dialectical moment' of dialectical logic never varied in the articles discussed but the following quotation testifies to the difficulty (which is not his alone) which he has in distinguishing this 'logic' from its 'moment': "The law of the excluded third in formal logic is based on the premiss that no contradiction is admissible; hence from two contradictory propositions it is necessary to choose one (either - or); there is not, nor can there be, any other solution in formal logic because this would be the admission of a contradiction. But Marxist dialectic proceeds from the following thesis: the presence of contradiction, the conflict of irreconcilable oppositions; one of them must gain the upper hand – and in that consists the resolution of the given contradiction: either - or. Reconciliation of the contradictions is impossible: there is no third road."[37]

Briefly, therefore, we can say that Kedrov responded to the Party's directive, first, by falling back into 'quotationism' and, second, by

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completely reversing his attitude or, at least, his statements in regard to the importance of Russian philosophers and scientists.

IV

And, therein lies the problem. How does it happen that an intelligent and serious thinker of the stature of Kedrov can change his opinions so radically and this solely and simply because of an externally imposed, human authority?

The solution generally offered consists in explaining that Kedrov and all other contemporary Soviet philosophers always submit to Party orders because they are Party members or because they are afraid of reprisals, and so on.

Such a solution may be satisfactory for explaining the activities of a Rozental', Mitin or Maksimov, but it seems to us that Kedrov is, as a philosopher, so much superior to these that the explanation can be considered at most partial. For, it was Kedrov precisely who thoroughly analysed and condemned such 'oscillations' along the Party line. His indictment of fellow dialectical-materialists in 'Critical Remarks...' could be paraphrased to read as follows: you take the *ukaz* (decree of the Party); you draw conclusions from it; you emphasize them and, at the same time, you disregard the facts, your own former opinions and even the principles of dialectics; then, you go to utter extremes in these views and condemn all who do not completely agree with you. Kedrov's conclusion is categorical. He reasons that if deformations of the facts are necessary to defend dialectical materialism, then there would be serious doubt as to its value. Yet, less than a year later Kedrov was deforming the facts and completely contradicting himself. It seems that an explanation in terms of political expediency is insufficient – taken by itself – to fully explain this change.

We would propose an explanation based on an analysis of contemporary Soviet philosophic method.[38] In other words, by considering *the way* in which contemporary Soviet philosophers justify their assertions we come to a clearer understanding of why they make such assertions and, what is more important, why their comportment is so much different from that of other contemporary philosophers. It might be objected that such an investigation is useless because everyone knows that contemporary

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Soviet philosophy is a dogmatic system where the works of the 'classics of Marxism-Leninism' take the place of the Bible, and all the contemporary Soviet philosopher has to do is to quote the proper chapter and verse. To this we would make the following counter-objection. If contemporary Soviet philosophy is taken to be a purely dogmatic system using the so-called 'theological syllogism', that is the mode of argumentation in which the major premiss is an article of faith, the minor premiss an article of faith or a proposition of reason, and the conclusion a 'theological consequence', then it becomes very difficult to explain two facts: first, how a human authority, such as that of Marx, Engels and Lenin, can serve as guarantee for the major premiss of a theological syllogism; secondly, how contemporary Soviet philosophers can claim that their science is *the* scientific world-view and that it is constantly being 'verified'.

In other words, the procedure used by contemporary Soviet philosophers seems to be, at the same time, 'dogmatic' and 'empirical'. The contemporary Soviet philosopher takes as his point of departure a set of propositions, which are called the 'principles of Marxism-Leninism' and which are statements of the 'classics'. From these he proceeds by a *deduction* to conclusions which are admitted into the system only if they can be shown not to contradict the statements of these same 'classics'. The basic assumptions from which the theoretical constructs of contemporary Soviet philosophers depend as from the axioms of a deductive system are: the primacy of being (matter) over thought (spirit); the materiality of the objective world; the dialectical character of reality; and, the 'reflective' nature of knowledge. These four propositions are accepted as axioms, i.e., without critical examination, and are at the basis of all further speculation. What is more, the basic pattern of the argumentation is rigorously the same whether the author in question be dealing with matter, motion, logic or epistemology: the 'problem' is posed by a 'classic' – the deduction is made – then, the conclusion is confirmed by a 'classic'. Therefore, in as far as the basic argumentation of contemporary Soviet philosophy is a deduction from principles which are accepted without critical examination from an authority which lies outside of the domain of philosophy, it can be termed 'dogmatic'.

But, contemporary Soviet philosophers contend on the other hand that there is nothing which happens which is not a confirmation of the Marxist-Leninist theory. This attitude is summed up in the *Osnovy* in the words:

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"The entire course of world history for the last century irrefutably proves the truthfulness of the principles of Marxism-Leninism and of the laws revealed by it. Just as the Great October Socialist Revolution and the victory of socialism in the USSR, the victory of the socialist revolution in China and a string of other countries was the triumph and the confirmation of the truth of the laws of historical materialism, so the striking discoveries of contemporary science are the triumph and confirmation of the truthfulness of dialectical materialism."[39]

It seems that the presence of these mutually exclusive elements – dogmatism and verification – can be explained by taking contemporary Soviet philosophic method to have a basically hypothetico-deductive structure in which the hypothesis-formation is considered as having already been done by the 'classics' and the deductive stage, with its consequent verification, is that now being done by the contemporary Soviet philosophers themselves. Let us take a closer look at each of these two stages.

The first stage, that of hypothesis-formation, can be represented as follows: the 'classics', Marx, Engels, Lenin, took statements about data (data of 19th century science, sociology and history of philosophy for Marx and Engels; data of the early 20th century for Lenin) and constructed hypotheses, i.e., proposed general explanations for all or, at least, most of these data. Now, it is important to note here that it would be up to the Marxologist and Leninologist to tell us whether or not it is true that these three intended their statements as hypotheses. What matters for the present discussion is the fact that contemporary Soviet philosophers do take these statements as hypotheses and this can be seen in the fact that the statements of the 'classics' are constantly described by Soviet philosophers as generalizations of the data and are said to serve as the bases for predictions. But, these are precisely the two characteristics which mark a scientific hypothesis.

Turning to the second step in the process, a definition of terms is necessary. By 'dogma' we mean a proposition which is accepted on the basis of an extra-philosophic authority, by means of a type of faith. By 'meta-dogma' we mean a proposition which is not only itself a dogma but also is the reason why the dogmata of a given system are accepted on faith. And, it seems that in any sufficiently developed dogmatic system there are three levels of discourse: the dogmata and two types of meta-

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dogmata. The first type of meta-dogma, which we will here call 'magisterial meta-dogma', deals with the competence of an authority to prescribe belief in the dogmata. The second, which we will call 'fideistic meta-dogma' is a meta-dogma in the full sense of the term. Thus, in contemporary Soviet philosophy the *dogmata* are the statements of fact dealing with the nature of matter, motion, the dialectic, categories, etc. The *magisterial meta-dogmata* are propositions dealing with the authority of the Party, especially in ideological matters. The *fideistic meta-dogmata* are the 'proletarian redemption' and the 'Communist destiny'. It is because of these fideistic meta-dogmata that contemporary Soviet philosophers accept the *corpus doctrinarum* of Marxism-Leninism. They are dogmata because their very formulation makes it evident that they are not subject to rational verification. The 'proletarian redemption' says that 'the proletariat, as the creative force of history, has the mission of redeeming mankind because its interests fully coincide with the interests of mankind'; the 'communist destiny' says that 'the destiny of mankind lies in the downfall of capitalism and the full triumph of Communism'. Briefly, both the 'proletarian redemption' and the 'Communist destiny' are dogmata because they require an identification of the 'proletariat' with 'mankind', and the acceptance of a future state, Communism, as a certainty. In other words, both depend on some sort of mystic vision of the future. And such a vision can be believed but never scientifically established.

Because of his belief in these fideistic meta-dogmata, then, the contemporary Soviet philosopher is committed to whatever consequences, no matter how irrational, may be entailed by them. Thus, he accepts the authority of the so-called classics because it was they who 'revealed' and pointed out the way to the 'proletarian redemption' and the 'Communist destiny'; he accepts the authority of the Party because the Party is the *avant-garde* of the 'proletarian redemption' and the conscious leader of humanity toward the 'Communist destiny'.

Finally, a close look at 'Soviet verification' shows that it is not a verification at all in the sense in which this word is understood in Western science or philosophy. Ordinarily, the hypothetico-deductive process runs as follows: from observation of a certain series of facts, the researcher proposes a general statement, the hypothesis; he infers statements on future possible cases; then he proceeds to the verification by comparing the inferred statements with reality. Now a positive result gives added

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strength to the hypothesis; a negative case leads to revision or rejection of the hypothesis. The basic difference between this procedure and that of contemporary Soviet philosophers is that, although every positive result is taken as 'absolute proof' of Marxism-Leninism, when faced with a negative case, the contemporary Soviet philosopher rejects or revises not the hypothesis (which is, at the same time, a principle of Marxism-Leninism) but the facts.

As we saw in the statement from *Osnovy*, quoted above, the principles of Marxism-Leninism are said to be established *en bloc* by the 'accomplishments of the working class', i.e., by the 'proletarian redeemer', and by 'socialist construction', which is an essential stage in the approach to the 'Communist destiny'. Therefore, this verification is meta-dogmatic and takes the form of an acceptance of all events and theories which are defined by the Party as genuine and the revision or rejection of those which are not so defined.

V

With these elements in mind, let us return to the case of B. M. Kedrov and see if we are in a better position to explain what happened. First of all, previous to the 'Markov affair', Kedrov reconciled his 'Marxist-Leninist faith' with the facts of history and science by (1) rationally interpreting the 'classics', (2) maintaining that the reason why dialectical materialism was correct was its correspondence to the materialistic character of modern science, and (3) refusing to distort historical fact in favor of Russian philosophers and scientists. When, because of the 'Markov affair', the Party decided in favor of his opponents, he seems to have changed his views completely on all three points. We explain this change as follows. Having been formed in the spirit of Marxism-Leninism, Kedrov accepts the basic beliefs of every Communist: he believes that the proletariat is the appointed saviour of mankind; and he believes that mankind is moving with historical necessity toward an earthly paradise, which is 'Communism'. But, how has he learned these two articles of faith? He learned them thanks to the works of genius of the 'classics'. The 'classics' then become the sources of 'revelation' and their works the source of inspiration for all of mankind. Further, these 'prophets' of the new order not only revealed the great truths but also established an instrument for the accomplishment of these great goals. The Party, then, is clothed in

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a double sanctity. It was elected by the 'classics' and it is the conscious leader of mankind along the path of destiny. This is why Kedrov can be sure that when he denies his own rational convictions and follows the dictates of the Party he is doing the right thing. For, by following what the Party says he is cooperating in the accomplishment of the glorious destiny of mankind. And, this is of infinitely more value than any personal satisfaction which is to be gained from following the dictates of human reason. Therefore, although it can be admitted that Kedrov's switch in point of view could have been due at least in part to political expediency – he thought it better to submit rather than be silenced completely – the full explanation must take into account the fact that it was his total ideological commitment which made any such change even possible.

From this simple example we can see the extremely difficult position in which the contemporary Soviet thinker finds himself when he sets out to do any sort of philosophizing. He is, as a matter of fact, faced by a double dilemma.

First of all, he is constantly brought up against conflicts of faith and science. At every step in his philosophical investigations he must ask himself: are my premisses and conclusions in complete accord with the letter and spirit of the classics? Further, he is faced with the very difficult decision of which is to be revised, if there is conflict, the 'classics' or the 'facts'. He can never be quite sure whether he must reconsider his own speculations or try to reinterpret the statements of the 'classics'. As we have seen, Kedrov's normal tendency always has been to rationally interpret the 'classics' rather than to do violence to the results of legitimate scientific investigations. Other, less adventurous, contemporary Soviet philosophers have the tendency to fall back into quotationism when faced by such a difficulty. But, regardless of which solution he may find, the fact remains that the contemporary Soviet philosopher is continually faced by the dilemma of faith and science. This dilemma is one result of the fact that Marxism-Leninism is an ambiguous system – one that is dogmatic but which tries to be 'empirical' at the same time.

Secondly, the contemporary Soviet philosopher is faced by the conflict between his thought and Party decrees. This dilemma seems to be much more difficult than that between faith and science.[40] Even when the contemporary Soviet philosopher has succeeded in finding a *modus vivendi* between his faith and the results of his philosophic investigations, he

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may find out that it has been cancelled by a Party decree. Thus, Kedrov in his editorship period seemed to have found an ideal system for the concordance of the 'classics' and modern science, and for the 'proper' presentation of the role of Russian scientists and philosophers. Much to his surprise, he found that these hard-won results were completely nullified by a decision of the Party. Because of its infallibility as the vanguard of the proletariat on the road to Communism, the Party has the absolute right of deciding which questions are to be discussed, when the 'discussion' is finished and what the final 'solution' to the question must be.

Basically, then, Kedrov philosophized up to 1948 and since 1950 in the atmosphere which is that of every dialectical materialist; torn between the demands of his faith and his desire to produce serious philosophical analyses, he is ever threatened by the intervention of the Party. His retreat in 1948 seems to indicate that for him as for other dialectical materialists the Party represents a legitimate philosophical authority because of its position at the head of the victorious march toward Communism. But, the fact that after Stalin's 'Letters on Linguistics' he made a complete comeback to his previous position is evidence of the new wind which is blowing in the domain of contemporary Soviet philosophy. If we compare the case of Kedrov with those of Deborin or of G. F. Aleksandrov, we note that in neither of the other two was there such a spectacular and complete return: something new had been added in 1950. If we add to this the fact that Bakradze and Kondakov were able to openly argue an official decision in *VF* in 1952[41] and that E. Kol'man was able to successfully defend his public rejection of a statement of one of the 'classics'[42], then it seems that we are justified in speaking of a certain 'liberalization' in contemporary Soviet philosophy. It is interesting, however, to note that this liberalization does not seem to be directly affecting the content of dialectical materialism: i.e., the 'liberalization' is not taking the form of a revision of the basic dogmata of Marxism-Leninism but of Party control thereof. This was most clearly exemplified in the consequences which were drawn from Stalin's statements on linguistics. Once it was admitted that language was not an affair of class, the conclusion was immediately drawn that logic, which is an affair of language, is not class-bound. But, to deny that something is class-bound is to take it out of the context of the class-war and, consequently, out of the direct control of the Party. A

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similar consequence was drawn for the empirical sciences which are intimately bound up with technology and, therefore, are at the level of 'forces of production'; and, at this level there is no class-war. Thus, the 'liberalization' consists rather in loosening Party control than in modifying the dogmatic bases of dialectical materialism.

It is too early to tell whether this resistance to Party control will entail a fundamental change in the dogmatic structure of Marxism-Leninism. For the moment it seems that contemporary Soviet philosophers do not deny the Party's *right* to interfere; but they have begun to object to the Party's interference in this or that particular domain, on this or that specific question.

ZUSAMMENFASSUNG

Die Stellung der sowjetischen Philosophen wird im Westen oft als die reiner Marionetten bezeichnet, die so schreiben, wie die Partei es befehlt. Daß diese Darstellung stark vereinfachend ist und man es mit einer viel komplexeren Situation zu tun hat, wird am Beispiel von B. M. Kedrov, einem der bedeutendsten zeitgenössischen Denker der Sowjetunion, gezeigt.

Kedrov kam von den Naturwissenschaften her zur Philosophie. Seine hauptsächlichen Interessengebeite sind: (a) Geschichte, Methodologie, Klassifizierung der Naturwissenschaften. (b) Gesetze und Kategorien der Dialektik. (c) Formale *vs.* dialektische Logik.

Kedrov war der erste Herausgeber der *VF* und blieb es bis zur sog. Markov-Affäre. Über einen Artikel von M. A. Markov: 'Das Wesen der physikalischen Erkenntnis' kam es zur Diskussion. A. A. Maksimov kritisierte Markov, wogegen Kedrov ihn verteidigte, indem er Maksimov die Verdrehung geschichtlicher Tatsachen zur Wahrung der Parteilinie nachwies. Kedrov verlor seine Stellung und änderte teilweise seine Ansichten. Nach dem Erscheinen des Stalinschen 'Der Marxismus und die Probleme der Sprachwissenschaft' tritt er wieder mehr in den Vordergrund und zwar mit wiederum entscheidend veränderten Ansichten. Diese Meinungsänderungen, deren letzte Phase wieder auf die erste zurückkommt, vollzogen sich vor allem auf drei Gebieten: (a) Das Verhältnis zu den "Klassikern" wird von einer "rationalen Exegese" zu primitivem "Zitatismus". (b) Das Zusammenstimmen zwischen Diamat und Naturwissenschaften versucht Kedrov zunächst aus dem materialistischen Charakter der modernen Naturwissenschaften wirklich zu beweisen. Später (zuletzt wieder nicht) genügt dann eine Stelle aus den "Klassikern" zu diesem Beweis. (c) Schließlich änderte Kedrov seine Ansichten über die Bedeutung der russischen Philosophen und Wissenschaftler. Nahm er hier zunächst eine sehr objektive, historisch-kritische Haltung ein (Markov-Affäre), so ist in der zweiten Periode alles bedeutend, was russisch ist.

Die Tatsache seiner Parteimitgliedschaft und politische Klugheit können bei einem so ernsthaften Denker wie Kedrov diese Umschwenkungen sicher nicht vollkommen erklären. Es wird daher eine andere, auf eine Analyse der Methode der sowjetischen Philosophie aufbauende Erklärung vorgeschlagen.

Diese Methode scheint – entgegen der Meinung, daß sie eine rein dogmatische, jener der Theologie ähnliche sei – beides: dogmatisch und empirisch zu sein. Dogmatisch

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ist sie, weil sie einige undiskutierte Grundsätze annimmt: der Vorrang des Seins vor dem Denken; die Materialität der objektiven Welt; der dialektische Charakter der Wirklichkeit; das Erkennen als Wiederspiegelung der materiellen Welt. Von diesen Dogmen der "Klassiker" wird abgeleitet, wobei die Schlußfolgerung wieder von einem "Klassiker" bestätigt sein muß. Daneben ist diese Methode aber auch empirisch. Denn alles in der Welt wird als Bestätigung der Ideologie angesehen und muß daraufhin angesehen werden.

Somit scheint man es hier mit einer hypothetisch-deduktiven Methode zu tun zu haben, wobei die Hypothesenbildung von den "Klassikern" geleistet wurde, die Ableitung und Verifizierung jedoch Aufgabe jedes sowjetischen Philosophen ist.

In jedem entwickelten dogmatischen System gibt es neben den Dogmen zwei Arten von "Meta-Dogmen", die erklären, warum die Dogmen geglaubt werden müssen. Die erste solche Art wird "obrigkeitliche (magisterial) Meta-Dogmen" genannt; diese entscheiden über die Zuständigkeit einer Autorität, das Glauben an die Dogmen vorzuschreiben. Die anderen werden "fideistische Meta-Dogmen" genannt und sind Meta-Dogmen im wahren Sinn des Wortes.

Die "obrigkeitlichen Meta-Dogmen" betreffen im Kommunismus die Autorität der Partei, vor allem in ideologischen Fragen. Die "fideistischen Meta-Dogmen" handeln von der Erlöserrolle des Proletariats und vom kommunistischen Zukunftsbild der Menschheit.

Durch diese Meta-Dogmen wird die Situation und Methode der sowjetischen Philosophie schon klarer. Die "fideistischen Meta-Dogmen" binden den sowjetischen Philosophen, mit all ihren irrationalen Konsequenzen. Die Stellung der "Klassiker" wird klar, wenn man sie als die versteht, welche die "fideistischen Meta-Dogmen" aufgestellt haben. Als die von den "Klassikern" dazu bestimmte Avantgarde zur Einhaltung und Erfüllung dieser Meta-Dogmen ist die Partei absolute Autorität.

Auch die Verifikation hat in diesem System einen ganz besonderen Sinn: die Prinzipien des Marxismus-Leninismus werden im allgemeinen, durch alle "Errungenschaften der arbeitenden Klasse" bestätigt.

Nach diesen Überlegungen läßt sich auch der Fall Kedrov besser verstehen. Sein Umschwenken von einer rationalen und objektiven Methode zu einer einfachen Zitierens und blinden Gehorsams läßt sich folgendermaßen erklären: Als guter Kommunist glaubt Kedrov an die Grundprinzipien des Kommunismus. Von ihnen wurde er durch die "Klassiker" überzeugt. Die Klassiker sind es aber auch, die die Partei als Autorität für die Ideologie eingesetzt haben. So wird die totale Unterordnung unter die Partei zu einem rationalereren Akt, als direkte Einsicht in die Probleme zu suchen. Dies dürfte darum auch für das Verhalten Kedrovs eine vollständigere Erklärung bieten, als nur politisches Geschick und Vorsicht darin zu sehen.

Freilich befindet sich hiermit der sowjetische Philosophie in einer zweifach schwierigen Situation: Erstens besteht ein Widerspruch zwischen seinem Glauben und seinem Drang nach ernsthaftem wissenschaftlichem Forschen. Zweitens kann sein Denken, auch wenn er aus dem obigen Dilemma einen Ausweg gefunden hat, stets durch ein Parteidekret unterbrochen und zum Stillstand gezwungen werden. Diese zweite Schwierigkeit scheint auch Kedrov besonders berührt zu haben, denn nachdem er die Widerspruchslosigkeit von Diamat und Naturwissenschaften bewiesen zu haben glaubte, verurteilte ihn die Partei zum Schweigen.

Es ist in diesem Zusammenhang interessant, daß die 'Liberalisierung' in der sowjetischen Philosophie, wie sie nach dem Erscheinen des oben genannten Werkes von Stalin eintrat, nicht die Grunddogmen des Marxismus-Leninismus betrifft. Viel-

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mehr scheint sie sich, da man jetzt einige Gebiete aus dem Klassengegensatz herausnimmt und damit auch der Zuständigkeit der Partei entzieht, auf das "obrigkeitliche Meta-Dogma" zu beziehen. Man lockert die Parteikontrolle, womit auch die Rehabilitierung Kedrovs erklärt werden kann.

Zusammenfassung und Übersetzung von *K. G. Ballestrem*

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28. Successively: 'O filosofskom značenii estestvenno-naučnyx otkrytij M. V. Lomonosova'. *VF* 1951, 5, 62–76. 'Protiv idealizma i mexanicizma v organičeskoj ximii'. *Bol'ševik* 1951, 19, 13–24. 'O vyskazyvanijax D. I. Mendeleeva po filosofskim voprosam estestvoznanija'. *VF* 1952, 2, 112–127. 'Protiv talmudizma i vul'garizacii marksizma v učebnike logiki dlja srednej školy'. *VF* 1952, 3, 227–234. 'O materialističeskom ponimanii zakonov prirody'. *VF* 1952, 6, 63–83.
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35. *VF* 1954, 2, 66.
36. *VF* 1948, 1, 65.
37. *VF* 1951, 4, 222.
38. Cf. Blakeley, T. J.: *Soviet Scholasticism*. Dordrecht. 1961 or 'Method in Soviet Philosophy'. *SST* I (1961) 17–28.
39. *Osnovy marksistskoj filosofii* (Principles of Marxist Philosophy). M., Gt., 1958. str. 3.
40. In *Der Mensch ohne Alternative* (München, 1960), Kotakowski describes the dilemma in terms of 'intellectual' *vs.* 'institutional' Marxism: "Der Begriff 'Marxismus' wurde zu einem Begriff mit institutionellem und nicht intellektuellem Inhalt wie das übrigens mit jeder kirchlichen Doktrin geschieht. Das Wort 'Marxist' bezeichnet nicht einen Menschen, der die eine oder andere inhaltlich umrissene Auffassung von der Welt besitzt, sondern einen Menschen mit einer bestimmten Geisteshaltung, die durch die Bereitschaft gekennzeichnet ist, Auffassungen zu akzeptieren, die behördlich bestätigt worden sind. Welchen aktuellen Inhalt der Marxismus besitzt, ist von diesem Gesichtspunkt aus ohne Bedeutung – man wird dadurch zum Marxisten, daß man sich bereit erklärt, von Fall zu Fall den Inhalt zu akzeptieren, den die Behörde präsentiert. . . . Aus eben diesem Grunde – im Hinblick auf den institutionellen und nicht intellektuellen Charakter des Marxismus – bekennt sich der echte Marxist zu Ansichten, deren Inhalt er nicht zu verstehen braucht. Wie jeder Marxist im Jahre 1950 wußte, war die Vererbungslehre Lyssenkos richtig, war Hegels Philosophie eine aristokratische Reaktion auf die Französische Revolution, war Dostojewski ein 'verfaulter Dekadenzler' und Babajewski ein ausgezeichneter Schriftsteller, war Ssuworow ein Träger des Fortschritts und die Resonanztheorie in der Chemie ein überholter Unsinn. Jeder Marxist wußte dies auch dann, wenn er nie etwas von Chromosomen gehört hatte, wenn er nicht wußte, in welchem Jahrhundert Hegel gelebt hatte,

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wenn er nie eine Erzählung von Dostojewski gelesen und nie ein Chemiebuch für die Mittelschule durchgearbeitet hatte. Mit all dem brauchte er sich nicht zu befassen, denn der Inhalt des Marxismus war ja durch die Behörde festgelegt." (SS. 8–9.)

41. Cf. *VF* 1956, 2.
42. Cf. Lobkowicz, N.: *Das Widerspruchsprinzip in der neueren sowjetischen Philosophie*. Dordrecht. 1959.

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IS THE SOVIET NOTION OF PRACTICE MARXIAN?

The somewhat esoteric title of my paper[1] would seem to call for a few explanatory remarks. The question whether this or that component of contemporary Communist ideology can legitimately be traced back to Marx is certainly not new. Unfortunately, however, questions of this kind are usually asked in too general a way to be amenable to a truly satisfactory answer. For example, the question whether the contemporary Soviet concept of man or history is genuinely Marxian or not, is so enormously complex that it would seem virtually impossible to answer it without breaking it down into a whole series of more specific questions. The same applies to recent discussions as to whether the humanistic insights of the young Marx have been preserved in contemporary Marxism-Leninism or not.

However, once one has succeeded in pinning down a fairly definite doctrine and then asks oneself whether and to what extent it can be traced back to Marx, one is entering a discussion which is as exciting as it is timely. The recent reaction of Soviet philosophers, for example, to I. Fetscher's suggestion that both Soviet ideology and Soviet reality might be criticized in terms of ideas advanced by Marx himself[2], indicates that Communist thinkers simply cannot afford to ignore this kind of argument which dissociates them from one of their main authorities. It would be nasty, and perhaps somewhat too easy, to say that by dissociating the Communists from Marx one succeeds in undermining the peculiar self-confidence characteristic of contemporary Marxist-Leninist ideology. Therefore, I prefer to put it in a somewhat more obliging, if also more pretentious way: to ask whether this or that element of Marxist-Leninist ideology is compatible with or even can be traced back to ideas of Karl Marx is a forceful means of bringing us into conversation with Communist ideologists and philosophers – into a conversation which today seems as necessary as it is difficult and which, as unfruitful or even impossible as it might have appeared a few years ago, has been gathering momentum in the last two or three years.

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It is in this spirit that I wish briefly to discuss here the question whether the Marxist-Leninist notion of *practice*, as it is discussed by Soviet philosophers[3], is compatible with, traceable back to, or even identical with, Marx's notion of *Praxis*. In spite of its seemingly esoteric nature, the importance of this question hardly needs to be stressed; for all Marxists-Leninists would seem to agree that Marx's notion of *Praxis* together with its various implications is one of the most significant, if not the greatest single, contribution of the Father of Scientific Communism to mankind's thought.

I may begin by quickly summarizing the Marxist-Leninist definition of, as well as the two most fundamental statements about, practice. Not all Soviet texts define practice exactly in the same way, it is true. However, all seem to agree that the expression '*praktika*' denotes those purposeful and inevitably social activities in terms of which man, or human society, change and transform realities independent of the human mind. Thus, according to the *Great Soviet Encyclopaedia*, practice is the "activity of men in terms of which they influence the objective, material world and transform it".[4] According to the *Fundamentals of Marxism-Leninism*, practice is the entire activity of man altering the world.[5] According to the *Fundamentals of Marxist Philosophy*, it is the "sensuous material activity of men which changes objects, appearances and processes of reality". The same textbook also advances a more general definition: "practice is that interaction of subject (man) and object (a material thing) the immediate result of which is a change of the object".[6] Specialized monographs on the subject[7] add little as far as this basic notion of practice is concerned.[8] Usually, they will stress that practice is the activity of man transforming the world in a "material" way, as opposed to theoretical activities which by themselves, that is, without practice, cannot possibly change the world.[9] In many cases, they will suggest that only activities which contribute to the *development* of production, technology and society have to be considered as practice.[10] In fact, even though not all texts state it in so many words, it seems to be agreed that the activities of the "workers' movement", of the proletarian class, and of the CP's are practice, but that activities of American imperialists or of West European Democratic Parties should be described in some other way, usually pejorative.

As to concrete examples, all texts without exception, stress that the most fundamental type of practice is "material production", that is, the

production of material goods and, more generally, "industry". And, though the details vary, there also seems to be a general agreement as to less basic types of practice. No text omits class-struggle and scientific experiment. Some texts will specify that, as there is no class-struggle in socialist and Communist countries, the socialist and Communist counterpart to class-struggle is the political activity of governments and parties. Most texts mention revolution; some texts mention scientific and artistic activities involving physical procedures. The *Fundamentals of Marxist Philosophy* adds that even activities "in the realm of public education, of health care, etc." belong to practice.[11]

About practice so defined, Marxism-Leninism makes a number of statements of which two seem to be the most central: first, that practice is the ultimate source, the continuing foundation and, in a sense, the all-determining life element of all human knowledge from perception through abstract thought to scientific theories and ideologies; and, secondly, that practice is the main or even the only criterion of truth. The first thesis amounts to saying that man perceives, thinks and theorizes as in fact he does because his practice is such as in fact it is, that is, because labor and industry have reached this or that stage of their historical development. As to this doctrine, there is no doubt that it is authentically Marxian, at least as far as its basic outlines are concerned. The second doctrine amounts to saying that practice is that in terms of which one decides whether a perception, a proposition, or a system of propositions, corresponds to reality or does not correspond to it, is true or is false.

In what follows I shall argue that this second doctrine is not Marxian. I also shall try to indicate that this un-Marxian statement *about* practice gives to the very *notion* of practice an un-Marxian twist. That the doctrine in question is also false and to some extent even unintelligible, I shall be able to argue only *en passant*.

However, before going on, I believe it important to say that the claim that practice is a criterion of truth, or even *the* criterion, may mean at least three quite different things.

First, it may mean that in order to decide whether a certain proposition is true or false we have to act upon reality in one way or another. For example, in order to decide whether it is correct to say that salt water has a higher boiling-point than fresh water, I have to make a trip to the coast, make a fire, heat a pot of water, check the boiling-point, etc. Though only

a few contemporary non-Communist thinkers would be prepared to grant that there are *no* propositions the truth or falsity of which cannot be decided without doing or rather making something in the sense just described, it is generally recognized that there are many propositions which cannot be verified or falsified without in some way interfering with nature.

Secondly, the claim in question may be taken to mean that some or all propositions elicit actions which *make* true or false what the proposition states. In this case, practice would be the criterion of the truth of a proposition such as 'The proletariat is the agent which brings about the ultimate completion of mankind' in the sense that this proposition, once promulgated, induces the proletariat to act and thus to bring about humanity's ultimate completion. Again, most contemporary non-Communist thinkers would agree that there exist some propositions which can be "verified" or "falsified" by actualizing or preventing whatever the propositions in question state. An instance are propositions concerning future events which can be brought about by humans. Kant must have had in mind this kind of propositions when to the question, "How is a history *a priori* possible?", he replied by saying: "When the soothsayer himself makes and arranges the events which he has predicted in advance."[12]

Thirdly, the statement in question may be taken to mean that practice verifies or falsifies a proposition in the sense in which one says that sense-perception, experience, insight, the application of the principle of non-contradiction, etc., permit one to decide whether a proposition is true or false. Unless I am mistaken, it is in this last sense only, and certainly mainly in this sense, that Marxism-Leninism understands the doctrine under discussion. For specialized studies on practice as the criterion of truth without exception contain a lengthy historical introduction critically discussing pre-Marxist doctrines about what the criterion of truth is. They refer to thinkers such as Descartes who claimed that the distinctness and clarity of an idea is the criterion of its truth; to thinkers such as Hume who appeal to sense-evidence, or such as Leibniz who appeal to the principle of non-contradiction, or such as the German idealists who saw the criterion of truth in the self-transparence of a subject identical with its object. They then reject all this as insufficient, indeed as subjectivist, and try to prove that the real criterion of truth must be something radically transcending the human mind, namely, practice.

For the time being, I shall refrain from arguing that this doctrine, in a

very fundamental sense, is unintelligible. Instead, I shall make a few remarks about whether this doctrine can be traced back to Marx. Marx inherited from the Left Hegelians the notion of *Praxis* which in Fichte and Hegel, not to speak of Schelling, had played a rather subordinate role. In particular, it was the Polish (and by no means "Left") Hegelian, Count August Cieszkowski[13], who in his *Prolegomena zur Historiosophie* (1838) developed a "praxeology" according to which the sociopolitical activity of post-Hegelian humanity is the natural prolongation and completion of Absolute Knowledge as described by Hegel. Although the direct influence of Cieszkowski's book is somewhat difficult to assess[14], there can be no doubt that since about 1840 the notion of *Praxis* came to play a significant role in the speculations of the Left Hegelians. For Cieszkowski's claim that Hegel's Absolute Knowledge has to be prolongated, indeed translated into socio-political practice seemed to solve two problems which had haunted all Left Hegelians: on the one hand, the distressing feeling that after Hegel truly creative philosophizing was no longer possible and, on the other hand, the insight that Hegel's "eschatological transfiguration" of reality was a purely mental affair which left reality as unredeemed as it was before.[15] Of course, most Left Hegelians before Marx still described this "revolutionary practice" as something which could be achieved by the help of a pen. Thus Bruno Bauer repeatedly describes his "critical critique" as *the* true *Praxis*.[16] Ruge describes his "scientific journalism" displayed on the pages of the *Deutsche*, and later *Hallische*, *Jahrbücher*, as a journalistic activity which urges toward and in fact directly influences socio-political practice[17] – and this in spite of the fact that his *Jahrbücher* merely became the battle-ground of the Left Hegelian school which constantly mistook the developments of its ideas *about* political realities for changes of these political realities themselves. Even Moses Hess whose position came closest to that of Marx never succeeded in producing more than abstract ideas such as that the revolutionary activity of the post-Hegelian generation are "sacred *Praxis*", as opposed to the "profane facts" characteristic of pre-Hegelian humanity.[18]

The writings of the young Marx are full of reflections about practice which he first understood, following Bauer, as a critical philosophical activity and which since the *Manuscripts* of 1844 he identified with labor and material production, that is, with an activity prior to and independent of philosophical speculations. I cannot possibly enter a discussion of the

various statements which, until about 1845, Marx made with respect to this subject[19]; I have to restrict myself to the question whether and in which sense Marx ever argued that practice is a criterion of truth.

Contemporary Communists usually refer to statements of Marx such as the following, found in the famous article on the Hegelian philosophy of right in the *Deutsch-Französische Jahrbücher*: "the critique of speculative philosophy of right strays not into itself but into tasks which there is only one means of solving – practice"[20]. All that this and many similar passages seem to amount to saying is that there are certain problems which cannot be solved in terms of speculative philosophy; they only can be solved by changing the world, as the last of the Theses on Feuerbach states.

As far as I am able to determine, it is in this sense, too, that the second Thesis on Feuerbach which the Soviets usurp as evidence for their own conception has to be understood:

"The question whether human thought can pretend to objective truth (*gegenständliche Wahrheit*) is not a theoretical but a practical question. Man must prove the truth, that is, the actuality (*Wirklichkeit*) and power, the this-sidedness of his thought, in practice. The dispute over the actuality or non-actuality of thought (*Wirklichkeit oder Nichtwirklichkeit des Denkens*) that is isolated from practice is a purely scholastic question."[21]

Even non-Communist commentators often take these three sentences to mean that the so-called "Kantian question", that is, the question whether our knowledge conforms to reality or "reality" conforms to our knowledge, ought to be decided on the grounds of practice, that is, by considering whether our everyday acting upon nature may be explained more adequately in realist or in idealist terms. However, it is easy to show that this interpretation is both an anachronism and based upon superficial reading. It is an anachronism, because in 1845, when Marx wrote his Theses on Feuerbach, no Hegelian was bothered about the problem whether we can know reality such as it is in itself; it was obvious to them that we *can* know it. In the Hegelian context this question is perfectly meaningless; it became meaningful only many decades later when all that remained of German Idealism was the vague apprehension of many scientists and philosophers about the possibility of knowing the *Ding an sich*. And it is based upon a superficial reading, because all that Marx says is that propositions such as 'Man is capable of shaping his fate

according to his own ideas', but also propositions such as 'This world is a vale of woe', ought not to be discussed as purely theoretical statements, but rather ought to be understood as an invitation to deeds, the success of which would prove that man *can* shape his fate by himself and that this world *is not*, at least not necessarily, a vale of woe. In short, instead of arguing that practice is the only criterion of truth, Marx's second Thesis on Feuerbach is an odd combination of Aristotle's claim that human potentialities can be judged only in terms of their actualization, and of Hegel's far more daring claim that man is what he is by his very own deeds. After all, in the Hegelian terminology used by Marx, '*gegenständliche Wahrheit*' does not mean 'objective truth' but rather 'truth concerning objects'[22]; and '*Wirklichkeit oder Nichtwirklichkeit des Denkens*' does not mean 'objectivity or non-objectivity of thought' but rather 'effectiveness or non-effectiveness of thought' (*Wirk-lichkeit*). What bothers Marx is whether human thought is sufficiently powerful and *this-sided* to succeed in transforming the world; not the question whether we we can know things such as they are.

It was not until Engels, who quite contrary to Marx never really understood what Hegel meant and certainly was in no position to appreciate Hegel's *pièce magistrale*, the *Phenomenology of Mind*, that the idea that practice is a criterion of truth emerged. And it is not by chance that this idea cropped up for the first time in Engels' *Ludwig Feuerbach and the End of Classical German Philosophy* in an appendix to the first edition of which Engels published for the first time Marx's notes on Feuerbach. When coming to the point where he wanted to discuss Kant's *Ding an sich*, Engels probably remembered the second thesis which to the positivist he had meanwhile become looked like a statement about the objectivity of knowledge. Accordingly, after having remarked that Hegel had already disproved the claim that we cannot know the *Ding an sich*, Engels proceeded to say that by far the best argument against whims of thinkers such as Kant is "practice, namely, industry and experiment". After which he wrote one of the most preposterous things which he ever confided to his pen, namely, that our ability to produce organic substances such as the recently discovered alizarin proves that we can make of a *Ding an sich* a *Ding für uns*.

That this argument proves nothing at all against Kant and that it violates Hegel's terminology (according to which '*an sich*' is equivalent

to '*für uns*' and opposed to '*für sich*') has been pointed out so often that it would be tedious to repeat it. What I wish to point out is simply this: this preposterous argument is understandable as a product of the otherwise quite intelligent Engels only if we assume that Engels *tried to comply with a text by Marx which he misread.* Believing that Marx intended to say that practice is the ultimate criterion of truth, Engels remembered that theories are said to be corroborated by experiments and pondered on the problem which types of experiment might be said to falsify Kant's claim that there exist unknowable *Dinge an sich.* Finally, he threw experiment and practice into one pot and wrote: "The most compelling refutation of this as well as of all other philosophical whims is practice, namely, experiment and industry".[23]

Still, Engels was far from making the even more nonsensical claim which later cropped up in Lenin and which, further simplified, became a basic doctrine of Soviet ideology, namely, that practice is the *only* real criterion of truth. For this claim became possible only after Lenin had argued that all propositions, including laws of formal logic, are based upon experience – and that the laws of formal logic came to be considered as axioms only because whole generations had had this experience.[24]

I may do well to conclude this paper by stating briefly why I consider the thesis that practice is the criterion of truth to be not only false but also rather unintelligible. I shall restrict myself to two remarks.

The Soviets consistently extol the doctrine in question because, they claim, it is the only analysis which does not see the criterion of truth in something intra-mental and therefore subjective. To this, one will have to reply that, in order to become a criterion of truth, practice has to be known, be it by perception or by thought. Provided that it is at all meaningful to say that practice is the ultimate criterion of truth, one will have to add that one decides the truth or falsity of a perception or knowledge in terms of a perception of or knowledge about practice and its consequences. If the Soviets do not mean this, it seems very difficult to see what possibly they might mean. But if they are prepared to admit that practice is a criterion of truth only *qua* perceived or known, the criterion of truth to which they appeal is neither more nor less intra-mental and therefore subjective than the criterion of truth of those who appeal to sense-experience or to evidence (concerning either practice or things).

Secondly, it is simply false that an experiment is a criterion of truth in

so far as it is an instance of practice. This was pointed out by G. Lukács more than forty years ago.[25] Of course, nobody doubts that an experiment is a criterion of truth, that is, that we check our scientific theories by deducing from them certain consequences which can be checked by making experiments. Nor does anybody doubt that experiments involve practice; since the middle of the last century, especially since Claude Bernard's famous *Introduction à la médecine expérimentale* of 1865, it is generally agreed that the difference between mere observation and experiment consists in that the former does not involve an interference with nature while the latter does involve it. However, it does not seem to be the interference with nature, or practice, which is the verifying element properly speaking of an experiment. Practice merely serves to produce an ideal case *the perception of which* in the end verifies or falsifies a scientific theory. In short, even though an experiment undoubtedly involves practice, it is not this practice which verifies a theory, but the perception of a phenomenon made observable by the practice in question. Ultimately, the fact that a scientist needs experiments rather than mere observation, that is, that verification involves practice, is only due to the circumstance that we do not live long enough to be able to encounter a sufficient number of natural phenomena corroborating our theories without forcing nature to show them. One might of course argue, as Pavlov did and as many contemporary philosophers of science would do, that an experiment forces nature to show something which nature *never* would show by itself. Yet this only amounts to saying that without experiments certain events never could become observable. In order to show that it is the experiment's element of practice that verifies a theory, one would have to show that the practice in question becomes an *integral part of the observable phenomenon as such*; and I simply cannot see what showing this possibly could amount to.

In the end, if I am not wrong, there is only one kind of statement which may be said to be verified by practice, namely, statements about practice and their consequences. If I say 'John digs a cave' or 'Humanity will change the surface of the earth', the only way to check the truth of these statements is to look and see whether John is in fact digging, and to wait long enough to discover whether humanity has changed the surface of the earth or not.

I may add that the Soviet doctrine about practice as the criterion of

truth should not be confused with what is usually called pragmatism. For Dewey or James, for example, never denied that perception and, more generally, experience is the ultimate criterion of truth. What in pragmatism reminds one of the Marxist-Leninist doctrine is the idea that the truth of a theory or conception should be decided on the grounds of its usefulness, scientific fruitfulness, etc. But then the pragmatists quite explicitly state that this is what they *mean* by 'true': for a theory to be true *means* for them that it works, is useful, productive of further knowledge, etc. Marxism-Leninism, on the contrary, even though it claims that practice proves the truth or falsity of all ideas, clings to the Aristotelian notion of truth according to which '*S* is *P*' is true if and only if *S* is in fact *P*.

It is easy to see that the un-Marxian thesis *about* practice which we discussed in this paper gives to the very *notion* of practice an un-Marxian twist. For Marx never would have considered scientific experiment a basic instance of revolutionary practice. When he spoke of practice, he always had in mind the activity of humanity as a whole, an activity which shapes man's environment and thereby also man himself. This is not to say that Marx would have denied that scientific experiments may be taken to be a subordinate dimension of mankind's revolutionary practice. Yet the doctrine that practice is the only criterion of truth focuses the attention upon scientific experiment in a way which certainly was foreign to Marx.

I cannot elaborate on the hidden motives which make the Soviets cling to their queer doctrine. But one might mention that the Russian expression '*opyt*', just as the French expression 'expérience', means both experiment and experience; the Soviet tendency to interpret all experience as one variant or another of practice is certainly supported by this linguistic ambiguity. Why the CP cherishes the doctrine that practice is the ultimate criterion of truth, I hardly have to spell out: it obviously is a "philosophical" prop for its claim that each and every move of the Party is the ultimate criterion of the truth of each and every conception.

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2. Cf. the discussion between I. Fetscher and E. M. Sitnikov, published in *Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte* (supplement to *Das Parlament*), B 46/63 (Nov. 13, 1963).

3. I explicitly wish to emphasize that my remarks concern only the current *Soviet* treatment of practice. Authors such as Gajo Petrović (Yugoslavia) or Karel Kosík (Czechoslovakia) have discussed the notion of practice in a way which is both incomparably more intelligent and significantly more faithful to Marx's original insights.
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5. *Fundamentals of Marxism-Leninism.* 2nd impression, Moscow 1961, p. 134.
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8. For a Marxist-Leninist discussion concerning practice, see *SST*, 1964, 123 ff.
9. E.g. Rutkevič, M. N.: in *VF*, 1954, 3, 38.
10. E.g. Rozental', M. M., Judin, P. F.: *Filosofskij Slovar'.* M. 1963, col. 449 b.
11. *Osnovy Marksistskoj Filosofii*, str. 289.
12. *Werke* (Akademie-Ausg.), VII, S. 392.
13. As Cieszkowski is consistently ignored in English writings on Marx and Marxism, we may do well to emphasize the importance of his *Prolegomena* for an adequate understanding of Marx's notion of practice. However, cf. next reference. The most thorough study is that by W. Kühne: *Graf August Cieszkowski.* Leipzig. 1938. Two recent studies discuss both Cieszkowski's relationship to other Hegelians and his notion of *Praxis:* J. Gebhardt: *Politik und Eschatologie.* München. 1963, SS. 130–152, and H. Stuke: *Philosophie der Tat*, Stuttgart. 1963, SS. 85–122, cf. my review in *Review of Politics*, 1965, 3, 434–439. Contrary to what some historians believe, C. was *not* a Left Hegelian, cf. his *Gott und die Palingenesie.* Berlin 1842, S 11, where he describes himself as a "conservative in the fullest and most progressive sense of the term"; he argues for a "conservative progress as opposed to a "revolutionary overthrow", *ibid.* S. 96 ff.
14. Cieszkowski's book was reviewed only twice: by C. L. Michelet in Hegel's *Jahrbücher für wissenschaftliche Kritik* (1838, col. 785–792 and 793–797), and by the Left Hegelian J. Frauenstädt in the *Hallische Jahrbücher* (1839, col. 476–480, and 487 ff.). Whether Marx read the book, is somewhat difficult to decide; he probably came to know its content through Moses Hess who was enthusiastic about C.'s "praxeology" just around the time when Marx met him. The only time Marx mentions C. is in a letter to Engels of January 12, 1882; but he makes no reference to the *Prolegomena.* R. Lauth, in *Orientalia Christiana Periodica*, 1955, 399 ff., has made a futile attempt to prove a dependence of Marx's doctoral dissertation upon C.'s *Prolegomena*; as Stuke, *op. cit.*, 85 ff., shows, Lauth's analysis suffers from an almost total ignorance of the terminology and the problems occupying *all*

Left Hegelians. But even if it were true that Marx never read the *Prolegomena*, C.'s ideas are relevant in so far as they throw significant light upon how Hegel's philosophy, almost quietist, resulted into the revolutionary anti-philosophy of Marx'.

15. This point is extremely well elaborated by J. Gebhardt, *op. cit.* As to the feeling of impotence which Hegel's overwhelming synthesis produced among the Hegelians, cf. H. Popitz: *Der entfremdete Mensch.* Basel. 1953; however, cf. also the criticism by J. Habermas: *Theorie und Praxis.* Neuwied. 1963, SS. 281 ff.
16. Cf. Bauer's letter to Marx, *MEGA*, I, 1/2, 247, also Stuke, *op. cit.*, 159 ff.
17. Cf. A. Ruge: *Aus früherer Zeit.* Berlin. 1863, Teil IV, SS. 460 ff.
18. Moses Hess: *Die europäische Triarchie.* Leipzig. 1841, S. 21. The distinction between "acts" and "facts" (which amounts to a distinction between those deeds of humanity mediated by Hegel's Absolute Knowledge, and deeds preceding this mediation) goes back to Cieszkowski: *Prolegomena zur Historiosophie.* Berlin 1838, SS. 17 ff. and 44. – Besides M. Hess, I could detect only two authors directly influenced by Cieszkowski's *Prolegomena*: Alexander Herzen who around 1840 planned to write a study on "Our century as the link between the past and the future", cf. P. Scheibert; *Von Bakunin zu Lenin.* Leiden. 1956, Teil. I, SS. 107 ff.; and Michael Bakunin, whose famous article "Reaction in Germany", published in the *Hallische Jahrbücher* in 1842, clearly displays Cieszkowski's influence.
19. The first volume of a study, *Theory and Practice*, by the author of this article, which will be published in 1966 by the Notre Dame Press, will try to discuss the various features of Marx's notion of *Praxis*.
20. *MEW*, I, 385.
21. *MEW*, III, 5.
22. Actually, this terminology comes from Feuerbach who had stressed against Hegel that a real being necessarily has objects outside itself, as opposed to only being conscious of itself. Marx discusses this issue at length in the *Philosophical and Economic Manuscripts*, cf. *MEGA*, I, 3, 160 ff.
23. Cf. *MEW*, XXI, 276.
24. V. I. Lenin: *Sočinenija*, 5-oe izd., tom XXIX, p. 98.
25. G. Lukács: *Geschichte und Klassenbewußtsein.* Berlin. 1923, p. 146.

P. KIRSCHENMANN

ON THE KINSHIP OF CYBERNETICS TO DIALECTICAL MATERIALISM

Up until 1954, cybernetics was for the most part rejected by Marxist-Leninist ideologists. Since then, the attitude of Communist philosophers toward this new science has basically changed. This 'reactionary pseudo-science', a 'form of contemporary mechanism'[1] that was '*allegedly* to pave the way for unlimited technical, economical and social progress', that was 'leading to humiliation and exploitation and spiritual poisoning of the masses', that was 'aiming at replacing Pavlov's tenets' and 'in a mystifying fashion drawing unscientific analogies', 'wanting to transpose one form of motion of matter into another'[2], has become, on the contrary, 'one of the most impressive confirmations of Dialectical Materialism by a special science'[3] and even 'the most important element of (its) contemporary scientific foundation'[4]. In trying to find a reason for this change of mind, one will no doubt first hit upon the growing relevance of cybernetics for technology, economics and production which cannot be disregarded, even by the Soviet ideologist. But its increasing impact on philosophical thinking, especially in the realm of Dialectical Materialism, cannot be explained only by this practical importance as a motive that made a reassessment necessary. As a reason that made the final acknowledgement of the new science possible, one must consider a certain kinship of cybernetical methods or deliberations to some of the basic conceptions of Dialectical Materialism.

The gnoseological realism advocated by Dialectical Materialism must, above all, be mentioned here since it is basic to the views of nearly all scientists in general. This consists in the instinctive assumption of a world of things which is independent of the knowing subject and which can be explored and described objectively. Furthermore, in Dialectical-Materialist reflections on philosophical problems of nature, this 'objective reality' is conceived as consisting of things as ultimate elements possessing certain inner and outer qualities and relations to other things. The essential role played by the concept "thing" might be shown with the aid of any definition of other basic concepts as quality or phenomenon. More

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especially, although the universal connection of all things, phenomena, and processes is incessantly emphasized, most of the more detailed analyses refer immediately to corporeal and thus visible things. (This is why these investigations are often nothing more than exemplicative and quite intuitive illustrations of philosophical propositions.) This holds good even in those cases where the category 'system' is employed to a large extent, for systems are taken therein as being decomposable into subsystems and elements. With the exception of the category 'quality', used in a rather unspecified sense, this approach is inherited from mechanical materialism, conceiving the world as a manifold of elementary objects interconnected by exterior relations, and analysing it accordingly. Consider for instance the rather undefined category of interaction in Dialectical Materialism: interaction as the form of universal connection is most readily disconnected into isolated causal chains; cause and effect are looked upon as quasi-things or are illustrated almost exclusively by causal processes that incorporate things, and the causal process without further analysis is taken as an interjacent third. Such a tendency toward discreteness is typical of the cybernetical method as well, since the intention of realising the theoretical models technically is one of the main traits of cybernetics and since any technical construction consists of adding element to element and part to part. This means that for analysing a given system or organism cybernetics has to presuppose that parts of systems and single processes can be isolated.

The object of cybernetics as a science belongs, for the most part, to the macroscopic realm. The phenomena under investigation are rather conspicuous and immediately given, at least to people who are to some extent trained in technical and physical thinking. There is little that has to be found in conclusions drawn from voluminous theories. Thus, construing its results is far less different from explaining what is immediately given than would be the case, for example, in interpreting the outcome of quantum physics or physical cosmology. Therefore, cybernetics is much more easily accessible to traditional natural philosophy than is a science of a highly theoretical type. This applies as well to Dialectical Materialism, notwithstanding its contention that its object is not nature but the complex nature-and-natural-science. For, as far as natural knowledge is concerned, it, too, is referring to what is immediately given, though its view is scientifically tinged. Up to now results gained by logico-mathemat-

ical conclusions have mostly been considered only in so far as these had already led to violent dispute amongst the scientists concerned, thus drawing the philosophers' attention to those problems as well. Dialectical Materialism is far from having sufficiently coped with the totality of scientific methods and results.

Marxism-Leninism regards social practice as the basis, starting point, moving force, and aim of human knowledge. In particular, practice is also the criterion of knowledge, the touchstone of its truth. In cybernetics there is a peculiarly close connection of theory, scientific and technical application, and skill in optimizing, unknown to such an extent in other precincts of science. Roughly speaking, cybernetical knowledge is knowing by acting. Truth of propositions is replaced by functional correctness of theoretical and realized models. The model, as it were, is theory, its object and its application all in one, thus being rather akin to the Marxist-Leninist principle of the unity of theory and practice. Of course, what should be expressed by this gross formulation only makes sense in comparison to a conception of theoretical models, taking, for example, axiomatized theories and analytically closed mathematical solutions as standards wherein theory is much more independent of its application and it is much more reasonable to talk of knowledge for its own sake.

Frequently the Dialectical Materialists renounce an analysis of the ontological constitution in favour of a genetic reconstruction. For instance the various forms of human thinking are explained as products of developing social practice. Inasmuch as cybernetics confines the analysis of thinking to its functional-operational form regarded as a means for solving tasks posed by the exterior world, thus making thought part of the process of adaption of man in his surroundings, it comes by a similar genetical way of explanation. The emphasis on the exterior world and the rejection of concepts like spirit and consciousness in their traditional meaning led several cyberneticians to recoin these concepts in terms of sets of detachable and enumerable elements and relations between these sets. Doing so is mostly connected with the optimistic hope of once being able to account for the total plenitude of spiritual phenomena in that manner. The as yet scanty results of that approach have their counterpart in the weakness of Marxism-Leninism as a philosophy of spirit.

These common traits undoubtedly have historical roots in common

that will not be treated in detail here. Attention has already been directed to materialism as the point of departure of modern natural sciences and as one of the main constituents of Dialectical Materialism. Of course, cybernetics has a particular prehistory of its own. Modern psychology of the experimental type, which has found one of its continuations in cybernetics, might be mentioned here. Russian scholars like Sečenov and Pavlov, the latter with his conception of the psychic as a signal function and his theory of reflection, have done considerable work in this field. The reafferent principle, at first formulated by Anoxin, is even more closely related to cybernetics as it includes the idea of feed-back.

As distinguished from Dialectical Materialism, cybernetics is a particular science. Any philosophical considerations uttered in connection with cybernetics do not pertain to its proper object. No doubt, cybernetics like all other sciences has an impact on various forms of world-outlook, especially on those with a positivist shaping. This impact is much more an outcome of a cybernetical way of thinking that tends to spread beyond the confined scientific precinct of cybernetics itself, the rejection of any kind of metaphysics being its chief characteristic. According to a "cybernetical" thinker there is no possibility at all of telling anything about the constitution, whether material or spiritual, of the world itself any more than about the truth of propositions that, as was pointed out above, are replaced and not defined by functional correctness of models. Furthermore, within the methods of cybernetics there is no room for dialectical thinking. Wherever Marxist-Leninist philosophers see a confirmation of dialectical laws in the procedures and results of cybernetics, it is but the shining, as it were, of a dialectical relationship behind a logical formulation of cybernetics.

The kinship between cybernetics and Dialectical Materialism pointed out above might explain both the violent rejection and the enthusiastic acceptance of this science on the part of Marxist-Leninist ideologists. They merely had to discern the useful supporter in the rival, and to rid cybernetics as a science of all philosophical and ideological implications and of all sensational generalisations. They had only to realize that cybernetics did not claim to have discovered the most general laws of nature, man, and society, and that it did not rise as an opponent against classical doctrines of Dialectical Materialism, for example, the Pavlovian theory of reflection. In the course of this change of mind Marx himself

has been named the first cybernetician.[5] In short, Lenin's definition of Communism as consisting of soviets plus electrification had to be extended in order to embrace automation and cybernetics as well.[6]

Coming to terms with a new science could not be without influence on the self-assessment of Marxism-Leninism. Cybernetics has been raising questions which Marxist-Leninist classics naturally could not have treated. Preparatory work for their solution is for the most part missing. This explains many of the rather arbitrary and awkward formulations expressed as hasty answers to those questions. In most cases the authors themselves have explicitly underlined the hypothetical and provisional character of their opinions. In short, the confrontation with a new science led to the assessment that their own philosophy had also to develop in order to be capable of coping with the new facts. With the exception of some basic tenets, the statements of the classics nowadays are considered much more as tasks than as final solutions, much more as conditioned by their context than as absolute truths. To be sure, cybernetics is not the only reason for this. A concomitant factor is the increasing awareness of problems by the Marxist-Leninist philosophers. The conception of philosophy as a weapon for confirming one's own tenets and disproving those of the adversary has not yet disappeared in the really philosophical literature of Marxism-Leninism, i.e., there are still polemics, but they are becoming less voluminous in comparison with the deliberations orientated towards the solution of problems.[7]

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3. G. Klaus: *Kybernetik in philosophischer Sicht*. Berlin. 1961, 1963, Ed. 3, S. 7.
4. *Kibernetika, myšlenie, žizn'* (Cybernetics, Thinking, Life). M. 1964, str. 79.
5. G. Klaus: *op. cit.*, S. 219.
6. *Programma KPSS* (Party program). M. 1961.
7. Cf., e.g.: Tjuxtin: *O prirode obraza (psixičeskoe otraženie v svete idei kibernetiki)* (On the Nature of the Image (Psychic Reflection in the Light of Cybernetics)). M. 1963. (See review in this issue page 47f.).

NOTES AND COMMENTS

LUKÁCS REHABILITATED?

Officials and philosophers responsible for Hungary's cultural and scientific life have long been puzzled over what to do about their most distinguished philosopher, Georg Lukács, in disgrace since his participation in Imre Nagy's cabinet in October, 1956 (cf. my note in *SST*, 1964, 3). They have been increasingly lenient in all matters touching upon Lukács, permitting him to see whomever he wishes and to publish his works wherever he wishes, as long as it is not in Hungary. Last summer the Hungarian Academy of Science approved the compilation and publication of a detailed bibliography of all Lukács' works (cf. my note in *SST* 1965, 4). But they consistently refused to publish him in Hungary. Since the octogenarian Lukács is said to be unwilling to assume public position even if offered, publication of his works in Hungary would be tantamount to his rehabilitation. It is of no mean importance therefore, that the *Hungarian Review of Philosophy* published a Lukács paper as the first article of the 1965, 4 issue. This event could not pass without comment, and the editors provided it by printing on the title-page of the study, the following note: "Georg Lukács has recently completed his eightieth year. We wish the eighty-year old Georg Lukács strength, health, and long life. During our debates with him we were, and still are, conscious of the extraordinary significance of his life's work in philosophy and aesthetics. We are certain that today too, he has penetrating, encompassing, and forward-looking things to say for Marxist philosophy. The present study – which has not appeared in Hungarian previously, was written in 1938, as a chapter of his book on Hegel [*Der junge Hegel*, Europa Verlag, 1948; Aufbau Verlag, 1954 (E. L.)] – is a historical contribution to one of our currently debated questions, the problem of alienation. It examines the historical development of the Hegelian concept of alienation and its place in the system and method of Hegelian philosophy, also giving a detailed discussion of how Marx transcended the concept's Hegelian meaning and what transformations and concretizations it underwent in Marx's hands."

Hence the shock of a Lukács work occupying its habitual first place in an issue of a Hungarian philosophical journal has been tempered by

presenting an older paper as a historical contribution to an acute contemporary problem. Whether recent Lukács works will also appear on the pages of Hungarian publications remains to be seen. If he lives long enough and the present trend remains unchanged, it seems most likely.

E. L.

NARSKIJ IN 'MIND'

Mind published I. S. Narskij's paper 'On the Conception of Truth' in volume 74 (1965) no. 296, pp. 530–539. Narskij, the author of *Sovremennyj pozitivizm*, M. 1961, is considered an expert on the history of positivism (cf. 'Soviet Philosophy and the Semantic Definition of Truth' by Guido Küng in *SST*, 1965, 1–2, where Narskij's views on these problems are outlined). He has apparently been chosen to represent Soviet counter-views to Ayer's assertions that such dialectical materialist theses as that on the universality of motion in the sense of change in general are disguised tautologies ("everything happens in the way in which it happens", "existing things exist", etc.), as well as to Ayer's endorsement (in his Moscow lecture of 1962) of Tarski's semantic definition of truth, the essence of which is the condition of material adequacy in the definition '"p" is true $\equiv$ p'.

Narskij says that "To give a philosophical interpretation of the semantic definition of truth means ultimately to interpret 'fact'." He then goes on to discard the current attemps begun by Wittgenstein and Russell to define 'fact', as leading to contradictions (although he does not tell us at what point), and to reject the view that fact is something elementary and indivisible in view of modern natural science, which, according to him, reveals an infinite 'breaking down' of facts. Narskij then proposes to solve the problem by deducing 'facts' from the Leninist reflection-theory as " 'perception-facts' ... caused by processes in objective reality". These represent just one of four types of facts, however, which jointly permit Narskij to proceed from the relation of names in sentences to the correlation of sensations and things. Anything less, he affirms, is insufficient: "Reality must not be conceived as simpler than it is". But, since he calls facts which stand for the correlation of sensations and things representative of 'metaphysical materialism' while nevertheless implicitly basing his entire argument on them, he is obliged to show how we can discover such facts. We can discover them, it seems, in the 'social practice

of mankind'. By what criteria we should approach the complex problems of such practice he does not explicitly say, but one may take it that they are the tenets of the Marxist concept of 'practice'. These, for some reason, are not in need of being analyzed to semantical truth. "*Philosophy* must not be conceived as simpler than it is" seems to be Narskij's real motto.

While Narskij tempers the dialectical materialist habit of treating that school of philosophy as an intelligent agent which affirms, adopts positions, come out against, etc., by adding 'as I understand it', 'as I think' a few times, it still remains a curious sensation to find unanalyzed assertions of Hegelian and Leninist doctrines on the pages of *Mind*, a main organ of Oxford analysis. Yet, such exchanges of views between Western and East-European philosophers are to be warmly welcomed, since they are part of a slowly arising East-West dialogue on the level of systematic philosophy which tends, on the one hand, to make Western thinkers aware of their East-European colleagues' existence, and on the other, to force the latter to reexamine basic tenets of their philosophy in the attempt to prove them to sceptical-minded analysts.

E. L.

A REMARKABLE BOOK

Marksistsko-leninskaja filosofija i sociologija v SSSR i evropejskix socialističeskix stranax (Marxist-Leninist Philosophy and Sociology in the USSR and the European Socialist Countries). Moskva, "Nauka". 1965. 549 str.) is a relatively objective presentation of Soviet philosophy from 1917 to the present. 'Relatively' because the editorial staff includes M. B. Mitin and M. T. Iovčuk who still have a vested interest in keeping certain skeletons in the closet. The other members of the editorial staff are: B. V. Bogdanov, L. G. Gorškova, V. M. Kaganov, L. A. Kogan, and E. V. Osipova.

The first section is devoted to 'Marxist-Leninist Philosophy in the USSR' which is divided into the following periods: 1917–1925; 1926–1936; 1937–1955; 1956–1963 – a somewhat dogmatically historicist division, but workable. The second section contains a chapter for each satellite with Jugoslavia getting short shrift and Albania being totally omitted. The authors' explanation is that "sources are lacking" (pp. 10 and 12).

For the first time we find in this book a reasonably accurate account of the 1930 discussion, of the 'Markov affair', and of the 1947 discussion.

There are even some rather shocking admissions. For example: "As a consequence, during the period of Stalinist hero worship (*kul't ličnosti*), A. M. Deborin and a number of his collaborators were unjustly excluded from active participation in philosophical work and *some of them suffered from unjustifiable repression*" (p. 115; our italics. *T. B.*). "A series of Soviet philosophers suffered unjust repression." (p. 162. The reference is to Stalin's arbitrary pontificating).

Among other gems to be gleaned from this work is the following *dramatis personae* for the 1930 discussion:

"*Mechanists*": I. I. Skvorcov-Stepanov, L. I. Aksel'rod-Ortodoks, A. I. Var'jaš, V. N. Sarab'janov, A. K. Timirjazev.

"*Deborinites*": A. M. Deborin, N. A. Karev, Ja. E. Sten, I. K. Luppol, I. Agol, S. Levit, M. Levin, B. Gessen.

"*Pures*" *or* "*Orthodox*": V. V. Adoratskij, V. P. Miljutin, E. M. Jaroslavskij, N. A. Skrypnik, M. B. Mitin, P. F. Judin, M. D. Kammari, F. V. Konstantinov, V. F. Ral'cevič, P. S. Čeremnyx, G. D. Običkin, T. D. Pavlov, V. M. Pozner, M. Z. Selektor.

It can be assumed that any Soviet philosopher not included in one of the first two groups must be a 'pure'. It is strange, however, that old stalwarts like M. M. Rozental' and V. F. Asmus are nowhere to be found. It goes without saying that M. B. Mitin did not collaborate on the chapter discussing this question.

Another series of interesting lists are those singling out the 'experts' in various domains:

Esthetics: V. F. Asmus, V. F. Grib, V. S. Kemenov, M. A. Lifšic, M. M. Rozental';

History of philosophy: G. S. Vaseckij, M. M. Grigor'jan, V. E. Evgrafov, M. T. Iovčuk, V. S. Kružkov, L. A. Kogan, A. N. Maslin, M. M. Rozental', Z. V. Smirnova, D. I. Česnokov, I. Ja. Ščipanov;

Psychology: S. L. Rubinštejn, B. G. Anan'ev, K. N. Kornilov, A. N. Leont'ev, A. A. Smirnov, B. M. Teplov;

Philosophy and science: B. M. Kedrov, E. Kol'man, I. V. Kuznecov, M. E. Omel'janovskij, G. V. Platonov, X. M. Fataliev, E. V. Šoroxova;

Science and philosophy: A. N. Bax, I. S. Beritašvili, N. N. Burdenko, S. I. Vavilov, N. I. Vavilov, N. D. Zelinskij, A. F. Ioffe, V. L. Komarov, N. S. Kurnakov, I. V. Kurčatov, L. A. Orbeli.

Contemporary Soviet philosophy (i.e., since 1947) has been thoroughly

researched in the West, notably in Fribourg. The so-called 'first period of discussions' and 'quiet period' have remained untouched for lack of access to the sources. We have, therefore, compiled a list of Soviet philosophical works for the period 1917–1947 (cf. the bibliographical section in this issue of *SST*), based on the titles cited in the present work. It is hoped that this will give impetus to research on these periods – a research which, among other things, could show that the 'quiet' or 'dead' period was not as unproductive as is usually assumed.

Finally, this work permits us to establish an approach to a chronology for the periods in question:

1918: Founding of the Socialist (later, Communist) Academy.
1919: First issue of *Revoljucija i cerkov'* (Revolution and Church).
1920: Founding of the Marx-Engels Institute.
1921: Founding of the Institute of Red Professors.
1922: First issue of *Bezbožnik* (Godless).
1923: First issue of *Bezbožnik u stanka* (Atheist at the Workbench).
1923–1935: Discussion on art.
1924: Establishment of the Lenin Institute.
1925: First congress of the readers of *Bezbožnik*.
Establishment of the *Sojuz voinstvujuščix bezbožnikov* (Union of Militant Atheists).
1929: Second All-Union Congress of Marxist-Leninist Scientific Institutions
Discussion on historical materialism.
1930: Deborinite controversy.
1931: Union of the Marx-Engels Institute with the Lenin Institute.
1934: First congress of Soviet writers.

T. B.

V. S. Tjuchtin: *O prirode obraza* (psichičeskoe otraženie v svete idei kibernetiki). M. 1963. 122 str.

Im Mittelpunkt der Abhandlung Tjuchtins über die dialektisch-materialistische Abbildtheorie steht das Problem der Wahrnehmung, des "sinnlichen Abbilds", und zwar ohne Berücksichtigung der Spezifikation der Wahrnehmung nach den verschiedenen Sinnen. Andere psychische Phänomene wie das Empfinden, das Denken oder das Fühlen werden nur am Rande behandelt. Die Wahrnehmung wird somit weitgehend als Prototyp des "Abbilds" aufgefaßt. Eingangs betont Tjuchtin, daß die bloße Feststellung, die psychische Widerspiegelung ideell sei, den Anforderungen der Wissenschaft und Praxis nicht mehr genüge (3); die These: Empfindungen und Gedanken sind "natürliche Prozesse", Funktionen, Eigenschaften der höchstorganisierten Materie, die zur Widerspiegelung der äußeren Welt befähigt ist, bedürfe der Begründung (9). Deshalb stellt er sich selbst die Aufgabe, den Zusammenhang zwischen Materiellem und Ideellem aufzudecken, und zwar nicht als Koordination, sondern als Subordination, d. h. das Ideelle aus dem Materiellen herzuleiten (9). Dazu möchte er anstelle der sonst größtenteils im dialektischen Materialismus üblichen genetischen Analyse eine logische durchführen, die aus einer empirischen Kennzeichnung und einer Analyse der Realisationsbedingungen des Abbilds, einer Analyse seiner Bedeutung im Ganzen der Lebensfunktionen bestehe und vor allem auch die Ergebnisse der einschlägigen Einzelwissenschaften berücksichtige (11). Unter die letzteren fällt neben Physiologie und Psychologie die Kybernetik, deren "Grundbegriffe, Ideen und Methoden der Autor zur Analyse der Natur des Abbilds zu verwenden bestrebt ist" (3). Dem für die Kybernetik charakteristischen Zug zum Konstruktiven trägt der Autor dagegen wenig Rechnung. Höchstens klingt er noch an den Stellen an, wo Tjuchtin von den elementaren Formen verschiedener Phänomene spricht: von der Empfindung als einfachster Form und Ausgangsform des Abbilds (30), von der "Versuch-und-Irrtum"-Methode als einfachster Verhaltensform (33, 73), von elementaren Signalen (31) und Elementarzeichen (60), vom Ausgangselement der vorpsychischen Einheit eines Organismus und seiner Existenzbedingungen (92), vom elementaren Wechselwirkungsakt (111, 115), von der Operation des Beziehens als der Keimform des funktionalen Ersetzens (116). Jedoch versteht er die höheren Formen nicht als einfache Zusammensetzungen solcher Keimformen, sondern bestimmt sie durch neue hinzukommende Merkmale. Dabei ist der Bezug auf den ganzen Verhaltensakt, den der Verfasser selbst den Schlüssel für seine Untersuchung nennt (11), das methodische Gegengewicht zu seiner Keimkonzeption. In seiner Auffassung der Ganzheit des Verhaltensakts als Gesamtheit der Wechselwirkungen eines Organismus mit der veränderlichen Umwelt (34), also bei Betonung des äußerlichen Verhaltens, kommt, wie die Ausführungen selbst dann zeigen, die reiche Mannigfaltigkeit der psychischen Phänomene

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unvermeidlich zu kurz. Dies ist charakteristisch sowohl für die kybernetische als auch die dialektisch-materialistische Denkweise.

Aus dem Gedankengut der Kybernetik verwendet der Verfasser neben den für sie spezifischen Begriffen der Regelung und der Information – etwa in der Auffassung der sinnlichen Abbildung als Informationsprozeß oder des ganzen Verhaltens als Regulationsprozeß (38) – die Begriffe der Stabilität, des Modells, ferner des Signals und des Zeichens (welche letzteren ja viel eher über die Diskussion um die Kybernetik als über die, wenn auch früher begonnene Auseinandersetzung mit der Semiotik Eingang in die dialektisch-materialistische Literatur gefunden haben). Ausgiebigen Gebrauch macht er vor allem von dem Begriff der Isomorphie.

In der Beziehung der Isomorphie zur "Objekt-Quelle" zu stehen, ist nach Tjuchtin ein notwendiges Merkmal aller Signale (17, 42); die Informationsfunktion eines Signals beruht auf der quantitativen, seine Regelungsfunktion auf der qualitativen Seite dieser Beziehung (25). Wie viele andere, innerhalb des dialektischen Materialismus in verallgemeinertem Sinne verwendete Termini, die in einem bestimmten Kontext eine präzise Bedeutung besitzen, ist hier das Wort Isomorphie der Gefahr ausgesetzt, durch diese Hypertrophie seine Signifikanz zu verlieren. Dasselbe gilt auch für die 'Widerspiegelung', die nach dem Autor allgemeinen Charakter besitzt (111); von der 'Materialität' der Welt ist das Entsprechende hinlänglich bekannt. Demgemäß spricht sich Tjuchtin gegen eine "metaphysische" Auffassung der Isomorphie als Ebenbildlichkeit und gegen ein zu enges Verständnis der Isomorphie als einer nur äußerlichen Beziehung aus (55). Isomorphie ist für ihn eine Verallgemeinerung von Identität und Ähnlichkeit (14), sie besitzt ihre Grundlage in der materiellen Einheit der Welt als Fähigkeit ihrer verschiedenen Strukturen, miteinander in Wechselwirkung zu treten, genauer: im Gesetz der Wechselwirkung oder im Kausalitätsgesetz (12, 16). Die postulierte Universalität und Objektivität der Isomorphiebeziehung wird so mit dem Hinweis auf eine Verquickung von Gesetzmäßigkeit, Kausalität und Wechselwirkung als belegt angesehen, insbesondere wird zum Nachweis der Realität der Isomorphiebeziehung offenbar nur eine genetische Begründung für möglich gehalten. Doch sicherlich gibt es isomorphe Strukturen und analoge Prozesse, die nicht in genetischem Zusammenhange miteinander stehen, und Isomorphie im Sinne einer eineindeutigen Entsprechung der Strukturen von Gegenstand und Wahrnehmung, von Signal und Quelle ist nicht charakteristisch für alle Wahrnehmungen und Signale.

Da Tjuchtin es ablehnt, die Isomorphie von Signalen als "physikalische Ebenbildlichkeit" zu verstehen, kritisiert er auch die naive Auffassung des "Abbilds" als Kopie oder Photo. Das Abbild sei ein verwickelter Komplex von Empfindungen und deshalb von "Modell-Signalen" (30). Der Fehler der naiven Auffassung liege vor allem in einer Verwechslung von gnoseologischem Aspekt ("Abbild") und naturwissenschaftlichem Aspekt ("physikalisches Ebenbild") und in der mangelnden Trennung zwischen Form und Inhalt der Widerspiegelung (30). Unter der Form eines Signals versteht Tjuchtin die Art und Weise, wie

es existiert und Information ausdrückt (21), unter dem Inhalt oder Gehalt (*soderžanie*) im wesentlichen seine Information über ein Objekt (18) oder über die Quelle (23). 'Inhalt' bedeutet hier also nicht wie in der üblichen Form-Inhalt Schematik im Marxismus-Leninismus der geformte Inhalt, das Innere hinter der äußerlichen Form, sondern die Bedeutung von etwas schon Geformtem, etwa die Bedeutung einer Nachricht. Die Verwechslung, die sich hier zeigt, hat darin ihren Grund, daß Ausdrucksform und Form eines Substrats nach dem gleichen Schema behandelt werden, was auch in Tjuchtins mangelhafter Unterscheidung zwischen Signal (oder Signalprozeß) und Signalumwandlungsprozeß aufgewiesen werden kann.

Die Isomorphierelation bildet zusammen mit der Gegenständlichkeit das grundlegende Merkmalpaar des 'Abbilds'. Alle übrigen Eigenschaften des Abbilds – etwa seine subjektive oder ideelle Form, die räumliche Projektion oder die Makrokontinuierlichkeit – seien Folgen oder Teilerscheinungen davon. Die beiden Grundeigenschaften seien notwendig und hinreichend zur Orientierung des Individuums, zur Garantie des vollständig bestimmten Zusammenhangs zwischen Subjekt und Objekt, d.h. für das Verhalten (56). Jedoch seien der gegenständliche Charakter des Abbilds, wie auch die zur Kennzeichnung seines Inhalts gehörende Funktion der Antizipation nicht unmittelbar physikalisch-kausal begründbar. Gegenständlichkeit und Antizipation seien funktionale Eigenschaften mit den beiden wesentlichen Zügen der Subjektivität und Idealität (39, 40), – funktional in dem Sinne, daß das Subjekt den Inhalt des Abbilds von seiner Form abtrennen und diesen Inhalt in der Wechselbeziehung mit dem Objekt verwenden könne (50). Die Analyse psychischer Erscheinungen wie der Wahrnehmung und im weiteren auch des Denkens unter funktionalen und instrumentalen Gesichtspunkten, kann, wenn auch von Tjuchtin nicht erwähnt, wiederum als ein gemeinsamer Zug von dialektisch-materialistischer und kybernetischer Denkweise angesehen werden. Bei der Frage der Determination der psychischen Erscheinungen geht Tjuchtin wie bei der Begründung der "objektiven Realität" der Eigenschaften der Isomorphie und Gegenständlichkeit des Abbilds von der Wechselwirkung und der Kausalität aus (90), dem Phänomen nach: von der Situation der Organismen in ihrer Umwelt. Das Prinzip der Determination psychischer Erscheinungen bestehe in der konkret reflektorischen Struktur des Wechselwirkungsakts von Subjekt und Objekt, und es sei organisch verbunden mit dem genetischen Prinzip, dem naturhistorischen Zugang (Philogenese, Ontogenese) bei der Erforschung des Psychischen (93). Er kritisiert eine im dialektischen Materialismus weit verbreitete, zu "eng empirische" Zweiseitentheorie des Psychischen, welche die Eigenaktivität des Subjekts zu wenig berücksichtige (95), die vor allem bei den höheren psychischen Erscheinungen, etwa bei der Zwecksetzung und Planung, als Determinationsfaktor wesentlich ist (98). In der Umwandlung der äußeren Welt finde die Freiheit des Menschen, seine positive Subjektivität oder Aktivität ihren höchsten Ausdruck (93). Die bestimmte anatomisch-physiologische Organisation, die nach dem Reflektorprinzip (kybernetisch: Rückkopplungsprinzip) einge-

richtet ist, die Aktivität des Lebewesens in seiner gegenständlichen Handlung und die Erfahrung der Vergangenheit seien die Bedingungen, die zum *Erleben* der Dinge und Wirkungen in Form eines ideellen Modells führen (49, 100ff.). Im Hinblick auf physiologische Untersuchungen wagt Tjuchtin die These, daß das Geheimnis des eigentlichen psychischen Zustands des Subjekts in kaum merklichen elektrischen Impulsen von der Peripherie ins Zentrum des Organismus und umgekehrt bestehe (50).

Bemerkenswert ist der Abschnitt 'Über die Möglichkeit einer Modellierung des Bedürfniszustandes' (82ff.), da ja Erfordernisse und Bedürfnisse in den Erörterungen im dialektischen Materialismus, besonders aber auch im historischen Materialismus oft die Rolle eines Letzten spielen, das nicht mehr weiter in Frage gestellt werden braucht. Eine strenge Bestimmung dieses Begriffs sei kaum möglich (82). Tjuchtins Versuch einer solchen basiert auf dem Begriff der Instabilität, die zur Quelle einer auf ein Gleichgewicht gerichteten Handlung wird. Im Anschluß daran diskutiert er die "Modellierung von anderen Funktionen und Eigenschaften der lebenden Materie" (84ff.), wobei er vor verschiedenen Fehlern in diesbezüglichen Argumentationen warnt (88, 89).

Auf alle Gedanken dieser, besonders in den Details sehr ansprechenden Abhandlung, kann hier nicht eingegangen werden. Von einigem Interesse dürften aber die Punkte sein, die in der kritischen Besprechung des Buches in der Zeitschrift 'Fragen der Philosophie' weniger Zustimmung fanden (*VF* 1964, 5, 173–177). Dort wird beanstandet, daß die Subordination des Psychischen nicht klar herausgearbeitet sei, wo doch eine synthetische Herleitung aus Signalelementen, die den Gesetzen der Wechselwirkung unterworfen sind, so naheläge. Tjuchtins Behauptung, ein Signal erhalte nur dank einer besonderen Vergleichsoperation die Eigenschaft der Gegenständlichkeit und damit diejenige, "Modell zu sein", lasse den Schluß zu, daß das sinnliche Abbild primär sei und alle übrigen Signale daraus abgeleitet seien. Die hier zum Vorschein kommende Aversion gegen einen erkenntnistheoretischen Subjektivismus kann aber meiner Meinung nach an der betreffenden Stelle des Buches gar keine Nahrung finden: Tjuchtin schreibt hier nur, daß die in der Technik verwendeten Signale und Modelle den erkennenden Menschen voraussetzen. Weiter treten die Kritiker (L. M. Vekker, M. G. Jaroševskij) einer Überbetonung der Aktivität des Subjekts bei der Analyse des Zustandekommens des "Abbilds" entgegen. Man könne nicht davon reden, daß "das Abbild nach außen getragen würde" (objektiviert werden würde). Bedürfnisse selbst seien Objekte der Widerspiegelung. Notwendig sei eine Unterscheidung verschiedener Stufen der Aktivität. Schließlich sehen sie einen Widerspruch zwischen Tjuchtins Absicht, die allgemeinen Gesetzmäßigkeiten des psychischen Abbilds aufzudecken, und seiner Aussage, daß die individuelle Erfahrung einen wesentlichen Faktor beim Übergang vom Physiologischen zum eigentlich Psychischen darstelle, da das Individuelle durch seine Unwiederholbarkeit ausgezeichnet sei.

P. Kirschenmann

Russian Philosophy; an Historical Anthology. Edited by James M. Edie, James P. Scanlan, and Mary-Barbara Zeldin, with the collaboration of George L. Kline. Chicago, Quadrangle Books. 1965. 3 vols. XX + 434 pp; XX + 312 pp.; XX + 521 pp. $. 7.50; $. 6.50; $. 8.50.

This extensive work, covering well over 1200 pages, claims to be "the first historical anthology of Russian thought from its origins to the present day ...". Certainly, it is by far the largest English anthology of its kind, and as such fills a serious gap in the field. The excerpts from each thinker are preceded in each case by concise introductory comments which effectively link up the various chapters and sections and help to place them in their historical context. The general lay-out is excellent, and typographically the books are pleasing to read. Each volume contains its own index, and a selected bibliography is supplied for each thinker concerned. The emphasis is on philosophical rather than socio-political thought, though the distinction is by no means always clear-cut: as the publishers rightly point out, "Russian speculation has always been decidedly *man-centred*". Moreover, "Russian philosophical thought has been uniquely non-academic and non-institutional".

The complete work contains 68 selections from 27 Russian philosophers, arranged in nine books (three per volume). Book I contains two 18th-century thinkers, Skovoroda and Radiščev, followed by Čaadaev, whose first *Lettre philosophique* is given in full. Book II covers the Slavophils, Book III the Westernisers. In Volume 2, Book IV comprises "The Nihilists", Book V "The Populists", and Book VI "Critics of Religion and Culture", namely Tolstoj, Dostoevskij, Konstantin Leont'ev, and Rozanov. Volume 3 opens (Book VII) with N. Fëdorov and Vladimir Solov'ëv; Book VIII deals with "Philosophers in Exile" (Berdjaev, Leon Šestov, S. L. Frank, and N. O. Losskij), and Book IX with "Marxists and Communists" – Plexanov, Bogdanov, and Lenin, followed by Ljubov' ("Ortodoks") Aksel'rod's review of Lenin's *Materialism and Empirio-criticism*, and finally a contemporary Soviet view, in the form of A. G. Spirkin's article on 'Dialectical Materialism' written for the current *Philosophical Encyclopædia* (Vol. I. M., 1960).

Even in a work of this size, omissions are inevitable: V. F. Odoevskij; the Aksakov brothers and Samarin from the Slavophils; Ogarëv from the Westernisers; Dobroljubov from the "Nihilists", to mention a few. While the emphasis on philosophy proper evidently lies behind some omissions, it hardly explains the inclusion of only two examples of Slavophil thinking (one each from Xomjakov and Ivan Kireevskij) as against no less than twelve from the Westernisers. By the same token, it would have seemed equitable to include Danilevskij or at least some aspect of Panslavist thought from the later part of the 19th century. On the whole, however, the selection of thinkers and excerpts strikes the present reviewer as judicious and well-balanced – one detects the guiding hand of Prof. George Kline, to whose vast experience and invaluable assistance the translator-editors pay handsome tribute in their Preface.

Studies in Soviet Thought VI, 1 (March 1966); © *D. Reidel, Dordrecht-Holland*

Minor errors include the statement (Vol. I, p. 216, note 3) that Xomjakov's famous letter of 28 Nov. 1846 to William Palmer is printed in English *translation* in Birkbeck's *Russia and the English Church*. In fact, Xomjakov himself wrote this letter – like all his others to Palmer – in such remarkably good English that Birkbeck felt able to reproduce them, as he himself stated in his *Introduction* (p. lvii), "in almost exactly the same words as they were written". A *Schönheitsfehler* is the repeated reference (on the dust-covers) to "new translations and critical and *interpretive* commentary"; "interpretative" is the word.

All in all, this finely produced anthology represents a splendid pioneering effort and forms an invaluable addition to the English-language literature on Russian intellectual history that will certainly render yeoman service to teachers and students alike.

R. J. Kemball

THE PHILOSOPHICAL WORKS OF BONIFATIJ MIXAJLOVIČ KEDROV

'Ponjatie termodinamičeskoj verojatnosti' (The Concept of Thermodynamic Probability). *Pod znamenem marksizma* 1938, 3.

'Džon Dal'ton – otec sovremennoj ximii' (John Dalton, Father of Contemporary Chemistry). In: *Džon Dal'ton: Izbrannye raboty po atomistike*. L. 1940. Izd. 2: *Atomistika Dal'tona*. M.–L. 1949.

O količestvennyx i kačestvennyx izmenenijax v prirode (On Quantitative and Qualitative Changes in Nature). M. 1946.

'Ponjatie "ximičeskij element" i ego logičeskij analiz' (The Concept "Chemical Element" and its Logical Analysis). *Filosofskie Zapiski* 1946, I. 118–178.

Engel's i estestvoznanie (Engels and Natural Science). M. 1947.

'Reč.' (Speech). *VF* 1947, 1, 38–53.

'Ximičeskie ponjatija v svete mendeleevskogo nasledstva' (Concepts of Chemistry in the Light of the Mendeleevian Heritage). In: *Periodičeskij zakon D. I. Mendeleeva i ego filosofskoe značenie*. M. 1947.

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'O značenii leninskix "Filosofskix tetradej" dlja estestvoznanija'. (On the Importance of Lenin's *Philosophical Notebooks* for Natural Science). *V AN SSSR* 1947, 1, 5–22.

'O leninskix tetradjax po filosofii' (On Lenin's Notebooks for Philosophy). *VF* 1947, 2, 55–83.

'Atomistika' Dal'tona i eë filosofskoe značenie' (Dalton's Atomic Theory and its Philosophic Importance). *Izv. AN SSSR* 1947, 6, 487–504.

Razvitie ponjatija elementa ot Mendeleeva do našix dnej (The Development of the Concept of Element from Mendeleev to the Present). M., Gostexizdat, 1948.

O putjax razvitija estestvoznanija (On the Paths of the Development of Natural Science). M.–L. 1948.

'Leninskij vzgljad na elektron i sovremennaja fizika' (Lenin's View on the Electron and Contemporary Physics). *Bol'ševik* 1948, 2, 44–61.

'K voprosu o principax periodizacii istorii estestvoznanija' (On the Principles of the Periodization of the History of Natural Science). In: *Trudy soveščanija po istorii estestvoznanija*. M., Izd. AN SSSR. 1948.

'Kritičeskie zametki na filosofskie temy' (Critical Remarks on a Philosophical Theme). *VF* 1948, 1, 53–71.

'Mužestvennaja kniga peredovogo grečeskogo učenogo' (Bold Book by a Progressive Greek Scholar). *VF* 1948, 2, 315–318.

'K istorii otkrytija periodičeskogo zakona D. I. Mendeleeva' (On the History of the Discovery of Mendeleev's Periodic Law). In: *D. I. Mendeleev*. M.–L. 1950.

'Neudačnaja kniga po istorii fiziki' (Unfortunate Book on the History of Physics). *VF* 1950, 1, 365–378.

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'Ob otnošenii logiki k marksizmu' (On the Relationship of Logic to Marxism). *VF* 1951, 4, 212–227.

'O filosofskom značenii estestvenno-naučnyx otkrytij M. V. Lomonosova' (On the Philosophic Importance of the Scientific Discoveries of M. V. Lomonosov). *VF* 1951, 5, 62–76.

'Protiv idealizma i mexanicizma v organičeskoj ximii' (Against Idealism and Mechanicism in Organic Chemistry). *Bol'ševik* 1951, 19, 13–24.

'O vyskazyvanijax D. I. Mendeleeva po filosofskim voprosam estestvoznanija' (On Mendeleev's Pronouncements on Philosophic Questions of Natural Science). *VF* 1952, 2, 112–127.

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'O materialističeskom ponimanii zakonov prirody' (On the Materialist Conception of the Laws of Nature). *VF* 1952, 6, 63–83.

'Zakon Mendeleeva i zadača upravlenija jadernymi processami' (The Law of Mendeleev and the Task of Controlling Nuclear Processes). *VF* 1953, 5, 53–75.

'O soderžanii i ob'eme izmenjajuščegosja ponjatija' (On the Intension and Extension of Changing Concepts). *Filosofskie Zapiski* 1953, 6, 188–254.

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'Postepennost' kak odna iz form perexoda ot starogo kačestva k novomu kačestvu' (Progression as one of the Forms of Transition from an old Quality to a new Quality). *VF* 1954, 2, 50–70.

'O klassifikacii nauk' (On the Classification of Sciences). *VF* 1955, 2, 49–68.

'Ob otnošenii marksizma k darvinizmu v svjazi s problemoj vidoobrazovanija' (On the Relationship of Marxism to Darwinism on the Problem of the Formation of Species). *VF* 1955, 6, 149–166.

Evoljucija ponjatija elementa v ximii (Evolution of the Concept of Element in Chemistry). M. 1956. 360 str.

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'Naučnyj metod D. I. Mendeleeva' (Mendeleev's Scientific Method). *VF* 1957, 3, 19–34.

'Toržestvo čelovečeskogo razuma' (The Triumph of Human Reason). *VF* 1957, 6, 11–20.

'K voprosu o psixologii naučnogo tvorčestva' (On the Psychology of Scientific Creativity). *Voprosy psixologii* 1957, 6, 92.

Den' odnogo velikogo otkrytija (Day of one Great Discovery) M., Socekgiz. 1958. 560 str.

(ed.) Mendeleev, D. I.: *Periodičeskij zakon* (Periodic Law). M., Izd. AN SSSR. 1958, 830 str.

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'O povtorjaemosti osobogo roda v processe razvitija' (On Recurrence of a Special Type in the Process of Development). *FN* 1959, 1, 49–61 and 3, 58–68.

'O sootnošenii form dviženija materii v prirode' (On the Relations of the Forms of the Motion of Matter in Nature). *VF* 1959, 4, 44–56.

'Leninskij analiz revoljucii i krizisa sovremennogo estestvoznanija' (Lenin's Analysis of the Revolution and Crisis in Contemporary Natural Science). In: *Lenin i nauka.* M. 1960.

'"Fazovyj sposob" v formal'noj logike ("Phased Mode" in Formal Logic). In: *Primenenie logiki v nauke i texnike.* M., Izd. AN SSSR. 1960. 421–501.

'O dialektiko-logičeskom obobščenii istorii estestvoznanija' (On the Dialectical-Logical Generalization of the History of Natural Science). *VF* 1960, 1, 61–74.

'Opyt metodologičeskogo analiza naučnyx otkrytij' (Experience in the Methodological Analysis of Scientific Discoveries). *VF* 1960, 5, 63–78.

'Istoričeskoe i logičeskoe v razvitii naučnogo poznanija' (The Historical and the Logical in the Development of Scientific Knowledge). *VF* 1960, 12, 62–73.

Klassifikacija nauk. I: *Engel's i ego predšestvenniki* (Classification of Sciences. I: Engels and his Predecessors). M., Izd. AON, 1961. 472 str.

O povtorjaemosti v processe razvitija (On Recurrence in the Process of Development). M. 1961.

Kak izučat' knigu V. I. Lenina "Materializm i empiriokriticizm" (How to Study Lenin's *Materialism and Empirio-Criticism*). M. 1961.

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Predmet i vzaimosvjaz' estestvennyx nauk (Object and Relations of the Natural Sciences). M., Izd. AN SSSR, 1962. 410 str.

'Filosofija kak obščaja nauka' (Philosophy as a General Science). *VF* 1962, 5, 44–58 and 6, 48–62.

'Vzaimosvjaz' dvux stepenej poznanija' (Inter-Connection of two Stages in Knowledge). *FN* 1962, 5, 50–58.

'Predmet marksistskoj dialektičeskoj logiki i ego otličie ot predmeta formal'noj logiki' (The Object of Marxist Dialectical Logic and its Differentiation from the Object of Formal Logic). In: *Dialektika i logika. Zakony myšlenija.* M., Izd. AN SSSR, 1962. 63–137.

'Zakony marksistskoj dialektičeskoj logiki i ix otnošenie k zakonam formal'noj logiki' (The Laws of Marxist Dialectical Logic and Their Relations to the Laws of Formal Logic). *Ibid.* 138–218.

'Nesvodimost' marksistskoj dialektičeskoj traktovki protivorečij k formal'nologičeskim sxemam' (The Irreducibility of the Marxist Dialectical Interpretation of Contradictions to Formal-Logical Schemata). *Ibid.* 308–334.

'Operirovanie naučnymi ponjatijami v dialektičeskoj i formal'noj logika' (Operating with Scientific Concepts in Dialectical and Formal Logic). In: *Dialektika i logika. Formy myšlenija.* M., Izd. AN SSSR, 1962. 42–141.

'Formal'nye i dialektičeskie principy klassifikacii nauk i obščaja struktura naučnogo znanija' (Formal and Dialectical Principles of the Classification of Sciences and the General Structure of Scientific Knowledge). *Ibid.* 271–310.

Edinstvo dialektiki, logiki i teorii poznanija (The Unity of Dialectic, Logic and Theory of Knowledge). M., Gt., 1963. 295 str.

'Tvorčeskaja storona revoljucii v estestvoznanii (Creative Aspect of the Revolution in Natural Science). *VF* 1963, 11, 99–109.

'Metodologičeskie problemy estestvoznanija' (Methodological Problems of Natural Science). *VF* 1964, 3, 38–49.

'Metod Galileja' (Method of Galileo). *VF* 1964, 12, 76–86.

'Obščij xod poznanija veščestva' (The General Course of Knowing Substance). *VF* 1965, 4, 92–103.

Thomas J. Blakeley

SOVIET PHILOSOPHICAL WORKS 1917–1947

The time-span 1917 to 1947 includes the periods which Professor Bocheński has called the 'first period of discussions' and the 'quiet' or 'dead' period. Hitherto Western researchers have been greatly handicapped in reference to these two periods by a lack of access to the original sources. The Soviets themselves – for rather obvious reasons – have been slow to begin retrospective discussions on the events of these periods.

Recently, however, Soviet philosophers have published a number of works which make it possible to piece together at least the beginnings of a basic bibliography of this time-span. In view of the notorious backwardness of Soviet philosophers as regards bibliographical work, we feel justified in publishing this preliminary compilation which, when properly supplemented, will allow basic research on the periods in question to get off the ground.

The basic collection of titles is drawn from *Marxist-Leninist Philosophy and Sociology in the USSR and the European Socialist Countries* (cf. pp. 44–46 of this issue of *SST*). This has been supplemented from the individual bibliographies to be found in the first three volumes of the *Philosophical Encyclopedia* (Moscow. 1960, 1962, 1964), and checked against the bibliographies in volumes II and IV of the *History of Philosophy* (Moscow. 1957, 1959). Soviet bibliographical inaccuracy accounts for the incompleteness of some titles. We thought it worthwhile to include such incomplete citations since they may provide someone else with a clue, or someone else may be able to complete them for us.

The Soviet philosophical journal during this time was *Pod Znamenem Marksizma* (Under the Banner of Marxism). Our present listing will be essentially complete when it has been supplemented by a comprehensive listing of articles from this journal.

ABBREVIATIONS

B	*Bol'ševik* (now *Kommunist*)	Izv.	bulletin
č.	part	Ss.	collective work
Iz.	edition	Soč.	collected works
kn.	book	T.	volume
PZM	*Pod Znamenem Marksizma*	UZ	scholarly works
Pb.	St. Petersburg	V	bulletin
R.	editor(s)	vyp.	booklet

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Jan. General meeting of the sections of Philosophy and Law (of AN) in Moscow, to analyse research in philosophical and legal development. The meeting was opened by P. N. Fedoseev with a speech, about the problems of elaboration of theory and logic in scientific knowledge and philosophical questions in contemporary science (including philosophical questions in biology, especially in history of genetics). Other speeches were given by M. B. Mitin, B. M. Kedrov, M. N. Alekseev and others. (*VF* 1965, 6, 142–148).

Jan. 12 City conference in Obninsk on philosophical questions in science. Theme: 'The Role of Probability and Statistical Laws in Contemporary Sciences'. Six speeches by members of the IF, the Physical Energy Institute, the Philosophy Faculty of MGU, etc. (*VF* 1965, 8, 156–158).

Jan. 14 Session of the Chairs of Marxism-Leninism of the philosophical science faculties of MGU. Speech by G. V. Platonov on 'Some Methodological Problems of Contemporary Genetics'. Participation of members of the Soil Biology and the Philosophy Faculties of MGU, IF and others. (*FN* 1965, 3, 149–158).

Jan. 15 The Scientific Council of the Philosophy Faculty of MGU and the Moscow Philosophical Society celebrated the 70th birthday and the 45th anniversary of Valentin F. Asmus (Professor for History of Foreign Philosophy at MGU) as a pedagogic scientist. (*FN* 1965, 3, 147–148).

1965 In the Philosophical Seminar in Sverdlovsk the Inter-Upper School section of Ethics is working. (Leader: L. M. Arxangel'skij, Ural University). Methodological questions of teaching ethics are regularly being considered as well as plans for philosophical dissertations. (*VF* 1965, 8, 158–159).

February Theoretical conference of physicists and philosophers in Dubno on 'Category of Structure and Development of Physics in the Elementary Particles'. Participation by members of the IF. (Among others: J. A. Akčurin, G. S. Batiščev). (*VF* 1965, 10, 166–171).

Feb./March Meetings and consultations of teachers in Moscow, Leningrad, Taškent and other towns, discussing difficulties in teaching 'Foundations of Scientific Communism' as a high school course. (*FN* 1965, 4, 104–107).

March Two sessions of the Teaching Council of IF (Chairman: F. V. Konstantinov) Speeches were given by O. G. Drobnickij ('Problems of Value in Marxist Philosophy'), I. S. Narskij, K. K. Platonov and others. (*VF* 1965, 9, 152–157).

March 14–16 XII session of the Pakistan Philosophical Congress in Lahore, with participation of the two Soviet philosophers S. F. Oduev and M. T. Stepanjanc (*VF* 1965, 9, 158–160).

April 7–9 Symposium on contemporary problems of materialistic dialectics. With participation of more than 600 philosophers from different towns of the USSR. Speeches were given by P. N. Fedoseev, M. M. Rozental', M. N. Rutkevič, S. A. Stepanjan, M. N. Alekseev, G. E. Glezerman and others. (*VF* 1965, 10, 130–164).

April 15–19 Lomonosov lectures in MGU. Speeches by T. I. Ojzerman ('Early Works by K. Marx and the Contemporary Ideological Struggle'), A. M. Kovalev, F. N. Momdžjan, I. Ja. Ščipanov. In the section of Diamat, Logic and History, speeches were given by M. N. Alekseev, A. D. Kosičev, A. M. Korsunov and others. (*VMGU* 1965, 5, 83–88).

May 18–22 Third conference of editors of philosophical journals in European Socialist countries in Varna (Bulgaria). Russian participators: M. B. Mitin, (with a speech on 'The Dialectics of the Development of Socialist Society'), M. T. Iovčuk (editor of *FN*) and E. Arab-Ogly (Editor of *Problemy mira i socializma*) (*FN* 1965, 5, 120–130).

May 24 Meeting of the Chair of Marxist-Leninist Philosophy of the *VPŠ*, to discuss the book *O dialektike processa poznanija prirody i kibernetiki* (On the Dialectics of Process of Knowledge in Nature and Cybernetics), by A. D. Vislobokov ("Mysl'", M., 1965). (*FN* 1965, 5, 136–138).

Students enrolled. Winter semester 1965/66: 55.

Courses offered. The courses offered by the Institute for the Winter Semester 1965/66 are as follows:

Languages: Russian for beginners – Russian for advanced students – Advanced seminar for reading Russian texts.

History: History of Russia – History and Organization of the Communist Party – History of 19th Century Russian Thought.

Literature: 19th Century Russian Literature.

Philosophy and Ideology: Communist Ideology – Soviet Philosophy of Physics – Current Soviet Philosophy (Discussion Group) – Problems of Philosophy of Nature for Sovietologists – Methodology for Sovietologists – Proseminar on the Classics of Marxism-Leninism.

Dissertations. T. R. Payne: *S. L. Rubenštejn and the Theoretical Foundations of Soviet Psychology*; K. G. Ballestrem: *Die Erkenntnismetaphysik in der sowjetischen Philosophie und ihr Verhältnis zu Hegel*; L. Vrtačič: *Jugoslawische Philosophie der Gegenwart. Der Marxismus-Leninismus auf neuen Wegen*; J. Hölling: *Ontologische Beiträge zum Raum-Zeit-Problem im modernen Denken.*

Publications. Prof. S. Müller-Markus: 'Ideologie und Physik in der Sowjetunion', *Osteuropa*, Heft 5, May 1965, S. 296-305.

Work in Progress. Bibliographie der Sowjetischen Philosophie VI being compiled by T. Blakeley and K. Gerstenmaier.

On leave. K. G. Ballestrem has been released from the Institute to lecture in the Philosophy Department of Rosary College in River Forest, Illinois for the spring semester, 1966.

Miscellaneous. The Institute quarters have been expanded and alterations are in progress.

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HELMUT FLEISCHER

DAS HANDELNDE SUBJEKT IM HISTORISCHEN MATERIALISMUS

Für die marxistisch-leninistische Gesellschaftstheorie wird jetzt mehr und mehr eine Problematik auf neue Weise akut, die in den bisherigen Formeln eher notdürftig überbrückt als wirklich gelöst war: die Frage, wie fest und vollständig wir Menschen, denkend-handelnde Subjekte, uns in die Ordnung einer Welt als eines 'Umgreifenden, das nicht wir sind' (Jaspers) eingefügt finden, im besonderen auch in eine bestimmte Ordnung des gesellschaftlichen Werdens, wie weit dieses Eingefügtsein ein Sich-Einordnen und ein Sich-Unterordnen ist, wie weit wir uns andererseits in dem zur Geltung bringen können, was wir selbst sind und wollen.

In ihrer sowjetischen Version ist die marxistische Philosophie zu einem System geworden, für das der Mensch ein radikal eingeordnetes Wesen ist, ein Seiendes inmitten des Seienden und – auch in seinem gesellschaftlich-geschichtlichen Dasein – unter 'objektiven Gesetzen' stehend und einem 'objektiven Prozeß' unterworfen – wobei 'objektiv' eben dies bedeutet: unabhängig vom Subjekt, seinem Denken und Wollen. Das Subjekt nimmt, was die Legislative des Weltlaufs angeht, eine betont exzentrische Stellung ein, wie sehr auch andererseits der Marxismus-Leninismus als eine Theorie der revolutionären Aktion denkbar weit von einem kontemplativ-quietistischen Geschehenlassen entfernt ist. Doch es scheint, daß für ihn die menschliche Praxis eine bloß exekutive Funktion ist, wie es namentlich im Verständnis der Freiheit als 'Einsicht in die Notwendigkeit' deutlich wird; Freiheit wird hier geradezu zu einem Modus des Gehorsams. Und auch sonst zeigt die historisch-materialistische Theorie in mehrfacher Hinsicht eine subordinative Behandlung des Subjekts. Wie stark diese Position auch noch in den jüngsten Veröffentlichungen sowjetischer Philosophen ausgebaut ist, werden wir im folgenden sehen.

Die Problematik, die sich für diese Position ergibt, hat ihren Grund darin, daß in der marxistischen Tradition auch das entgegengesetzte Motiv eines prometheischen menschlichen Selbstbewußtseins ein Recht hat und dieses Recht Wortführer gefunden hat, die ihm wieder zu stärkerer Geltung verhelfen wollen. Am nachdrücklichsten hat wohl der

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polnische marxistische Philosoph Adam Schaff die Rückkehr zu einem anthropozentrischen Philosophieren verfochten, das von der Lebenstätigkeit und Selbstwertschätzung der menschlichen Individuen, von ihrem Streben nach Glück seinen Ausgang und Auftrag nimmt. Er artikuliert damit – als Kontrapunkt zu jener im Sowjetmarxismus vorherrschenden Auffassung, die das Erkenntnisziel der Philosophie in der Kodifikation allgemeinster Gesetze der Wirklichkeit erblickt und die Schaff als die 'ionische Linie' tituliert – die 'sokratische Linie' eines Philosophierens im Horizont der menschlich-gesellschaftlichen Existenz, die im Marxismus die ursprüngliche gewesen ist.[1] Im sowjetischen Bereich ist die daraus erwachsende Problematik noch nicht so explizit geworden, doch mit der weiteren Intensivierung der anthropologisch-axiologischen Reflexion dürfte sie auch dort zu neuen Überlegungen herausfordern. Wir haben darum vor allem jene alten Positionen zu bezeichnen, von denen man wird loskommen müssen.

DER MENSCH ALS PRODUKT

Wenn es darum geht, eine fundamentale Wesensbestimmung des Menschen zu geben, rekurrieren die sowjetischen Theoretiker regelmäßig auf jene Formel, die Marx in der sechsten seiner Thesen über Feuerbach geprägt hat: das menschliche Wesen ist das Ensemble der gesellschaftlichen Verhältnisse. Sie pflegen sich nicht bei der kategorialen Problematik dieser Formel und bei den übrigen anthropologischen Deklarationen des frühen Marx aufzuhalten, die mit ihr auf einen gemeinsamen Nenner zu bringen gar nicht so leicht ist. Vielmehr führt ihre Interpretation oft sehr geradlinig zu dem Satz, den Marx gerade in den nämlichen Feuerbach-Thesen so sehr problematisiert hat: daß der Mensch, die Einzelperson, das Produkt seiner gesellschaftlichen Umwelt sei. Wie V. P. Tugarinov in seiner Arbeit über das Thema *Person und Gesellschaft* bemerkt, ist eben dies in der sowjetischen philosophischen Literatur das Übliche: daß man den bestimmenden Einfluß der Gesellschaft und ihrer Struktur auf das Subjekt aufzeigt und das Subjekt als Produkt der Gesellschaft, als Gesamtheit der gesellschaftlichen Verhältnisse darstellt.[2]

Ganz in diesem Sinne sind die Ausführungen über das Wesen des Menschen in dem Buch von M. I. Petrosjan über den Humanismus gehalten. Die Autorin beschreibt, welche Umformung der Gedanke von der

'formierenden Rolle des sozialen Milieus in bezug auf die Person' im Marxismus erfahren hat: vor allem beschränkt er sich hier nicht auf die politische Organisation der Gesellschaft und die geistige Verfassung, sondern erschließt die ökonomischen, die 'materiellen Produktionsverhältnisse' als das 'Fundament der Gesellschaft' – ohne freilich diese Verhältnisse zu 'verabsolutisieren' und darüber die anderen, die politischen, nationalen, ideologischen u.a. Verhältnisse zu ignorieren. Vom Menschen, der einer ständigen geschichtlichen Veränderung unterliegt, heißt es nun: "Er ist das Produkt seiner Epoche, des sozialen Milieus (im marxistischen Verständnis dieses Wortes). Seine Gedanken, seine Gefühle und sein Verhalten sind durch dieses Milieu determiniert."[3]

Es folgen wohl noch einige Einschränkungen: so soll man die Determination eines Menschen durch seine angeborene Klassenzugehörigkeit nicht als striktes Gesetz, sondern nur als tendenzielle Regel verstehen[4], man soll auch die Bedeutung der Erbveranlagung, der angeborenen individuellen Fähigkeiten nicht übersehen.[5] Schließlich hat man auch die Aktivität der Person selbst in Rechnung zu stellen: "Bei aller ihrer bestimmenden Bedeutung erfahren die gesellschaftlichen Verhältnisse selbst die umformende Kraft der Menschen. Der Mensch gestaltet die Natur und die gesellschaftlichen Verhältnisse um und arbeitet in diesem Prozeß auch seine eigene Natur um." Er spielt hier also als das 'aktive Subjekt der Geschichte' eine Rolle im Prozeß seiner 'Selbstveränderung', wie es Marx in seiner dritten Feuerbach-These als das 'Zusammenfallen des Änderns der Umstände und der menschlichen Tätigkeit oder Selbstveränderung' umschrieben hat.[6]

Man kann bezweifeln, ob damit eine ausgewogene Konzeption gewonnen ist. Sicher wird heute niemand mehr bestreiten, daß jeder Mensch zuerst unendlich viel empfängt, bevor er vielleicht etwas Neues hinzufügt.[7] Doch um die Art der Aktivität zu kennzeichnen, um die es hier geht, wird man – zumal wenn dies unter der prätentiösen Überschrift 'das Wesen des Menschen' geschieht – andere Kategorien einsetzen müssen. Das erste Gebot hat Marx bündig formuliert: "Es ist vor allem zu vermeiden, die 'Gesellschaft' wieder als Abstraktion dem Individuum gegenüber zu fixieren."[8] Gerade an solchen Fixierungen ist die sowjetische Gesellschaftstheorie überaus reich, und die logische Analyse der sozialanthropologischen Kategorien läßt viel zu wünschen übrig. Wenn die 'Gesellschaft' das Individuum 'produziert' und 'formiert', dann heißt dies

primär: andere Individuen tun dies; nicht von ungefähr zieht Marx so oft die Rede von 'den Individuen' der abstraktiven Fixierung 'Gesellschaft' vor.[9] Ferner wird man gut daran tun, den Inbegriff der 'gesellschaftlichen Verhältnisse' genauer zu bestimmen, namentlich die gegenständlichen Objektivationen vorausgegangener menschlicher Aktivität (die Produkte im eigentlichen Sinne), die Weisen menschlichen Verhaltens und die institutionellen Regelungen gesondert zu vermerken. Schließlich – und das ist das wichtigste – gilt es den Charakter und Richtungssinn der Aktivität selbst zu erhellen, in der die Subjekte überhaupt und in bezug auf einander begriffen sind. Mit der Feststellung, daß die einen Menschen die Produkte der anderen sind, kommt man keinen Schritt weiter im Verständnis des wesentlichen Gehalts, der spezifischen Qualität des Menschseins und der menschlichen Aktivität. Es kommt also darauf an, die Spontaneität der gesellschaftlich verbundenen (und aufeinander einwirkenden) Subjekte in den Termini ihrer Bedürfnisse, Interessen, Finalität und Wertdimensionen zu erfassen. Das alles gibt es doch auch bei Marx, und es bedeutet eine völlig ungerechtfertigte Verkürzung, wenn man seine Wesensbestimmung des Menschen auf eine milieutheoretisch mißverstandene Formel von der 'Gesamtheit der gesellschaftlichen Verhältnisse' reduziert.[10]

Was leistet nun die sowjetische Anthropologie, um den Menschen, das Individuum, als Subjekt seiner Handlungen und Verhältnisse zu kennzeichnen? Worin sieht sie sein 'Maß'? Und woher emfängt er es?

DER MENSCH ALS SUBJEKT

Es fehlt in der sowjetischen Literatur natürlich nicht an Deklarationen über den Menschen als den Schöpfer seines Daseins, doch es fehlt solchen Deklarationen noch sehr an theoretischer Artikulation. Man hat es in den letzten Jahren mehrfach bemerkt, daß die Problematik der Einzelperson über der vorrangigen Beschäftigung mit den Aktivitäten sozialer Großgruppen und mit den diversen Ordnungskorrelationen innerhalb dieser Aktivität arg vernachlässigt geblieben ist.[11] Wohl erklärt M. B. Mitin: "Es gibt nicht ein einziges Problem der geistigen Welt des Menschen, sei es seines Erlebens, seiner Freude oder seines Schmerzes, seien es seine schöpferischen Erfolge und die Flüge seiner Phantasie, sei es das Gefühl seiner Verantwortung vor dem Kollektiv, manchmal auch das Empfinden der Einsamkeit, der Krankheit und der Todesangst usw.usf., das nicht

Gegenstand einer marxistischen Analyse sein könnte oder schon wäre – einer psychologischen, logischen, sozialen oder moralischen."[12] Doch abgesehen davon, daß hier eben vieles erst noch 'sein *könnte*', wird man vor allem bemängeln müssen, daß vieles von dem bereits Geleisteten noch nicht bis ins Zentrum der anthroposoziologischen Theoriebildung vorgedrungen ist.

Um eine deutlichere Akzentuierung des einzelpersonalen Subjekts hat sich – nach seinen problembewußten Arbeiten über die Kategorien des dialektischen und historischen Materialismus sowie über die Wertproblematik des menschlichen Lebens – V. P. Tugarinov in seiner Studie *Person und Gesellschaft* bemüht. Wie er hier ausführt, ist der einzelne Mensch zunächst als Subjekt bestimmt, als substrathafte (substantielle) Einheit, als 'Naturgegenstand' und zugleich als 'Element der Gesellschaft', als realer 'Träger der gesellschaftlichen Beziehungen' und als Akteur des gesellschaftlich-historischen Geschehens. In der Gesellschaft erlangt der Mensch den Status der Persönlichkeit, und er wird dies durch die Gesamtheit der Eigenschaften, die sich in ihm im Prozeß der Wechselbeziehung mit der Gesellschaft herausbilden.[13] Nach Explikation dieser Eigenschaften faßt Tugarinov den Begriff der Persönlichkeit in diese Formel: "Die Persönlichkeit ist ein Mensch, der einen historisch bestimmten Grad von Vernünftigkeit und Verantwortlichkeit vor der Gesellschaft besitzt, der im Einklang mit seinen inneren Qualitäten bestimmte Rechte und Freiheiten genießt (oder fähig ist, sie zu genießen), der durch seine individuelle Tätigkeit einen Beitrag zur Entwicklung der Gesellschaft leistet und sein Leben in einer Art führt, wie es den Idealen seiner Epoche oder Klasse entspricht."[14] Auch Tugarinov hebt, wie alle anderen Autoren, die Rezeptivität der Individuen hervor, und er tut dies mitunter in Termini, die das gegenläufige Moment der Subjekt-Spontaneität zu verdunkeln geeignet sind. So schreibt er, das Subjekt, der einzelne Mensch, sei eine 'Widerspiegelung der Gesellschaft in individueller Form'.[15] Oder in den hier recht fragwürdigen Kategorien einer Subjekt-Objekt-Beziehung: "Die Person ist Subjekt. Aber das Subjekt ist nichts anderes als ein organisches Element des Objekts, ein kleiner Teil davon, und sein – des Subjekts – Wesen besteht darin, daß es in jedem einzelnen Menschen und jedesmal *auf eigene Art* in sich die Gesamtheit der gesellschaftlichen Verhältnisse, in denen es lebt, konzentriert und widerspiegelt." "Das Subjektive ist nur die Widerspiegelung des Objektiven, daher ist das Subjekt

umso vollkommener, je vollständiger und tiefer es das Objektive in sich widerspiegelt."[16] Statt des Rekurses vom Subjekt (Einzelmensch) zum Objekt (Gesellschaft), der sich im Grunde nur in einem definitorischen Zirkel bewegen würde (denn wenn man weiter fragte, was die Gesellschaft als eine menschliche kennzeichnet, müßte man doch wieder auf etwas rekurrieren, was nur an den Individuen faßbar wird), bietet sich hier vielmehr der Rekurs auf ein 'Gattungswesen' an, an welchem die Individuen einzeln und als gesellschaftlich organisierte Pluralität teilhaben.

Umso wichtiger ist es, wenn Tugarinov die Abhängigkeit der Gesellschaft von den personalen Subjekten postuliert – und zwar nicht einfach in dem trivialen Sinne, daß die Gesellschaft nicht außerhalb der Individuen existiert, sondern in einem final-normativen Sinne: "Der Mensch ist auch darum noch Subjekt, weil er (genauer, sie – die Menschen) jener 'Gegenstand' ist, dessen Bedürfnissen und Zielen die Gesellschaft dient, um dessentwillen die Gesellschaft denn auch da ist. Der Mensch macht die Geschichte zur Verwirklichung seiner eigenen menschlichen Ziele."[17] Damit erlangt das Subjekt eine starke Position, wird es in gewissem Sinne zum Maß der 'gesellschaftlichen Verhältnisse', zur legislativen Instanz.

Es geht hier ganz und gar nicht darum, einem bürgerlichen (d.h. an privates Produktionsmittel-Eigentum gebundenen) Individualismus das Wort zu reden, sondern den theoretischen Ausdruck einer personalen Autonomie zu formulieren, die hoffentlich auch jede sozialistische Transformation überdauert und, soweit sie dabei Schaden genommen hat, sich wieder fest etabliert. Es geht zum anderen auch nicht darum, die personale Autonomie gegen das gesellschaftliche Engagement abzugrenzen, sondern darum, das gesellschaftliche Engagement ebenso wie die Gesellschaft, der es gilt, so zu gestalten, daß darin die personale Autonomie ihre Erfüllung findet. Auch dort, wo das Individuum gesellschaftlich Tradiertes übernimmt, ist neben Indoktrination und Dressur doch auch eine freie Rezeption möglich, die in den Termini einer 'Formierung der Persönlichkeit durch die Gesellschaft' nicht adäquat zu erfassen ist.

WÜRDE UND WERT DES MENSCHEN

Eine Verdeutlichung der Aussagen über Eigenständigkeit und Eigenrecht des Subjekts wird man dort erwarten, wo ausdrücklich von der Person und ihrer Würde die Rede ist. Wir finden in den sowjetischen Arbeiten

eine Reihe von Deklarationen sowohl über die persönliche Würde als auch über etwas, was man den 'Wert des Menschen' nennt. Es besteht indes eine gewisse Schwierigkeit hinsichtlich des Begriffs der Person. Das russische Wort *ličnost'*, welches dafür steht, hat vorwiegend die Bedeutung von 'Persönlichkeit' und ist hier – ähnlich wie im angelsächsischen Bereich – nicht so sehr etwas, was man *ist*, als vielmehr etwas, was man *hat*, und zwar dadurch, daß man es *erwirbt* beziehungsweise vermittelt bekommt. V. P. Tugarinov, der stets auf kategoriale Status-Unterschiede achtet, erläutert: "Der Begriff *ličnost'* weist auf eine *Eigenschaft* des Menschen hin, der Mensch aber ist der *Träger* dieser Eigenschaft. Folglich sind diese Begriffe voneinander unterschieden wie Eigenschaft und Substrat."[18] Der Komplex der Eigenschaften, die den Inbegriff der Persönlichkeit ausmachen, umfaßt – Tugarinov handelt sie in dieser Reihenfolge ab – Vernünftigkeit, Verantwortlichkeit, Freiheit, Individualität und persönliche Würde. Doch diese inhaltliche Bestimmung bedeutet zugleich auch eine (wenngleich periphere) Einschränkung, insofern als nicht alle Individuen *eo ipso* auch schon den *ličnost'*-Status haben: er kommt nur dem erwachsenen und psychisch normalen Menschen zu, nicht dem minderjährigen Kind, dem Geisteskranken oder einem Menschen, der sonstwie die Fähigkeit zu verantwortlichem Verhalten eingebüßt hat. Unterschiede der Hautfarbe, des Geschlechts und der Nationalität jedoch können nach marxistischer Auffassung die Personwürde nicht beeinträchtigen.[19]

Die Schwierigkeit besteht nun darin, daß hier keine Unterscheidung zwischen Personalität und Persönlichkeit getroffen ist. Uns scheint aber, daß dieser Unterscheidung sehr prinzipielles Gewicht zukommt, sowohl in den passiven als auch in den aktiven Beziehungen, in denen das Individuum steht. Hier geht es einfach darum, daß dem Menschen, sofern er Glied eines Personenverbandes ist, auch ganz unabhängig vom Reifegrad, der Fülle und Qualität einer Persönlichkeit (also jenes Komplexes von Eigenschaften) ein bestimmter *Status* zuerkannt ist, eine Seins- und Wertautonomie, die ihre Konkretisierung in gewissen aktiven und passiven Rechten findet. Übrigens wird unseres Erachtens auch A. Schaff dem nicht gerecht, wenn er schreibt: "Es gibt keine Person als geistige Einheit, die man vom Individuum, als realem Wesen, unterscheiden kann. Die Persönlichkeit ist nur eine spezifische Bestimmung des menschlichen Individuums und steht ihm zu wie sein physisches Aussehen. Die Persön-

lichkeit in Gestalt einer hypostasierten 'Person' vom Individuum zu trennen, ist ebensosehr Mystifikation wie der Versuch, dem Individuum sein Äußeres oder seinen Schatten zu nehmen..."[20] Er kommt so zu der einfachen Alternative: "entweder faßt man die Persönlichkeit als Komplex bestimmter Eigenschaften eines realen Subjekts auf..., oder man faßt sie autonom als *geistige Person* auf und entscheidet damit nicht nur die Frage der Persönlichkeit, sondern auch die des menschlichen Individuums als eines solchen im Geiste des Idealismus."[21] In einem von ihm zitierten Passus aus Marxens Kritik des Hegelschen Staatsrechts sieht Schaff ein "gegen die idealistische (personalistische) Konzeption der *Person* gerichtetes Argument", das ihm die These zu bekräftigen scheint: "die Persönlichkeit ist kein selbständiges oder (im Verhältnis zur materiellen Welt, also auch zur Welt der realen menschlichen Individuen) autonomes geistiges Wesen, sondern ein *gesellschaftliches Produkt*, die Funktion der gesellschaftlichen Verhältnisse, der Verhältnisse zwischen realen menschlichen Individuen." Woraus dann weiter folgt, daß die Persönlichkeit des Menschen nicht *gegeben ist*, sondern *wird*.[22]

Wir wollen nicht bestreiten, daß es in der Lehre von der Person manche Fälle einer spiritualistischen Verkürzung gibt; der Vieldeutigkeit des Ausdrucks wegen wollen wir den Titel der '*geistigen* Person' hier weder kritisieren noch verteidigen. Doch auf dieses Adjektiv kommt es gar nicht an: es geht um eine Autonomie der Person, die durchaus nicht nur ihre Geistigkeit betrifft (was immer man darunter verstehen mag), sondern ebenso auch ihre leibliche Existenz, das Individuum in seiner Ganzheit. Wir sehen nicht ein, weshalb Schaff zusammen mit einer reinen Geistigkeit auch die *Selbständigkeit* des Individuums gegenüber der Welt der Dinge und der Mitmenschen in Zweifel ziehen muß. Sie beginnt doch schon damit, daß jeder als Einzelner eben er selbst im Unterschied von den anderen ist.[23] Und auch in dem, *was* ein Mensch ist, geht er schon rein faktisch niemals in dem auf, was 'die Gesellschaft' aus ihm gemacht hat (und unter normativem Aspekt soll er es wohl auch nicht). Wie V. P. Tugarinov bemerkt, gibt es eine weite Vielfalt von Beziehungen zwischen Individuum und Gesellschaft, von einem fast völligen Verschmelzen des Menschen mit seiner Gesellschaft bis hin zu schroffer Divergenz und Gegensätzlichkeit.[24] Es hat darum doch wohl seinen guten Sinn, die Eigenständigkeit des Individuums als Person in einem Personenverband kategorial besonders zu artikulieren, namentlich im Hinblick auf die

axiologischen Implikationen, auf die Rechte, die der Person aus diesem ihrem Status erwachsen – als 'Selbstzweck' anerkannt zu sein. Und von höchster Wichtigkeit ist, daß man diesen Status nicht erst im Verlaufe seiner Persönlichkeitsentwicklung erwirbt, sondern ihn mit dem Eintritt in den Personenverband als einen *character indelebilis* hat. Davon machen dann auch jene Individuen keine Ausnahme, denen Tugarinov den Status der Persönlichkeit mit Recht nicht oder nur vermindert zuerkennt.

Welche Unsicherheiten und Gefahren das Fehlen eines so oder ähnlich gefaßten Personbegriffs nach sich zieht, sieht man an einigen der sowjetischen Erörterungen über die Würde oder über den Wert des Menschen. In seinen *Grundlagen der marxistischen Ethik* gibt A. F. Šiškin einige Grundsatzerklärungen darüber ab, daß die kommunistische Moral aus ihrem humanistischen Prinzip heraus vor allem die menschliche Würde achtet. Die allseitige Entwicklung des Menschen, so sagt er, ist die größte Produktivkraft, und das Hauptkapital ist der Mensch selbst. "Davon ausgehend fordert der Marxismus die Vernichtung aller Bedingungen und Verhältnisse, die den Menschen versklaven und erniedrigen." Im Sozialismus ist alles auf die Erhöhung des Menschen gerichtet, "der Mensch wird zum größten unter allen Werten, die es in der Welt gibt".[25] Auf diese Erklärungen, die durch die in ihnen anklingende Motivation schon etwas zweideutig werden, folgt dann eine Rezitation aus dem Denken der 'revolutionären Demokraten', nämlich ein Satz von V. G. Belinskij, der Achtung für die menschliche Würde in jedem Menschen einfach darum fordert, weil er ein Mensch ist.[26] Weiter führt der Gedankengang zu Überlegungen, in denen von menschlicher Würde in einer anderen Bedeutung die Rede ist: von der Würde im Betragen eines Menschen und vom Bewußtsein dieser Würde, dem Gefühl der freien Persönlichkeit, schließlich auch von der Möglichkeit, diese Würde zu verlieren. Echte Würde besitzen – und entsprechende Achtung verdienen – demnach nicht die 'Ritter des Profits' und ihre Lakaien, sondern die Menschen der Arbeit, die Kämpfer für Frieden und Fortschritt der Gesellschaft.[27]

Hier sind offenbar zwei Begriffe von menschlicher Würde so aufeinander projiziert, daß der zweite den ersten relativiert. Das wird noch deutlicher an einer Stelle des Humanismus-Buches von M. I. Petrosjan, wo die Verfasserin gegen den englischen 'Revisionisten' C. Taylor polemisiert. Dieser hatte sich gegen eine Funktionalisierung der menschlichen Würde gewandt und gefordert, der Mensch müsse seinen Wert einfach als Mensch

haben, unabhängig davon, welche Rolle er bei der Entwicklung der menschlichen Möglichkeiten spielt oder nicht spielt.[28] Die Antwort darauf lautet: das kann nur den Sinn haben, daß parasitäre Elemente und Reaktionäre den gleichen Wert haben wie die Menschen der schöpferischen Arbeit und die Kämpfer für den Fortschritt.[29] M. L. Petrosjan unterscheidet zwei 'Ebenen' in der Frage nach dem Wert des Menschen: in der 'anthropologischen Ebene' sind alle Menschen ohne Unterschied der Rasse und Sprache gleichwertig; weil der Mensch überdies ein soziales Wesen ist, darf man seine 'biologische Grundlage' nicht 'metaphysisch verabsolutieren'. "Der Wert des Menschen, sofern wir von ihm auf anthropologischer Ebene als von einem Vertreter der menschlichen Art sprechen, ist unstrittig." "Doch der Begriff des Wertes verliert seine Autonomie und Absolutheit, wenn vom Menschen als von einem gesellschaftlichen Wesen die Rede ist." Hier geht es um die gesellschaftliche Bedeutsamkeit eines Menschen.[30] "Daher muß man das Kriterium des Wertes der menschlichen Person in der Sphäre der gesellschaftlichen Verhältnisse suchen, in jener Sphäre, die sein Wesen bestimmt. In dieser Sphäre ist das herrschende Prinzip die Arbeitstätigkeit der Menschen als spezifisch menschliche Tätigkeit. Folglich ist das Kriterium des Wertes einer Person ihr Verhältnis zur Arbeit, die gesellschaftlich nützliche Arbeit des Menschen."[31]

Die Verlegung der Gleichwertigkeit in eine so 'undialektisch' von der sozialen abgegrenzte anthropobiologische Ebene ist unseres Erachtens keine akzeptable Lösung. Denn sie läßt die entscheidende Frage unbeantwortet, was jene Gleichwertigkeit gerade *im* sozialen Bereich für Konsequenzen hat, namentlich, welche mit der Würde des Menschen als Menschen verbundenen Rechte auch durch keinerlei soziale Funktionsunterschiede, selbst nicht durch Verhältnisse der politischen Gegnerschaft und durch gesellschaftswidriges Verhalten außer Kraft gesetzt sein sollen. Um diese Differenzierungen auch terminologisch sichtbar zu machen, wäre zu überlegen, ob man nicht analog zum Unterschied zwischen Person und Persönlichkeit einen Unterschied zwischen Würde des Menschen und Wert seiner einzelnen Qualitäten und Leistungen machen sollte.

DAS SUBJEKT UND DIE GESCHICHTE

Das marxistisch-leninistische Verständnis des geschichtlichen Werdegan-

ges der menschlichen Gesellschaft steht im Zeichen einer durchaus nicht spannungsfreien Polarität der Prinzipien. Mit Marx und Engels erklären die sowjetischen Theoretiker: die Menschen machen ihre Geschichte selbst. Doch oft genug sagen sie das erst an zweiter Stelle, in den Vordergrund jedoch rücken sie die andere These, daß die Geschichte ein 'objektiver Prozeß' unter Gesetzen sei, die vom Menschen als dem Subjekt unabhängig sind. Die Synthese der beiden Sätze soll darin bestehen, daß die Menschen ihre Geschichte nach objektiven Gesetzen machen beziehungsweise daß die objektiven Gesetze sich vermittels des Handelns der Menschen durchsetzen, 'ihren Weg bahnen'. Die Frage ist nur, ob sich die beiden Aspekte in der derzeitigen Darstellung der Theorie wirklich zur Einheit einer Konzeption zusammenschließen. Die Autoren eines der neueren Histomat-Kompendien, V. Ž. Kelle und M. Ja. Koval'zon, heben die Dualität der Aspekte besonders deutlich ins Bewußtsein, indem sie ihr Buch entsprechend gliedern und zuerst den Begriff der Geschichte als eines naturhistorischen Prozesses entwickeln, dann dieselbe Geschichte als Ergebnis der Tätigkeit der Menschen charakterisieren und schließlich auch noch die 'geistige Seite' des Prozesses gesondert zur Sprache bringen. "Die Geschichte", so resümieren die Verfasser, "ist zugleich sowohl ein naturhistorischer Prozeß, der nicht vom Wollen und Wünschen der Menschen abhängt, als auch Resultat der Tätigkeit von Menschen, die sich von ihren Zielen, Wünschen und Bestrebungen leiten lassen. Mit anderen Worten, die geschichtliche Entwicklung ist ein gesetzmäßiger objektiver Prozeß, der sich im Ergebnis der Anstrengungen, der Energie und der Tätigkeit der Menschen, bewußter Wesen, realisiert."[32] Die 'dialektische' Vermittlung der beiden heterogenen Sichtweisen soll darin bestehen, daß die Menschen ihre Geschichte eben unter nicht selbstgewählten Bedingungen zu machen haben; sie machen auch nicht im vollen Sinne 'Geschichte', sondern verfolgen lediglich ihre partiellen Interessen – und dabei "bahnen sich die Gesetze der Geschichte ihren Weg".

Wir finden, daß man hier eine höchst anfechtbare Konstruktion aufgeführt hat, um einen Tatbestand zur Geltung zu bringen, der sich sehr viel besser anders beschreiben ließe. Es steht ganz außer Zweifel, daß in der Geschichte vieles geschehen ist, was nicht gewollt war, und daß vieles, was gewollt war, nicht geschehen ist; daß die Geschichte nicht ein einheitlicher Finalprozeß ist, sondern eine reichlich naturhafte Resultante aus zahllosen miteinander konkurrierenden Aktivitäten; daß jede Tätig-

keit an ein Repertoire materieller Mittel rückgebunden ist und in ihm ein Maß des Möglichen findet. Das alles läßt sich direkt beim Namen nennen, rechtfertigt jedoch kaum die Begriffskonstruktion eines 'objektiven Prozesses'. Nicht weniger problematisch ist die bei den sowjetischen Autoren längst schon habituell gewordene Berufung auf die 'objektiven Gesetze'. Kelle und Koval'zon glauben hier einen 'rationellen Kern' der Hegelschen Geschichtsphilosophie herausschälen zu können: Hegel habe richtig bemerkt, daß in den Handlungen der Menschen etwas realisiert wird, was ihre bewußten Absichten transzendiert. Doch nicht um den Gang eines Weltgeistes handelt es sich: "Der Marxismus hat gezeigt, daß die Geschichte zwar von Menschen gemacht wird, daß deren Tätigkeit jedoch von objektiven Gesetzen des gesellschaftlichen Seins bestimmt und eine Form der Realisation dieser Gesetze ist, unabhängig davon, ob sich die Menschen ihrer bewußt sind oder nicht. Diese Gesetze bestimmen denn auch die objektiven Ergebnisse der menschlichen Handlungen. Die Menschen machen die Geschichte, doch sie machen sie nicht aus Willkür, sondern so, wie sie dazu durch die materiellen Bedingungen ihres Lebens determiniert sind."[33]

Das Irritierende dieser Gedankenführung ist, wie unvermittelt, geradezu sprunghaft sie von der durchaus evidenten Konstatierung einer Nicht-Beliebigkeit des geschichtlichen Gestaltens zu ihrem Begriff der 'objektiven Gesetze' und zur Hypostase des 'objektiven Prozesses' gelangt, die so radikal von der natürlichen Finalität und Bedingtheit menschlichen Handelns abgeschnitten ist. Auch bei anderen sowjetischen Autoren ist dieser Gedankensprung zu beobachten, so auch in G. E. Glezerman's Buch über die Gesetze der gesellschaftlichen Entwicklung: Die gesellschaftliche Entwicklung, heißt es zuerst, wird von den Menschen geschaffen, aber nicht nach eigenem Ermessen, sondern unter bestimmten historischen Bedingungen, die nicht von ihrem Willen und Bewußtsein abhängen. "Daher ist der Gang der historischen Ereignisse nicht allein durch die bewußten Handlungen der Menschen bestimmt. Er ist objektiven, nicht von ihrem Willen und Bewußtsein abhängigen Gesetzen unterworfen, die im Verlaufe der ganzen vergangenen Geschichte ähnlich elementaren Naturkräften über sie geherrscht haben."[34]

Die unvermittelte Einführung der 'Gesetze' vermag umso weniger zu überzeugen, als ihr Kodex in inhaltlicher Hinsicht bis auf ganze wenige Titel recht unbestimmt bleibt und die ganz wenigen unter ihnen, die man

expressis verbis formuliert findet (so das 'Gesetz der Übereinstimmung der Produktionsverhältnisse mit dem Charakter der Produktivkräfte'), in ihrer Partialität bei weitem nicht dazu ausreichen, den Begriff der Geschichte als eines gesetzmäßigen Prozesses zu erfüllen. Gezetze der gesellschaftlichen Prozesse, wie viele oder wie wenige davon präzis formulierbar sein mögen, können kaum etwas anderes als bestimmte Korrelationen zwischen Ausgangssituationen, Verhaltensdispositionen der Subjekte, Zielsetzungen, Verwirklichungsmitteln, Handlungsresultaten und erneuten Reaktionen der Subjekte u.a.m. sein. Sofern Subjektdispositionen einen wesentlichen konstitutiven Anteil an ihnen haben, ist es zumindest irreführend, sie kurzerhand als 'objektiv' zu titulieren. Ebenso dürfte auch die Rede vom 'objektiven Prozeß' nicht sinnvoll sein, wie auch manche anderen der gängigen Formeln (Realisation oder Wirken der Gesetze, sich den Weg bahnen etc.) unangemessen sind.

Es fällt den sowjetischen Theoretikern sichtlich leichter, von den Subjekten und ihren Absichten, Aktivitäten und Resultaten zur Konstruktion eines 'objektiven Prozesses' zu gelangen, als von da den Weg wieder zurück zu einem Verständnis des Sozialgeschehens aus der zwar bedingten und begrenzten, gespaltenen und gebrochenen, aber doch einzig realen Aktivität und Finalität der Subjekte und aus ihren Tätigkeitsimpulsen zu finden. Eine konstruktive Kritik an der jetzigen Konzeption des historischen Materialismus könnte in den Vorschlag ausmünden, das ganze Verfahren umzukehren und, statt die Tätigkeit der menschlichen Subjekte in ein vorfixiertes Schema des 'objektiven Prozesses' und seiner gesetzlichen Korrelationen einordnen zu wollen, vielmehr von dieser Subjekt-Tätigkeit und ihren Antrieben auszugehen und aus ihren Konstellationen und Bedingungen die Resultate (von denen die Subjekte dann wieder rückbetroffen und zu weiteren Tätigkeiten stimuliert werden) und den gesamten 'Gang' des 'Prozesses' begreiflich zu machen. Das läge durchaus in der Konsequenz des Marx-Engelsschen Ansatzes in der *Deutschen Ideologie* und in jenen Passagen der *Heiligen Familie*, die sich gegen eine Hypostasierung der 'Geschichte' wenden und darauf bestehen, daß die Geschichte nichts als die Tätigkeit der ihre Ziele verfolgenden Menschen ist. Keine der im Marxismus mit Recht konstatierten Bedingtheiten und Rückbindungen (namentlich an materielle Verwirklichungsmittel) brauchte mit einer solchen Umkehrung, mit einem solchen anthropologischen (oder pragmatologischen) Rekurs, aus dem Blick

zu verschwinden. Nur so aber kann die historische Subjekt-Problematik zu einer reichen Entfaltung gelangen.

SUBJEKT UND SPONTANEITÄT

Die Degradierung des Subjekts in vielen (nicht in allen) Gedankenkonstruktionen der sowjetischen Theoretiker besteht nicht darin, daß man seine Aktivität leugnete – das Gegenteil trifft zu –, sondern darin, daß man das Moment der Spontaneität nicht gebührend zur Geltung kommen läßt; 'Spontaneität' ist sogar weithin zu einem Ausdruck für die Benennung eines bloß naturhaft-reaktiven Verhaltens ohne höhere Bewußtheit geworden. Wir wollen darunter im folgenden jedoch (wie es übrigens auch aus den Erklärungen des sowjetischen Philosophischen Wörterbuchs[35] hervorgeht) das Moment oder den Anteil qualitativ bestimmter (gattungsspezifischer und individueller, reproduktiver und produktiver) 'Selbstbewegung' = 'Selbsttätigkeit' verstehen, der in keiner Bedingtheit von außen und in keinem Produkt-Status aufgeht, worin also ein Individuum, soweit es solche Spontaneität besitzt, unmittelbar am faktischen und normativen 'Wesen' der menschlichen Gattung teilhat, namentlich auch an jedem möglichen historischen Progreß.

Daß man hierfür in der sowjetischen Konzeption des historischen Materialismus erst noch den nötigen Raum schaffen muß, läßt sich an verschiedenen Erörterungen demonstrieren, in denen jeweils die Ursprünglichkeit des Subjekts in Frage steht; sie betreffen die Verwurzelung menschlich-gesellschaftlichen Handelns in Bedürfnissen und Interessen, den Ursprung von Zielen des Handelns, die Wertcharakteristik der Lebensverhältnisse und die menschliche Freiheit. In jedem Falle geht die Tendenz dahin, dem Subjekt und dem Subjekt-eigenen seine Ursprünglichkeit und Autonomie zu nehmen und den *nomos* in etwas von ihm Unabhängiges zu verlegen.

Im Gegensatz zu der Möglichkeit, in den *Bedürfnissen* (oder der Bedürftigkeit) der Menschen etwas faktisch und normativ Letztes zu sehen, argumentieren V. Ž. Kelle und M. Ja. Koval'zon, daß damit überhaupt nichts erklärt sei; die Bedürfnisse hängen von den Lebensbedingungen ab, vom Produktionsniveau.[36] "In der Tat", schreibt A. V. Borzenko in einer Studie über die 'Ziele' in der gesellschaftlichen Entwicklung, "die nächste Ursache menschlicher Tätigkeit sind stets bewußte Antriebe und

die aus ihnen erwachsenden Ziele und Bestrebungen." Doch die Ziele, fährt der Autor fort, "widerspiegeln die Außenwelt", sind von ihr allerdings nicht unmittelbar bestimmt, sondern "vermittels der Bedürfnisse der Menschen und den ganzen Komplex seiner geistigen Welt. Die Bedürfnisse der Menschen wiederum bilden sich im Prozeß ihrer unmittelbaren Wechselwirkung mit der Außenwelt und miteinander, sie sind ein Produkt des sozialen Lebens."[37] Was mit diesen umständlichen Worten gemeint ist, wird man verstehen. Es ergibt jedoch ein einseitiges, anthropologisch unzutreffendes Bild, wenn man sich nur an jene Fälle hält, in denen Bedürfnisse infolge irgendwelcher Stimulationen (z.B. neue Produktionsmöglichkeiten) historisch entstehen. Das alles sind schließlich doch nur Zutaten zu einem Fundus an Bedürfnissen, die der Mensch einfach hat und elementar empfindet; vieles von der historischen Variabilität der Bedürfnisse und Interessen läuft auf eine qualitative und quantitative Konkretisierung jenes Fundus hinaus. Und die Frage, wie neue Bedürfnisse allererstmalig wach werden, läßt sich durch keinerlei Rekurs auf Außenwelt und soziales Leben beantworten – hier stößt man auf dieselbe Spontaneität, die auch den Bedürfniskonstanten eigen ist.

Dieselbe Tendenz zeigt sich in den Erörterungen über den Wertcharakter von Gütern, menschlichen Verhaltensweisen und sozialen Ordnungen. So versucht V. V. Mšvenieradze auf sehr rigorose Weise, diese Wertcharaktere vom Stigma der Subjektivität zu reinigen. Es ist wahr, daß der Wert eines Sachverhalts relativ auf ein Interesse ist. "Doch diese Interessen haben ungeachtet ihrer subjektiven Form selbst eine objektive Grundlage und bringen objektive soziale Verhältnisse, vor allem ökonomische, zum Ausdruck." In historischer Dimension soll als 'objektiver Maßstab' des Wertes eine 'objektive Gesetzmäßigkeit des sozialen Fortschritts' fungieren, doch die Definitionsformel für das Wort 'Wert' vermag kaum zu verbergen, daß hinter all dem Reden vom 'Objektiven' = Nicht-Subjektiven letztlich doch die Realität (und natürlich nicht nur das 'Bewußtsein' und 'Wollen') eines normativen Subjekts steht: "Der Wert ist eine soziale Kategorie zur Bezeichnung der materiellen und geistigen Erscheinungen, die von den Menschen im Kampf um den sozialen Fortschritt, die Freiheit und das Aufblühen der menschlichen Persönlichkeit geschaffen werden."[38] Nicht so verklausuliert ist die Relativität der Wertcharaktere auf ein Subjekt bei S. I. Popov: "Das Wertverhältnis des Menschen zur Wirklichkeit formiert sich auf der Grundlage seiner Interessen und

Bedürfnisse; der Mensch selbst ist der höchste und in einem bestimmten Sinne der unbedingte Wert... Die volle Entwicklung des Menschen ist der Selbstzweck der Geschichte und das 'wahre Reich der Freiheit'."[39] Doch wo der Verfasser, der in solcher Weise den konstitutiven Anteil des Subjekts deutlich genug ausgesprochen hat, auf die Frage nach dem 'Kriterium' des Wertvollseins zu sprechen kommt, da bringt er es doch nicht fertig, dem Wertempfinden selbst die letzte Entscheidung zuzuerkennen, sondern gerät ins Unbestimmte: er widerspricht der von einem anderen Autor geäußerten Ansicht, Maßstab des Wertes sei der Mensch selbst; die Rückführung des Wertes auf die Gesetzmäßigkeit des sozialen Fortschritts komme der Wahrheit schon näher, am richtigsten aber sei es, als das universelle Wertkriterium die 'gesellschaftliche Praxis' gelten zu lassen, welche die 'bewegende Kraft' des sozialen Fortschritts ist.[40]

Die subordinative Behandlung des Subjekts wird nirgends deutlicher als im Verständnis der menschlichen Freiheit als 'Einsicht in die Notwendigkeit'. "Der Mensch ist frei", erklärt F.V. Konstantinov, "wenn er sich in seiner gesellschaftlich bedeutsamen Tätigkeit bewußt von den objektiven Gesetzen des historischen Fortschritts leiten läßt."[41] Wie sehr sich eine so verstandene Freiheit auf Gehorsam reduzieren kann, sieht man an der Formel von D. I. Kerimov: "Die Freiheit des Individuums besteht in der Unterordnung seines Willens, seiner Antriebe und seiner Handlungen unter die bewußt erfaßten gesellschaftlich bedeutsamen Ziele, was eine Herrschaft der Vernunft über die Gefühle, Selbstbeherrschung, Organisiertheit und Selbstdisziplin, die Lenkung seiner Tätigkeit nicht zum Schaden, sondern zum Nutzen der Gesellschaft gewährleistet."[42]

Manches davon mag seine gute Berechtigung haben, doch es macht nicht das Wesen der Freiheit aus. Vielmehr handelt es sich hier um eine Rückbindung des in seiner Zielrichtung autonomen, freien Handelns an bestimmte natürliche und gesellschaftliche Ordnungen, in denen es sich bewegt. Die Unterordnung, die darin liegt, ist selbst etwas Untergeordnetes: sie betrifft gewisse Rücksichtnahmen bei der Wahl von Mitteln und Verhaltensweisen, auch bei der Setzung von Teilzielen, doch dies geschieht stets in Unterordnung unter Gesamt- und Endziele, die das Subjekt autonom setzt oder hat. Das sekundäre Unterordnungsverhältnis (das in der Tat die Freiheit nicht aufzuheben braucht) zum Inbegriff der Freiheit selbst zu erheben bedeutet eine Verkehrung. Man kann den sowjetischen Theoretikern zwar nicht vorwerfen, sie hätten überhaupt

kein Augenmerk für jene anderen Aspekte des Freiheitsproblems – von der innerpsychischen Freiheit des Wollens und Denkens über die politisch-rechtliche Freiheit des Dürfens bis zu der im vollen Sinne praktischen Freiheit des Könnens, der Verwirklichung gesetzter Ziele –, also jener Aspekte, in denen sich Freiheit keineswegs in 'Einsicht in die Notwendigkeit' erschöpft. Doch die Dominanz, mit der sie diese Formel als Inbegriff des philosophischen Freiheitsverständnisses schlechthin verfechten, bringt mit sich eine Einseitigkeit, die durchaus nicht 'harmlos' ist. Sie trägt bei zu jener allgemeinen Verdrängung der Subjekt-Spontaneität. Wir werden folglich dafür plädieren, daß man von der Fixierung eines Sekundärverhältnisses, als welches sich die Einsicht in (faktisch und normativ) Notwendiges erweist, zum wirklichen Ursprung zurückgeht und die Freiheit so versteht, wie es V.P. Tugarinov wiederholt umschrieben hat: als die Möglichkeit, nicht unter äußerer Nötigung, sondern nach eigenem Willen zu denken und zu handeln.[43]

SUBJEKT UND PROJEKT

Der Marxismus hat seine Wurzel in einer 'Philosophie des menschlichen Selbstbewußtseins'. Von diesem Selbstbewußtsein als der 'obersten Gottheit'[44] führte der Weg zur Proklamation des Menschen als des 'höchsten Wesens' und zu einem kategorischen Imperativ, alle Verhältnisse umzuwerfen, in denen der Mensch ein erniedrigtes Wesen ist.[45] Die Projektion zukünftiger gesellschaftlicher Ordnungen entsteht in der Reaktion eines autonomen Wesens auf eine Heteronomie, der es unterworfen ist – auf die 'Entfremdung' als Inbegriff von Privation, Repression und Destruktion, wogegen sich eine (allgemeine oder bestimmt veranlagte) menschliche Natur empört.[46] Diese Motivationsordnung ist jedoch in der Gesellschaftslehre des sowjetischen Marxismus aus verschiedenen Gründen (die sich in ideologiekritischer Analyse bestimmen ließen) gründlich durcheinandergeraten. Es kam geradezu zu einer Entfremdung der Theorie vom Subjekt, deren hauptsächliche Aspekte wir betrachtet haben. In der nachstalinschen Ära hat sich die Problematik des Subjekts (wiederum aus Gründen, die in der Verfassung der sowjetischen Gesellschaft liegen) neu aktualisiert. Die programmatischen Deklarationen der Parteiideologie sind den theoretischen Konstruktionen der Philosophie darin sogar um einiges vorausgeeilt, den Philosophen steht nunmehr die theoretische

Bewältigung dieser Problematik bevor. Der zentrale Anwendungsbereich ist die anthropologische Konstitution der sowjetischen Gesellschaft selbst: in der Praxis drängt sich den Theoretikern die vielschichtige Frage auf, in welcher Weise der Mensch als Subjekt aller 'gesellschaftlichen Verhältnisse' das Maß des Notwendigen wie auch des Möglichen ist.

Aus der Vielfalt der damit akut werdenden Überlegungen wollen wir nur das generelle Problem der anthropologischen Begründung des Kommunismus herausgreifen. Nicht ohne Widerstände und Rezidive setzt sich in der sowjetischen Gesellschaftslehre seit einigen Jahren die Ansicht durch, daß der Kommunismus vor allem ein 'Ideal' ist, dem bestimmte anthropologische Normen zugrunde liegen, daß er einen evidenten Wert für die Menschen haben soll, die unter ihm leben. Bei V. P. Tugarinov, der als einer der ersten sowjetischen Philosophen die axiologische Konstitution des gesellschaftlichen Lebens und auch der sozialistisch-kommunistischen Ordnung ausdrücklich erörtert hat, sehen wir, wie mühsam sich diese Sichtweise gegen die verdinglichte, entfremdete Konstruktion des objektiv-notwendigen Prozesses durchsetzen muß. Der Sozialismus, so erklärt Tugarinov, ist "das Resultat des unwiderstehlichen Wirkens der objektiven Gesetze der historischen Entwicklung", eine "objektive, naturhistorische Erscheinung", und die Theorie des Sozialismus der "wissenschaftliche Ausdruck dieser historischen Notwendigkeit". Doch Sozialismus und Kommunismus sind zugleich "auch ein höchster Wert für Millionen Werktätige", also "nicht nur historisch notwendig, unausweichlich, sondern auch wünschenswert für Milliarden von Menschen".[47] Man wird kaum sagen können, daß axiologische Normativität und 'objektive Notwendigkeit' hier in einer überzeugenden und durchsichtigen Weise vermittelt wären, zumal dann nicht, wenn die axiologische Qualifikation gar als ein Derivat aus der wissenschaftlichen Feststellung der 'objektiven Notwendigkeit' hervorgehen soll.

Wir haben es hier mit einem pragmatologischen Kalkül zu tun, in dem axiologische und faktologische (wissenschaftlich feststellbare) Konstituentien eng miteinander verflochten sind, und zwar in einem bestimmten Subordinationsverhältnis. Das eindeutige *prius* und der zentrierende Bezugspunkt ist in jedem Falle ein Subjekt mit bestimmten Zielrichtungen seines Strebens, die sich bei aller historischen Spezifikation durchaus auch anthropologisch-generell bezeichnen lassen und als Richtungen eines Wünschens und Sehnens dem Können und Verwirklichen weit vorauszu-

laufen pflegen. Etwas derartiges ist auch für die Idee des Kommunismus noch vor aller wissenschaftlichen Bedingungsanalyse konstitutiv gewesen und geblieben, wenn es ihm letzten Endes darum zu tun ist, eine menschliche Lebensordnung der Fülle, Gleichheit, Freiheit und Harmonie herbeizuführen. Die 'historische Notwendigkeit' dieses Schrittes ist von Hause aus axiologisch, auf dieser Stufe muß es darum heißen: notwendig, weil wünschenswert – nicht umgekehrt. Ein Leben ohne Not und ohne Ausbeutung, Beherrschung und Vernichtung des Menschen durch den Menschen zu postulieren ist noch kein wissenschaftlicher Akt.

Die wissenschaftliche Reflexion beginnt mit Fragen wie jener nach der Fundierung des anthropologischen Ideals in einem durch und durch nüchternen, illusionslosen Begriff der 'menschlichen Natur' und des Spektrums ihrer Möglichkeiten, nach den instrumentalen (sachlich-materiellen und institutionellen) Voraussetzungen einer Realisation des Erwünschten, nach den Schritten und Etappen des Verwirklichungsweges. Auch hier entscheidet sich, wie schon hinsichtlich der vorlaufenden Zielrichtungen, das Wesentlichste an den Möglichkeiten des Subjekts selbst – denn auch die sachlichen Voraussetzungen sind das, als was sie fungieren, nur in Korrelation mit entsprechenden Verhaltensdispositionen der Subjekte. Für den Kommunismus geht es hier – von der vorausgegangenen Bereitschaft zum revolutionären Sturz der alten Ordnung abgesehen – unter anderem darum, wie die Menschen unter entsprechenden Voraussetzungen ihr Verhältnis zur Arbeit gestalten werden, wie sie angesichts eines bestimmten Gütervolumens ihre Konsumforderungen bemessen und welche Verteilungsproportionen sie für angemessen halten werden, in welcherlei Konkurrenz sie dann noch geraten können und in welche nicht mehr, wie allgemein das Interesse an den öffentlichen Angelegenheiten sein wird und anderes mehr; in alledem ist es immer auch die Frage, in welchen Grenzen das programmatisch angelegte Agieren der einen das prognostisch und hypothetisch, unter Kategorien der 'Möglichkeit' bestimmbare Verhalten der anderen Subjekte zu determinieren vermag. Alles Projektieren ist an solche Bedingungen der Möglichkeit rückgebunden. Auf dieser Stufe kann praktisch notwendig nur das werden, was auch reell möglich ist – wünschenswert zu sein genügt allein noch nicht.

Das Subjekt ist somit in zweifachem Sinne legislativ, in dem, was es sich wünscht, wie in dem, was es praktisch vermag. Die Legislative, von der hier die Rede ist, besteht natürlich nicht in einer beliebigen Setzung,

jedenfalls in wirklich lebenswichtigen Dingen nicht. Eher kann man sagen, ein jeweils bestimmtes Wollen ist mit dem Subjekt immer schon zugleich mitgesetzt. (Freilich wäre es im weiteren Sache einer sorgfältigen Prüfung, festzustellen, von welcher partikulären oder generellen Intersubjektivität die Projektionsrichtungen sind, wo es doch bis jetzt neben jedem bestimmttypischen Projektieren stets auch heterotypisches und antitypisches gegeben hat.)

In den hier lediglich angedeuteten Richtungen eröffnet sich ein weites Feld von Reflexionen, die in das Zentrum einer historisch-materialistischen Theorie der menschlichen Gesellschaft zu rücken wären und von diesem Zentrum her das Ganze 'subjektologisch' zu durchdringen hätten, dabei alle fetischistischen Verdinglichungen auflösend. Im Stile der 'Lösungen', die in der sowjetischen Welt so beliebt sind, könnte man sagen: die Entfaltung der Theorie des Subjekts 'entscheidet jetzt alles'.

ANMERKUNGEN

1. In den deutschen Ausgaben: *Marx oder Sartre? Versuch einer Philosophie des Menschen*, 1964, 176 S., und *Marxismus und das menschliche Individuum*, 1965, 349 S.
2. *Ličnost' i obščestvo*, 1965, Str. 25–26.
3. *Gumanizm*, 1964, S. 154. Im gleichen Sinne F. V. Konstantinov: "Das, was ein Mensch seiner Natur nach geworden ist und darstellt, verdankt er in erster Linie der Gesellschaft, der Geschichte der Gesellschaft, historisch bestimmten gesellschaftlichen Verhältnissen, nicht aber irgendeiner spontanen, abgesonderten Entwicklung der Persönlichkeit." (in: *Čelovek i ėpocha*, 1964, Str. 89)
4. *Gumanizm*, str. 156.
5. *Ibidem*, str. 157.
6. *Ibidem*, str. 160.
7. Vgl. M. Landmann: *Der Mensch als Schöpfer und Geschöpf der Kultur*, 1961, S. 46 u.a.
8. Philosophisch-ökonomische Manuskripte, in: *Frühe Schriften* I, Hrsg. H.-J. Lieber und P. Furth, 1962, S. 597. Wie sehr immer wieder sowjetische Autoren gegen dieses Gebot verstoßen, läßt sich an einem Aufsatz zweier Autoren, N.N. Kulikova und G. K. Gumnickij, 'Zum Problem des Kriteriums des sittlichen Fortschritts' demonstrieren. ('K probleme kriterija nravstvennogo progressa', in: *Vestnik GMU* 1965, 2) Die Gesellschaft erscheint hier als "etwas, das über jeglichen individuellen Bestrebungen steht, als der höchste Wert oder das höchste Gut" (str. 37). "Daher ist das Wesen der moralischen Beziehung eine Wechselbeziehung von Gesellschaft und Einzelperson, die auf die Unterordnung des persönlichen Interesses unter die Gesellschaft, die im gegebenen Moment Trägerin des sozialen Fortschritts ist, gegründet ist." (str. 37–38) Das 'Gesetz der Zufriedenstellung der Interessen eines jeden', das in den Kategorien der Menschlichkeit und Gerechtigkeit seinen Ausdruck findet, trägt demgegenüber 'abgeleiteten' Charakter (str. 38). "Das Wohl der

(Einzel)Person kann kein ursprünglicher, vollkommen selbständiger moralischer Wert sein. ... Das persönliche Wohl ist ein großer moralischer Wert, doch es kann moralische Bedeutung nur insoweit haben, als es dem Gemeinwohl nicht widerspricht und aus ihm als dem höheren Ziel hervorgeht." (str. 39)

9. Im Feuerbach-Kapitel der *Deutschen Ideologie* findet man einen Passus, in dem das Wort 'Individuen' besonders häufig vorkommt, fast in jeder Zeile. (*Werke* Bd. 3, 1958, S. 67)
10. Wahrscheinlich hat Marx an dieser Stelle überhaupt nichts Erschöpfendes und Ausschließendes über das menschliche Wesen sagen, sondern nur betonen wollen, daß das Phänomen der Religion nicht aus einem übergeschichtlichen menschlichen Wesen, sondern aus einer historisch bestimmten Gestalt der Gesellschaft erwächst.
11. Leitartikel in *VF* 1963, 2, 6; V. P. Tugarinov: *Ličnost' i obščestvo*, str. 30–31.
12. *Čelovek i ėpocha*, str. 65.
13. *Ličnost' i obščestvo*, str. 24–25, 43.
14. *Ibidem*, str. 88.
15. *Ibidem*, str. 29.
16. *Ibidem*, str. 28.
17. *Ibidem*, str. 25.
18. *Ibidem*, str. 42.
19. *Ibidem*, str. 41.
20. A. Schaff: *Marxismus und das menschliche Individuum*, S. 126.
21. *Ibidem*, S. 126–127.
22. *Ibidem*, S. 127–128.
23. V. P. Tugarinov, *ibidem*, str. 43.
24. *Ibidem*, str. 15.
25. *Osnovy marksistkoj ėtiki*, 1961, str. 321.
26. *Ibidem*, str. 322.
27. *Ibidem*, str. 324.
28. C. Taylor: 'Marxism and Humanism', *The New Reasoner*, 1958, 2, 96–97.
29. *Gumanizm*, str. 190.
30. *Ibidem*, str. 190, 191.
31. *Ibidem*, str. 188, 189.
32. *Istoričeskij materializm*, 1962, str. 159, 160.
33. *Ibidem*, S. 162.
34. *O zakonach obščestvennogo razvitija*, 1960, str. 90. Vgl. auch V. P. Tugarinov: *Licnost' i obščestvo*, str. 25, und A. V. Borzenko: *Problema celi v obščestvennom razvitii*, 1963, str. 7.
35. *Filosofskij slovar'*, 1963, str. 428–429.
36. *Istoričeskij materializm*, str. 161, 163.
37. *Problema celi v obščestvennom razvitii*, str. 11.
38. 'Marksizm i problema cennostej', *FN* 1965, 1, 69.
39. 'Kategorii cennosti i ocenki i marksistskaja filosofija', *FN* 1965, 5, 58.
40. *Ibidem*, 58.
41. *Čelovek i ėpocha*, str. 92.
42. 'Svoboda i pravo', *FN* 1964, 3, 21.
43. *Ličnost' i obščestvo*, S. 61.
44. Marx, Vorrede zur Doktordissertation, in: *Frühe Schriften* I, S. 21–22.
45. Marx, Einleitung zur Kritik der Hegelschen Rechtsphilosophie, in: *Frühe Schriften* I, S. 497.

46. Die Vorstellung von einer allgemeinen menschlichen Natur als Grundstock jeder 'historisch modifizierten Menschennatur' ist auch für den Marx des *Kapital* noch bedeutsam. Die hier gebrauchte Redewendung – 'etwas, wogegen sich die menschliche Natur empört' – ist aus Engels' früher Arbeit über die Lage der arbeitenden Klassen in England entnommen. (*Werke*, Bd. 2, S. 257)
47. *O cennostjach žizni i kul'tury*, 1960, str. 6.

J. SCHIEBEL

NATIONAL-LIBERATION MOVEMENTS, HISTORICAL MATERIALISM, AND SOVIET PHILOSOPHY

In the last thirty years, a number of problems in Soviet thought and historiography which the Soviet leadership found to be too bothersome either politically or academically, have been evaded by consigning them to the Orwellian category of 'un-problems'. In the past few years one of these un-problems, that of the Marxist-Leninist concept of the 'Asiatic mode of production', has been brought back to life in the form of a renewed discussion of this aspect of Marx' thought (Lenin's contribution still being, for the moment, ignored). At the beginning of 1965, this problem was submitted to Soviet philosophers who, presumably, are being asked to participate in its resolution. A review article, entitled 'On the Pages of the Journal *La Pensée*', by M. A. Vitkin and N. B. Ter-Akopjan in the March, 1965 issue of the *Voprosy filosofii* (pp. 172–176) seeks to bring Soviet philosophers into the renewed "discussion of problems of the Asiatic mode of production".

Despite the fact that most of the problems involved in a discussion of this concept of societal structures and historical development would, in the West, concern not the philosopher but the political or social scientist, Western philosophers dealing with Soviet thought are likely to be drawn into this discussion.

To begin with, this problem has been placed before Soviet philosophers as part of the wider program of topics and issues assigned to them, which alone would make the matter of interest to students of Soviet philosophy.

Then, the resolution of conflicts between theories of unilinear and of multilinear historical development depends on how the pertinent implications of the socio-historical analysis of Oriental societies are dealt with. Since historical materialism in its most recent formulation presupposes a unilinear sequence of historical development, the fact that the Marxist concept of the Asiatic mode of production establishes multilinear patterns of development is likely to call for extensive and potentially troublesome adjustments in histomat. As long as Soviet thinkers maintain the peculiar

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dependence of historical materialism and its economic, historiographic, political and social conclusions on the principles of dialectical materialism, these problems do interest Soviet philosophy and must therefore, again, engage its Western student.

As will be shown, the Soviet political and academic leadership expects this renewed discussion to be a controlled one, that is a discussion of those implications which are likely to be useful to certain Soviet political objectives, while omitting at the same time those aspects which have in the past been politically embarrassing to the Soviet leadership or which raise questions regarding the present structure of histomat. Western scholars should seek to take part in this discussion to increase their understanding; they may conceivably also clarify some matters. If, moreover, the Soviet scholars should desire genuine dialogue on this issue, that would be all to the good.

Whether Western scholars can succeed in de-controlling the discussion and whether their contributions will be acknowledged by the Soviet discussants remains to be seen. Academic considerations alone would require that an attempt be made to assure that certain difficulties will no longer be avoided by Soviet scholars (or by Western scholars calling themselves Marxists) through the suppression or distortion of uncongenial facts and sources.

Besides the implications concerning the multilinear structure of the Marxist and early Leninist theories of historical development, a number of political and "sociological" problems are exposed by a full discussion of the theory of the Asiatic mode of production. This concept of the Asiatic, Oriental or managerial society[1], as developed by Marx, Engels, Plexanov, Lenin and other Russian Marxists from earlier formulations, identifies a societal form in which, for a variety of reasons, the state, composed of a single ruler and a ruling bureaucracy dependent on the former, controls a socially, politically and economically atomized social structure; a society whose lack of a social structure independent of the state makes it politically impotent against the power of the state. One outstanding characteristic of this societal form, and one especially relevant to the Marxist analysis, was held by Marxist analysts to be its non-dynamic, non-developmental nature. Since Oriental society was seen by them as having, to a considerable extent, originated in ecological conditions rather than in social antagonisms (and consequently devoid of any inner social dynamic),

was seen as being subject to change only through outside interference, and was explicitly considered as a separate formation subject to entirely different laws of social structure and development than those governing such non-Oriental societies as classical antiquity and medieval (feudal) society, there would appear to be no room for it in the general developmental scheme which Marx and Engels had acclaimed from 1845 to 1853 for the West European societies, and which has since been presented by 'scientific Communism' as a universal law of societal development.

There are several immediate implications of this concept of the Oriental society for Marxism, Marxism-Leninism and contemporary Soviet thought: because it shows Marx' scheme for societal development to have been multilinear, it casts doubts on the claims, advanced essentially for political reasons, of the inevitable need for all societies to develop through the familiar stages from primitive communism to the final Communist stage. More seriously, it challenges the description of the present Soviet state as a Socialist state in the process of developing toward a Communist order. Marx, Engels, Lenin and virtually the entire Russian Marxist movement had identified Russia as a marginal form of Oriental despotism i.e. a single-centered, bureaucratic state stronger than its fragmented society. Lenin had posited several conditions which would insure that a Bolshevik-led anti-autocratic revolution in Russia would not only place total power in Bolshevik hands, but that the new state would be a Socialist state. These necessary preconditions for avoiding the mere replacement of one system of total power by another were well known to the Bolshevik membership. They consisted of the absolute guarantee that the Russian revolution would trigger a socialist revolution in the industrialized West which, in turn, could assure that the revolutionary regime in Russia would become socialist in form, and of the relative guarantee that for an initial period after the assumption of power, there would be rule without a bureaucracy, a standing army and a secret police to permit a socialist social structure to emerge from the unrestricted interplay between remaining class antagonisms. It is precisely the restoration of a new form of the old despotic regime which Lenin had predicted in the event these preconditions were not met (and they were most assuredly not met) that can be shown to have in fact occurred by applying Marxist criteria to an evaluation of the events of 1917 and the Bolshevik regime that resulted from them. Indeed, investigations of the Soviet system

through methods of institutional analysis preferred by Western scholars have yielded results substantially in agreement with the conclusions offered by the early Marxist-Leninist concept of Oriental despotism, of the 'Asiatic' interpretation of Russia's history and state, and of the 'programming' of the Russian revolution: that the Bolshevik revolution in Russia did succeed in removing the old order and in giving all power to the Bolshevik leadership, but that it failed to establish a Socialist order in Russia, restoring instead a totalitarian despotism in, as it turned out, a more severe form than was ever taken by the despotism of the past.

There can be little doubt that it was this embarrassing implication which caused the Soviet leadership to impose a blackout on the concept of the Asiatic mode of production which, until recently, has been quite successful. Beginning with the so-called Leningrad discussion ending in February, 1931 (part of a then wider effort to eliminate meaningful discussion from formulations of Soviet thought), and ending in 1950 with an official report on Soviet Oriental studies, announcing "the rout of the notorious theory of the 'Asiatic mode of production'"[2], every effort was made to make of the concept an un-concept, to make un-writings of the pertinent sources, to purge the memories of scholars of these ideas and, indeed, to purge some of the interested scholars themselves.

Three major reasons appear to have caused this renewal of the discussion of Asiatic society among the Marxists and the Communists. Karl A. Wittfogel, who has provided the first systematic treatment of this concept, not only was not silenced, either personally or literarily, but the impact of his work has become so great that several Marxist writers began to speak of the need to go to battle against the renegades and falsifiers of Marxism, and especially against Wittfogel's "caricature of the Asiatic mode of production", which they felt "compelled to indicate" had "contributed to the renewal of interest".[3] Then, more and new material has become available to Soviet scholars. But while they must be given credit for taking up now such works of Marx as the 'Forms Preceding the Capitalist Mode of Production' (a chapter in the *Grundrisse zur Kritik der Politischen Oekonomie*), they must also bear the responsibility for not having done so earlier.

Most importantly, however, the renewed interest is due not primarily to scholarly reasons, but to political needs of the Soviet leadership. Summarizing a Moscow discussion of February, 1965, led by Academician

and *Voprosy filosofii* editor M. B. Mitin and devoted to tasks, laws and categories of scientific Communism, Soviet philosophy, as officially as is possible, stated that whereas the "general line of the world-wide Communist movement ... has been determined in ... 1957 and 1960", there remained now the task of "further working out, deepening, making more concrete problems of this line", including the "strategy and tactics of the Communist movement ... in countries, in which the national-liberation movement has gone underway or has already succeeded."[4] Despite the fact that philosophy and political economy are not held solely responsible for the treatment of social-political problems, the problems involved in the concept of the 'non-capitalist path of development' have, with others, become specific tasks of scientific Communism[5], and have been submitted to Soviet philosophers for treatment within the newly emphasized category of the 'non-capitalist path of development'.[6] As is indicated above, the political problem of the national-liberation strategy has been made into a philosophical problem, illustrating the continuing role of Soviet scholarship, no matter how creative in itself, of rationalizing political decisions.

This particular new task of Soviet 'scientific' work has become especially urgent because many among the African and Asian intelligentsia, unexpectedly insofar as the Soviet leadership was concerned, have raised objections to the previous Communist claim to direct and guide their aspirations which had been based on the unilinear concept of development. They had been expected to accept Communist scientific and political authority because the transition of African and Asian societies to Socialism and Communism was claimed to be as inevitable as in the Western, industrialized societies, and for the same dialectical reasons. The 'new look' in scientific Communism presents a more sophisticated argument, and seeks to elicit an Asian and African[7] following by agreeing not only that conditions in the colonial or so-called backward areas were fundamentally different, but that Marx and the Marxists had known so all along and that they possessed the proper socio-analytic concepts to deal with these conditions. Communists, Russian as well as Chinese, and Western Communists thus find themselves resorting to concepts which in 1931 were believed to imperil their work in Asia and Africa.

The next set of questions by the native African and Asian intelligentia may well include inquiries into the Soviet and Chinese experience which,

after all, was based not on West European institutional foundations and revolutionary processes, but on essentially similar conditions as those confronting the national leadership in Africa and Asia. The Soviet leadership has every reason to fear that such inquiries will result in less eagerness to emulate its experience and will no doubt be better off if it succeeds in its present attempts to exclude Russia and China from the discussion.

CONTROLLED DISCUSSION WANTED

All of this, then, makes it quite apparent that what is wanted is a 'controlled discussion', that is a treatment of the concept of the Asiatic mode of production and of its theoretical implications for the doctrine of historical development, as they can be applied to the Soviet political strategy in the countries of Asia and Africa said to be ready for national-liberation movements, without any mention of its troublesome implications for historical materialism itself and for the socio-historical analysis of the results of the revolution in Russia and of the present Soviet system.

The discussion among Communists so far, and especially the article in the *Voprosy filosofii* which brings Soviet philosophers into the discussion, reveals some of the restrictions which the 'controllers' of the discussion impose upon themselves. The authors of the article appear to mention only congenial literature. They refer primarily to the *Pensée* group, to E. Varga's 'The Asiatic Mode of Production' in his *Essays on Problems of the Political Economy of Capitalism* (Moscow, 1964), to a symposium of the VIIth International Congress of Ethnographic and Anthropological Sciences, held in Moscow in August, 1964, to several articles in the journal *Narodi Azii i Afriki*, to Marx' *Capital*, Engels' *Anti-Dühring*, and to "various articles of the founders of Marxism". They also indicate that Lenin may have had something to say on the question. References are also made to Marx' 'Synopsis of M. M. Kovalevskij's Communal Agriculture' (*Sovetskoe Vostokovedenie*, No. 3, 1958, p. 5) and to I. M. D'jakonov's 'The Obščina in the Ancient East in the Works of Soviet Researchers' (*Vestnik Drevnej Istorij* 1 (1963) 32), as well as to other Soviet orientalists.

This is, indeed, a narrow selection. The *Pensée* group is not much more hospitable to uncongenial literature than are Vitkin and Ter-Akopjan in *Voprosy filosofii*, even though the former covers a bit more ground. Varga

restricts himself to problems which do not involve Russia and China. The above-mentioned symposium did not go beyond the limits of the discussion reached by the *Pensée* contributors. The *Voprosy filosofii*, in fact, acknowledges that the writings of Parain, Chesneaux, Godelier, Suret-Canale and Tokei represent the "fullest presentation of the discussion in progress".[8] What is true for the symposium applies also to the articles on the subject which have hitherto appeared in *Narodi Afriki i Azii*. None of this means, of course, that any discussion in future editions of these journals, or indeed in the *Voprosy filosofii*, will not cover more ground, but for the time being it is by no means certain that some of the key factors missing from the discussion will appear unless the Soviet scholars are reminded of them, if even then.

What are some of these missing factors? What Marx said on the subject in *Capital*, in the 1859 Preface to the *Critique of Political Economy*, in his articles on India, in the 'Forms Preceding Capitalism', and what Engels contributed in the *Anti-Dühring* and in the *Origins of the Family, Property and the State* are indeed interesting, as are the various drafts of Marx' letter to Vera Zasulich, but what is contained in their writings described only as "various articles"? Do they comprise the 'Revelations of the Diplomatic History of the Eighteenth Century'[9], which identify the Russian state as institutionally Asiatic? That these have been made unwritings in the aftermath of the Leningrad discussion appears to constitute no scholarly reason for excluding them from consideration.

What Lenin actually did say on the question has nowhere been indicated in the renewed discussion among the Communists, although the statements of the unedited Lenin, that is his pre-1916 identification of traditional Russia as an Asiatic despotism, and his clear acknowledgement of the danger of a degeneration of the Socialist revolution into a restoration of the disintegrating bureaucratic despotism if the guarantees against it did not materialize, would be of the utmost importance here.

Altogether omitted is George Plexanov, who not only is widely credited with having sired the Russian Marxist movement, but who also had more to say on the concept of the Asiatic mode of production and its significance to Communism in Russia than anyone commended to the attention of Soviet philosophers. He, unlike many of the other present 'discussants', was after all a *bona fide* philosopher. Perhaps he is excluded because his insights challenge the present Soviet leadership no less than they did Lenin.

Perhaps a case can be made for excluding Max Weber, since his interesting observations on Oriental bureaucracy and statecraft were not presented systematically, but there can surely be no adequate discussion of the subject when Karl August Wittfogel's systematic analysis of "states stronger than society", of Oriental society, of the history of the concept of Oriental despotism, and of the fate of the concept of the Asiatic mode of production among the fathers of Marxism and their Russian heirs is excluded. In this case at least, as has already been indicated, the Marxist scholars hint at what is being omitted: Ferenc Tokei, echoing Charles Chesneaux, cites one of the objectives of the renewed discussion to be the need to "take the lead of the discussion from the revisionists and from the falsifiers like Wittfogel".[10] And N. B. Ter-Akopjan, the co-author of the *Voprosy filosofii* article elsewhere rejects Wittfogel's argument that Marx and Engels were sensitive to the possibility of an Asiatic restoration.[11]

The need to consult the works of the Soviet orientalist historians Struve, Tjumenev, D'jakonov and others is pointed out. Are these others Prigožin and Grinevič who, with those named, were searching for a 'feudal' explanation of phenomena which Marx had considered manifestations of the Asiatic mode of production? If, however, they also include Riazanov and Madyar, who upheld the Asiatic theory in the USSR at a time when debate was still permitted, and Godes and Yolk, who didn't like the theory but acknowledged its existence, then we should know about these scholars.

What is important here is not the natural fact that the amount of source material and the number of scholarly opinions to be considered are being limited, but that certain lines of inquiry undertaken in the past, and suggested by certain sources, are being excluded from the start.

A number of questionable statements and serious omissions made by the authors of the *Voprosy filosofii* article appear to be only the consequence of completely disregarding certain established facts and supported opinions.

Soviet philosophers are informed that the Asiatic mode of production "was the subject of animated discussion ... at the end of the 1920's and the beginning of the 1930's", but that "later, however, it was undeservedly forgotten".[12] This is, at the very least, a colossal understatement. Varga, by stating that "scholarly arguments on this most important

problem stopped after the appearance of Stalin's *On Dialectical and Historical Materialism*"[13] comes closer to the truth. It was not a decline of scholarly interest, but a wholly unacademic, summary political decision that chopped off the debate and imposed the subsequent blackout. It is to be hoped that those among the present discussants in the Soviet Union who take the inquiry far enough to risk making the Soviet political leadership uneasy will be spared the fate of some of their erstwhile scholarly colleagues.

PROBLEMS OF SOVIET ANALYSIS

Since the discussion is still unfolding, the possibility that some matters may yet appear must be considered in dealing with omissions. But it can be said that the Soviet philosophers working on this problem are going to find some inquiries difficult if pursued within the old Marxist categories of class and property.

The authors of the *Voprosy filosofii* article insist that "it is impossible to discover the class nature of the system (of the Asiatic mode of production) ... without a clear answer to the question as to the form of landed property."[14] Such a line of inquiry, however, is likely to lead to a dead end on two counts. It may be good scientific communism to look to the owners of the means of production (in the case of predominantly agrarian societies, the landowners) and their relation to those they are said to have exploited for an explanation of the state and social structure which is claimed to be inevitably built on the basis of this economic relationship, but there are likely to be useful insights only in cases where 'strong' property existed, i.e. where the holding of property gave the holder political power independent of the state, as in the feudal West. In non-Western societies, the land and the surplus were to a large extent controlled by the state; where there was private ownership of land, as in China, that property was 'weak', for it was from the absolutist government that the bureaucratic landlords derived their political power, not from their property, the ownership of which was politically largely irrelevant.

The Marxist-Leninist way of defining classes on the basis of production relations in a society, and of determining the ruling class to be the one controlling the means of production is not an appropriate analytical con-

cept especially with respect to an analysis of the class structure of societies, or of the ruling class in such societies. There is, in Oriental societies, no or little meaningful class structure of a politically relevant kind because of the monopoly of political power of the state. There is a ruling bureaucracy which may constitute a class according to non-Marxist definitions of class, but which is not a class in the Marxist sense because its power or character does not derive from its economic functions, but from the state or ruler in whose behalf it administers the state. The Marxist assertion that the ruling class always serves the interests of the property holders is simply not true, especially in the Oriental societies.

Vitkin and Ter-Akopjan reject Tokei's argument that Marx had never undertaken an analysis of the class structure of Oriental societies, and assert that he had.[15] Marx, in fact, did not do so[16] and the reason he neglected it was his sensitivity to the idea that a bureaucracy could be a ruling class, a notion which could easily embarrass a man who was then projecting a future Socialist transitional state in which a ruling group (a dictatorship of the advanced elements of the proletariat exercising both political control and bureaucratic functions) would administer that Socialist state and, in the process of paving the way for the final, Communist stage, would carry out the liquidation of all remnants of the previous classes.

It is this same, and now very real, fear of having the new Soviet bureaucracy, composed of the party membership and holding a monopoly of political power in the single-centered Communist states, identified as a ruling class which prevents the Soviet political and academic leadership, and many scholars elsewhere, calling themselves Marxists from accounting adequately for the role of the ruling bureaucracy as the only class in Oriental societies.

There are other obstacles to a full analysis by Soviet scholars, revealed by the discussion so far. The *Voprosy filosofii* authors accept, uncritically, Tokei's statement that Marx, "in letters to Engels (June, 1853) and in the article 'British Rule in India', refutes the assertion that irrigation had been the decisive cause in the rise of Asiatic despotism".[17] There is no question, however, that Marx, particularly in the article referred to, clearly attributed the key formative role to irrigation, while he assigned to the rural communes, as Tokei, Vitkin and Ter-Akopjan correctly say, a perpetuative role.[18]

To speak of the "role of tradition" in "hardening the relationship of rule and subordination between the despotic central power on the one hand and the communes on the other"[19] is to overlook the institutions and methods (such as the system of the selection and assignment of officials and the rigid body of beliefs to which those who meant to gain and maintain official positions had to expose themselves) and the various controls and checks which insured absolute loyalty to the central authority, often to the point of inefficiency.

Scientific Communism, maintaining that experience is the criterion for the truth of a proposition, concludes that the success of the October revolution proves the Marxist assertion that the capitalist mode of production must inevitably lead to Socialism.[20]

The experience of the October revolution proves nothing of the kind. Few of the various independent approaches to a social analysis of pre-revolutionary Russia lead to the conclusion that it was transformed into a full-fledged bourgeois order, even fewer analysts would maintain that what capitalist institutions had appeared were rooted in a previous feudal stage. Most would clearly attempt to distinguish between the relatively weak manifestations of the kind of capitalist development which Marxists say produces bourgeois antagonisms on the one hand, and the state-directed capitalist development on the other, which did at least as much to strengthen the Russian state as to assist the emergence of a class of bourgeois exploiters. No one could state more clearly than had Lenin and the Bolsheviks before 1917 that the order to be overthrown was not bourgeois-capitalist, but Asiatic-despotic. Whether or not the representatives of a bourgeois system had governed Russia between March and November, 1917, is, of course, another question, but one that is moot with regard to the subsequent turn of events. For the view that the October revolution did not move Russia forward to Socialism, but backward into despotism we need only to go to Marx and the Russian Marxists and the way in which they 'discussed' the concept of the Asiatic mode of production, and then to turn to an examination of the many and striking affinities between the institutions of total power which a full discussion of the Asiatic concept will reveal to have existed in the old Oriental societies, to prevail in many of the Asian and African pre-capitalist societies now under discussion, and to have been restored and refined by the Communist regimes in Russia and China.

If, then, the test of experience is conscientiously applied to what historical materialism claims had to happen and did happen in the Russian revolution, historical materialism, as presently formulated, will prove to be deficient.

Historical materialism maintains that there are two forms of property in which the means of production belong either to individual persons or classes, etc., or to the whole society. From the former are said to result conditions of rule and subordination, exploitation and oppression, from the latter conditions of cooperation and mutual assistance.[21]

In situations where property belongs to the whole society, as it supposedly does in the Soviet states, the situation, when looked at closely, is not at all dissimilar to the situation in some Oriental societies, where the means of production belonged to the whole society in the sense that a state controlling the entire society controlled production in essence and appropriated its surplus. If histomat claims that in such a society the principle of cooperation and mutual assistance prevailed, then its teachings are proven wrong by the observable experience of the Oriental society. If, however, scientific Communism maintains that exploitation and suppression characterized Oriental society, then there would be no reason not to inquire into whether the same conditions do not prevail in the contemporary Communist states.

DEFICIENCIES OF HISTORICAL MATERIALISM

There are two main sets of problems here. One could continue for some time to dwell on the implications of the concept of the 'Asiatic mode of production' for the contemporary Communist states. But it is equally as important to speak of the emerging contradictions between the established principles of historical materialism regarding societal development, and the developmental laws which are now said to govern the non-capitalist path of development to Socialism in the countries of Africa and Asia.

Historical materialism teaches that all societies can be classified, on the basis of their economic foundations, into one of five stages (those five being the familiar forms characterized as primitive communal, slave-holding, feudal, capitalist and socialist-communist).[22] While the various dogmatic statements of scientific Communism hedge on stating outright

that each society must go through all of these stages in succession, it is stated that these are the stages of development for society as a whole, and in a number of ways it is at least implied that these stages follow laws which make them necessarily progressive, inevitable and universal.

Marx' and Engels' descriptions of Oriental societies clearly show, and some contemporary Marxist-Leninist characterizations strongly imply that Oriental society was one of three types of societies which emerged from primitive-communal foundations, the other two being slave-holding and feudal societies. We are compelled to deal, in other words, with three parallel formations. These descriptions further show that only one of these, the feudal form, developed into a "higher" form, while antiquity disappeared in a swamp[23], and Oriental despotism remained unchanged (and unchangeable) until either broken down by conquest (military or intellectual) from the West[24] or, where it survives, is to be directly advanced to Socialism with the assistance of Socialist (i.e. Soviet) power.[25]

Instead of the five, progressive forms of society established by histomat we have, thus, six forms, two of which (antiquity and Asiatic society) are non-progressive.[26] It is difficult to see how histomat can maintain the dogma of the five progressive societies and of the unilinear development from lower to higher forms in the face of philosophic, historical and political-economical inquiries and facts which establish at least six societies and do not require all of them to be progressive, or consecutive.

One thing that can be done by Communist scholars is to adjust histomat. This is going to be difficult but it seems entirely possible. The concepts of necessity and possibility will have to be reformulated in a number of ways, for example. If undertaken, this will probably result in less certainty about the necessity of unilinear progressive development and will instead probably allow for the possibility of social change by external power in the absence of internal dynamic forces, and it may lead to an abandonment of the entire unilinear structure. But this is something for the Communists themselves to work out, because non-Communist students, applying logical analysis, would be insensitive to the political power considerations to be taken into account. To drop the present unilinear scheme in histomat for a multilinear one would no doubt strengthen the Communist argument in the non-capitalist societies, but would at the same time have to weaken its appeal among those who are now being assured that the

success of their anti-capitalist revolutionary efforts is guaranteed by scientific Communism and Soviet philosophy.

Whether or not the Soviet political leadership will establish such a priority for the guidance of Soviet scholars is their own affair, but Soviet philosophers themselves appear to be uncertain that it will be done for them. Instead of making adjustments in histomat, they can, and do, also attempt solutions making such adjustments unnecessary. Vitkin and Ter-Akopjan speak of "the place of the Asiatic mode of production in the *general evolution*, the causes of its stability and *dynamism*" (emphasis mine)[27], as though suggesting that the Asiatic society possessed an inner dynamic making it progressive (something which Marx had explicitly denied), and as though it could be fitted into a general succession of societal transformation. At the same time, though, they know that there are clear differences between feudalism and Asiatic society.[28] Again, however, they are not sure that they agree with Tokei's assertion that the development of the Asiatic mode of production from primitive communal forms was the most general form and with his allusion that slave-holding antiquity represented only a special variant thereof, not a separate formation.[29] This seems to be a half-hearted attempt to suggest to Soviet philosophers that they somehow make something progressive out of Asiatic society so that the unilinear claim of histomat can be salvaged. This, at any rate, is what one Western translator of the *Voprosy filosofii* article appeared to think its authors had in mind (for which they themselves can, of course, not be held directly responsible). That translator renders Marx' key statement of 1859 regarding social transformation, quoted by Vitkin and Ter-Akopjan, as follows: "In their general features ... the Asian, classical, feudal and modern capitalist modes of production may be designated *the successive* epochs of the economic social order" (emphasis mine).[30] Marx had in fact spoken of these societies only as so many *progressive* epochs[31] without, at that time, making it at all clear that he did not have in mind the multilinear line which his previous writings had suggested.

Another way to salvage the unilinear claim is to resort to the concept of the overleaping of stages with the help of already established Socialist powers. With respect to the contemporary Asian and African societies this is, in fact, what the Communists are attempting, and it seems altogether possible, especially with reference to Engels' own belief that once

the core areas of the capitalist world have become Socialist, it would be idle to expect all the backward areas of the world to repeat the entire process.[32] The areas under colonial control at least would be offered a short-cut to Socialism by taking over outright the system prevailing in the colonial country which caused Marx to propose that colonies not be immediately set free once Socialism had come to the motherlands. (There is, of course, no good reason why this should not also furnish a rationalization for contemporary Soviet imperialism.)

Leaping, then, will work without compromising histomat, provided that the leaping is forward and there is a midwife in the form of a strong Socialist state. As will be recalled, the leaping in China and Russia, however, was backward, and there was no Socialist power to guarantee its success in the case of Russia. The analysis of the Russian revolution through histomat, then, remains problematical.

If pursued to the fullest extent, the present inquiries in Soviet philosophy regarding the Asiatic mode of production must use facts and will produce conclusions which render the core teachings of historical materialism seriously deficient. If the necessary adjustments are not made in histomat, these facts and conclusions will lack the authority of confirmation by histomat. And if the inquiries are restricted to facts and conclusions avoiding this difficulty, then they will lack the proof of experience. The question now remains whether in this area, Soviet philosophers will remain within the limits imposed by the core of Soviet ideology and will content themselves with scholarly inquiries and answers less than credible, or whether there will be adjustments in the core; whether, for example, the concept of the six societies will appear in the next edition of the *Osnovy marksizma-leninizma.* Such adjustments are possible not because of anything Soviet philosophers may write, but because the Soviet political leadership may very well prefer to have a stronger argument in the non-Western world at the expense of its intellectual position in the United States and Western Europe, so long as the active promotion of the national-liberation movements is strategically more promising than the passive wait for crises and collapse in the capitalist world.

The intellectual inconsistencies and the political subservience so far evidenced by the renewed Communist approaches to the concept of Oriental society would indicate, first of all, that there is no cause for optimism concerning the results of the renewed investigation, but also

that, in celebrating qualitative improvements in several branches of Soviet academic work, including philosophy, in recent years, concessions to standards have been made which would not be afforded to anyone in Western academies.

This entire discussion of the Asiatic mode of production requires clarity; instead it receives obfuscation. The burden of the Communist argument is that Oriental society is characterized by communal forms of property. Communal property is a quite general phenomenon and does not sufficiently distinguish Oriental society from other forms. Oriental society, however, in its full dimension, has very specific institutions and conditions which serve as the source of state power, and which have specific consequences including despotic and highly sophisticated patterns of rule and exploitation.

Soviet philosophy presumably is up to the task of elaborating philosophic principles in the form of general laws of development which provide a systematic source for specific socio-political conclusions. Whether it is up to any more than that is doubtful as long as its practitioners keep their investigations confined to the secondary questions which do not infringe upon core dogma. It just so happens, however, that the fullest discussion of the Asiatic mode of production raises questions of the greatest consequence for the core of Marxist-Leninist teaching, on whether or not historical development is progressive, the relationship of productive powers decisive, Socialism necessary, Communism good, or Marxism-Leninism worth dying for. The scholarly output of Soviet philosophy is relatively weak; the strong ideas are in the political core. Western scholars devoted to the study of Soviet thought have no choice but to study it because it is there, but they have the choice of an immanent critique of the weak ideas, or of a full analysis and exposure of the really powerful formulations of Marxist and Soviet ideas regarding the order of the universe and the place of man therein.

A further article on the Asiatic mode of production has since appeared in the *Voprosy filosofii* in December, 1965.[33] L. V. Danilova there summarizes what appears to have been a reasonably lively discussion of the problem which took place in the Philosophical Institute of the USSR Academy of Sciences in December, 1964. This more recent article differs from the one discussed above in the range of opinions and sources

entering into the discussion. The major conceptual and political restrictions and definitions, however, remain unchanged.

In the article a fuller presentation is given of the extent of the discussion in the Soviet Union, and the names of more writers on the problem appear, including that of Plexanov. Wittfogel, still the scholar to be kept out of the discussion as an "ideological opponent" who took advantage of the post-1931 silencing of Soviet students of the problem, is now specifically referred to. Interestingly, among the three of his works cited (or rather mis-cited – the word 'Society' in the title is changed to 'Socialism') is his 1960 *World Politics* article 'The Marxist View of Russian Society and Revolution'.[34] It is this article which contains the fullest description of Lenin's identification of Russia as a form of Asiatic despotism. Soviet philosophers thus are demonstrably aware of the direct relevance of the Asiatic concept to Russia and China.

Despite this undoubted awareness, Danilova in fact reports nothing whatever said about what Lenin's, Plexanov's or, for that matter, Wittfogel's view were, or are. There is still the same complete silence about the relationship of the concept of the Asiatic mode of production to the Russian and Chinese revolutions and their results. The same contrived speculations are attempted to make of Asiatic society a variant of one or another of the five basic societal forms in order to avoid its only tenable identification as a sixth and separate formation. The identification of the ruling bureaucracy as the only controlling and exploitative element continues to be avoided by various attempts to explain the structure of Asiatic society on the basis of the village communes and class and property contradictions. Mention is made of the need for a critical reassessment of the established conception of world history, but no concrete steps are proposed toward making the required adjustments in *histomat* suggested above (p. 119). The conclusion that the increasing impact of Wittfogel's work and the tactical and strategic considerations of the national-liberation movement have compelled the exhumation of the Asiatic theory is confirmed by the Danilova article.

As Soviet philosophers and their colleagues in other disciplines engaged in the re-examination of the Asiatic concept move ever closer to the hitherto forbidden sources and opinions, their political and academic difficulties will increase. It will be interesting to see where, when or if this development will be stopped. The consequences of the fullest possible

clarification and study of this question are so great that the engagement of non-Communist scholars in the discussion is absolutely essential.

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2. S. Tolstov, as quoted by Karl A. Wittfogel, *op.cit.*, p. 411.
3. Jean Chesneaux, 'La Mode de Production Asiatique. Quelques Perspectives de Recherche', *Pensée*, No. 114 (April 1964) 34.
4. V. M. Mixkatev and Ju. E. Fëdorov, 'Diskussija po Problemam naučnogo Kommunizma', *VF*, 1965, 5, 160.
5. *Ibid.*, p. 141.
6. *Ibid.*, p. 146.
7. Latin America is also frequently mentioned along with Africa and Asia as requiring 'philosophical' foundations for its various national-liberation movements, but the applicability of the Asiatic interpretation there is suggested less frequently.
8. M. A. Vitkin and N. B. Ter-Akopjan, 'Po stranicam žurnala 'Pensée', *VF*, 1965, 3, 172.
9. *The Free Press* (London, February and April, 1857).
10. *Pensée*, April 1964, p. 71.
11. *Narodi Afriki i Azii*, 1965, 3, 77.
12. Vitkin and Ter-Akopjan, *op.cit.*, p. 172.
13. As quoted by Vitkin and Ter-Akopjan, *op.cit.*, p. 173.
14. Vitkin and Ter-Akopjan, *op.cit.*, p. 175.
15. *Ibid.*, p. 174.
16. Marx was aware of a number of texts suggesting a class analysis, but he did not include the point in his own argument.
17. Vitkin and Ter-Akopjan, *op.cit.*, p. 173.
18. *Ibid.*
19. *Ibid.*
20. *Fundamentals of Marxism-Leninism* (Moscow, 1963), p. 111.
21. *Osnovy marksistskoj filosofii* (Moscow, 1960), pp. 389–390.
22. *Ibid.*, p. 392.
23. Friedrich Engels, 'Der Ursprung der Familie, des Privateigentums und des Staats', *Werke*, vol. 21 (Berlin, 1962), pp. 149 f.
24. Karl Marx, 'Die britische Herrschaft in Indien', *Werke*, vol. 9 (Berlin, 1960), pp. 127 ff.
25. K. Ivanov, 'The National-Liberation Movement and Non-Capitalist Path of Development', *International Affairs* (Moscow) 1964, 12, 9.
26. Still another form (not discussed by the Marxists), it may be argued (and indeed is by Professor Wittfogel), is now constituted by the new Communist societies in at

least Russia and China, since these are not the Socialist societies projected by Marxism, but new total managerial forms of Asiatic despotism.

27. Vitkin and Ter-Akopjan, *op.cit.*, p. 175.
28. *Ibid.*, p. 173.
29. *Ibid.*
30. *Soviet Anthropology and Archeology* (Selected Articles from Soviet Journals in English Translation), vol. IV, No. 2 (New York, Fall 1962), p. 46. The eagerness of the translator, identified in the publication, of seeking favorable interpretations of Communist policies and ideas has been consistently demonstrated over a number of years. This mistranslation, then, of Marx' statement may not be altogether innocent.
31. Karl Marx, 'Vorwort zur Kritik der Politischen Oekonomie', *Werke*, vol. 13 (Berlin, 1961), p. 9.
32. Letter by Friedrich Engels to Karl Kautsky, November 12, 1882, in Lewis S. Feuer, ed., *Basic Writings on Politics and Philosophy* (New York, 1959), pp. 451 f.
33. L. V. Danilova, 'Diskussija po važnoj probleme', *VF*, 1965, 12, 149–156.
34. *Ibid.*, p. 151.

T. R. PAYNE

ON THE THEORETICAL FOUNDATIONS OF SOVIET PSYCHOLOGY

In common with the other sciences in the Soviet Union, Soviet psychology must conform to the demands of ideology. In psychology, as elsewhere, ideological considerations have exercised a determining influence on the formation of basic theory with the result that over the years a body of scientific and philosophical principles has gradually emerged which is officially recognised as the obligatory basis for Soviet psychological theory. The principles in question have been drawn from two sources: the philosophical doctrines of Marxism-Leninism and the scientific teaching of I. P. Pavlov. Soviet psychology is, therefore, heir to two distinct and independent traditions, the one owing much to Hegel and the other a continuation of pre-revolutionary Russian physiological psychology. Official Soviet literature, however, presents them as two complementary sources of psychological theory, ascribing to the former the general philosophical foundations for psychology, while the latter is said to provide the scientific methodology. The respective roles of Marxist-Leninist philosophy and Pavlovian psychology in the formation of psychological theory are expressed in the current *Philosophical Dictionary* as follows: "Psychology as a science founded on dialectical materialism came into being in the USSR. It represents a new historical stage in the development of psychology. Scientific psychology takes as its starting point the Marxist-Leninist theory of knowledge and has as its natural-scientific basis the reflex theory of the psychic put forward by Sečenov and elaborated by I. P. Pavlov."

The aim of this article is to give a brief critical examination of the content of these two traditions, to determine what they say that is relevant to the basic philosophical problems of psychology, and to see whether they can be justifiably called complementary.

The course of Soviet psychology has been largely determined by the continuous effort to bring it into line with the principles of Marxism-Leninism. The most influential factor in the formation of Soviet psychological theory has, in consequence, been dialectical materialism. Here

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psychology has shared the common fate of the sciences in the Soviet Union; for in keeping with the now generally accepted view, one of the most important tasks of philosophy is to provide a general methodology of scientific knowledge and to give a philosophical interpretation of the data of science. The history of psychology in the Soviet Union has, therefore, been characterised by the repeated attempt to found that science on the principles of dialectical materialism. Judging from the frequent discussions by Soviet psychologists and philosophers on this point, the task has not yet been accomplished to their satisfaction.

None of the 'Classics' of Marxism-Leninism wrote a work on psychology and their writings contain only passing references to psychological problems; and these references have for the most part been concerned with the problem of the relation of mind to matter. Yet on the basis of these passing and often cryptic remarks and on their general philosophical teaching, Soviet psychologists have attempted to construct a theoretical framework for their science. Of the general body of philosophical doctrine contained in the writings of the 'Classics', three elements in particular have been influential in the formation of psychological theory: materialist monism, the doctrine of the dialectical nature of reality and, to a lesser extent, the so-called Marxist-Leninist theory of reflection. These three doctrines have exercised their influence on Soviet psychology in that order; Soviet psychologists having successively concluded that psychology must be (1) materialist, (2) dialectical, and (3) must take account of the implications of Lenin's theory of reflection.

(1) *Materialism.* The significance of materialism for psychology is self-evident. Ontological materialism, especially as it appears in the works of Engels and Lenin, implies a monistic conception of man and excludes the possibility of spiritual substances. According to Engels and Lenin, all that exists is matter and what depends on matter. "The real unity of the world consists in its materiality".[2] From the eternal movement of matter arises "every finite mode of existence of matter whether it be sun or nebular vapour, single animal or genus of animal, chemical combination or dissociation" right up to "animals with brains capable of thought".[3] The material unity of the world admits of no exception: "no spiritual world exists separately, besides the material world".[4] The espousal of materialism in this sense would seem to exclude not only spiritual substances but any non-material phenomena whatsoever, and consequently

imply that psychic phenomena too are material, i.e. merely higher-order material phenomena. But both Engels and Lenin avoid drawing this conclusion. Engels variously speaks of thought and consciousness as "products of the human brain"[5] or as "forms of the motion of matter"[6], while Lenin explicitly states that "to say that thought is material is to make a false step towards confusing materialism with idealism".[7]

(2) *Dialectics.* The key to this apparent contradiction is to be found in the second element of dialectical materialism, namely, dialectics. The Marxist-Leninist doctrine of the dialectical nature of reality finds its most important application in ontology and theory of knowledge. However, as Soviet psychological theory is closely connected with these last mentioned disciplines it also has important implications for psychology. It permits the reconciliation of dialectical materialism's monistic ontology with the recognition of the special irreducible nature of psychic events. The combination of dialectics and materialism adds a new dimension to materialism. Matter is no longer a homogeneous property of all reality. Within the material unity of the world there is room for specific differences so that the materialistic monism of the 'Classics' is combined with a form of categorial pluralism. Engels in particular conceives of reality as hierarchically divided into different levels, each with its own specific laws. The laws of a higher level cannot be explained by, or be reduced to, the laws of a lower level since transition from one level to another is achieved through a dialectical 'leap' and consequently something new is added. These levels are usually conceived of as different forms of the motion of matter, beginning with simple mechanical change, ascending through chemical and organic change to the highest form of the motion of matter which is consciousness or thought.

(3) *Theory of Reflection.* The special, irreducible nature of psychic events is further stressed by the so-called Marxist-Leninist theory of knowledge. Though the idea that thought or consciousness is a reflection of the material world is already present in the writings of Marx and Engels, it was further elaborated by Lenin in his polemic with the Russian Machists. The first effect of the Marxist-Leninist theory of knowledge is to underscore the non-materiality of the psychic. In *Materialism and Empirio-Criticism*, Lenin begins by saying that the concepts "being and thinking", "matter and sensation", "physical and mental" are the "ultimate" and "most comprehensive" concepts in epistemology.[8]

This in effect makes them ultimately undefinable and implies that the realities which they express are themselves irreconcilably opposed. Thus, Lenin's theory of reflection not only affirms the peculiar nature of psychic events but implies a duality of matter and spirit. Lenin, however, qualifies this first proposition by stating that the opposition and consequent duality of matter and spirit is only realised or is only valid within the limits of epistemology. "To operate beyond these limits with a distinction between matter and mind, physical and mental, as though they were absolute opposites, would be a great mistake."[9] Lenin further qualifies his first statement by adding a second element to his theory of reflection, namely, by postulating that the ability to reflect, which is characteristic of human consciousness or thought, is realised in some faint way by all material reality.

The theory of reflection is significant for psychology mainly because it seems to offer a formula for reconciling the transcendent nature of thought with dialectical materialism's monistic ontology. By admitting a duality of matter and consciousness on the level of epistemology the Leninist theory of reflection skirts the 'mechanist' danger of reducing thought to matter, while by restricting this duality to epistemology it safeguards the material unity of the world.

The materialisation of psychology was accomplished relatively quickly in the first years following the October Revolution. Between 1917 and 1924 the older introspectionist schools which had existed in Russia since the second half of the nineteenth century were eliminated on the grounds of their incompatibility with the new Marxist ideology. In the first years of the nineteen-twenties, when Soviet philosophers were still divided on the principles of Marxist-Leninist philosophy, there was a general consensus of opinion among the new generation of psychologists that Soviet psychology must be 'materialist' in order to be 'Marxist'. Introspectionist psychology was branded as 'idealist', 'subjectivist' and 'dualist', the leading introspectionists were deprived of their posts in universities and schools and their places taken by supporters of the new line.

If the acceptance of 'materialism' as a necessary element in Soviet psychology was achieved relatively rapidly, it was only after a long period of debate that the significance of dialectics was recognised. During the second half of the nineteen-twenties the dominant trend in Soviet psychology was one of pronounced mechanism and reductionism. This was

due in large measure to the general predominance of mechanism in Soviet philosophy and to the presence of a number of behaviouristically orientated schools in Russia. The works of Pavlov and Bexterev were widely known in Russia and abroad long before the Revolution and the elimination of the introspectionist schools left them in almost undisputed possession of the psychological field. It was only as a result of the condemnation of mechanism at the All-Union Conference of Marxist-Leninist Scientific Institutes in 1929 and the vindication of the dialectical school led by A. M. Deborin that the significance of dialectics for Soviet psychology was finally recognised. The incorporation of Leninist epistemology into Soviet psychology took place during the first half of the nineteen-thirties. It was motivated partly by the renewed effort to reconstruct psychological theory on the basis of Marxism-Leninism which was one of the outcomes of the defeat of mechanism, and partly by a new interest in Lenin's theory of reflection occasioned by the publication of the *Philosophical Notebooks* in 1929. These three elements, materialism, dialectics and the Leninist theory of knowledge remained the basic elements of Soviet psychological theory until 1950 when a new element was added in the form of an insistence on the theories of I. P. Pavlov.

The ideas and methods of I. P. Pavlov have only been part of the canon of Soviet psychology since 1950. The insistence that Soviet psychology must be firmly established on the foundation of Pavlovian psychology was a direct result of the six-day "Scientific Session on the Physiological Teaching of Academician I. P. Pavlov" held jointly by the Academy of Sciences of the USSR and the Academy of Medical Sciences of the USSR from June 28th to July 4th of that year.[10] The express purpose of the conference was to undertake "a critical and self-critical examination of how matters stand with regard to the development of Pavlov's legacy in the Soviet Union".[11] In the course of six days of discussion and debate the significance of Pavlov's ideas for all branches of the biological sciences, from physiology to spa-therapy, was stressed. Though psychologists played a comparatively small role in the work of the conference the decisions taken at the conference had a profound effect on Soviet psychology. The resolutions adopted at the close of the conference clearly indicated that psychology must henceforward be guided by the teaching of Pavlov and Soviet psychologists immediately set about evaluating the significance of Pavlov's ideas for their science. Re-evaluating

would perhaps be a better word, for the works of Pavlov were, of course, well known to Soviet psychologists and, as already pointed out, had exercised a profound influence on the development of psychology in the nineteen-twenties. However, in the wave of anti-mechanism which swept psychology in the first half of the nineteen-thirties, Pavlov's ideas fell into disrepute among the psychologists.

The part of Pavlov's work which is immediately relevant for psychology is his theories on higher nervous activity. Pavlov developed these theories in connection with his investigations into the phenomena of the conditioned reflex. The details of Pavlov's work on conditioned reflexes are well known and need only be briefly referred to here. In the course of his experiments on the physiology of digestion, Pavlov was struck by the fact that the laboratory dogs secreted saliva not only when food was placed in their mouths but also when some other stimulus associated with feeding was present, as for example, at the ringing of a bell. Having attempted, as he says, unsuccessfully, to explain this and similar phenomena in subjective or generally accepted psychological terms, Pavlov decided that the phenomena could only be scientifically investigated using the methods of physiology.[12] In the course of more that 30 years of research, Pavlov developed a complex theory of human and animal behaviour based on the principles of reflexology.

It is impossible, within the limits of this article to set out Pavlov's theories at any length but the most important points for psychology may be summarised as follows. Like Sečenov, Pavlov believed that the so-called psychic life of animals and men could be explained on the basis of the theory of reflexes. Pavlov distinguished two kinds of reflexes: *unconditioned reflexes* such as salivation when food is present in the mouth; and *conditioned reflexes*, as for example, salivation at the sound of a bell. The former, according to Pavlov, are relatively constant connections between the organism and its environment, while the latter are less stable and are acquired in the course of ontogenesis. The ability to build up conditioned reflexes is essential to the organism since this ability permits it to adapt itself to the changing conditions of its environment. Through the mechanism of the conditioned reflex an indifferent stimulus can signal those properties of an object which have a vital significance for the organism. The mechanism which controls the formation of conditioned reflexes, Pavlov calls higher nervous activity.

Pavlov further distinguished between what he called the first and second signalling systems. The first system, which is common to man and the higher animals, is made up of stimuli which come immediately from the external world and which signal those objects which are necessary for survival. In man, however, there is a second line of signals which is constituted by words and which Pavlov refers to as the second signalling system. Words are signals of signals and serve to generalise the multitude of signals of the first system. This second line of signals also allows a higher degree of analysis and synthesis. For Pavlov it is the possession of this second system which primarily distinguishes man from the brutes and is the principle of man's limitless power of adaptation.[13]

Since 1950 Pavlov has, for all practical purposes, been raised to the dignity of a 'classic' as far as Soviet psychology is concerned and his theories have been hailed as the natural-science corollary of the Marxist-Leninist teaching on the nature of mind and its relation to the material world. However, from the brief outline of Pavlov's ideas given above it appears that his views on the nature of psychic phenomena and even on the scientific status of psychology differ sharply from that found in the writings of Marx, Engels and Lenin. We must now consider at some length what standpoint on the two above-mentioned problems is implicit and explicit in Pavlov's works.

As already mentioned, Pavlov attempted to investigate the whole range of normal and pathological phenomena usually referred to as 'psychic' using the methods and terminology of physiology. This in itself suggests that Pavlov did not recognise any essential distinction between psychological and physiological events. Though this charge is vigorously rejected by Soviet psychologists there is considerable evidence to support it. Pavlov's innocence of any form of 'reductionism' was officially proclaimed at the Pavlov Conference of 1950, but it is significant that, according to I. P. Antonov[14], until the conference, many psychologists considered that Pavlov's ideas were mechanistic. It is true that Pavlov, in a much quoted text, seems to reject the charge of mechanism and speaks of the "absurdity of a reconciliation between the subjective and mechanical state".[15] However, read in its context, it is not certain that Pavlov there totally rejects the ideal of arriving at a mechanistic conception of man. In fact his quarrel seems to be not with mechanism, but with the ability of science in its present state to arrive successfully at such an interpretation. In the same

place Pavlov goes on to say: "From my point of view, the point of view of a physiologist, I try to push our common problem a little further in the direction of a true general mechanics."[16] Commenting on the first quotation, W. Horsley Gannt, for many years a collaborator of Pavlov, remarks: "In spite of these denials, it must be admitted that Pavlov drew largely on the philosophy of Descartes who compared the animal organism to a machine."[17]

A form of reductionism is certainly implicit in Pavlov's theory of the relation between the first and second signalling systems. For Pavlov, the second system is that which primarily distinguishes man from the brutes. But, according to Pavlov, the second system of signals obeys the same laws as the first[18], which is the common possession of man and the animals. In certain texts Pavlov refers to the conditioned reflex as "an elementary psychic phenomena"[19] while in others he calls it "a purely physiological phenomenon". Again he defines consciousness as a "nervous activity of a certain part of the cerebral hemispheres".[20]

In his 'Reply of a Physiologist to Psychologists', Pavlov expresses himself unequivocally on what he considers the true relationship of psychology to physiology. The most important present-day, scientific undertaking is, in his opinion, that of "identifying the physiological with the psychological, the subjective with the objective".[21] Soviet writers usually try to explain away this and similar statements of Pavlov by saying that they are merely directed against "the idealist separation of the psychic from its material, physiological basis".[22]

Though the texts quoted above – and Pavlov's works abound with similar texts – seem to demonstrate conclusively that Pavlov's conception of the relationship between psychic and physiological events was mechanistic in the extreme, care should be taken when interpreting these and similar statements. It is clear, as Horsley Gannt remarks, that Pavlov "treated the subjective physiologically"[23] and that the philosophical implications of many of his statements are that he subscribed to an extreme form of reductionism. However, it must be remembered that Pavlov was above all a scientist committed to an objective standpoint and distrustful of anything that could not be subjected to mathematical analysis. Though he defined consciousness as "nervous activity" Pavlov made it quite clear that he did not wish to "discuss this question from a philosophical point of view, i.e. I shall not touch on the problem of how

the brain substance creates subjective phenomena".[24] Pavlov's attitude to psychic phenomena was fundamentally that of a naturalist and a scientist and we shall look in vain for clear philosophical statements in his works.

But the fact remains that Pavlov's ideas lend themselves easily to a mechanist interpretation which is incompatible with the doctrine of the 'Classics' on the nature of psychic events. Moreover, if there is reason to hesitate before labeling Pavlov a mechanist, there is even more reason for hesitating before calling him a materialist. Yet Soviet writers, particularly since 1950, have made extravagant claims for Pavlov's materialism. Not content with asserting that Pavlov's teaching on higher nervous activity provides a natural-science foundation for a materialist psychology and even that it provides a scientific confirmation for the Marxist-Leninist world view, some writers have gone so far as to claim that Pavlov was a "conscious" materialist.[25] But it is certainly nearer the truth to say that Pavlov was a mechanist but not a materialist than to say that he was a materialist but not a mechanist. If we understand materialism as a philosophical doctrine – and it is in this sense that Soviet authors use the word when speaking of Pavlov – then there is no evidence that Pavlov actually espoused materialism. As already noted Pavlov explicitly refused to draw philosophical conclusions from his investigations. However, this is not to deny that Pavlov's works are open to a materialistic interpretation. But it is important to note that such an interpretation is only possible as an extension of Pavlov's implicit mechanism, i.e. it is a further interpretation thereof. Hence to deny that Pavlov's thought was mechanistic is to destroy the possibility of claiming that it was materialist. When discussing Pavlov, Soviet writers seem to forget the unusual nature of dialectical materialism. As remarked above, it is the combination of dialectics with materialism that saves Marxism-Leninism from reductionism and there is no trace of dialectics in Pavlov's writings. Pavlov himself summed up his outlook in a speech delivered in 1931 in the following terms: "I am neither a materialist nor an idealist; I am a monist, or if one must commit oneself, a methodological materialist."[26]

The denials of official Soviet literature notwithstanding, one is forced to conclude that the theoretical model of human nature implicit in the theories of Pavlov is mechanistic. Consciousness and subjective elements

generally, have no place in his scheme of human behaviour. The whole trend of Pavlov's thought is, in consequence, reductionist since he is forced by a refusal to take subjective factors into account in the study of human behaviour to reduce man's so-called 'psychic' life to the status of higher neural phenomena. It is, moreover, behavioristic since it focuses attention exclusively on external human activity and refuses to admit the scientific validity of introspection. Pavlov's conception is radically monist but this monism is both categorial and substantial, that is to say, man is considered not only as one substance, but any essential distinction between psychological and physiological is denied.

CONCLUSION

We are now in a position to examine the claim that Pavlovian physiology and Marxist-Leninist philosophy form two complementary systems.

There is certainly a similarity between the Leninist theory of reflection and Pavlov's theory of higher nervous activity. Both present so-called psychic phenomena as a reaction of the organism to the stimuli of the outer world and both insist that this reflection is not a passive reception of impressions but is an active response on the part of the organism.

Again both systems are monist; they are united in excluding the possibility of having recourse to a non-material substance as the basis for psychic phenomena. But for Pavlov this exclusion is a scientific axiom while for Marxism-Leninism it is founded on philosophical materialism. However, the most important difference between Pavlov's theories and Marxism-Leninism on this point is that Pavlov's approach to psychic is fundamentally mechanistic and reductionist whereas that of Marxism-Leninism is dialectical and consequently anti-reductionist and anti-mechanist. Soviet psychology is, in consequence, founded partly on a mechanist system which is not materialist in the full sense of the word, and partly on a materialist system which is definitely not mechanist. From this point of view there is a definite discrepancy between the two traditions on which Soviet psychology is founded and which goes a long way towards explaining many of the inconsistencies in Soviet psychological theory.

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W. F. BOESELAGER

SOVIET DIALECTICAL METHODOLOGY *

'Dialecticians' vs. 'Aristotelians': this opposition of two lines of thought has been observed in almost every branch of Soviet philosophy. Yet nowhere has it been more visible and decisive than in the fields of logic and methodology. Since the great discussion about formal logic in 1950/1951[1], the contributors to these fields can be adequately classified in the following simplified way:

(1) Scholars who know and use the formal methods of mathematical logic, who defend the validity of formal logic in all fields of rational knowledge, and present and/or discuss the detailed methodological problems of science – as they are discussed by Western analysts – with the help of these formal means. Such authors are, for instance: K. S. Bakradze, A. A. Zinov'ev, D. P. Gorskij, N. I. Kondakov, P. V. Tavanec.

(2) Philosophers who show little interest and competence in contemporary formal logic and insist on the possibility and necessity of developing a 'dialectical logic'[2], i.e. of posing and solving the problems of knowledge in a way which is to be completely different from and superior to the formal methods of the 'Anglo-Saxon neopositivists'. Some of the leading dialectical logicians are: M. N. Alekseev, B. M. Kedrov, P. V. Kopnin, M. M. Rozental', V. I. Čerkesov. However, the new non-formal approach was always more demanded and praised than developed or applied, and one became accustomed to look for careful and detailed work exclusively among the followers of the first tendency. The impression was frequently gained that a Soviet author would insist on the superiority of dialectical logic – if not for dogmatic reasons – mainly because he was not competent in mathematical logic or did not like it. "Dialectical logic is really no logic"[3] and many observers would add: It does not seem to be relevant for *methodology* at all.[4] If anything of real interest for the understanding of science is to come out of the Soviet Union, it was expected to come from

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the 'Aristotelians', and therefore it was hoped that they would increase in number and in influence.

However, this writer believes that such expectations were wrong and that things have developed in a different way: (1) a dialectical methodology, i.e. an application of 'dialectical logic' to methodology of science is being developed. It has already reached some detail and technical competence and, in collaboration with formal logicians, it occupies the first place in Soviet methodology. (2) This dialectical methodology gives senseful answers to many questions connected with the understanding of science within the general system of contemporary Marxism-Leninism. Some of the work of the 'Dialecticians' in this field seems to be valuable even from a non-Marxist-Leninist point of view.

This development certainly deserves a detailed and comprehensive analysis. However, in the present note only a sketch of dialectical methodology will be given in order to draw attention to its existence and interest and to provoke further studies in the future. There will be two sections to this note, following the two points made above: (I) a presentation of some elements of dialectical methodology and schematic analysis thereof; (II) an appreciation of its meaning and value within Marxism-Leninism and of some of its merits for an observer from the outside.

I. PRESENTATION OF DIALECTICAL METHODOLOGY

One can consider a collective work published only recently as a representative example of most recent dialectical methodology: *Logika naučnogo issledovanija* (Logic of Scientific Research), edited by P. V. Kopnin and M. V. Propovič.[5] Kopnin is the director of the Institute of Philosophy of the Ukrainian Academy of Sciences at Kiev (several of his collaborators are also at Kiev, e.g., Žarikov and Krymskij). He is one of the best known Soviet philosophers and an advocate of 'dialectical logic'.

Kopnin says in his introduction that wholesale declarations about the dialectically lawful nature of scientific procedure are no longer sufficient, and that his intention is a detailed analysis thereof.[6] In this still relatively new and underdeveloped field of study, Kopnin wants to use both formal and dialectical logic.[7] Indeed, the formal methods of mathematical (i.e., formal) logic and Anglo-Saxon methodology are to some extent known and used by the authors of the book; Soviet formal logicians as well as

Western logicians and methodologists like Braithwaite, Carnap, Nelson, Pap, Popper, Quine, Stegmüller, etc., are quoted and their technical work of formal analysis is considered as valuable. But a 'limitation to formal-logical studies' is rejected as insufficient to explain the complex phenomena of science. Formal logic is to be wedded to many other forms of study (philosophical, psychological, socio-historical) in order to understand science in its totality. Formal considerations are thus present in the book, but never for their own interest. E. S. Žarikov even uses arguments of Gödel and Church to show the limitations of formal systems.[8]

The articles of the carefully edited collective work[9] can be grouped in three parts: (1) The main steps of scientific research: problem, fact and system. This part includes a chapter each on scientific problem and fact by E. S. Žarikov; one by V. V. Kosolanov on abstraction; and one by P. F. Jolon on theoretical systems in general. (2) Function and change of theories. Here S. B. Krymskij writes on interpretation of theories; Popovič, on verification of theories; Kopnin, on the step from probable knowledge and hypothesis to certainty, and on the role of practice; Popovič again, on logical contradictions as the 'limits of development of theories' vs. dialectical contradictions; I. V. Byčko and Žarikov, together, on 'scientific search' – this chapter would have better been included in the first part; and Krymskij with A. T. Artjux, on the 'logical' principles for the replacement of one theory by another. (3) 'General methodological presuppositions' of science. The first chapter of this part is written by Kopnin himself and it is on the nature of science and its functions in general and on materialist dialectic as its method; the second chapter by V. F. Černovolenko deals with the highest steps of systematisation: *Weltanschauung* and 'scientific picture of the world'.

More interesting perhaps than this list of contents is an analysis of how they are treated. Here is a schematized presentation thereof:

(a) First, the authors have a strong bent towards *phenomenological description* of science. Starting from the firm conviction *that* science works, they undertake to describe and define, distinguish and combine the steps and methods of science in order to show *how* it works, whereas Western methodologists are more concerned with simplified and formalized aspects and forms of science in order to solve the logical problems of *if* and *why* it works.

An example for the preference given to phenomenological description

is Žarikov's analysis of what he calls a 'fact' (i.e., in the usual Western language, an 'individual statement of fact'). He describes and classifies 'facts' and shows, for instance, that they have a partly theoretical character and cannot be reduced to an expression of sense data. But at the same time he does not go at all into the problems of how such partly theoretical 'facts' are justified as true statements about the world.[10]

A second general tendency of the dialectical methodologists is to look at scientific knowledge in a '*concrete*' (i.e., comprehensive) way, and not to abstract and isolate aspects of it. There are different forms of this 'concreteness':

(b) One is to see science *genetically*, dynamically, as in development, and not as a ready-given system. This genetic approach to methodology had already been advocated earlier, e.g., by V. S. Švyrev in a *sbornik* on neopositivism three years ago.[11] The system of scientific theory as it exists at a given moment (and as it can be formalized) is only an aspect of the whole living reality. Already the title of Kopnin's collection 'Logic of Scientific *Research*' and the interest in processes rather than in formal structures throughout the book are indications of the preoccupation with development. As an example of where this preoccupation leads: Kopnin says that verification can of course never be final and definite, because it is a historical process[12] exactly like truth itself.[13]

(c) Another form of 'concreteness' which follows partly from the first is manifested in the consideration of the *psychological* side of science. According to this, it is wrong to limit one's attention to the formal and formalizable ideal relations among facts and theories, because these relations are only important aspects, and what really counts is to understand the whole process in which the subject comes to know what it comes to know. Psychology in this context is not concerned with physiological and associational conditions, but like philosophical psychology it deals, for instance, with the epistemological analysis of science. Thus Kopnin's *sbornik* contains – as has been seen above – special chapters on abstraction and intuition; probability is understood as psychological probability (i.e., the degree of subjective conviction), great attention is paid to the heuristic importance of how problems are posed and to that of the *Weltanschauung* which guides the scientist.

(d) As a third form of 'concreteness' one can consider the attention given to *practice*. Practice is to be understood in the widest possible sense

as 'sensual-material activity', ranging from scientific experiment[14] to political action. Intellectualism (pure theory) and utilitarianism or operationalism (overestimations of the practical) are both wrong. Theory and practice are to be considered as a unity.[15]

(e) Finally, science should not be considered as individual knowledge, but rather as *social*, collective knowledge. E.g., Kopnin insists that scientific research is directed towards that which is new to the whole of humanity, to the '*sub"ekt voobše*' (subject in general).[16]

All these elements of dialectical methodology make it a very specific approach to science. But it is senseful to call it 'methodology'. The meaning of 'logic' in the title of Kopnin's *sbornik* is far from that of the same word in Western terminology, for instance in the title of Popper's *The Logic of Scientific Discovery*. It is equivocal and confusing that the same name 'Logic' is being used in both cases. But as for 'methodology' the situation is different: if this term denotes the study of methods (of science) then there seems to be no reason not to apply it to phenomenological descriptions and to genetic, psychological, practical and sociological studies of such methods. On the contrary, it would seem rather artificial to restrict the meaning of 'methodology' to their logical (formal logical) analysis and justification. Before making more remarks of appreciation, a brief report on *non*-dialectical writings must be given for the purpose of comparison.

There are also publications in the Soviet Union which are concerned with formal logical analysis for its own interest, e.g., the majority of articles in two recent collections edited by P. V. Tavanec.[17] In one of them Tavanec and Švyrev say that the subject matter of their work is "those aspects of scientific knowledge that are connected with the use of the means of formal logic".[18] This is obviously very different from the interest of Kopnin and his collaborators. But the two directions do not exclude each other, and between the two groups there does not seem to be any 'antagonistic opposition', such as existed some years ago. The *sborniki* edited by Tavanec are published by the same publishing house (Nauka) which published the work of Kopnin, and the two groups are in perfect harmony and sometimes even collaboration. E.g., the man who wrote the article quoted above together with Tavanec is the same V. S. Švyrev who insisted very eloquently on the necessity of a dialectical methodology in another place.[19]

The collections of Tavanec contain articles by Tavanec himself, Švyrev, A. A. Zinov'ev, V. N. Sadovskij, D. P. Gorskij, A. I. Uëmov, I. S. Narskij, Ju. A. Petrov, A. I. Subbotin and others. These philosophers have shown interest in formal logic and some degree of competence in it. Some of their work – e.g., that of Zinov'ev – may even be considered as a valuable contribution to formal logic. But what Soviet methodologists with a principal interest in formal logic do in the majority of their works is to report and discuss Western opinions without much originality or to elaborate in very technical detail problems mostly connected with mathematics or cybernetics and therefore hardly relevant for general methodology. Thus, it seems that the more interesting part of Soviet methodology – one is tempted to say *the* methodology in the Soviet Union – is the work of the 'dialecticians'.

II. APPRECIATION OF DIALECTICAL METHODOLOGY

There is much to be said about the insufficiencies and the large areas of darkness in the described dialectical methodology. But within the limits of this article it is more interesting to point to some of the positive aspects of it.

It seems that the described approach actually fits the whole system of contemporary Marxism-Leninism very well (maybe better than any formal analysis does) and that some of the crucial problems of methodology can be sensefully solved (or eliminated) within this system by that approach.

Marxism-Leninism has inherited from Hegel much of his ontology: dialectical monism, relationalism and evolutionism.[20] In the framework of this ontology, knowledge is explained as the 'knowledge of mankind in its historical development', the distinction of ideal and real being is dissolved in the 'unity of the logical and the historical' and in the 'unity of theory and practice', truth is a process and resides in the whole system of knowledge understood as a Hegelian 'concrete universal'.

Keeping the ontological premisses of 'dialectical logic' in mind makes it easier to understand the specifics of dialectical methodology: it seems to be only consequent to these premisses that the procedure of science is to be first of all described phenomenologically. A proper description of the steps and forms of its development shows at the same time its inner logical structure, because the two are basically one. The demand of

'concreteness' in methodology, or in other words, the refusal to study one 'abstract' side of science independently of the whole is a consequence of the general relationalism. All of the forms of this 'concreteness': the genetical, psychological, practical and social point of view, follow naturally from the ontological premisses.

The reasoning may look like this for the example of induction: the existence in science of factual statements with universal and predictive meaning is a fact. The process of formulating such statements must be described and they find their justification in their historical and psychological development, in their practical and social function, and in their systematic effectiveness. The problems of formal inductive logic are precisely caused by the isolated abstraction of the formal side of knowledge and the failure to see the whole phenomenon. Thus, in dialectical methodology this central problem disappears.

To see the Hegelian premisses is a necessary condition for the understanding of Soviet dialectical methodology. But to disagree with those premisses is not sufficient reason to reject the methodological work. First, it may happen that valuable work is done with wrong premisses (*ex falso sequitur quodlibet*) and second, the system of premisses, although wrong as a whole, may have true elements that lead to valid conclusions independently of the systematic connection with other false elements. Both these possibilities allow Soviet methodology to come to some valuable results.

(a) First of all, the *phenomenological* description of the procedures of science is interesting in itself. Kopnin's collection contains many examples of it. If such descriptions cannot replace logical analysis they nevertheless allow a better understanding.

(b) The *genetic* approach preserves dialectical methodologists from possible mistakes. E.g., Western methodologists were for a long time convinced of the strict alternative between analytical and individually verifiable, synthetical statements in science because they analysed the fiction of ready-given, complete scientific systems into which such a strict alternative can indeed be introduced. Western methodologists have since criticized and rejected the erroneous alternative in the face of problems such as implicit definitions and dispositional predicates.[21] But to dialectical methodologists this mistake could not have happened. They see every scientific system in its genetic context, and it was precisely the neglect

of the genesis of science that led to the acceptance of the mentioned alternative.

(c) In a similar and closely connected way the *psychological* approach saves Soviet methodologists from some faults of early Western methodologists. For the development of formal logic it was decisive that 'psychologism' in logic was condemned and that the fields of psychology and logic were clearly distinguished. But it seems that Western methodologists were frequently led by this anti-psychologism in logic to illegitimately exclude psychological considerations from methodology as well. Methodology as the analysis of the methods of scientific knowledge cannot do without a study of the nature of knowledge itself, and this study is precisely done by a branch of philosophical psychology. To give only one example: The refusal of psychological considerations by the young Carnap – he would have called them 'metaphysical' – led him to his failure in *Der logische Aufbau der Welt*. His 'psychic objects' as empirical foundations of science were later rejected as misconceptions and as unable to found anything.

(d) *Practice* is the link between theoretical and empirical concepts and propositions. It is in the human activity that the insight into essences and necessary structures of reality is made possible for man. A Cartesian static subject-object relation together with a general mechanist view makes the fact of knowledge and science unintelligible. Practice is the dynamic transcendental relation between consciousness and material world which makes knowledge possible. This is certainly an interesting idea (and a long way from the Marxian concept of *Praxis* in the direction of something like Whitehead's 'causal efficacy').

(e) A last word about the *social* nature of science. Even without the assumption of a monster of real *sub"ekt voobše* (subject in general), one is left with something relevant: there is no doubt that scientists act and think in many respects as if there were a great totality of science in general, an organism of scientific systems, of which any individual scientist and his knowledge are only a part. This 'as if' is an important aspect of scientific procedure and it is certainly decisive for the planning of scientific division of labour and for the direction of scientific progress. Thus, the social considerations, as well as the other specific approaches of dialectical methodology, seem to be of relevance and interest.

REFERENCES

Note added in proof. After the present paper had gone to the printers, an article which is highly relevant to the subject has appeared: D. D. Comey: 'Current Trends in Soviet Logic', *Inquiry* (Oslo) 9, 1, 94–108. Mr. Comey's scholarly work provides a detailed and competent analysis and documentation of the most recent dialectical logic (up to and including 1964), and should definitely be consulted.

1. *VF* 1950, 2, to 1951, 6. For a survey of the decade after 1950, cf. J. M. Bochenski: 'Soviet Logic', *SST* I (1961) 29–38. A study on the discussions about formal logic is being prepared by J. Hänggi.
2. For a presentation of dialectical logic, see: K. G. Ballestrem: 'Dialectical Logic', *SST*, V, 3 (1965) 139–172.
3. *Ibid.*, p. 139.
4. T. J. Blakeley speaks about "the inability of the dialectical materialist to take a methodological point of view", in his review of A. F. Begiašvili: *Metod analiza sovremennoj buržuaznoj filosofii* in *SST* III, 3 (1963) 216 f. Cf. also his *Soviet Theory of Knowledge* (Sovietica, Dordrecht, 1964), pp. 80f.
5. *Logika naučnogo issledovanija*, Ss. Red. P. V. Kopnin i M. V. Popovič. IF AN USSR, Izd. Nauka, M., 1965. 360 str. A year before, Kopnin had already edited another sbornik with M. B. Vil'nickij, treating some of the same problems in a similar spirit and with many of the same contributors, but in a more superficial, handbook fashion: *Problemy myšlenija v sovremennoj nauke* (Problems of Thinking in Contemporary Science), Ss. Red. P. V. Kopnin i M. B. Vil'nickij. IF AN USSR, Izd. Mysl, M., 1964. 470 str.
6. *Logika naučnogo issledovanija, op.cit.*, str. 18.
7. *Ibid.*, str. 12f.
8. *Ibid.*, str. 44.
9. The articles look more like chapters of a monograph than like collected articles, and they are followed by a common bibliography and indices.
10. *Logika naučnogo issledovanija, op.cit.* str. 50–54.
11. V. S. Švyrev: 'O neopozitivistskoj koncepcii logičeskogo analiza nauki' (The Neopositivist Conception of the Logical Analysis of Science) in *Filosofija marksizma i neopozitivizm* (The Philosophy of Marxism and Neopositivism), Ss. Red. T. I. Ojzerman i dr. (Izd. MGU, M., 1963. 543 str.), str. 315–341, here mainly str. 340f.
12. *Logika naučnogo issledovanija, op.cit.*, str. 194.
13. *Ibid.*, str. 178. On truth, cf. also K. G. Ballestrem: 'The Soviet Concept of Truth' in *SST* IV, 1 (1964) 1–19.
14. *Logika naučnogo issledovanija, op.cit.*, str. 197.
15. *Ibid.*, str. 14, 32f., 57, 163f., 192ff. On practice, cf. N. Lobkowicz: 'Is the Soviet Notion of Practice Marxian?', *SST* VI, 1 (1966) 25–36.
16. *Ibid.*, str. 9.
17. *Problemy logiki naučnogo poznanija* (Problems of the Logic of Scientific Knowledge), Ss. Red. P. V. Tavanec. IF, Izd. Nauka, M., 1964, 410 str.; and *Formal'naja logika i metodologija nauki* (Formal Logic and Methodology of Science), Ss. Red. P. V. Tavanec, IF, Izd. Nauka, M., 1964, 301 str.
18. *Problemy logiki naučnogo poznanija, op.cit.*, str. 11.
19. Above, p. 136, and reference 11.
20. This has been emphasized by many observers. Recently however, the Hegelian heritage has been found to be the determining factor in contemporary Soviet

metaphysics of knowledge by K. G. Ballestrem. Cf. his articles 'The Soviet Concept of Truth', *op.cit.*, and 'Dialectical Logic', *op. cit.* A book by Mr. Ballestrem is forthcoming in German in the Sovetica series: *Die sowjetische Erkenntnismetaphysik und ihr Verhältnis zu Hegel.* (Diss.) Fribourg, 1965.

21. Cf. A. Pap: *Analytische Erkenntnistheorie*, Vienna 1955, pp. 27–57.

NOTES AND COMMENTS

WORKS OF EINSTEIN IN THE SOVIET UNION

On the occasion of the 60th anniversary of the special relativity theory in 1965, an Einstein committee was founded at the Academy of Sciences in Moscow. The committee is headed by the Nobel prize winner, Igor Tamm. Its task will be the publication and popularisation of Einstein's heritage in the Soviet Union. Einstein's complete works will be published for the first time in four volumes, the first of which appeared in 1965; the other three volumes will appear in 1966. Furthermore, the committee's intention is to publish annually a volume of collected papers on Einstein's creative work and on the fundamental problems of modern physics. In 1964, the leading Soviet scientist on the history of physics, B. G. Kuznecov, was elected chairman of the International Einstein Committee which includes such members as B. Russell, R. Oppenheimer and L. Infeld. B. G. Kuznecov is the author of numerous works on the relativity theory, including a biography, *Ejnštejn* (second edition, Moscow 1963).

ON THE DISCUSSION OF CONTRADICTIONS IN SOVIET SOCIETY

The Director of the Institute for Philosophy in Kiev, Professor Kopnin, opposes the tendency to deny contradictions in Soviet society in an article published in *Pravda*, February 10, 1966. Rožin and Tugarinov strictly refuse the thesis that there exist contradictions, Stepanjan admits only some contrasting tendencies but denies any contradiction in Soviet society. Those tendencies would not imply any conflict. According to Štraks, the dialectics of Communist society is the harmony manifested in the contradiction between possibility and reality, between concrete form and content. Kopnin's reply to his colleagues is biting mockery: "Some philosophers were obviously influenced by the disciples of an ostentatious well-being and decided to employ this attitude also in Marxist-Leninist dialectics. They forgot that dialectics does not allow subjectivism but demands all phenomena to be seen in their real way, i.e. in their entire, contradictory, concrete-historical context." All attempts to veil the real contradictions, says Kopnin, hinder the development of social sciences, and encourage voluntarism and subjectivism in politics. According to

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Kopnin, it is especially disastrous when the Soviet reader gets the impression from books that the contradictions of socialism are being solved without conflict and that, as a matter of fact, not the old and the new are confronting each other, but the very good and the simply good. The situation in life turns out to be more complicated; the illusion of peaceful harmony in socialism vanishes and it is only a small step thence to nihilism. Kopnin speaks out as well against an apologetics of socialistic reality as being an artificial "stimulation" of the contradictions. The existing contradictions will be solved on the basis of socialist relations. (*Pravda*, Feb. 2, 1966)

SOVIET-JAPANESE SYMPOSIUM ON PERSONALITY

A symposium was held in early January on the 'Problem of the Human Being in Socialist and Communist Society'. The symposium took place at the Institute for Philosophy in Moscow. Its themes were: 'The Marxist-Leninist Conception of the Nature of Personality', 'Revolution and Human Being', 'Individuum and Personality'. As far as we know, from Japan only materialistic philosophers participated. (*Izvestija*, Jan. 5, 1966)

PROFESSOR DUBININ HONOURED

The leading Soviet geneticist, Professor Dubinin, whose Institute had to abandon its activity under pressure from Lysenko in 1948, is at present being demonstratively honoured in the Soviet press. He has been suggested as laureate of the Lenin prize for 1966.

GLORIFICATION OF ŽDANOV

Ždanov, who was responsible for the "Kultur-Stalinizm" between 1945 and 1953, is, on the occasion of his 70th anniversary, the object of official glorification in the Soviet Union. *Pravda* dedicated an article to him and in Leningrad a commemoration was held for him. (*Pravda*, Feb. 26, 1966)

QUARTERLY ON SOCIOLOGY

At the general assembly of the Soviet sociological society on February 5,

1966, the members decided to publish a quarterly 'Sociological Research in the Soviet Union'. The new-elected chairman of the society is Professor Ossipov. (*Izvestija*, Feb. 8, 1966)

TWO CONFERENCES ON GRAVITATION

The Second Soviet Conference on Gravitation was held between April 20–28, 1965 in Tiflis, with 98 contributions which treated problems also being discussed in the Western world. To the well-known discussion centres in Copenhagen, London, Dublin, Paris, Princeton and Warsaw must now be added those in Leningrad, Moscow, Kazan', Kiev, and Tartu. The contributions covered the activity of galactic centres (Ambarcumjan), the gravitation collapse (Ginzburg), a critique of Einstein's principles (Fok), the unified field-theory (Ivanenko), the tetrad-formulation (Levašev), gravitational-waves (Petrov), and energy and momentum of the gravitation field (M. F. Širokov).

An All-Union symposium on philosophical problems of Einstein's gravitation theory and relativistic cosmology was held from May 18–21, 1964. This is perhaps the first philosophical conference ever on general relativity theory. 200 physicists and philosophers from Moscow, Leningrad, Kiev, Minsk, Kazan', Alma-Ata and other towns participated in it. The main themes consisted of: foundations of the theory, the nature of space-time and the gravitational field, the relation between absolute and relative, finity and infinity. The proceedings were recently published for the first time under the title *Filosofskie problemy teorii tjagotenija Ejnštejna i reljativistskoj kosmologii* (Izd. 'Naukova Dumka', Kiev, 1965, 331 str.). The conference demonstrated the active collaboration of Soviet philosophers and physicists on a field that even in the West may be regarded as practically new territory. The conference was summoned by the Soviet gravitational committee, the Scientific Council on Philosophical Problems of Natural Sciences of the Ukrainian Academy of Sciences, and the Institute of Philosophy of the Ukrainian Academy of Sciences. The level of the discussion was practically free from emotion, and the physicists' attitude was barely bound to ideology. The conference will be exhaustively commented on in one of the forthcoming issues of this journal.

S. M.-M.

JUGOSLAWIEN

Wir sehen mit Genugtuung, daß eine bisher für die meisten westlichen Beobachter bestehende Sprachgrenze, die sie von einer der lebendigsten Sektionen der marxistisch-leninistischen Philosophie getrennt hat, nun zu einem wichtigen Teil überbrückt worden ist: unter dem Titel *Praxis* erscheint seit 1965 vierteljährlich eine internationale Ausgabe der Zeitschrift, welche die Kroatische Philosophische Gesellschaft (Zagreb) herausgibt. Die Beiträge – Artikel, Berichte und Rezensionen – sind in Englisch, Französisch und Deutsch wiedergegeben. Jedes der Hefte hat ein zentrales Thema, dem jeweils mehrere Abhandlungen gewidmet sind (Praxis, Sozialismus, Freiheit).

Der Jahrgang 1965 enthält unter anderem folgende Titel:

BOŠNJAK, Branko: 'Betrachtung über die Praxis' (1)
GRLIČ, Danko: 'Practice and Dogma' (1), 'Questions sur la liberté' (4)
KANGRGA, Milan: 'Die Freiheit als erkannte Notwendigkeit' (4)
KREŠIČ, Andrija: 'Le socialisme comme question d'histoire' (2/3)
MARKOVIČ, Mihajlo: 'Socialism and Self-Management' (2/3)
MIKECIN, Vjekoslav: 'Les racines profondes du dogmatisme' (4)
MILIČ, Vojin: 'A Contribution to the Theory of Social Conflict' (4)
PEJOVIČ, Danilo: 'Le socialisme et les intellectuels' (2/3), 'Portraits von Sartre' (1) 'Merleau-Ponty' (2/3) und 'Carnap' (4)
PEŠIČ-GOLUBOVIČ, Zagorka: 'Socialism and Humanism' (4)
PETROVIČ, Gajo: 'Praxis und Sein' (1), 'What is Freedom?' (4)
STOJANOVIČ, Svetozar: 'Freedom and Democracy in Socialism' (2/3)
SUPEK, Rudi: 'Dialectique de la pratique sociale' (1)
TADIČ, Ljubo: 'Solidarité et liberté' (4)
VRANICKI, Predrag: 'De la coéxistence' (1), 'Socialism and the Problem of Alienation' (2/3), 'Von dem historischen Determinismus und der historischen Freiheit' (4)
ŽIVOTIČ, Miladin: 'Socialism and Mass Culture' (2/3)

Der Chefredakteur der Zeitschrift ist Danilo Pejovič, die Adresse (auch für Bestellungen) lautet: Administracija časopisa *Praxis*, Odsjek za filozofiju Filosofskog fakulteta, Zagreb, Đure Salaja b.b.

PHILOSOPHISCHE DISSERTATIONEN IN DER UDSSR

Ein in *VF* 1966, 2, 138–140 veröffentlichter Bericht über philosophische Doktor- und Kandidatendissertationen bringt außer einer Kritik an verschiedenen Mängeln der derzeitigen Promotionspraxis eine Statistik, aus welcher die thematische Aufgliederung der Dissertationsarbeiten hervorgeht:

Thematik	Doktordiss.	Kandidatendiss.
Historischer Materialismus u. wissentschaftlicher Kommunismus	16	82
Wissentschaftlicher Atheismus	2	28
Ethik	1	45
Aesthetik	4	35
Geschichte der Philosophie	16	49
Dialektischer Materialismus	6	12
Erkenntnisstheorie	5	18
Philosophische Probleme der Physik	1	4
Idem pro Biologie und Medezin	1	4
Idem pro Mathematik	0	3
Idem pro Chemie	1	1
Idem pro Kibernetik	1	1
Idem pro Formale Logik und Semiotik	0	4

H. F.

REVIEWS

P. H. Vigor: *A Guide to Marxism and its Effects on Soviet Development*. London, Faber and Faber. 1966. 253 pp. 35/—.

P. H. Vigor has produced a remarkably clear, concise and well organised account of Marxist-Leninist ideology. The book is what it claims to be: a *guide*. It makes no pretensions to being a profound or original analysis of Communist ideology but is obviously intended as an introduction for the ordinary reader to the complexities of Marxist-Leninist ideology.

The book is divided into five sections following the historical development of Communist thought.

The first part, which begins with a brief biographical sketch of the life of Karl Marx, covers what the author calls the "main ingredients" of Communist ideology as it is found in the writings of Marx and Engels. The "ingredients" are skilfully organised under three headings: *beliefs*, *inferences* and *predictions*. This threefold division of Communist ideology is one of the most useful ways of dividing Marxian thought suggested and it enables the author to give a short, well balanced summary of the vast complexities of Marx' thought.

Part two contains a brief account of Marxism-Leninism or Lenin's additions to the theory and deals primarily with Lenin's conception of the Party. The section on Imperialism is unfortunately too short and does not bring out the fact that Lenin worked out his theory of imperialism as the highest stage of Capitalism to explain why Capitalism did not seem to be developing along the line predicted by Marx.

The third part, which treats of the development of Marxism-Leninism since Lenin's death, covers an impressive amount of detail – Stalinism, Krushchevism and the Chinese and Yugoslav variants of Communism – in just over thirty pages.

Part four covers the effects of Marxist-Leninist theory on different sectors of Soviet society and even contains a brief summary of the recent Libermann proposals in economics. Part five is a glossary of Marxist and Marxist-Leninist terms.

The book, which is intended as a first introduction to Marxist-Leninist thought, contains little or no new material but the author's treatment of the subject is everywhere scholarly and balanced. P. H. Vigor deserves the highest praise for a clear and highly competent account of a very difficult subject.

T. R. Payne

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Grace Carlton: *Friedrich Engels: The Shadow Prophet.* Pall Mall Press, London. 1965. IX+235 pp.

In comparison with the libraries that have been written on Karl Marx, history has been relatively silent about the man who was largely responsible for making Marx something more than an intractable leader of a small 19th century socialist sect. It was Engels who supported the Marx family for three decades, who devoted himself unstintingly to spreading the name and influence of the master, who edited the most important of Marx's unpublished works (and many of the published ones during his lifetime), and whose popularisations were largely responsible for reviving the interest and power of the Marxian credo.

Mrs. Carlton's biography merits more than most being called 'eminently readable'. As she states in the Foreword, it is intended for the general reader, and not for the professional historian or political scientist. Yet, there is much of value here even for the specialist, and certainly for the student wishing to situate the proper historical context. For one thing, although summary acknowledgement of Marx's debt to Engels is often given, it is stirring to realise how closely Marxism escaped joining Proudhonism, 'True Socialism' and a host of other socialist sects in historical oblivion, only because of the energy and devotion of this convivial and self-effacing friend. For another, although writing primarily as a popular historian and not as a philosopher, economist or political scientist, the author occasionally intersperses her text with some clear and penetrating remarks on the historical procedures and errors of Marx and Engels.

One regrets that she did not extend any further her analysis of historical materialism in general and of Engels' own writings in particular. The only work of his given any treatment at length is *The Origin of the Family, Private Property and the State.* There is not enough elucidation given to *Anti-Dühring*, especially in the light of its impact upon the socialist movement at the time. There are, moreover, certain gaping lacunae: the complete absence of any mention of Engels' work on the *Dialectics of Nature* and of his writings on the origins of religion and Christianity. Whereas his research in Irish history and military affairs are of passing interest, these other preoccupations were far greater in his latter years and were of far more impact on the subsequent development of dialectical and historical materialism in the hands of Lenin and his successors. Engels' scientism and peculiar historiography have laid a heavy yoke upon the intellects of his Soviet disciples, and they deserved more attention. Indeed, a concluding chapter on the posthumous treatment of Engels in Leninist and Communist theory, and on their fidelity to him and Marx, would have been a real service to the reader. In the event that the book proceed to a second printing, as it surely and deservedly will do, a couple of suggestions might be offered: the addition of a more ample bibliography and of references for the numerous quotations.

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Despite the above reservations, however, the book has been a pleasure to read. Mrs. Carlton's style is light and witty (although perhaps a bit too mordant at times), her remarks astute, and her sympathy with the most *gemütlich* of the fathers of Communism is not only warming, but contagious.

Pierre Beemans

Alexander Steininger: *Literatur und Politik in der Sowjetunion nach Stalins Tod.* (Veröffentlichungen des Osteuropa-Instituts München, Band 26). Verlag Otto Harrasowitz, Wiesbaden 1965. 236 SS. DM 30.—.

Die Entwicklung der sowjetischen Literatur und Politik nach dem Tode Stalins, und die damit verbundene Verschiebung der geistigen Orientierung, besonders bei der jüngeren Generation in der Sowjetunion, wird von A. Steininger in ausgezeichneter Weise behandelt.

Der Verfasser zieht einen kurzen Vergleich mit der vorrevolutionären russischen Literatur (die bei aller vorübergehend zum Ziel erhobenen Zweckgebundenheit doch stets künstlerische Literatur blieb, und in diesem Sinne "im Grunde genommen konstruktiv war"). (S. 17) Dabei wird der mit der Revolution von 1917 auch in Literatur und Dichtung erfolgte Bruch verdeutlicht, der das politische, soziale und geistige Gefüge Rußlands von dem des nachfolgenden Sowjetstaates trennt.

Wie wenig man die sowjetische Literatur ursprünglich als Fortsetzung und natürliches Erbe der russischen betrachten könne, werde schon ersichtlich aus Lenins (bis heute verbindlicher) Forderung nach einer sogenannten Parteiliteratur, die nicht künstlerisch, sondern in erster Linie pragmatisch sein müsse. Steininger nennt folglich die Konzeption der Sowjetliteratur "nicht Ausdruck des Fühlens, Denkens und Sinnens einer Nation", sondern bezeichnet sie vielmehr als Vertreterin von "Zielen und Interessen einer politischen, nicht literarischen Gruppe, einer Partei...". (S. 17)

Der Hauptteil des Buches gliedert sich in sieben Kapitel: (1) Die Gegebenheiten zum Zeitpunkt von Stalins Tod; (2) Von Stalins Tod bis zum XX. Parteitag der KPdSU; (3) Der XX. Parteitag der KPdSU und die Jahre 1956–1957; (4) Die Entwicklung bis zum Dritten Schriftstellerkongreß; (5) Die Tendenzen der Jahre 1959–1961; (6) Zwei Schwerpunktprobleme: Religiosität und Berufsleben; (7) Vom XXII. Parteitag der KPdSU bis zum Herbst 1963. In ihnen wird untersucht, inwieweit die Tendenzen des Sozialistischen Realismus echte Dichtung und schriftstellerische Begabung zu unterdrücken vermochten, in welchem Ausmaß eine geistige Versklavung wirklich erfolgen konnte. Dabei kommt der Verfasser zu weitgehend optimistischen Schlüssen.

Nicht zuletzt infolge der Entstalinisierung und der damit verbundenen Entmythologisierung der Partei scheine das "absolute Parteimonopol auf die öffentliche Meinung ... durchbrochen zu sein. Das zunehmende Denken der Menschen 'auch außerhalb der parteilich zulässigen Grenzen' erkläre sich teilweise aus der Steigerung ihres Selbstbewußtseins, aus der verstärkten Immunität gegenüber der Phraseologie der Parteiführung, verbunden mit einer kritischen ... Haltung im Hinblick auf die Äußerungen des Regimes". (S. 219) Dieses unter anderem habe zur Folge, daß die Literatur heute viel "Spezifisch-Sowjetisches eingebüßt" habe und "vielschichtiger und komplizierter" geworden sei. (S. 220) Obwohl "die Ideen, Wünsche und Sehnsüchte der Jugend" augenblicklich noch kaum "ausgeprägte Kristallisationspunkte" aufwiesen, auch

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wenn der Literatur" in jedem Fall...nicht überschreitbare Grenzen durch das Regime gesetzt" seien, sieht Steininger in dem Ergebnis aller von ihm aufgeführten Faktoren eine "potentielle Schwächung des Regimes". (S. 221) Dies wurde möglich nicht zuletzt durch eine relative Erschlaffung des Totalitarismus, oder wie es der Verfasser ausdrückt, durch eine "gewisse Verdünnung der inneren Substanz" (der Partei), die "große gesellschaftspolitische Wandlungen" mit sich brachte. Die sowjetische Literatur, deren jüngste Entwicklung nicht außerhalb verschiedener anderer (größtenteils irreversibler) Prozesse, die die nachstalinistische Zeit mit sich brachte gesehen werden könne, werde künftig in erster Linie von der innen- und außenpolitischen Lage bestimmt werden". (S. 221)

Bemerkenswert ist die Materialfülle über unorthodoxe literarische Gruppen, die während der letzten Jahre neben der unerfreulich farblosen parteitreuen Literatur mehr und mehr hervortreten und ihre Werke illegal publizieren konnten.

Das Regime zeigt bislang keinerlei Bereitschaft, seinen Anspruch einer Kontrolle über die geistigen und künstlerischen Äußerungen seiner Untertanen aufzugeben. Es wird darin von gewissen Kritikern und einigen linientreuen Literaten unterstützt, deren schriftstellerische Produkte zwar Zweifel hinsichtlich der Qualität aufkommen lassen, die sich aber um so mehr des Wohlwollens der Partei erfreuen. Sie zögern nicht als getreues Echo der obersten Führung, ihre Kollegen und deren abweichlerische Tendenzen lautstark mit vorwurfsvollen Schmähreden zu belegen.

Daß trotz dieser Tatsache von längeren Phasen erzwungener geistiger Stagnation in den letzten Jahren kaum mehr die Rede sein kann, gibt Anlaß zur Hoffnung auf eine weitere positive Entwicklung des geistigen Lebens in der Sowjetunion.

Daß dies, unter Hinzuziehung zahlreicher Quellen und mit Angabe einer umfangreichen Sekundärliteratur herausgearbeitet wurde, ist einer der wesentlichen Vorzüge des vorliegenden Buches, derentwegen es nicht nur dem Fachmann, sondern einem breiten Leserpublikum empfohlen werden kann.

C. Gerstenmaier

Social Sciences in the USSR. Paris-The Hague, Mouton & Co. 1965. XII+297 pp.

This *sbornik* "prepared by the USSR Academy of Sciences at the request of Unesco", is published under the auspices of the "International Social Science Council". The editor-in-chief is K. V. Ostrovitjanov, and M. T. Iovčuk is the editor of the "Philosophical Sciences" section. The book contains a general introduction by A. I. Paskov and four main sections: on Historical (13–78), Philosophical (79–140), Economic (141–246) and Juridical Sciences (247–292). A list of Social Science Journals published in the USSR is added.

The philosophical section contains a general survey ("Principal Trends and Forms of Scientific Work") and seven articles: on Dialectical Materialism and Logic (P. V. Kopnin and N. V. Karabanov), Problems of Natural Science (V. M. Kaganov and E. N. Česnokov), Historical Materialism and Concrete Sociological Research (M. D. Kammari and G. L. Kabaev), Ethics (V. A. Razumnij), Psychology (S. L. Rubinštejn) and History of Philosophy (M. I. Iovčuk and V. E. Timosenko).

The book is of interest for the specialist, if for no other reason than because it shows how official centers of philosophical research see the situation. To cite just one instance, one learns that "Historical Materialism ... is Marxist sociology" (p. 3) – a contention which surely is not made by all Soviet sociologists. Also the book contains an amount of bibliographical data which may be useful.

The general reader must be cautioned, however, that the picture offered by the *sbornik* is not always reliable. Without entering into too many details, some examples taken at random may illustrate this affirmation.

In the chapter 'Research on Problems of Dialectical Materialism and Logic', while a work about the activities of chimpanzees is quoted (p. 83); not a single mention is made of the considerable achievements of Soviet mathematical logicians. The fact that mathematical logic is highly specialized is no excuse, because several Soviet logicians have published interesting *philosophical* studies on problems of logic. Obviously, the authors of this chapter consider the products of P. V. Kopnin and others similar as being far more important. This is their right. But they are not impartial in presenting what is being done in the Soviet Union. Another detail which merits being mentioned is the bibliography of the chapter on sociology, where agitprop is mixed with serious scientific work.

The reviewer was not able to find a single mention of the extensive and, in his view, relevant discussions on the philosophical problems of cybernetics. It is perhaps partly due to the fact that the book does not cover the field beyond 1960; but still, the omission is serious.

One may ask in how far a sympathetic and uninformed reader in the English speaking countries may be impressed by this book. For the avowed aim of the editors was to make Soviet science ("Social" Science) known abroad – and implicitly, one presumes, better appreciated by foreigners. The answer is that it undoubtedly may do some good for the cause which this journal has been

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furthering, along with the Soviet philosophers, namely, that Western philosophers recognize Soviet philosophy as something worth studying. If such a philosopher reads this book attentively he will probably find that some of his own problems are debated in the Soviet Union. But otherwise he will get little more than titles – i.e. no insight into the way in which his Soviet colleagues are philosophizing. On the other hand, the way some of the contributors have written in this book (e.g., the concluding paragraph of the section on history of philosophy with its "unmasking", etc.) will probably make him think that most, if not all philosophers in the Soviet Union are like Messrs. Mitin, Kammari and Kopnin. Which would be most unjust to Soviet philosophy.

J. M. Bocheński

WORKS OF GEORG LUKÁCS IN NON-HUNGARIAN LANGUAGES I

This bibliography has been compiled for the benefit of the numerous students of historical and contemporary Marxism and Marxism-Leninism who do not read Hungarian, but for whom the writings of Georg Lukács are of eminent interest.*

This first part of the bibliography deals with Lukács' works published in book form; Part II, to appear in the next issue of this journal, will treat Lukács' papers published in periodicals. Included are writings published prior to 1965.

CZECHOSLOVAK LANGUAGES

Czech

Existencialismus či marxismus. Praha, 1949, 229 pp.

Slovak

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Velci rusti realisté. Praha, 1948, 258 pp.; Bratislava 1950, 475 pp.

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Goethe et son époque. Paris, 1949, 351 pp.
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La théorie du roman. Paris, 1963, 196 pp.

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* For a bibliography of Lukács' books and articles in Hungarian, see Ervin Laszlo, *The Communist Ideology in Hungary,* Bibliographic Section, Dordrecht, 1966.

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Der russische Realismus in der Weltliteratur. Berlin, 1949, 293 pp.; Berlin, 1952, 541 pp.; Berlin, 1953, 592 pp.
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Essays über Realismus. Berlin, 1948, 268 pp.
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Seminar in Leningrad, working on theory of organisation. 20 speeches were given. One by L. A. Petrušenko (LIAP) on "Theory of Organisation and its Philosophical and Methodological Meaning". (*VF* 1966, 2, 140–143)

March–May — Two discussions were held on the question of Asiatic Mode of Production. Participation of scientific collaborators of the humanities institutes of the AN, of the Institute for Marxism-Leninism (*pri CK KPSS*), teachers of MGU and other high-schools. (*VF* 1965, 12, 149–156)

April — Philosophical congress in (East) Berlin on 'Marxist-Leninist Philosophy and Technical Revolution'. Organized by the Section of Philosophy and the German Academy of Science, together with the United Philosophical Institution of the DDR. With participation of delegations from the USSR, Poland, Western Germany, Austria and others. (*VF* 1966, 2, 143–145)

May — Symposium in Moscow on philosophical problems of culture, organized by the Moscow State Institute for Culture and the IF. Speeches: A. J. Arnol'dov, 'Some Aspects of Becoming a United All-Human Culture'; A. N. Maslin, 'Morality and Culture'; V. G. Sinicyn, 'Being and Culture'; P. F. Judin, 'Philosophical Problems of Communist Culture'. (*VF* 1966, 1, 145–148)

June — Fourth conference of philosophers and scientists in Obninsk, discussing philosophical problems of contemporary biology. (*VF* 1966, 1, 148–150)

June — International Colloquium in Jena (DDR) on problems of sociological development of religion. With participation of most of the Socialist European countries. Speeches for the USSR were given by D. M. Ugrinovič and A. F. Okulov, amongst others. (*VF* 1966, 1, 150–156)

26 Nov. — Session of the Praesidium of the AN with a discussion on results and perspectives of research in world history of philosophy and the Leninist stage of its development. (*VF* 1966, 1, 156–158)

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EDITORIAL NOTE

It is incumbent upon a scientific journal specialized in Soviet and East-European philosophy to focus its readers' attention on the outstanding problems and events in its complex and diversified field. To do this, the editors of this journal have decided to publish, from time to time as current developments warrant, special issues. These will provide a forum for the discussion and analysis of chosen topics by qualified investigators from their various individual points of view.

The present number of *Studies in Soviet Thought* is the first such special issue. It is devoted to the open questions facing Soviet philosophers today, in such diverse fields as ontology, epistemology, theory of social law and philosophy of law and State. The next special issue, on East-West contacts in philosophy, is now in preparation.

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HELMUT FLEISCHER

OPEN QUESTIONS IN CONTEMPORARY SOVIET ONTOLOGY

In former years it was no more than a customary ritual for Soviet philosophers to speak about the '*questions*' of dialectical materialism, and open questions played only a peripheral role. Thus one could confirm the clear dominance of a set of indisputable answers. But today exactly the opposite situation is to be found. The answers are, to use a simile of Engels, surrounded "as by a swarm of bees" by unsolved, insufficiently elaborated and widely disputed problems. This has been shown by discussions in recent years, among which is the symposium on 'Present Problems of Materialist Dialectics' (April 7–9, 1965), whose materials are being published in four volumes.[1]

The set of problems which comes to light is widely diversified, and in the following paper we only want to touch upon some of the questions which concern the total structure and ontological positions in dialectical materialism.

THEORETICAL INTENTION AND SYSTEMATIC DIVISION

One is confronted with problems already, so to speak, at the very entrance-gate to dialectical materialism, if one asks what the general theme, scope and theoretical function of this doctrine really is. Up to now it has been taken as a universal, fundamental doctrine of the general nature of being and knowledge, this nature being uniform in all domains. Historical materialism is subordinated to it as the special, regional doctrine of human society. Yet in recent times some authors (L. N. Suvorov[2] and M. N. Alekseev[3]) have questioned this conception. They plead for a 'unitary' conception, in which 'dialectical materialism' and 'Marxist-Leninist philosophy' are synonymous. The component parts of this unitary whole are 'theory of knowledge' and 'historical materialism'. Ontology is not presented separately here, but, as is done by many Soviet philosophers, is incorporated into 'theory of knowledge'. Also, the relation of subordination between general and special, regional theory does not

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become explicit. The rightly-maintained nucleus of the argument is the claim that, in fact, one cannot delimit a characteristically different 'historical' materialism from a 'dialectical' one, since the former must naturally be just as "dialectical" as the latter. But the misunderstanding comes only from the fact that Soviet philosophers have elevated a *confessio* into a title for their 'dialectical materialism', instead of simply naming the disciplines according to their specific objects and themes.

That 'materialistic' and 'dialectical' are characterizations which run through all possible areas of philosophical doctrine, becomes clear in the division of V. P. Rožin.[4] He proposes for philosophy four "parts of the object of investigation" – nature, society, thinking and knowledge, and he attaches to them just as many "component parts of philosophy". But what is lost in this division is the actual function of 'dialectical materialism', which was part of the previous conception. This meant that above and beyond every separate characterization of these areas, it is right to articulate, in a conceptual manner, a general interregional characterization, which is concerned with beings as beings and knowledge as knowledge. No Soviet philosopher will want to dispense himself from this task. And in the following discussion we will deal only with this general, fundamental doctrine.

The discussions about the inner structure of this discipline are consistently guided by Lenin's postulate of the 'unity', 'coincidence' or 'identity' of logic, dialectics and theory of knowledge. Lenin understood logic (following Hegel) as the doctrine "of the laws of development of 'all material, natural and spiritual things', i.e. of the development of the total concrete content of the world and the knowledge of it".[5] Various authors conclude from this that there can be no autonomous philosophical disciplines within the limits of this basic doctrine. Nevertheless, even a radical thinker would hardly dispute that there are in this unity at least certain differences of 'aspect', of theoretical 'function' or of thematic orientation.

While theory of knowledge and logic are made legitimate, at least in principle, by the classics, the justification of ontology on the basis of Marxism is particularly disputed. When the *Philosophical Dictionary* proclaimed the illegitimacy of a dialectical materialist ontology,[6] it provoked strong opposition.[7] However, it does not appear to us worth-

while to give an extensive account of this controversy. It suffers from a deficiency (as did the long preliminary discussion on the relation between formal and dialectical logic), which is typical of methodological proposals that are not immediately worked out in a concrete formulation. False antitheses and unrealizable suggestions for construction arise, whose unrealistic character is discovered only when one begins to work them out in a concrete way. In P. V. Kopnin's *Dialectics as Logic* as in V. I. Čerkesov's *Materialistic Dialectics as Logic and Theory of Knowledge,* ontology comes off so badly that in the end one has no more than a partial discipline instead of a complete whole.

P. V. Kopnin is probably right when he says that since Kant philosophy has followed a path leading to the unification of theory of knowledge, logic and ontology.[8] Yet he carries this even further in saying that philosophy has set itself up as a theory of knowledge and has thereby made all metaphysics or ontology superfluous.[9] In fact, he substantiates this with the manifestly critically oriented thought, that there can be no concept of being aside from its relation to consciousness.[10] But all of this merely supports a 'critical' or 'transcendental' ontology, one which takes epistemological considerations into account, but it hardly rules out any ontology at all. The discussion is also prejudiced by the fact that some Marxist-Leninist philosophers have a very special concept of ontology. For example, the German author A. Kosing thinks that ontology *eo ipso* consists in attributing to being spurious essential features.[11] But what Engels said about philosophy in general might also hold here: whoever believes that he can get along without ontology has one anyway, in which case it is a bad one, since it is an unreflective, epistemologically naïve ontology, and is connected with a naïvely ontological epistemology.

If we finally ask how the unity of ontology and epistemology is realized in the system of dialectical materialism, the answer can be simply put – not at all. Rather, we find almost everywhere a clearly marked division, as follows: first come two ontological sections, (1) on the materiality of the world and (2) on development and its laws, and then an epistemological part, (3) on the nature and dialectics of knowledge (which is often inserted between the two ontological parts). The amount of epistemological reflection within the ontological sections is minimal (with the notable exception of G. G. Gabriël'jan's *Marxist Logic,* in which the

concept of matter is developed epistemologically from the perception of things).[12] One can speak of a real interpenetration of ontology and theory of knowledge (including both the knowledge of being and the knowledge of knowing) only if, step by step, each one of the ontological categories is examined with regard to its 'transcendental genesis' (as V. I. Stoljarov has rightly demanded[13]), and not only with regard to its operative use in the cognitive process, as is done by most Soviet authors. Ontology, taken seriously in the full sense of the word, refers to an inner gnoseo-logical reflexivity. Of course it has been, and still is, occasionally bound up with a lot of questionable speculation. Nevertheless, ontology is completely possible, even with the greatest scientific sobriety and methodological purity, as a critical reflexion on the 'Logos', in whose medium we grasp beings as beings by a 'way of knowledge' proper to us as subjects. What is at stake here is a kind of 'applied theory of knowledge' within ontology. It is precisely this which is so sadly missing in Soviet dialectical materialism, and any progress in this regard would mean far more than a general debate on the unity of dialectical ontology, theory of knowledge and logic.

There is also an interesting ontological problem to be found in the theoretical substantiation which the dialectical materialists give for their postulate of the unity of being and knowledge. It proceeds from a thesis which Engels formulated (and which follows an old philosophical tradition): being (real existence) and 'thought' (to-be-thought) are admittedly different, but their laws are the same. They form, according to Engels, two orders which are 'different in expression' but 'factually identical'.[14] The laws of thought, which are at the same time laws of being, include both the basic laws of logic (which, as B. M. Kedrov says, have both a formal and a dialectical version[15]) and the universal laws of the materialist dialectic, which are supposed to be able to function as 'laws of knowledge' and 'logical laws of thought'.[16] Of course, the existence of a few identical principles or laws can hardly mean much for the question of the coincidence or difference of the ontological and epistemological orientation. It might be more important to see the motive for the unification of both aspects in the unity of the cognitive activity itself.

THE SYSTEM OF CATEGORIES

Another discussion taking place among Soviet philosophers is likewise still on the 'periphery' of real ontological work; that is the discussion about an 'objectively' established ordering (subordination) of the philosophical categories and theorems. Here also it is mainly a case of general proposals which are not sufficiently worked out, and the results amount to a few more or less detailed tables with more or less evident substantiations. Several authors have presented their proposals in papers for the 'Symposium on Materialist Dialectics'.[17] But once more we cannot attach to this discussion the importance which the activity in Soviet circles would seem to justify. And again we would like to say with Engels "the proof of the pudding is in the eating." The "correct" subordination of the categories (if it exists) should be put to the test within the systematic presentation of the theory, not in a vacuum high above it.

But if one tries to discover the 'logic of the system' not in the sphere of projects and methodological principles, but in the presently existing Soviet systematizations of dialectical materialism, his final judgment will be harsh. There is hardly any logic at all, but at best only a habituation to old didactic schemas, whose didactic effectiveness itself can justifiably be doubted. As an exception we can again name G. G. Gabriel'jan's *Marxist Logic* (which was conceived with reference to Hegel), notwithstanding various deficiencies in the detailed exposition. We think that a fruitful methodological discussion could start with this book. However, a table such as the one compiled by A. P. Šeptulin is hardly a step in that direction. It embraces three groups of categories: (1) matter and consciousness (matter and the material, the psychic and the physiological, consciousness and self-consciousness, etc.); (2) practice and knowledge (knowledge as reflection, thought, truth, purpose, means, etc.); (3) universal forms of being and levels of knowledge (thing, property, relation, movement, quality, law, freedom, etc., – altogether twenty subgroups).[18]

The author of the present article has discussed at an earlier time questions of the systematization of the categories, and has now received a reply from E. P. Sitkovskij.[19] Furthermore we have made an attempt at a systematic construction of dialectical-materialist ontology according to the methodological principle (described by Marx and repeatedly discussed

by Soviet authors) of "ascending from the abstract to the concrete". However, in spite of this, we do not want to attach to these considerations too much importance. What is needed at this time is not work on the system but, above all, systematic work on the individual problems. If V. I. Stoljarov's remark is true, that the concepts are extremely vague or completely undetermined[20], then it cannot make much sense to join them in the construction of new edifices.

ANALYSIS AND SYNTHESIS

The main interest of Marxist-Leninist philosophy has always been directed towards arriving at far-reaching and eventually all-encompassing syntheses: What is the world in its essence, something material or something spiritual? of what kind of being is it, dynamic or static? is its extent finite or infinite? in what direction and with what forms and rhythms does change occur? Such questions, and the clear-cut categorical decisions which they call for, serve an ideological function in the 'struggle of the revolutionary proletariat' with the various theoretical justifications for the existing social order. They are the central points of the 'proletarian *Weltanschauung*' (*mirovozzrenie*), in which elements of a theoretical understanding of the world are united with those of a practical relation to the world. (We cannot discuss here how the transition from theoretical to practical philosophy takes place.)

Dialectical-materialist theory arrives at its universal synthetic statements by a path already pointed out by Engels. It consists in a summation of the results of the positive sciences 'by means of dialectical thinking', which leads to the codification of the most general laws of the structure, movement and development of all being. Next to the materialistic solution of the 'basic question' of the primacy of matter or consciousness, the 'basic laws of the materialist dialectic' form dominating centres of theoretical interest. But, if it is observed how all of these theorems are presented and worked out in the compendiums of dialectical materialism, one will not only take issue with the details, but, more than that, a strong doubt can arise whether the theoretical task is correctly posed at all. The categorial repertoire, which Soviet philosophers use in every 'generalization', is antiquated in some of its decisive parts and is often simply confused (as, for example, the doctrine of 'dialectical contradictions').

We do not wish to discuss in this paper what philosophy, as ontology, can accomplish for a further elaboration of the results of the special sciences. In a more or less similar way, philosophy is faced with another task, which turns it in the opposite direction: namely, to reflect not only on the results but particularly, and perhaps with greater competence, on the *presuppositions* of the formation of scientific concepts (in the special sciences and in philosophy), in an analysis of the categories and categorial syntax of all meaningful discourse about beings. What Soviet philosophy accomplishes in this regard will be decisive for its future course. Compared with the highly ambitious questions on the essence of the world and the universal forms of all development, this is something very elementary and unsensational; but in spite of this or perhaps precisely because of it, these are extremely important and basic issues. One can find in Soviet philosophy many new attempts at analyzing traditional categories and at developing new ones. The syntactical relations between the categories are also beginning to be discussed (especially by V. P. Tugarinov). Yet, as P. V. Kopnin correctly notes, that is only a beginning. In his opinion, Soviet philosophers have up to now chiefly purified dialectical materialism of the consequences of the Stalinist cult and have restored the philosophical heritage of Marx, Engels and Lenin to an honorable position. "But we have not yet taken a major step forward, at least in comparison with the extensive networks of categories which existed in the second half of the nineteenth century."[21]

It might also be remarked, in passing, that the logical analysis of categories finds its significance not only in the construction of the general ontology of dialectical materialism; but, more importantly, it also has urgent tasks in the social doctrine of historical materialism, as a more concrete and, so to speak, 'applied ontology'. Some of these tasks would be to analyze the whole complex of 'social laws', the conception of 'objective processes', the fundamental relation between social being and consciousness, etc.

MATTER AND MATERIALISM

How much one is turned away from the all-encompassing synthetic statements to the task of an elementary clarification of categorial premisses is clearly perceived when he considers the basic materialistic axiom

of Marxism-Leninism, the thesis of the material unity of the world. In connection with this thesis, Soviet philosophers are faced with a complicated problem which arose historically. After Engels presented the problem of materialism in a completely traditional way, Lenin gave it a very peculiar turn with his epistemological definition of matter as objective reality, independent of consciousness. The basic problematics of the 'Leninist concept of matter' have recently been discussed in this journal. R. Thomas lamented the fact that Soviet philosophy has only rarely discussed the problem of materialism, and then just in passing; and in connection with his treatment of an 'avant-garde' discussion by some Bulgarian authors, he expressed the hope that a broad discussion, in a critical and analytical spirit, would soon develop.[22] Now, a few more new contributions can be mentioned.

The category 'matter' has been discussed in a very different sense by I.S. Narskij in *Filosofskie Nauki*, and F.T. Arxipcev, V.A. Bosenko and V.A. Demičev in a symposium in April, 1965. Arxipcev takes the traditional standpoint, as he did in his earlier works, and argues against the attempts at an ontological extension of the concept of matter. Further, he opposes the reduction of matter to a "substratum" different from qualities and relations, and rejects the inclusion of the attributes (space, time, motion, etc.) in the real concept of matter – which should remain defined as 'objective reality' according to Lenin.[23] I.S. Narskij articulates the problem more clearly. While characterizing the two-fold opposition of materialism (1) to spiritualism in ontology and (2) to epistemological idealism (thus considering an ontological characterization of matter as necessary) he pleads against too narrow an interpretation of the Leninist statement that the only constitutive characteristic of matter is its independence from consciousness. He also indicates the general lines of a many-sided ontological concept of matter. The fundamental properties of matter are divided into three groups: (1) the genetic priority of matter and the derivative character of consciousness which reflects it; (2) space, time, movement; (3) spatio-temporal infinity, the quantitatively and qualitatively inexhaustible multiplicity of manifestations, the forms of motion and kinds of 'reflection', activity, hierarchical structure, and conformity to law of processes.[24]

The contributions of the two other authors continue the discussion of the problem in very different directions. V.A. Demičev works basically

along the 'analytical line' sketched by V.P. Tugarinov. He turns against the identification of materiality and objective reality (since properties and relations are also real, although they are not matter), and he characterizes matter in the narrow sense as the material substratum lying at the basis of everything. Consciousness then becomes a special case of a property of matter[25], which according to Arxipcev is equal to eliminating the 'basic question'.[26]

V.A. Bosenko gives the problem of matter an openly speculative treatment. He starts formally from the correlativity of matter and consciousness, as postulated in Lenin's definition; yet the relation of independence, so strongly maintained by Lenin, becomes unexpectedly a "necessary connection of being and consciousness". This means gnoseologically that there is no knowledge of things 'in-themselves' without their being altered by human practice. And this coming-into-consciousness of things which were previously merely material also receives a metaphysical interpretation. It is seen as the elevation of finite things, by means of their negation, to the universal essence of infinite matter which realizes itself definitively only in the concept of matter. Thereby, at the same time, reality becomes truth, and necessity (as consciously realized) becomes freedom. Thus, being and spirit form an inseparable, dialectically antithetical unity. Consciousness belongs to the eternally necessary attributes of matter, in the sense that the necessity is included in the mode of existence of matter to realize all of its dialectical possibilities, among others, to bring forth spirit.[27]

It is obvious that here the problem of matter and materiality acquires some new dimensions for Soviet philosophy. Perhaps they can be, in general, reduced to the following common denominators: First, how can the given multiplicity be considered as a manifestation of one thing? Or, how is a materialistic monism categorially possible? And secondly, how can the manifestation of one thing in a multiplicity be understood or explained? Or, what is it that makes matter manifest itself even in thinking, praying, fighting and playing beings? What is a materialistic monism able to understand, and what must it let stand as an uncomprehended fact or a speculative hypothesis?

From the previous course of the discussion it has long ago become clear, that the characteristic of 'materiality', as maintained in Marxist-Leninist theory, 'takes in' all beings but does not totally penetrate them

in all of their determinations. Materiality, taken in the totality of all possible predicates, is only something partial, something extremely elementary – namely, it concerns the quality of being which pertains to its substratum. Materiality is to be understood, again very much in the sense of the older materialist tradition, in the widely understood meaning of *res extensa*. The renovation of the concept of matter by Lenin had not gone beyond this position, but rather had fallen behind it, insofar as the explicit definition and not the implied understanding of the concept is concerned. Thus Soviet philosophers are all too justified in calling to mind again the basic characteristic of material substantiality.

It is essential for dialectical materialism to exclude a 'purely spiritual' substance. Everything which appears in the world belongs to the store of bodily, material beings; even 'the spiritual' (that which acts consciously) is always at the same time material and is co-determined in its spiritual existence by material things. With spirit integrated into the 'material world' in this manner, it makes sense for Marxist philosophy to speak about consciousness as *belonging to* matter. Yet to say that consciousness is "*produced* by matter", as one often reads in Soviet texts, is already an incorrect mode of expression. It seems that the singular substantive 'matter' easily misleads one into placing at the base of the world a subject, which then functions as the real actor and producer of all happenings and formations; yet that is a mystification. At best one can talk about an 'emergence', but again not in the sense that something emerges 'from matter'. If one wants to present, in an ontologically correct fashion, the hypothesis of cosmic evolution which is accepted in Marxist philosophy, one has to say: material structures of a higher order emerge from structures of a lower order; on the concrete level, lower and higher forms of motion, of types of interaction, of function of orientation, etc., correspondingly replace one another. All those predicates which, besides the characteristic 'material', also have a justification – for example, 'moved', 'structured', 'ordered according to law', 'qualitatively manifold', 'living', 'thinking', etc. – all these predicates certainly belong to the *ens materiale* and are thus connected with its 'materiality'. However, they are not 'derived from' materiality or from some other essence of matter, but are just as primary as materiality itself. Thus the question posed above can be answered in the following way: materialistic monism is ontologically possible only as categorical pluralism. The 'unity of the

world' cannot be reduced to a formula expressing a single principle or predicating of the world a single basic quality. It cannot consist 'simply in its materiality', but only in a structured multiplicity in which the one, materiality, exists together with other things. To the second question, it must be answered: as for the multiplicity in its essential possibility and in its explicative genesis, one simply has to accept it in its facticity. One stands here at the limits of 'materialistic explanation' and of any explanation at all. In short, only a materialism which itself remains sufficiently problematic is really possible.

UNIVERSAL DIALECTICS AND SOCIAL DIALECTICS

In Marxist-Leninist philosophy such an enormous number of statements have crowded under the title 'dialectics', that the concept of the dialectical has almost completely lost its meaningfulness. This began already when Engels defined dialectics purely according to its subject-matter, as the doctrine of 'connections', of 'development' and of the 'most general laws of every change and development'. What is there that would still remain outside of its scope? Besides, an original concept of the dialectical was retained, namely as a definite type of configurations and transitions. One can still see something of this concept in the codification of dialectical laws; however, it is in a formulation which obscures rather than clarifies the original meaning of dialectics. For all that, it appears that a radicalization of the question as to the authentic 'nature of the dialectical' is so far away for Soviet philosophers, that it would be out of place to discuss it under the title 'Open Questions in Contemporary Soviet Philosophy'.

But what is today both an immediate and urgent task is a rationalization of the repertoire of dialectical categories and laws extant in Soviet philosophy. We do not here wish to discuss whether that will lead to a 'better dialectic' or simply to a rational and phenomenologically correct morphology and typology of processes which is no longer *eo ipso* 'dialectic' (so that the term 'dialectical' would be free for something else, something more precisely determined); we only want to indicate this as a possibility. At the symposium there were several contributions to the theory of processes, namely by E.F. Molevič, M.N. Rutkevič, M.F. Vedenov, I.V. Sviderskij and V.S. Molodcov.[28] However, it is not our

intention to enter into a full discussion of this matter. We will be satisfied with these indications and will, in addition, only refer to the previously published studies[29] and to our systematic presentation of dialectical materialism as yet in manuscript. It might only be added that the typological differentiation, repeatedly advocated by us, of the doctrine of the 'dialectical contradictions' (the traditional theorem of the 'contradictory nature of motion' was discussed anew in *Filosofskie Nauki*, 1964–65) appears also on the agenda of the Soviet authors as a present desideratum. I.S. Narskij urges that a 'Typology of Contradictions' be worked out.[30]

Nevertheless the most acute problem of dialectics which faces Soviet philosophers today is the 'dialectics' of the social transformations on the road from Capitalism to Socialism and Communism. It probably belongs to the most peculiar phenomena of contemporary history of ideas that Soviet Marxism-Leninism not only describes and discussed the social and political relations and changes in which it operates, as well as its own operations, in the appropriate 'regional' terms, i.e., those used in sociology and political science, but moreover believes that it attains a greater degree of clarity by resorting to the highly formalized language of a general ontology (particularly of a morphology of processes of development, which is the same for both non-human nature and human society). We have already presented in an earlier article[31] some basic considerations in criticism of this procedure, and we do not want to repeat them here. We only want to find out how the Soviet philosophers themselves see their own confrontation with the problem. In the above mentioned symposium, the problems of the dialectics of social processes occupied an extraordinarily large place. The corresponding papers and discussions, which make up two of the announced four volumes, are not yet available, and we have to rely on the report in number 10, 1965 of the *Voprosy Filosofii.*

The symposium brought into clear focus the difficulties inherent in the 'social-ontological' construction of the materialist dialectic. It has been obvious for a long time, that the conception of the dialectic as the 'algebra of revolution' (so crudely formulated by Stalin) was much too narrow. In any case, it no longer corresponded to what was considered to be the form-of-development of Socialist society. V.P. Tugarinov, in a foreword to a collection of articles on the 'Peculiarities of the Operation of the Dialectical Laws in the Period of Transition to Communism',

formulates an essential premiss of the current discussion: "The main difficulty lies in the necessity of overcoming a certain mental sluggishness, a habit of conceiving the operation of these laws solely according to the pattern of their operation in capitalistic society." A further mistake, which Tugarinov mentions, is the 'abstract logicizing' which often takes the place of direct contact with the empirical concreteness of the objects, and which must be clearly distinguished from legitimate abstractions and logical-analytical operations.[32]

Thus the first task at hand is to eliminate the excessive specification with which the Soviet philosophers have been presenting the dialectics of social processes. But this is often done in such a way that a second specification is simply added to the first: the special dialectics of Socialist society. P.N. Fedoseev presented in his paper the diverse types of social dialectics chiefly in a descriptive manner (as would appear from the report). The logical problematic was then articulated in the subsequent discussions. It turned mainly around questions such as whether there are consequently *several dialectics* ('types of dialectics'), as seems to be implied by C.A. Stepanjan and V.P. Rožin, or only *one dialectic* (with specific modifications), which is the view of M.M. Rozental', V.S. Molodcov and V.P. Čertkov. In this context the question of whether and how the universal laws are undergoing a development becomes acute.

We do not need to consider here what the specifications look like in detail. But what does interest us above all is the state of the *general and universal dialectic.* The *casus belli* is here particularly the central law of the unity and conflict of opposites, with its various implications. In the *Foundations of Marxist Philosophy* it is formulated in this way: "By virtue of the law of the unity and conflict of opposites, all things, appearances and phenomena are characterized by contradictory aspects and tendencies which are in a state of conflict; the conflict of opposites provides the inner impulse to development and leads to the increase of contradictions which become resolved at a certain stage by the disappearance of the old and the appearance of the new."[33] It is apparent that one cannot easily determine where this schema can be placed in the Marxist-Leninist interpretation of the development of Socialist society. (It is difficult to determine the schema's place anywhere.)

Now what is the fate of these synthetic universal formulas, if the excessive specification is eliminated? What is determinate about them

proves to be all too determinate; and what remains is so indeterminate that it becomes almost meaningless. As Stepanjan put it, that which is absolutely universal in the central dialectical principle consists only in the fact that the 'contradiction' is the universal source of the ascending movement from one level to another.[34] Molodcov formulates it in this way: "The contradictory nature of all being, including that of Socialism, is the source of development".[35] If that is carried over from the language of dialectics into the language of dynamics, then it simply says: movement comes about only where there exists in the field of the moved objects a *dynamic difference* or discrepancy, a 'falling gradient'. In view of the diversity of objects, it does not seem possible to say any more about the special type of the processes. A number of Soviet philosophers also consider as untenable the axiom that every qualitatively determined being must have its 'basic contradiction', from whose resolution in the conflict of opposites a new quality emerges. If this were applied in a formal and strict manner it would follow that even the Communist form of society would one day have to pass over (possibly by revolution) into another form – which is, of course, rejected by Soviet theoreticians because of concrete sociological considerations. Nevertheless, it would be incorrect to accuse them, for this reason, of betraying the dialectic. What one can reproach them with is simply this, that they were formerly not cautious enough in conceiving their major premises. Let us hope that now they will revise them. Whether a harmonious society without any inherent revolution is possible, and whether the society appearing in the Soviet Union is of this type can only be decided *materialiter*, and not *via deductionis* from universal dialectical premises.

The use of a general ontological terminology to describe social affairs can appear problematic if one considers whether one would gain in clarity and logical stringency if he speaks of 'contradictions' instead of about hindrances, impediments, disproportions, discrepancies, divergencies and conflicts, depending on the situation. The more formal strictness connected with categorial unification turns out to be no more than an illusion and deception, for it is not at all true that there is a single type of relation, but rather that there are several, each constituted in a different way. The 'ontological' transcription is thus, first of all, a bad description, and secondly, if recourse to such questionable generalizations is made, it emerges as a false path. It is a particular deficiency

of the dialectical-ontological formalization of the theorems of social theory that there is no expression of the axiological orientation of human activity. Insofar as it is possible and meaningful to have any formalization in sociology and social pragmatology, it will be necessary to operate with categories other than the traditional dialectical ones. In this connection it might be of interest to mention the paper which E. Kol'man presented at the symposium. In it he transforms social dialectics into a kind of social cybernetics: "The goal of our development, Communist society, is a complex system, and from the point of view of cybernetics, is an open, dynamic one with ideal self-regulation. Since as a whole it has at its disposal the feedback of its numerous subsystems, it compensates automatically for the deviations from the state of dynamic equilibrium. For that it is necessary that the system and all its subsystems function according to an optimal program. The elements of this system, which are found in numerous and various connections, must have a sufficient degree of freedom in order to release the inner tensions which unavoidably arise. These connections cannot be determined in a strictly dynamic way, but must contain random elements. The program for action of the system must be adaptable. Punctual, exact and comprehensive information must easily flow in both directions along the paths of communication."[36]

Soviet philosophers will have to ask themselves how closely they want to connect their onto-gnoseological fundamental doctrine (dialectical materialism or materialist dialectics) with their social-political commitment. We have, at an earlier occasion[37], already advocated a 'depolitization" not of philosophy as a whole, but of ontology, and we still consider this a present task.

If we reduce our critical remarks to a common denominator and wish to indicate something like the 'decisive link' in the ontological work of Soviet philosophy, we have to say this: in the present situation the emphasis will have to lie on the *logical element in ontology*, on a fundamental logical analysis of its categorial construction, beginning with the semantic analysis of its categorial terms. This program fits in well with the general line of Soviet philosophy, i.e., the propensity for 'methodological problems'. As V.I. Stoljarov correctly remarked, before dialectical-materialist philosophy can aid the special sciences in their methods, it must first become sure of its own method of procedure.[38]

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19. *Ibidem*, str. 77. Sitkovskij's reply refers to the article, 'On Categories in Soviet Philosophy – A Survey' (*SST* I, 1961, pp. 64–73). I had only mentioned that Soviet authors often think that they can construct a logical system of philosophy according to the historical sequence either of the stages of knowledge or of the stages of development of the "objective world". Sitkovskij thinks that there is, not contradiction, but in fact congruence, between these two possibilities. I not only consider this disputable, but moreover think that the idea of a historical guiding scheme is mistaken, or at most is applicable only in a very limited sphere (sequence of the inorganic, the organic and the human world). But the fundamental attributes of being and many of the more special categorial determinations do not stand in any kind of historical sequence. Their succession in the systematic explication must follow a totally different "principle of concretion".
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THOMAS J. BLAKELEY

OPEN QUESTIONS IN CONTEMPORARY SOVIET EPISTEMOLOGY

When one speaks of 'open questions' one usually has in mind those matters which a given philosopher or philosophers have failed to treat or have only done so summarily. It is further assumed that these questions are of some significance. When we use the term 'open questions' in the context of contemporary Soviet philosophy, we are referring to philosophical subject-matters which contemporary Soviet philosophers touch on only in passing if at all; and this because they are under a sacred obligation to conform to a pseudo-revelation.

However, it would be abusive to speak of 'open questions' in contemporary Soviet epistemology. In itself this domain constitutes *the* open question in contemporary Soviet philosophy. It is the festering sore on the body of dialectical materialism; although encysted cancer might be a more descriptive term. We are, therefore, obliged to limit ourselves to the analysis of the gaps appearing in the four main problem-complexes of contemporary Soviet epistemology: the theory of reflection; the dialectic of absolute and relative truth; practice as basis of knowledge and criterion of truth; the dialectic of the logical and the historical.

REFLECTION

Great forbearance is necessary in order not to dismiss out of hand the whole of Marxist-Leninist epistemology which begins by describing knowledge as a reflection which is like a photograph or like the image in a mirror. For, although this may be a satisfyingly materialist description of knowledge, it adds nothing to the philosophical understanding of the cognitive function.

However, it is the psycho-physical problem which constitutes the main difficulty for Marxism-Leninism's reflectionists. Contemporary Soviet philosophy inherited its complete if somewhat chaotic doctrine on *epistemological reflection* from Lenin: sensation, perception, representation, concept, judgement, and reasoning are all cognitive reflections of

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the material world. *Physiological reflection*, on the other hand, is attributed to Pavlov: sensibility, irritability, excitability, and response to stimuli are the progressively more complex reactions of the living being to the material world.

Obviously, then, the central problem of contemporary Soviet epistemology is the synthesizing or coordination of these two types of reflection. The strange thing is that Soviet philosophers only vaguely sensed this until about 1956, when they began a more or less thorough effort to find a solution.

The current Soviet solution is called the "Leninist theory of reflection as the property of all matter". It says that all matter has the capacity of registering and reacting and adapting to external influences (of matter, of course). And as matter evolves to more complex and sophisticated forms, this capacity develops: from a simple 'change of state' in inanimate matter, through sensibility, irritability, excitability, to the level of response to stimuli, i.e., reflexes.

Reflexes are conditioned or unconditioned. The conditioned reflex, i.e., the animal's reaction to an abiotic factor or thing in the absence of the biotic factor or thing which had previously been present in conjunction with it, constitutes *sensation*. In addition to this 'first signal system', man – because of his highly developed 'central nervous system' – has a 'second signal system', in which the word ("the natural matter of thought") serves as the 'signal of the signal': this is *thought*.

This theory is paleo-Pavlovian in its physiology and neo-Lockean in its epistemology; but its major defect is that it leaves the basic question not only unanswered but even untouched. For – as contemporary Soviet philosophers themselves have clearly seen – there is a qualitative distinction not only between sensation and intellection but also between sensation and physiological functions. To make the jump from simple reaction to photographic retention to intellectual analysis, one must do more than merely put on dialectical shoes. We are told that reflection which is non-cognitive in inanimate matter becomes cognitive in animate matter. The transition is said to be due to an increase in the complexity of matter. But 'complex' is a notoriously vague term. In the present instance it would seem to mean that there is a point at which by the simple addition of an atom, molecule, neuron or two, one can bring the animal from simple sensation to the level of sensation plus intellection. Apart

from the difficulty that even 'superior Soviet science' has been unable to approximately establish values for such thresholds, this sounds suspiciously like an effort to extract quality from increases in quantity; as if from continuously piling up lead one could obtain anything other than an increasingly large pile of lead. 'Complex' could also be meant to indicate 'more highly organized'. In other words, the less highly organized only senses while the more highly organized both senses and thinks. But, the more highly organized comes from the less highly organized. Is the principle of higher organization inherent in the less highly organized matter? If not, whence comes it? If so, why was it inoperative in the less highly organized matter? Does it come into operation only when a certain 'quantitative' threshold is reached? If so, we are reduced – as above – to blindly inducing qualitative change from quantitative increase.

TRUTH

The classical, or 'correspondence', notion of truth – conformity of the mind to the thing – reappears in contemporary Soviet theory of knowledge. The cognitive 'reflection' is true if it faithfully represents material reality; otherwise it is false. There is here an obvious difficulty of explaining how error is possible if knowledge is simply a photographing or mirroring of material objects. The Soviet recourse is once again to 'complexity'. The fact that the 'second signal system' is in only indirect (through the word) contact with the material object makes error possible.

However, to this basically Aristotelian conception of truth, contemporary Marxism-Leninism adds the neo-Hegelian notion of truth as a process, which is dynamically continuous and cumulative. And since the material universe is infinite in extent and duration, truth as a process is a never-ending accumulation which tends toward an ideal limit, called 'absolute truth', and the truths accumulated along the way are called 'relative truths'.

The contemporary Soviet philosophers themselves recognize the difficulties involved in trying to eat Aristotelian cake and Hegelian pie at the same time. If truth is a process of accumulation of relative truths tending toward an absolute truth which is only an ideal limit, then nothing has definite validity and everything is subject to revision – including the laws of the dialectic, the notion of Communism, and other tenets so essential

to Marxism-Leninism. But, if these elements are verifiable as 'absolute truth', then other statements, tenets, etc. are also open to verification and the long disquisitions on 'relative truths' merely describe the obvious fact that the establishment of a true statement is preceded by a series of approximations.

Amazing as it may seem, the fact of the matter is that contemporary Soviet philosophers have not yet succeeded in making a clear distinction between 'truth' and 'knowledge'. When they talk about absolute and relative truth they obviously have in mind complete and incomplete knowledge. Until they come to realize this, Marxist-Leninist epistemology will remain short-circuited on the question of truth.

PRACTICE

For contemporary Soviet philosophy practice is the "basis of knowledge and criterion of truth". Although this notion is rightly considered to be one of the cornerstones of Marxism and Marxism-Leninism, it has yet to be stated with enough clarity and coherence so that one could say it is useful or useless as a conceptual tool.

If one takes practice literally as the intentional transformation of matter, then mathematical modeling by Socialist planners and political speculations in the Politburo would be difficult to classify as 'Socialist knowing'. However, the alternative proposed by contemporary Soviet philosophers – that 'practice' indicates that all knowledge involves some involvement with material reality, i.e., sensation – is obviously the case but just as obviously trivial.

DIALECTICAL LOGIC

The "dialectic of the logical and the historical" is contemporary Soviet philosophy's basis for the affirmation of the existence of a special, 'dialectical', logic.

The historical is the objective dialectic (material reality as subject to the laws of the dialectic) along with all that has happened in it and to it in its eternal existence. Every object in the real world has undergone a series of changes and influences each of which has necessarily left its mark on the 'reflective' matter of which the object is made.

The logical is the subjective dialectic (the mind as perceiving dialectically structured material reality) as reflecting, in abbreviated form, the history of the objective dialectic. It is a résumé of the essential in the evolution of the objective dialectic.

Formal logic is the study of the logical, i.e., of the abstracted 'nodal' points in the evolution of matter. Dialectical logic is a 'contentful' study of the objective dialectic in all of its infinite detail.

That dialectical logic is no logic in any senseful use of the term is evident. But, even more, a catalogue of all individual details is an impossible enterprise that has no place in science.

We have by no means catalogued all the gaps or weaknesses in contemporary Soviet epistemology. However, those we have examined are sufficient to show that this domain is probably the most under-developed in the whole of Marxism-Leninism. And it is relatively easy to put one's finger on the underlying cause of contemporary Soviet philosophy's failure to develop a viable theory of knowledge: fear of God!

In his effort to provide a philosophical account of reality the contemporary Soviet philosopher can have recourse to only one basic value, matter. There where a satisfactory reduction to matter cannot be made, he has to escape by applying the dialectic; which is a polite way of admitting defeat. Why is he forbidden to take the normal metaphysician's way out, i.e., the positing of another explanatory principle? Simply because the 'classics' ruled this out as leading to the admission of non-material, i.e., spiritual, being and thence to an admission of the possibility of the existence of God.

This by no means implies that the contemporary Soviet philosopher has to 'get religion' in order to complete his philosophical picture of the world. It does imply that he will either have to abandon the attempt at a rational and metaphysical explanation of the world or else find out that the admission of a non-material principle, co-equal with matter, does not force him to admit the existence of a personal God. Until this decision is made contemporary Soviet epistemology will remain a series of undecided options.

FRITZ RAPP

OPEN QUESTIONS IN CONTEMPORARY SOVIET THEORY OF SOCIAL LAW

The present paper gives an exposition of the Soviet discussion on the role of statistics in the knowledge of social phenomena and on the concept of social law as opposed to mere description by means of statistics. In the following critical evaluation of the Soviet arguments, the 'open questions' i.e. those treated by the Soviets in an unsatisfactory way, will be elaborated. Their philosophical discussion, which is still going on, began some years ago in connection with the application of statistical methods in investigating social affairs in the Soviet Union. This is of high interest, since empirical statements and their philosophical evaluation are directly confronted.

I. STATISTICS IN INORGANIC NATURE AND IN HUMAN SOCIETY

Surely there is nobody who will deny the obvious difference between a group of gas molecules and a group of human individuals. And yet in both cases the ensemble can be described by means of statistics. Thus it becomes necessary to investigate both cases and to show the difference between them as well as their common traits. The considerations presented by Soviet authors on this matter may be divided in the following way: (a) the difference between the phenomena of inorganic nature and those of human society, (b) the connection between nature and society, (c) the applicability of statistics.

(a) Soviet philosophers agree in acknowledging the fundamental *difference* which exists between events in inorganic nature and those within human society. The statistical set, which is formed by a human group, is marked by the fact that a number of persons live simultaneously within a certain district.[1] The connections within this statistical set are far more complicated than those of inorganic nature. If the fundamental differences between these two domains are neglected, one will arrive at a false mechanistic conception of human society.[2] The fundamental difference consists in the fact that in inorganic nature only unconscious and random

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forces are acting, while the conduct of human individuals is marked by conscious and planned activities.[3]

(b) Notwithstanding all these differences, the *connections* between nature and society also have to be taken into account, for both of them belong to the very same world[4] and are to a large extent subject to the same laws. In a wider sense, society is also a part of nature, and furthermore man can secure his material existence only by acting on the surrounding nature.[5]

(c) In spite of basic differences, both the state of affairs in human society and events of inorganic nature can be described by means of *statistics*. This is possible, for those characteristics are found in both cases which permit the application of statistics.[6] Thus, in spite of the particular behavior of individual men, it is possible to state a general mode of behavior as the average comportment of the group in question.[7] But it has to be observed that statistical methods cannot be used with equal success in all fields.[8] They may be applied best to inorganic nature, with less success to organic nature, and they are least able to exhaust social phenomena.[9]

O. O. Jaxot mentions that two extreme positions are held in Soviet literature. (He rejects them both.) He reports that some authors claim that statistics are not at all applicable to social phenomena[10], while it is maintained by others that statistics can refer only to human society.[11] But, according to Jaxot, the correct solution is not a 'universalism', which applies statistics with equal justification to phenomena of inorganic nature and those of human society, for, by this approach statistics would be separated from the real events which it describes, and thus the specific traits of the objects investigated would be lost.[12] As Jaxot claims, there are several types of statistics which are adapted to the special nature of the phenomena under investigation.[13]

One can surely agree with Jaxot in his rejection of the above mentioned extreme positions. But his refusal of 'universalism' cannot be accepted. Of course, it is a reasonable demand to regard every phenomenon in its own specific particularity. But this does not mean that there are basically different kinds of statistics. For, in fact, phenomena in inorganic nature and in human society can be studied by means of statistics precisely because these phenomena possess certain traits which permit the statistical application. And, indeed, these traits which allow the use of

statistics do not at all exhaust the studied phenomena. But it cannot be the task of statistics to take these peculiarities into account, since the use of statistics is made possible precisely by the neglect of specific traits.

This is clearly seen from the fact that, in contrast to the manifold applications of statistics, there exists only one mathematical statistics by which logical connections are studied without reference to any application. In general, it is characteristic for modern sciences, which apply mathematical methods, that the purely formal mathematical structure is distinguished from the concrete phenomena which are described by the mathematical apparatus. This distinction can never be abolished, whether one regrets its existence or not.

II. MATHEMATICAL DESCRIPTION AND PHILOSOPHICAL ESSENCE

The use of statistics in the investigation of social affairs raises serious questions for the foundations of Communist theory. For the main aim of Communist teaching, fixed in *historical materialism* by fundamental statements about human society and its development, consists in effecting a change in social conditions. But exactly formulated and directly testable statements about social conditions can only be made by means of statistics. Thus, the question arises as to what relations exist between such empirically investigated and mathematically formulated facts and the general statements of historical materialism. The situation is even more complicated by the fact that both statistical statements and general Communist doctrines on society and its development are held to be scientific.

In order to present a clear account, the arguments of Soviet philosophers referring to these questions will be divided into the following three points: (a) the usefulness of statistics, (b) the 'symptomatic' function of statistics, (c) the investigation of the essence of social phenomena.

(a) Soviet authors think that the application of statistical methods is very *useful* for the investigation of social phenomena. Thus, for example, the *theory of games*[14] introduced by von Neumann and Morgenstern may be of great use for administrative and technical calculations.[15] The investigations recently carried out in the Soviet Union on the diminution of the difference between spiritual and physical work, on the increase of the cultural and technical niveau of the working class, as well as on the increase of the cultural niveau of the kolxos farmers are based on carefully

selected and analyzed statistical data. O. O. Jaxot claims that, in general, the knowledge of statistics has become an absolute necessity for Soviet sociologists, and therefore the statistical education of young sociologists should be much more intensified.[16]

Only by statistics can social facts be stated in an unambiguous and reliable way. These facts correspond to experimental data which the investigators in other fields collect in the laboratory. And only by means of such scientifically confirmed facts is it possible to make general statements.[17] The combination of exact mathematical methods with the use of models for social phenomena makes it possible to transform social science, in the full sense of the word, into a science of engineering. In this way it will be possible to find quantitative statistical laws of social phenomena.[18]

But Soviet authors think that it is wrong to regard the relations revealed by statistics as the real laws of society.[19] For social events, like events on every other field, are produced by certain causes. But if the view is only limited to the connections which exist between the immediately grasped phenomena, the investigation remains superficial and the real essence, which consists in the causal relations, is not grasped.[20] Therefore the study of functional and correlative relations has to be deepened by the analysis of causal relations.[21] Factorial analysis also fails to take this situation into account when regarding the different factors as homogenous. But in fact there are always fundamental and decisive causes, which determine the process.[22]

(b) N. K. Družinin[23] and O. O. Jaxot[24] declare that in sociology the connections stated by means of statistics have above all a '*symptomatic*' function. As the increased temperature of the human body indicates sickness, so are statistical relations the expression of real processes and internal connections in human society. Therefore, when statistical investigations show regularly appearing connections, it is necessary to look for the real causes which produce these connections.[25] But this does not mean that statistical connections have only a methodological function within the process of knowing. Rather, the connections stated by statistics hold whether or not they are known by men and whether or not the real causes of social phenomena are investigated.[26]

Both Družinin and Jaxot report that, in opposition to their view, two other extreme positions are held in the Soviet Union.[27] On the one hand,

it is claimed that the connections stated by means of statistics are mere numerical expressions by which the range of social phenomena can be described and compared.[28] According to this opinion, which is held by some statisticians, these connections do not say anything about the real social conditions and their development.[29] This would mean that statistical investigations are of no relevance for the knowledge of the evolution of society. On the other hand, the very opposite position is also held according to which the connections stated by statistics coincide with the laws of society.[30] From this point of view the statistical connections are the exhaustive expression of social phenomena, so that a further analysis would not be necessary.[31]

(c) The *essence,* i.e. the real content of social phenomena, can only be recognized by an analysis of the internal connections which form the basis of visible appearances.[32] Therefore, the connections stated by means of statistics must always be investigated with respect to the class-relations which are their real causes.[33] Laws which really show the essence of social phenomena are, for example, the law of the conformity of the relations of production with the character of the productive forces, or the law of the accelerated increase of the means of production, according to which the means of production grow faster than the production itself.[34]

According to N. K. Družinin, the role of statistics in the knowledge of the essence of social conditions must be regarded in the light of the epistemology of dialectical materialism.[35] As the Marxist theory of knowledge teaches, every science starts with sense-experience and proceeds from it to abstract reasoning. In this process of abstraction concrete reality is reconstructed by means of concepts and general laws. And only this conceptual structure shows the essence of the phenomena investigated.[36] At the beginning of this procedure facts are always collected by means of a heuristic scheme, and these facts form the basis for further abstraction. The role of statistics for the investigation of society thus consists in the fact that it furnishes the systematically presented facts, which are later to be analyzed.[37]

The essence and the causes of social conditions become apparent only if the statistical collection of the facts, as well as the further analysis of this material, are based on the scientific outlook of Communism.[38] Because of this, even the questions to be studied must be chosen in accordance with the scientific Communist outlook.[39] The analysis of the collected

material has to be made on the basis of the Marxist-Leninist theory of class-relations.[40] With this view, O. O. Jaxot rejects the position of a Polish author[41], who claims that the task of sociology consists in the theoretical elaboration of empirical data independently of any philosophical point of view.[42] According to Jaxot, statements about social conditions which are not based on a Marxist analysis are of no relevance, even if the statistical data on which they are based are consistent from a formal point of view.[43]

It is especially important to take the essence of social phenomena into account when statements are made about the situation in capitalist countries. This is so, because statistical data touch only on the surface of *bourgeois* conditions, while the contradictions of capitalist society remain unrevealed.[44] Therefore, the investigations of American sociologists in which the population of capitalist countries is grouped according to its income and not according to its relation to the means of production, do not give a competent view of the real conditions which are understood only in the context of class-relations.[45]

One can surely agree with the claim of Soviet writers that by means of statistics alone, one cannot exhaustively study social phenomena. The faithful adherence to the real events, which are the subject of statistics, is a good preventive against a merely functional approach. But the claim that any further analysis must always start from class-relations as the real causes of social phenomena is as doubtful as the thesis that only such an analysis can be called scientific.

Above all, the double meaning of the term 'scientific', clearly evident in the above-quoted literature, must be clarified. On the one hand such methods are called scientific which follow the procedure of the natural sciences and by which the phenomena under investigation are described by means of mathematical statistics. On the other, the scientific Communist outlook allegedly gives the only possible guarantee for a really competent interpretation of social phenomena. But, the mathematical method of the natural sciences and a philosophic theory about human society are absolutely different things. This is also emphasized by the above quoted Soviet authors, who always insist on the fundamental difference between the description of empirically-gathered facts by means of statistics, and the speculative investigation of the real essence of these facts. The common use of the term 'scientific' in both cases might,

however, easily give rise to the impression that the Communist theory of society meets the strict criteria of the natural-scientific method. In order to avoid this false impression it becomes necessary to avoid the double meaning of the term 'scientific'. One could possibly make the following distinction, which would be in line with the Soviet position and would certainly clarify the situation. This would consist in calling the methods of natural science 'scientific', according to international usage, while the Communist theory of society could rather be labelled 'philosophical'.

Along with the unjustified use of the term 'scientific', the a priori and dogmatic character of Communist social theory is also untenable. Namely, if, according to the epistemology of dialectical materialism, the analysis of the essence of social phenomena has to begin with empirical facts, then the possibility must be allowed for that a change of facts will exert an influence on theory. But this very possibility is excluded if the collection of facts as well as their interpretation has to be made according to Marxist theory. This a priori claim to absolute validity is evidently intended to prevent a refutation of Communism by developments in Western countries. But then the Marxist scheme for interpreting society becomes simply a prejudice which can in no way claim objective validity.

It is only natural that friction arises when the Hegelian type of philosophical reasoning as adopted by Marx, and a statistical formulation of empirical facts, come into contact. Confronted with an empirically stated situation, it is not sufficient to demonstrate by means of general principles the internal evolution of opposites. Here the philosophical interpretation has to face reality, and it must run the risk of a possible falsification. Without the possibility of falsification there is no hope that a theory might be tested and thereby confirmed. This appeal to the actual state of affairs even fits in with the epistemology of dialectical materialism, where the decisive importance of practice, as the criterion of truth, is constantly emphasized.

III. INDIVIDUAL SPONTANEITY AND SOCIAL DETERMINATION

Historical materialism is based on the thesis that the evolution of society is a process determined with the very same inevitable necessity which characterizes the events of inorganic nature. But at the same time Soviet

philosophers recognize the spontaneity of the acts of individuals. Thus the question arises how, (a) the spontaneity of individuals is compatible with (b) the strict lawful determination of the society which is made up of these individuals. In connection with this, the freedom of will (c) must also be discussed.

(a) Although in a Socialist planned economy the 'capitalist anarchy of production' is removed, a planned economy is not a system which operates with computer-like necessity, for even in Socialist society events take place which were not intended in the planning.[46] Thus, for example, the demand for products, individual taste, and the personal needs as well as the purchasing power of the families (depending on the wages, state of health and personal character of its members) are *spontaneous* and not predictable quantities. Therefore, these factors, which are not strictly determined by law, must be investigated by means of statistics in order to avoid the unnecessary production of goods which cannot even be sold.[47] Statistics can be a valuable aid in ascertaining the general tendency of consumer-preference by taking random samples.[48]

(b) But the development of *society as a whole* is determined by objective laws which do not depend on the will and consciousness of men.[49] O. O. Jaxot and V. S. Nemčinov agree to this, as well as to the thesis that in a planned Socialist society objective historical laws are no longer acting 'blindly' as in capitalism, but are known and consciously applied.[50] Differences of opinion arise when it comes to characterizing the nature of social determination. While Nemčinov insists that the laws of society are the same as the laws of inorganic nature[51], Jaxot claims that in society necessity does not appear as strict and fixed inevitability (*odnosnačnaja žestkaja neizbeznost'*), there being also spontaneous deviations. Thus, for example, the phenomena mentioned in (a) cannot be fitted into a predetermined scheme, but must be studied by statistics and the laws of probability.[52] It is precisely the task of statistics to uncover the necessity which runs through a mass of contingencies.[53]

S. F. Anisimov is even convinced that the laws responsible for the development of society cannot be influenced by the fate of an individual (which always has a fortuitous character), no matter how important a role he may play in history.[54] He thinks that the situation in society can be compared with the evolution of a new species of animals. The whole process of evolution is governed by the law that individuals will propagate

and transmit those properties which are adapted to the surrounding conditions. But this statement, which concerns only the statistical average, does not take into consideration whether or not the individual meets favorable conditions and whether or not he propagates his species.[55] But in human society, as in the evolution of animals, the total results of individual destinies, which themselves have a purely chance character, are determined with strict necessity.[56]

(c) Anisimov declares that man will become aware of his *freedom of will* only if his behaviour is not in accord with the *Weltanschauung* and habits of the majority. But as long as someone agrees with the accepted standards he will not perceive any constraint on his behavior.[57] Thus, a person who is self-employed in a *bourgeois* society feels that he is free, though in fact in the statistical average his way of life, including his wishes and needs, are determined by the interests of his class. Though it is possible that there are certain deviations from the class-standard, the general behavior of man is always determined by his class membership.[58]

O. O. Jaxot discusses the problem of free will in connection with the investigations of the French sociologist Quétlet, which were mentioned by Marx. Jaxot thinks that the number of crimes, suicides, and marriages which remains constant for years shows that human actions are determined by law.[59] Therefore, the behavior of men is not the result of absolutely free acts of mind. The statistical study of a large number of individuals shows that men are subject to certain laws in their behavior. Thus spontaneous acts of will are only of secondary importance. Because of this determined character of human conduct, some historians and statisticians even spoke of statistical materialism (*statističeskij materializm*).[60]

As the quoted texts show, an examination of the actual situation leads Soviet authors to admit a certain indeterminateness in the conduct of individual men. But this uncertainty will be overcome by the superior necessity of the whole, which is determined by class-conditions and can be taken as a statistical average.

Now, it is certainly a great service of Marxist social teaching that it emphasizes the significance of social connections as opposed to the fiction of a collection of isolated individuals. It is furthermore clear that, in order to characterize the relations between individuals and society, one must take into account some sort of interaction between the individual and the whole which, evidently, is not possible without speculative

reasoning. But even when all these factors are considered, the arguments of Soviet authors justify serious criticism.

First, it has to be said that, in spite of all the unconsciously accepted standards of conduct, the basic spontaneity and openness of the human mind cannot be ignored. This spontaneity manifests itself in the personal experience of having freedom of choice, and can be observed in all great personalities who have cast off the chains of their environment either through theoretical reasoning or practical action. And only by referring to this basic openness can the capacity of the human mind for detached objective judgments be explained. It is here that philosophical reflection – which is also practiced by Soviet authors – finds its genuine place.

Even more important is a second point, which concerns the basis for the determination by law of social processes. It is striking that the necessity claimed by Soviet authors is not rooted in the individuals who are acting, but appears rather as an autonomous and superior force which governs single events. It is exactly this conception which forms the fundamental philosophical error of historical materialism: in the Hegelian manner of hypostatizing ideas, the 'predicate is made into the subject'. Instead of taking man as the real subject and the partial social determination of his actions as predicate, historical materialism regards man as an inessential feature of the social whole. Thus this whole has its own autonomous status and is falsely taken as the 'subject'.

That the idea of group-determination (regardless of whether social groups are to be analyzed in terms of the Marxist class-scheme) must always be reduced to individual agents can be clearly seen from the statistical examples cited by Soviet authors. For in fact a statistical average is only the sum total of the single cases which it includes, and apart from these cases there is no average at all. Thus the claim that social phenomena are determined with strict necessity appears to have little foundation.[61] In spite of the standard of behavior suggested by the group, there exists a certain spontaneity of individuals. If so, however, the total pattern of their behavior cannot be determined with strict necessity.

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LASZLO REVESZ

OPEN QUESTIONS IN CONTEMPORARY SOVIET PHILOSOPHY OF LAW AND STATE

I. THE STATE AND THE PREPARATION OF ITS OWN WITHERING-AWAY

The Marxist-Leninist Theory of State

The general Marxist-Leninist theory of state can be shortly summarized as follows:

The state, the political organization of society, is an especially important part of the superstructure which is built upon the economic base. It is a product and a direct consequence of the destruction of the original classless society, the result of which was a society with antagonistic classes. Parallel with the rise of private ownership of the means of production (originally of land, of domestic animals and even of men), there arose two basic classes: the propertied class and the non-propertied class. The propertied class then called the state into existence in order to guarantee its monopoly on private property and to be able to exploit the working-force of the propertyless class without any restriction.[1] Thus, the main internal functions of the state are 'suppression' and the organization of exploitation. The state is "a tool in the hands of the dominating class for suppressing the opposition of its class enemies".[2] In general, the state is the 'organ of power' of the ruling class.

A well-known Polish scholar of the older generation has given perhaps the most appropriate definition of the state in the Marxist-Leninist sense: "The state is an apparatus for coercion, hierarchically and territorially organized, which makes it possible for the class possessing the means of production to maintain its property and other interests as well as its leadership of the state over against its class enemy."[3] Thus, in Marxism-Leninism, the state is: (a) an element of the superstructure of the respective economic base, (b) a class product, and (c) a historical concept.

(a) As an element of the superstructure the state serves the economy, follows it in its development, and adapts to its needs. But the theory of state, 'enriched' by Lenin and Stalin and adapted to the needs of the

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twentieth century, emphasizes that the state must not only follow economic and social development but must influence and promote it. In the event that the state lags behind the development of its economic base and thus makes this development more difficult, the hitherto existing type of state must be replaced by a new, more expedient one. Likewise the relations of production (here property relations) hindering the development of the productive forces must be superseded by new ones.

(b) The state is bound to a class society. Marxist-Leninist theory distinguishes two basic forms of class society: in one type, the classes are hostile and antagonistic towards each other and carry on a bitter class-war; in the other, the classes are joined together by common tasks and goals (the building-up of Socialism or Communism).

Therefore the state is the instrument either of class-war or of social and economic construction in the interests of the whole people. In the society of antagonistic classes the state serves the suppression of the majority by the minority; on the other hand the state of the dictatorship of the proletariat serves the suppression of the minority (the remainder of the liquidated exploiting classes) by the majority (the working class and peasants). The state of the dictatorship of the proletariat is thus held to be the first class-state in which the public power is utilized and applied in the interests of the majority.

(c) Corresponding to economic and social development, one must distinguish in the development of the state several *types* of state which supersede one another (the state of the slave-holding society, the feudal state, the bourgeois state and the Socialist state). According to the original position of Marxism-Leninism, the transition from one type of state to another is supposed to be accomplished by a forceful revolution. Yet there is an essential difference in transitions, depending upon which class supersedes the other. If one exploiting-class supersedes another (as the bourgeoisie superseded the feudal lords) then there are no radical changes in the state. But after the Socialist revolution the working class must completely destroy the previous state apparatus, in order to secure the accomplishments of the revolution.

The dictatorship of the proletariat is the result of the objective laws of historical development; it cannot be skipped; its establishment is an objective law, which holds independent of the will of individuals and classes.

The question of how long the dictatorship of the proletariat is supposed to last is now being hotly discussed by the 'genuine Marxist-Leninists', the revisionist and the dogmatists.[4] Of course, each group claims that it has the only correct determination of the future development of socialist society, or of the Socialist state. The official party theory of all three lines states that it is only the Communist Party which can foresee the future developments. But in spite of a common starting point and common methods the three Communist Parties reached diametrically opposed results. The Soviet theory asserts that the dictatorship of the proletariat is solely a transitional form between Capitalism and Socialism. According to the Chinese position, the dictatorship of the proletariat must be maintained until the establishment of peoples' Communism. The Yugoslavian 'revisionists", on the other hand, represent the view that in Socialism not only the dictatorship but also the state and party leadership must be diminished.[5]

There are, at present, also two diametrically opposed interpretations of the Marxist-Leninist theory in the basic question of the transition to the state of the dictatorship of the proletariat, although both positions proceed from a common point and apply the same methods of investigation. The Communist world conferences of 1957 and 1960, which were held in Moscow and dominated by the CPSU, supported the *possibility* of peaceful transition, whereby the dictatorship of the proletariat is to be established (in accordance with objective laws) after the victory of the peaceful Socialist revolution. The Chinese are reproached for categorically denying this thesis.

The 'Withering-Away' of the State

Since the state is a historical concept, it did not always exist and also will not always exist. With regard to its withering-away there are again various and mutually-exclusive interpretations. The withering-away does not take place by leaps but in the form of a gradual evolution of the Socialist state into communistic social self-government. The rise of all other state and social formations is preceded by a revolution[6]; but since Socialism and Communism are two phases of the same social and economic formation with numerous common laws, a transition brought about by revolution is not required.[7]

Soviet legal science has given particular attention, especially since the

twenty-first congress of the CPSU (January 27th to February 5th, 1959), to the development of the Soviet state in the period of fully established Communism. In 1959 and 1960 alone there were published forty books and brochures and thirty articles in scholarly journals which dealt with this problem; and a national conference was convened in July, 1960, to discuss the development of the Soviet state in the direction of Communist self-government.[8] The party program adopted on October 31st, 1961, took the following position on this problem: "The development of the socialistic state will gradually lead to the point where it transforms itself into social communistic self-government.... The historical development leads inevitably to the withering-away of the state. For complete withering-away certain internal preconditions are needed – as the construction of a developed Communist society, as well as certain external conditions – as the final elimination of the conflicts between Capitalism and Communism in the international arena." (Program of the CPSU, part 2, chapter III/2.)

The withering-away of the state, i.e., the transition to communistic self-government, is held to be an objective, law-bound necessity, which takes place independently of human volition and even in spite of all efforts against it. The withering-away takes place gradually and *by means of constant strengthening of the state.* As Stalin declared, "the withering-away of the state does not occur by the weakening of state power but by its maximum strengthening"[9]; or as Khrushchev said at the twenty-first Party Congress, "One must not imagine the process of withering-away in such a simplified way, as the leaves of a tree wither and fall in autumn."[10] A weakening of the withering state would have a very harmful effect for all of Communism.[11] In the state which is withering away the function of suppression should be gradually eliminated; on the other hand, the external function (defense) will be complemented by the struggle for peace, i.e., for peaceful co-existence.[12]

A considerable discrepancy on this point arose between Soviet and Yugoslavian legal philosophers. The seventh congress of the Union of Communists of Yugoslavia took a position against the Soviets; this was worked out by Kardel' (on the ideological aspects) and Mirko Perovič (the juridical side of the problem). Perovič demanded[13] the weakening of the state apparatus in the interests of extending democracy. This provoked sharp criticism in the Soviet Union: "Socialism without a state" is anti-marxist and false.[14]

Contemporary Soviet political theory looks for the strengthening of the state not in the consolidation of the state apparatus and in the extension of its organs of power, but in the transfer of state functions to society, to the social organizations. It is the production collectives, the labor unions, and the various commissions of the soviets which are (gradually) to take over the functions of the state; naturally, the party is a special case. This development must be conceived dialectically: as a consequence of the transfer of more and more functions, the state will not be weakened; on the contrary, through its increased contact with the masses it will continue to grow stronger.[15] In party decrees as well as in the writings of party philosophers, the transfer of state functions is considered as an extension of democracy. However, one must distinguish here between the transfer of functions from the central organs of the state and from other organs. The functions of the Union and Republic organs can be transferred only to those social organizations which are strongly centralized, e.g., the party, the unions, the Komsomol, the DOSAAF, etc. These functions are transferred directly to the social organs and in general not to society. The transference does not mean that the state relinquishes its rule and control. The soviets, as the future organs of communistic self-government, must change their methods in accordance with the new line of development in the state:

(a) The permanent commissions, whose jurisdictions are to be broadened, will take in several million workers.

(b) The administrative machinery will be made up of voluntary activists ("social instructors")[16]; there will be no professional administrators, and the category of professional officials will cease to exist.[17]

(c) The necessity of being elected by and accountable to the voters will gradually be extended to all leading functionaries (program of the CPSU, part 2, chapter III/1).

(d) The elected body, i.e., the soviet, and the executive organs will be combined.[18] And the administrative positions will lose their political character to the extent that full communism is achieved.[19]

However, the following phenomenon must be mentioned: After the enactment of the new party program, the transfer of state functions and the replacement of the state's methods of coercion by social sanctions was brought about forcibly. This tendency was greatly overdone and led to the endangerment of state and social discipline. For this reason, recent

Soviet literature in legal theory warns against the premature elimination of state force, and against a conception of the comrade courts and people's družinas (groups of citizens banded together to maintain law and order) which regards them as almost the main official organ of public protection. The expansion of Socialist democracy may not encroach upon Socialist legality.[20] The growing number of small crimes makes it questionable whether the present tendency is actually leading to the strengthening of the state.[21] But in the event that it results in a general loosening of discipline, this would mean that the objective laws are not completed correct.

The fact that present-day society is a political society and is organized as a state does not mean, according to the Soviets, that this form is the only possible one for the organization of men. There are also other types of human organization which have no state character and no political forms. Among these the most numerous are those types in which men are organized as workers, i.e. the factory collectives. Thus in the course of the withering-away or transition *(pererastanie)* of the state, the organizational principle becomes more closely allied to production. The society which is based upon a union of the producers presents a new, higher type of social organization. The communistic social order will be based on the principle of work rather than on any political principle; not politics, but economics and work will underpin the new alliance of men. As is stated in the program of the CPSU, all productive units and all self-administered organizations will be brought together in one comprehensive, organized economy and society. "From that comes the distinctiveness of the communistic social order: in Communism the work- (or production-) collective ceases to be merely an economic unit – it becomes the basis of the whole society. One could also call these collectives 'unions of producers'. Since every member of society who is able to work will accomplish something, the members of society will be organized primarily as producers."[22]

Parallel to the withering-away of the state there will be a withering-away of law, since the two are inseparable. By promoting the development of the communistic base, law contributes to its own elimination, for the 'objective process' of the withering-away of law will occur together with the development of the socialistic into the communistic base.[23] The superstructure will continue to lose its political character[24] and the communistic superstructure will become qualitatively different from the

socialistic one.[25] Law will yield its place to social norms which no longer have a political character. In theory this development is already in process: the production collectives and the social organizations operate not only on the basis of legal norms but also on social norms.[26] Social norms will gradually replace legal norms, and thus the socialistic and communistic superstructures (of which laws and social norms are a part) will gradually flow into one another.[27]

II. THE PEOPLE'S STATE AS THE TRANSITION TO COMMUNISTIC SELF-GOVERNMENT

The Theory of the 'People's State'

At the twenty-second Party Congress, the Marxist-Leninist theory of state was 'enriched' by the concept of the state of the whole people: "One of the most important scientific discoveries of our epoch to enrich Marxism-Leninism is the idea of the Socialist state of the entire people. It was first clearly expressed in the program of the CPSU .... The state of the whole people characterizes a qualitatively new stage in the development of the socialistic *state.*"[28]

The party program and all the philosophical and theoretical legal literature which followed its publication emphasized that in the Soviet Union the dictatorship of the proletariat has been replaced by a state of the whole people, and the class-democracy by a democracy for the entire people: "The state, which arose as a state of proletarian dictatorship, has become, in the new, modern period, the state of the whole people, an organ which lends expression to the interests and will of the entire people." (Party program, part 2, chapter III, introduction.) Thus the state is no longer the organ of a class, but that of the whole people; it is a 'regulator of classes'[29], whose leadership the working class continues to recognize. Therefore the people's state will not completely lose its class character (program of the CPSU, part 1, chapter II).[30] However, the means and methods of leadership in the people's state differ from those in the state of the dictatorship of the proletariat (of course, legal scholars are now reproached for not having taken up this question before). Among other things, the leading role of the working class is strengthened by the fact that its alliance with the peasantry is broadened and receives "qualitatively new characteristic features". Nevertheless, in spite of the

alliance between the two classes, there are still considerable differences, which can be traced back to the two different forms of social property that serve as their respective social and economic bases. For this reason the people's state, as the political organization of the whole people, must take into consideration in its activity the class differences which still exist in society.[31]

Immediately after the introduction of this new concept, the question was raised in the literature of legal philosophy, whether or not one could still support the previous, widely accepted definition of the state as the "means of class domination", the "mechanism of the leading class for the suppression of the other classes". Legal literature came out against the preservation of this conception, since in the state of all the people there is an increase in institutions of "non-political social order" and thus an increase in social self-government. Yet a new, universally accepted definition was not given.[32] For a long time there was a dominant conception in the legal literature of the Soviet Union, according to which the Soviet Socialist state went through two stages in its development, and in both of these it appeared as a state of the dictatorship of the proletariat. The present-day view confirms those philosophers, who maintain that the development of the Soviet state went through three stages: the first two were stages of the dictatorship of the proletariat, and only in the third did the dictatorship of the proletariat change into a state of all the people.[33] As was stated in the Party Program (part 2, chapter III, Introduction) the dictatorship of the proletariat has its historical mission: the guarantee of the complete and final victory of Socialism, and thus of the transition to the full construction of Communism. And since this has been fulfilled, the dictatorship of the proletariat is "no longer necessary from the standpoint of the tasks of internal development in the USSR".

With regard to the appearance of the idea of a people's state, the following remarks must be made.

The conception of the people's state was worked out hastily without any thorough preliminary investigations (which was characteristic of the Khrushchev era); for that reason alone it could hardly lead to very great changes in practice. Rather than presenting a practical conception involving obvious changes, it is nothing more than a piece of sophistry. The twenty-first Party Congress of the CPSU (1959) was directly taken up with questions of law and the nature of the state, and yet it did not yet discover the

concept of the 'all-people's state'. Even Soviet legal science based itself on the decisions of the twenty-first Party Congress until the publication of the draft of the party program in 1961: "The Socialist state, the dictatorship of the proletariat, is the highest form of democracy in a class society."[34] However, it came to light two years later that there exists still a higher form of democracy, that of the whole people, and that there is still a higher type of Socialist state, the state of the whole people. The National Congress of Jurists, held in the summer of 1960, which discussed precisely the questions of the transformation of the Soviet state in communistic social self-government, knew nothing about an intermediary stage between the Soviet state of that time and the final phase of Communism.[35] And this was exactly one year before the publication of the draft program of the CPSU! Only immediately before the appearance of the draft program did the juridical literature discuss the state of the whole people, which will develop 'at a later time'.[36]

Yet the draft program was hardly published, and journalists, philosophers and legal scholars immediately took up the new line, criticizing all those who were of the opinion that the dictatorship of the proletariat must be maintained until the realization of full Communism.[37] As usual, the official position was even surpassed: "The state and the law of the socialistic social order no longer represent a state and law in the old sense of the words", for both possessed *from the beginning* many features of the people's state and people's law.[38] There was an immediate recourse to the statement of Engels that the Paris commune was already no longer a state in the real sense of the word, and to Lenin's declaration, in the spring and summer of 1917, that the future Soviet state will be a *half-state*. (Nevertheless, after the October revolution he tried to strengthen the state apparatus and to erect a strong proletarian state which was hardly a "half-state".[39]) It was generally recognized after 1961 that the social, economic and political conditions for the transition to the people's state were present from the middle of the thirties on. And it was only Stalin who, by strengthening the organ of class struggle, stood in the way of development in the direction of the people's state.[40]

The proclamation of the people's state is connected with the proclamation of the party of the whole people: "The Communist Party, the party of the working class, has today become the party of the whole people." (Statutes of the CPSU, Introduction.) Owing to the parallelism

between party and state (the latter being led and controlled by the former), if the party has already become a people's party, the state must also become a people's state. In this connection, it is clearly brought out in party literature that a people's party cannot arise in a bourgeois state, but only in a Socialist one.[41] Even the party of the working class cannot immediately be transformed into a people's party, after the victory of the proletarian revolution; there are certain social, political and economic preconditions which must first develop.

By the fact that the party became a people's party, it did not thereby cease to be also a workers' party. It is only more comprehensive, being the party of the other social strata as well. In this context, the Chinese Communist Party is accused of not being able to understand correctly the class character of the party in a society without antagonistic classes. Thus, the Communist Party is a people's party, but in spite of that also a class party (as the people's state also remains a class state). In the discussion with the Chinese Communist Party, the Soviets brought out the following point: the development of the Communist Party into a people's party is an objective law[42], just as the path from the state of the dictatorship of the proletariat to Communist self-government unavoidably passes over the people's state.[43]

It is stated in party literature, that the leadership of the working class in the people's party is to be realized indirectly, by the fact that the CPSU represents the ideology of the working class and leads it to victory.[44] In Socialism the ideals of the working class, their politics, and their ideology were embraced by the whole people; for this reason, the transformation of the workers' party into a party of the whole people was a necessary, law-bound development. Yet it does not mean that the Communist Party ceases to fight for the class-aims of the workers.[45]

If the people's party remains a class party and is led by the working class, this must also hold for the state. Thus, even the people's state will continue to embody the politics of the working class; it will be led by this class both directly and indirectly (by the Communist Party under the leadership of the working class). It is the only class in the world, as the party literature says, that does not want to maintain its own dictatorship forever, but takes pains to bring about, after the victory of Socialism, the conditions for developing into the people's state. Thus the leading role of the working class is an objective necessity even in the people's state.[46]

If the leading role of the working class is an objective necessity in the people's state, then the leading role of the Communist Party must also be regarded as an objective necessity, just as in the state of the dictatorship of the proletariat.[47] It must even be constantly extended with the construction of Socialism and Communism: "It is a universal, historically-objective and well-founded claim, that parallel with the strengthening and development of Socialism there must also be a strengthening of the leading role of the Marxist-Leninist party in the life of each of the Socialist countries" (i.e., the USSR and the people's democracies).[48]

Functions of the People's State

The state of the dictatorship of the proletariat corresponds to the society of the transition from capitalism to Socialism; the people's state, the final form of the state, corresponds to the period of the Socialist social order, i.e., of the transition from Socialism to Communism.[49]

The functions of the people's state and those of the state of the dictatorship of the proletariat in its last stage of development cannot be sharply separated from each other. The people's state inherited from its predecessor its position in the international class struggle and its tasks in the sphere of foreign policy; its main duty is to carry on the class struggle in the international arena until Communism achieves a world-wide victory.[50] In addition to serving the function of defense, there is the struggle for peace and the strengthening of friendship and co-operation in the Socialist camp and with the developing nations.[51]

The internal political functions and tasks of the people's state are closely connected with the broadening of democracy, which receives a new content and a new meaning in the people's state. This extension of democracy is not limited to the broadening of the participation of the workers in the management of the state and economy; but it includes a far-reaching decentralization in economic life, the extension of the rights of representative bodies over against the executive organs, the autonomy of the factory *vis-a-vis* the local and central authorities (above all in planning), and of the lower organs *vis-a-vis* the higher.[52] Thus, the people's state must work towards a general democratization[53] and promote 'Socialist autonomy'.[54]

In connection with the extension of Socialist democracy in the people's state, the unity of political action is maintained by (a) the strengthening

of democratic centralism and (b) the extension of the leading role of the party. Both safety measures serve to maintain a centripetal tendency as a countermeasure to those centrifugal tendencies which can arise as a consequence of a false interpretation of the extension of Socialist democracy. The supremacy of the higher organs over the lower is guaranteed by the fact that they must invalidate those decisions which contradict a law or decree and can issue binding instructions, directives, orders, etc., to the lower organs. Although these are not legal norms, they are just as binding.[55]

The legislative *(pravotvorčestkij)* functions in the people's state take on special forms: (a) the activity of the state organs, in directly establishing norms, (b) the state's sanctioning of the legal documents worked out by the social organizations, (c) the special activity of the social organizations whereby they formulate new laws, a function transferred to them from the state, (d) the immediate creation of law by the people. As is emphasized in Communist theory, there appears in all of the abovementioned forms a concrete form of participation by the people (which in the first category is only indirectly realized, since the Supreme Soviet and its presidium is elected by the people and thus are their representatives). As is foreseen in the party program, the right to take the initiative in legislation is given to the social organizations, but only through their Union and Republican organs.[56] Further, the Party Program comes out in favor of the possibility of a referendum (d), which will increase the role of the citizens' assemblies. Of course, it is nowhere set down in the Party Program whether this would be an advisory referendum or a referendum with the power of final decision. The legal literature supports the introduction of a referendum with decisive power in the matter of constitutional change.[57]

After the release of the new Party Program, in which the theory of the people's state was announced, there arose a demand in the legal literature to alter or complete the constitution in accordance with the concept of the state of the whole people. The decree of the twenty-first party congress mentioned only "certain changes and completions" in the constitution; however, the doctrine of the people's state had not yet been laid down at that time. Naturally, the new character of the state as a people's state demands a more thorough reworking of the constitution[58], at least if the theory is taken seriously.

The New Meaning of 'Democracy'

As was already mentioned, democracy also takes on a new meaning in the people's state, the very concept being changed. In Marxism-Leninism, democracy is an explicit class concept: There is no 'democracy in general' either in a Socialist or a bourgeois state."[59] With the concept of "democracy" the question must always be asked – democracy for whom, for which class? Democracy is closely connected with dictatorship: bourgeois democracy means democracy for the minority and dictatorship for the majority, Socialist democracy just the opposite. Thereby democracy becomes, to a certain degree, a 'quantitative concept'; it becomes all the more perfect, the more classes and individuals it includes.[60] Yet the basic difference between Socialist and bourgeois democracy consists in the recognition or denial of 'party-mindedness'. As Lenin emphasized, party-mindedness makes itself felt in the practical activity of bourgeois democracy just as in Socialist democracy, for the rejection of it is in itself a case of party-mindedness.[61]

In the new doctrine of the state and democracy of the whole people, the concept of democracy is just as radically changed as that of the state. According to the new version, democracy in the Soviet Union has nothing to do with dictatorship; it is not maintained by dictatorial means and is no longer concerned with suppressing the other classes.[62] But democracy still remains a political democracy; it keeps its political character, just as the people's state remains a class state whose activity is no longer directed at suppressing classes and social groups.[63] Democracy as a political concept will cease to exist only after the disappearance of all classes, parallel with the withering-away of the state. After it becomes perfect, it will be abolished[64] – however, this does not mean that the democratic methods of government will also be made to disappear.[65] The path to the perfection (and thereby the elimination) of democracy leads from a combination of representative democracy towards a full direct democracy. According to Soviet theory, this development can be observed in the Soviet Union. Strangely enough, the following thesis is put forward: in the development of the Soviet state, there were already present at the beginning, i.e. already in the period of the dictatorship of the proletariat, many characteristic features of the people's state. Thus it is also maintained that many characteristics of the 'all-people's democracy' already

existed within the dictatorship of the proletariat, a fact which came to light only with time.[66]

The People's Law

If the state became a people's state then it is self-evident that the law must become a people's law, whereby the difference between the law of the dictatorship of the proletariat and that of the people's state corresponds to the difference between the two types of states.

"The will of the whole people becomes law under the leading role of the working class.... This principle presents a very important qualitative feature of Soviet law."[67] While the old definition of law referred to the civil law of the early capitalist era and served the class struggle, several contemporary Soviet legal theoreticians maintain that the present Soviet law serves not the class struggle and class domination but the harmony of the working people. Thus law is no longer a form of expression of class domination, but it performs, in the Soviet Union, the function of a 'class regulator', as does the state. Therefore, it is only a half-law, which contributes to the transition from legal norms to social norms and brings the legal system closer to Communist morality. In this law, persuasion will gradually gain the upper hand over force.[68] The new people's law also contributes to the situation, that in Socialist democracy the leaders and those who are led do not present two separate groups, as in bourgeois democracy.[69] The idea itself, that Soviet law expresses the will of the whole people, is not new; one can find it in Soviet theory of law after the adoption of the current constitution (1936) and after the Second World War.[70] In spite of this, the idea of a people's law is new, for earlier the same line of thought was used in reference to the dictatorship of the proletariat. It is precisely this fact which indicates the meager practical significance of this new 'discovery'.

The Concept 'People'

In conclusion, we must mention a special aspect of the theory of the people's state, namely, the concept of the 'people'.

The concept 'people' is, like that of the state, a dialectical, historical concept: not all citizens belong to the people; people and population are not identical.[71] According to one wide-spread conception, "the working masses of a country's population" form its people.[72] Both Lenin[73] and

Stalin[74] spoke about the people in this sense. There can even be found in Lenin a direct contraposition of the people and the citizens, with a categorical exclusion of the latter from the concept of the people.[75]

Moreover, the concept of the 'people' changes its contents constantly, in accordance with the rules of the dialectic. According to another more modern and more dialectical interpretation, the 'people' includes those levels of society which advocate historical progress: "The objective demands of progressive development are the criteria on the basis of which one can determine which classes and population groups form the people." Hence the concept 'popular masses' or 'people' refers to a historically changing community of social groups and levels. In certain periods, for example, during the struggle against foreign conquerors and exploiters, the people can include the overwhelming majority of the population. Also, the present national bourgeoisie of former colonial states belong to the people if they take a position against imperialism. Yet, here too, the change in the content of the concept is imminent, since at a later (higher) stage in the revolutionary transformations, the bourgeoisie leaves the revolution and thereby excludes itself from the people.[76]

The old position was revised in connection with the conception of the people's state: in the state of the whole people the people includes the whole population, for all levels of Socialist society have the same interests and goals[77], with the exception of those groups which pay homage to the remains of the past. The concept of the people thus becomes altered in the conception of the people's state, which divides the totality of citizens, *on an ideological and moral basis,* into two categories.

Directions and Perspectives

In the latter half of 1965 and the first half of 1966, the concepts of the people's state, the people's party and the democracy of the whole people were mentioned less and less often, and one was inclined to believe that Khrushchev's successors wanted to let his 'discovery' gradually drop. At the twenty-third party congress every reference to the people's state was consistently avoided. Nevertheless, a leading editorial in the official organ for political and legal sciences supplies proof that these ideas are still alive and are to be regarded as a guideline for future development. It is the task of present-day Soviet legal science to clarify the future paths

of development of the people's state and people's law and to submit recommendations to the appropriate state organs.[78]

But neither the party nor the professional scholars are satisfied with the state of the juridical sciences, especially with the philosophy of law, and the improvement of the level of literature on the history of law is being urged. The reproaches are most often laid at the doorstep of legal philosophy: "The development of Soviet legal science proceeds in a constant struggle against serious difficulties and deficiences which can be traced back to the past, during which the role and authority of the social sciences was down-graded. The struggle against dogmatism and the practice of merely commenting, against quotationism[79] and against schematism is characteristic of the development of Soviet legal science during the past few years...."[80] According to the official position, the main task (since 1961) consists in working-out the problems of the development of the people's state and the people's law, as well as that of Socialist democracy.[81] The theory of state and of law should clarify the objective necessities of the present-day development of the people's state. The basis for developing the theory of state and for the investigation of the above-mentioned group of problems is the following: above all, the decree of Central Committee of the CPSU, of June, 1963, "on measures for the further development of legal science and for the improvement of juridical instruction in the country"[82], but also the decrees of the plenary sessions of the Central Committee in October, 1964, and March and September, 1965. Both the June plenary session and the Party Program of 1961 strongly urged further work on theoretical problems of the people's state and people's law.[83]

Some Soviet philosophers want to lead the philosophy of law out of the impasse it has reached, especially in connection with the theory of the people's state and people's law, by removing a considerable part of the theory of state (among other things, the theory of the people's state) from the philosophy of law and by making a special science for it: "political sciences". This new discipline would also absorb certain groups of problems concerning the basis of scientific Communism. Two respected philosophers of law, S. S. Alekseev and V. E. Čirkin, reproached other writers for the opinion that the philosophy of state and law is the only science which should treat the theoretical problems of these two phenomena. In their view, this position is no longer tenable, since there is here a

conflict with the "political organization of society", whose importance was stressed by the Party Program of 1961. Thus, the real, purely theoretical aspects of the theory of state should be left to this new branch of science.[84]

In January, 1965, *Pravda* published an article by F. M. Burlackij, entitled "Politics and Science", in which he also advocated the necessity of the new discipline. In February, 1965, at the general meeting of the 'Union for Political Sciences', a discussion was organized in connection with Burlackij's article. At this meeting the boundaries of the "political sciences" were fixed in broad outline; from these one can clearly see that the investigation of the theoretical problems of the "political and class relationships within a specific society as well as in the international sphere" are to be allocated to this new science.[85] One hundred and sixty leading philosophers and legal theoreticians took part in this meeting, and its decisions could possibly have the effect that, with time, the theory of the people's state will either be completely placed in the domain of this new science or be divided between it and the philosophy of law and state.

In line with the recommendation of a special discipline of 'political sciences', there is, in the framework of the Scientific Council of the Academy of Sciences "for the laws of the development of socialism and of the transition to Communism", a special section for the "political organization of society", under the presidency of the well-known legal scholar P. S. Romaškin.[86] By virtue of the existence of this section, the organizational framework for promoting the theory of the people's state is already created to some extent.

Today there are but scattered attempts to put some life into an uncommendable, stagnating philosophy of state and law, and to bring it closer to practical life. The near future might decide whether or not the division of this discipline, which is advocated by numerous well-known theoreticians, will actually come about.

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13. See his work cited above.
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15. See: A. D. Denisov: 'O sootnošenii gosudarstva i obščestva v perechodnyj ot kapitalizma k kommunizmu period'. *Sovetskoe gosudarstvo i pravo* (henceforth *SGiP*), 1960, 4, 39–40.
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17. *Program of the CPSU*, part 2, chapter III/1. Also, Karapetjan-Razin, *loc. cit.*
18. Fedoseev: 'Za dal'nejšij rascvet socialističeskoj demokratii'. In: *Ot socialističeskoj gosudarstvennosti*, 8.
19. V. Ja. El'meev: 'Razvitie form organizacii obščestva v processe perechoda k kommunizmu'. *Vestnik LGU*, no 11. *Serija Ekonomiki, Filosofii i Prava*. 1964, 2, 48–56. Here p. 53. However, it might be mentioned that some theoreticians maintain that in full communism the governing of persons will continue, while others are of the opinion that it will be limited to things and production. See El'meev, *loc. cit.*
20. 'XXIII. s'ezd KPSS i voprosy sovetskogo socialističeskogo gosudarstva i prava'. Leading article by the editors. *SGiP*, 1966, 5, 3–11.
21. Especially the small thefts of social property and rowdyism. In 1963, twenty percent of all registered crimes against the state in the RSFSR were thefts of social property, not even counting the smaller ones which were handled by the social courts. See: V. I. Laputin: '*Aktual'nye voprosy ukreplenija socialističeskogo pravoporjadka*'. *SGiP*, 1964, 61, 3–11. Also in Czechoslovakia: *Rudé Právo*, Prague, Sept. 26, 1964, 2. Because of the fast spread of rowdyism it was declared as a "dangerous punishable action" in decree no. 17 of the plenary session of the highest court of the USSR on December 22, 1964. See: *Sovetskaja Justicija*. M. 1965, 3, 27–28. In 1961 in Poland, 30,8 percent of all convictions concerned alcoholism or rowdyism, which stand in a close relationship. See: *Glos pracy*. Warsaw, April 12, 1962, 1.
22. El'meev, *op. cit.*, p. 52. The leading role of the party must be maintained, but it is

realized without dictatorship. See: F. Burlackij: 'Voprosy gosudarstva v proekte Programmy KPSS'. *Kommunist*, 1961, 13, 37–48.

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28. I. P. Il'inskij: 'Razvitie gosudarstvennosti v evropejskich socialističeskich stranach'. *VF* 1964, 10, 3–14.
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31. 'XXIII. s'ezd KPSS', *op. cit.*
32. N. O. Farberov: 'Obščenarodnoe gosudarstvo – zakonomernyj rezul'tat razvitija gosudarstva diktatury proletariata'. *SGiP*, 1962, 7, 14–24. "The state *loses the character of an instrument for class-suppression which had always belonged to it.* That means that precisely the function which constituted its essence in the whole course of its history now disappears...." Yet Socialist society cannot do without the state for several reasons. "First, because still long after the victory of socialism the state remains the most suitable and rational form of social management..." Further, the state is kept for reasons pertaining to foreign policy. In regard to the functions of the people's state see: *Osnovy marksizma-leninizma*. M. 1962.
33. Cf. P. S. Čeremnych: 'Obščenarodnoe socialističeskoe gosudarstvo'. *VF* 1962, 4, 100. A. Kosicyn: 'Voprosy teorii obščenarodnogo gosudarstva'. *Kommunist*, 1963, 5, 118–124.
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SGiP, 1963, 3, 19ff. Sokolov, ibid. Eugeniusz Zielinski: 'Instytucja referenduma w panstwie socjalistycznym'. *Panstwo i prawo*, 1965, 2, 232–240. But especially: V. Kotok: 'O razvitii form socetanija narodnogo predstavitel'stva s neposredstrennoj demokratiej v SSSR'. *SGiP*, 1960, 12, p. 14ff. And also: V. Kotok: *Referendum v systeme socialističeskoj demokrati.* M. 1964.

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63. Cf.: V. A. Vajčuk: 'Razvitie socialističeskoj gosudarstvennosti k kommunističeskomu samoupravleniju'. *FN*, 1962, 5, 160–164.
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65. Nikolaev, *op. cit.*, pp. 44–45.
66. Il'inskij, *op. cit.*, p. 8ff. V. I. Kozochin, *op. cit.*
67. V. M. Semenov: 'Principy sovetskogo socialisticeskogo obščenaradnogo prava'. *Izvestija vysših učebnych zavedenij.* Pravovedenie. Leningrad, 1964, 1, 16–26. In this article the principles of the people's law are listed in eight points.
68. László Révész: 'Recht und Sozialnorm', *op. cit.*, pp. 14–15.
69. *Uj szo.* Pressburg, September 25, 1965, 5. Article by László Szántó, academician: 'Thoughts on Socialist Democracy'.
70. Cf.: Hans-Jürg Bopp: *Marxismus und Rechtswissenschaft.* Zollikon, 1963, pp. 21–22.
71. Cf.: Alexander Patrzalek: *Instytucje prawa wyboczego Polskiej Rzeczypospolitej Ludowej.* Warsaw, 1963, 6. Cf. also the review of the book and the position represented therein: *Panstwo i prawo*, 1964, 5–6, 902–904. Review by Zygmunt Izdebski.
72. *Bol'šaja Sovetskaja Enciklopedija*, vol. 29, 131.
73. *The people's proletariat and the peasantry. Sočinenija*, 4th ed., vol. 9, 40.
74. "The revolution is led by the people; the people are the proletariat and the peasants". *Sočinenija*, vol. 1, 139.
75. *Sočinenija*, vol. 10, 233, and vol. 9, 113.
76. Cf.: G. Ašin: 'Kakovo soderžanie ponjatija "narod" v istoričeskom materializme'. *Političeskoe samoobrazovanie.* M. 1964, 7, 62–65.
77. Ibid.
78. 'XXIII. s'ezd KPSS', *op. cit.*
79. A method of operation which restricts itself to quoting from the works and explanations of leading Communists, without commentating or taking a position on them, i.e. without expressing one's own thoughts.
80. 'Juridičeskuju nauku – na uroven' zadač kommunističeskogo stroitel'stva'. Leading article by the editors. *SGiP*, 1966, 3, 3–14. Here p. 3.
81. Ibid., pp. 5–6.

82. 'Povyšat' rol' provovoj nauki v formirovanii kommunističeskogo mirovozrenija'. Leading article by the editors. *SGiP*, 1963, 8, pp. 3–14.
83. *Kommunist*, 1964, 12, 70–74.
84. Cf. *SGiP*, 1965, 5, 45–52.
85. Cf. the report of E. V. Tadevosjan in *VF* 1965, 10, 164–166, with an enumeration of the individual problems of the new planned branch of science.
86. Cf. the report in *SGiP*, 1963, 3, 120.

NOTES AND COMMENTS

'INQUIRY' ON EAST-EUROPEAN PHILOSOPHY

As a result of talks this writer had in Oslo in the spring of 1965 with Professor Arne Naess, editor of *Inquiry*, a special issue of that journal has been planned on philosophy in Eastern Europe. The undersigned had the privilege and responsibility of collecting the papers and providing, on the request of Professor Naess, a concise introduction to the subject. Containing five papers, in addition to the 'Introduction', the special issue appeared under the heading "Philosophy in Eastern Europe" as the Spring, 1966 (Volume 9 No. 1) number of *Inquiry*.

A special issue of a distinguished international philosophical journal devoted to contemporary philosophy in Eastern Europe is an event of note and an encouraging sign of awakening interest among Western philosophical circles in the work of their Marxist-Leninist colleagues. But not merely the fact, but also the contents of the issue may be of interest to readers of *SST*. For their information the abstracts of each paper are quoted below (by permission).

'Philosophy in Eastern Europe. An Introduction' by Ervin Laszlo

The purpose of this 'Introduction' is to provide an objective approach to the study of contemporary East-European dialectical materialism. It consists of three parts. Part I outlines the common features of the standpoints of East-European philosophers, defining a set of basic propositions functioning as universally accepted premisses of dialectical materialist philosophic construction. Part II considers the hierarchy of East-European philosophic life and sketches the conditions of philosophic activity. Part III draws analogies and points out the differences between contemporary philosophy in Eastern Europe and the West (the latter exemplified by Anglo-Saxon philosophy). It is found that differences are no longer categorical, but consist of gradations of emphasis on common or analogous elements.

'Morality, Ethics and East-European Marxism' by Richard T. De George

In recent years an orthodox Marxist-Leninist ethics has been developing in the Soviet Union. It is metaphysically based, teleologically oriented,

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and objectivist in its claims. Soviet ethical writings encompass five different activities: description, interpretative classification, prescription, content-analysis, and refutation. Among the distinctive features of the new Soviet Moral Code are its requirement of devotion to the Communist cause, its exclusively social orientation, and its emphasis on work. Upon analysis it turns out to prescribe a completely externalized and provincial morality. A comparison of Soviet ethics with recent ethical writings from other East-European countries, however, shows that Marxist ethics need not follow the Soviet pattern.

'Marxist-Leninist Scientific Atheism' by Thomas J. Blakeley

The main object of Marxist-Leninist 'scientific atheism' consists in the discovery and assimilation of 'scientific' data and its use in the 'atheistic' destruction of religion and all its appurtenances. The first task is to show – using the data mainly of the natural sciences – the non-existence of the object of religion, i.e. God. Second, it is necessary to explain how a theory without an object came to be and continues to show signs of vitality, i.e. to find the causes or 'roots' of religion: and this in terms of historical materialism.

'Dynamics of Ideological Change in Eastern Europe' by Ervin Laszlo

Communist ideology is evolving away from its original mould. One of the decisive factors in this process is the rate of acceptance of the 'Classical' doctrines by the intellectuals of East-European countries. In determining the dynamics of the process, the original doctrines and the thinking of the intellectuals are taken as sets of sentences constituting the premisses, and the manifest actual discourse of a Communist country as the set of sentences representing the conclusion. To demonstrate the conclusion from the premisses, heuristic laws are formulated accounting for the various factors conditioning the process of the interaction of Classical Communism and the thinking of the intellectuals. A logical schema of general applicability results, demonstrating the various phases of the evolution of Marxist-Leninist ideology in East-European countries.

'Niels Bohr in the Darkness and Light of Soviet Philosophy' by S. Müller-Markus

Soviet attitude towards Bohr reflects changes in the ideological approach

to science. During the last period before Stalin's death Ždanov proclaimed the campaign against Western influence in Soviet philosophy and science. Nevertheless the physicist M. A. Markov tried to introduce complementarity as a materialistic interpretation of quantum-mechanics in 1948. He was officially condemned. This was followed by a period (1948–54) during which heavy attacks were made against the Copenhagen school. In 1958, after a personal exchange of thoughts with Bohr, academician Fock declared complementarity and probability to be irreversible steps towards a new insight into physical reality, at the same time correcting some of Bohr's epistemological conceptions.

'Current Trends in Soviet Logic' by David D. Comey

A survey of the outstanding developments in Soviet philosophical logic shows that the formal and dialectical logicians have resolved most of the issues that divided them in the early 1950's. In orientation they are both converging on the *avant-garde* of English-speaking logicians who regard formalization as irrelevant for solving the essential problems of philosophical logic. Soviet dialecticians consider their logic to be a *rapprochement* with epistemology that will result in a logic that is concerned with the content and genetic development of concepts. Such a logic will provide a methodology of science that can encompass the creative growth of science, in contrast to the positivists' fixation on the 'logic of the finished report'.

Ervin Laszlo

'THE REVOLUTIONARY INTERNATIONALS'

The Revolutionary Internationals, 1864–1943. Ed. M. M. Drachkovitch. Hoover Institution Publications. Stanford, California (Stanford University Press), 1966. This important historical study contains essays in revised and expanded form which were presented at a conference held at the Hoover Institution on War, Revolution and Peace in October, 1964. The list of contributors is impressive – includes M. Drachkovitch, J. Freymond, C. Landauer, B. Lazitch, M. Molnár, B. Nicolaevsky, G. Niemeyer, M. Nomad, S. Possony. The contributors discuss the rise and decline of the three Internationals, the development of their directing ideals, and perhaps more important, the distinct character of each of

them, dominated by different personalities and historical situations. M. Drachkovitch indicates in the Introduction that one of the most 'arresting' findings of these studies is the enormous role which the personality and vacillations of Marx played in the development, not only of the First, but of the Second and Third Internationals.

A. H.

ESENIN-VOL'PIN IN KIEV

According the *Voprosy Filosofii* and *Filosofskie Nauki* (*VF* 1966, 4, 169; *FN* 1966, 1, 141), Aleksandr S. Esenin-Vol'pin, professor of mathematical logic at MGU, has evidently finished his involuntary stay at the lunatic asylum, where he had been locked up, after having sent illegally his oppositional poetry and his anti-Communist 'Free Philosophical Treatise' to the West in 1959/60 (where it was published under the title *A Leaf of Spring* in 1961).*

As far as one can see, there was not, at least in the western press, any special information about the exact data of the scientist's release. And yet Esenin-Vol'pin is not only free for apparently more than one year, but is presumably back in his former position. This can be concluded from the fact that Esenin-Vol'pin, amongst others, represented his subject, giving a report at the symposium on methodology and logic in Kiev, from June 21–25, 1965.

C. G.

* A. S. Yesenin-Vol'pin: *A Leaf of Spring*. F. Praeger, New York, 1961.

WORKS OF GEORG LUKÁCS IN NON-HUNGARIAN LANGUAGES II.*

CZECHOSLOVAK LANGUAGES

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* Within the language groups titles are listed in order of first publication.

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June 21–25 Symposium in Kiev on methodology and logic. With participation of more than 150 scientists. About 50 speeches and reports on actual problems in logic were given; amongst others by P. V. Kopnin, M. E. Omel'janovskij, A. A. Zinov'ev, E. G. Judin, B. V. Birjukov, I. S. Narskij (cf. his speech on 'Dispositional Predicates in Logic and the Problem of "Secondary Qualities"' in *FN* 1965, 5, 20–28; *FN* 1966, 1, 137–144; cf. also *VF* 1966, 4).

Oct. Meeting of the editorial members of *VF* with readers and authors in Tbilisi (*VF* 1966, 4, 172–174).

Oct. Symposium in Tbilisi on problems of value. Participation of scientists from Moscow, Leningrad, Kiev, Tartu, Tbilisi and other towns of the SSSR. The symposium was opened by V. P. Tugarinov (LGU) with a speech on 'Basic Questions of Marxist-Leninist Theory of Value'. Other speeches were given by Kedrov, Mitin, Iovčuk and Rožin (*FN* 1966, 2, 139–145).

Nov. Inter highschool scientific conference on ethics in Tambov. With participation of teachers and aspirants of the philosophical chairs and other social sciences, psychology and pedagogy. The conference work was extensive in three sections: 1) 'Theoretical Problems of Education in Communist Morality'; 2) 'History of Ethics and Critique of Anti-Marxist Ethical Scientists'; 3) 'Ethical Problems in Art and Artistic Literature' (*FN* 1966, 2, 146–149).

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J. M. BOCHEŃSKI

ON PHILOSOPHICAL DIALOGUE

I

Studies in Soviet Thought is an organ of a group of men who claim to be exclusively devoted to philosophy, i.e. to theory. Of course, each of them is also a citizen and might, as such, take part in practical activities. The author of the present article has done so many times in the past and is still prepared to act similarly if he considers it his duty. But – and this is a second characteristic of the group – they do believe that specialization is not only possible – it is necessary. They believe that a man devoted to a particular important activity should, in the course of it, abstract from points of view and aims which are not proper to the given field. In particular, they assume that a philosopher acting as such should forget about everything else except his proper task, which is the solving of philosophical problems. To be more precise, it is assumed here, that the philosopher acting as such is exclusively interested in *theoretical* problems and that he tries to solve them, not for the sake of anyone else but in order to increase his own knowledge. The attitude of a philosopher as understood here is first, theoretical and secondly, egotistical.

This assumption being made, it appears that the following aims are completely alien to the philosopher as such:

(1) The persuasion of other people. If a philosopher engages in a discussion, as he often does, this will not be in order to convince his adversary. The only thing he desires to achieve is *his own* conviction. He hopes either that he might learn from his opponent that his views are wrong and so gain a new and better grasp of reality, or that the arguments of his adversary may help him to formulate better, improve and strengthen his views. Of course, as a man, he may feel some charity towards the poor fellow who does not understand or just talks nonsense. But charity is conspicuously wanting in a purely philosophical attitude. As long as one engages in a philosophical discussion, he is not even allowed to use it in any way.

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(2) The philosopher will feel even less the need for victory in a contest. He is always prepared to abandon his own views if he finds that the other person's ideas are more correct. Of course, we are all men, and just as we may fall under the influence of charity, so also – and easier still – we may become victims of the fighting spirit. But it is possible to avoid it and many instances are known of men who were and are completely devoid of such desires when acting as philosophers. Once again, the philosopher wants one thing only: better understanding for himself, not any 'victory'.

(3) Far less still will he be interested in any directly political or similar aim. To quote just one instance, the celebrated need for a better mutual understanding and possibly for love between East and West leaves him completely cold. That is, he might consider such aims as desirable, but on the condition that they are necessary or useful for his main goal, namely for learning. For instance, he might believe that a better understanding between Moscow and Washington would facilitate his entering into talks with Soviet philosophers from whom he hopes to learn something. But even in that case the philosopher will consider the efforts in that direction to be the concern mainly of other men, e.g. politicians, but not his concern.

And that means that the philosopher does not wish any sort of dialogue which has this or any similar aim. He does appreciate the efforts of men of good will who try to bring about some progress in human relations. But he is not directly interested. He does not work either for peace or for mutual understanding, does not seek any kind of victory, and does not wish to teach anybody; he only wants to increase his knowledge.

II

The above analysis needs to be completed from another point of view, i.e. by considering the social nature of scientific and consequently also of philosophical research. It is a well known fact that we cannot be successful in research work without a human context, i.e. without the possibility of consulting other workers and testing our ideas by submitting them to their examination. It is to be noted that this social aspect of the activity of a philosopher does not diminish in any way his theoretical and egotistical character. He tends exclusively toward one end only, namely his own knowledge. But in order to achieve that aim, some circumstances must be

present, without which success is not possible. One such condition is the possibility of consulting other specialists.

Now this being so, the philosopher as such, because of his own interests, will naturally try to bring about this possibility. And that means that he will occasionally cooperate in helping other men to reach a level they must necessarily attain in order that they might be able to help him. The same rules of dialogue apply which were stated above with regard to this intermediate goal. The partners must have something to say pertaining to the field in which the philosopher works, and they must move in that field with sufficient knowledge and competence.

It follows that the philosopher can and even should behave in such a way that the level of thought in general be improved. That is probably what moves philosophers to communicate their thoughts and, generally, to teach. As a matter of fact, it is known that all philosophers did teach in one way or another. Some will perhaps say that they had to do so, because teaching is the only service they can render to society, which, after all, pays them. But, while this might have often been the case, it seems that the philosophers did not teach for that reason only. For one thing, many among them did not obtain much from their respective societies. Socrates got only poison, and many a philosopher was living from other activities – as Kant the Librarian and Marcel the Novelist. The deeper reason why the philosopher teaches is that he wants the level of thought to be improved, in order to help himself.

But if that be true, then the philosopher might also engage in dialogue with other philosophers for *that* sake. It will be not alien to his vocation to desire to meet and discuss with such men even if he cannot learn much from them, but on the assumption that his meeting them will help them to improve their level of thought and consequently enlarge the social groups he himself needs in order to develop his thought.

Yet, that sort of dialogue will not only be considered by the philosopher as having a secondary importance, subordinated to his main aim, but it will also take place rather rarely. He cannot forget that his main aim is the acquisition of knowledge and that *any* sort of other activities might divert him from it. Also to assume that sort of attitude towards a colleague supposes a feeling of superiority, which, as such, does not seem to befit a true philosopher. It must be admitted that, as a class, philosophers are not very conspicuous models of modesty. Still, at least the ideal of a philos-

opher is that of a man full of wisdom, i.e. of a thinker who knows better than the others just how little he does know, to use the famous statement ascribed to Socrates. There may be cases in which the inferiority of the level of someone's thought might be evident: but it is suggested that such cases will be rare and that a philosopher true to his ideal will seldom harbor feelings of superiority.

III

This having been said, let us ask the question: "What are the conditions on which a philosophical dialogue will be possible?"

Before attempting to answer this question, it will be useful to deal with the following preliminary problem which contemporary philosophers learned to consider from Moore: "What sort of question is it?" The answer will be that it is a purely *analytical* one. In order to know the conditions on which a philosophical dialogue will be possible, we cannot use any method other than the analysis of both nouns occurring in the question itself, namely of 'philosopher' and of 'dialogue'.

One aspect of the meaning of the term 'philosopher' has been described above: it has been said that a philosopher is a man who pursues only one aim, namely his own *understanding*; at least this is the way we do use the term 'philosopher' here. It should be added that the philosopher seeks this understanding *in his own field*, not, e.g. in biology or political science. He seeks the solution of philosophical problems only.

By the term 'dialogue' is meant an exchange of thoughts by means of writing or speech. It follows that at least two parties are needed for a dialogue, meaning not only two physically different persons or groups of persons, but also two different views, in our case, two different philosophical views. This needs to be stressed, because some people seem to consider their rôle in a dialogue as consisting in a simple acceptance of the views of their adversaries. That is, of course, completely wrong: a dialogue – or at least a philosophical dialogue – is not possible without opposing views. Moreover, a dialogue between philosophers will necessarily take the form of a discussion. It will be not only an exchange of thoughts, but also a clash of opposing views, i.e. an exchange of arguments by which the engaged parties will try to justify their own views and attempt to weaken or falsify those of their adversaries. Briefly, a philosophical dialogue will be

an exchange of arguments between at least two persons or groups of persons, representing different and opposing philosophical views.

IV

It is now possible to obtain, by deduction, several statements concerning the conditions on which a philosophical dialogue will be possible, i.e. the necessary conditions of such a dialogue. They fall into two classes: some conditions are required in the philosopher himself, others in his partner or opponent. We shall first consider the former.

The philosopher engaged in dialogue must, if he is acting as a philosopher, enter into the dialogue with the sole aim of acquiring more understanding; the only possible social aim which makes an exception to that rule has been stated above. Otherwise, the dialogue may be interesting, useful and fruitful for other purposes, but it will not be a philosophical dialogue.

But a philosopher who seeks to increase his knowledge by the dialogue, does it by taking into consideration the views and arguments of his opponent. Therefore, two further conditions will be required of him: he must try to understand those views and be capable of doing so. The first – the will to understand – is obviously required by the very meaning of the term 'dialogue' as explained above. As to the capacity to reach that understanding of the opponent's views, the philosopher is obliged to know the general frame of reference within which his adversary moves. Consequently, if he wishes to do his job in a proper way, he will have to know his opponent's language, historical background, basic assumptions and other similar things without which a thorough understanding of another man's thoughts is impossible (especially the thought of a philosopher belonging to another school). In order to anticipate what we shall have to say about the dialogue between Communists and non-Communists, we must note the deplorable fact that so many persons in both of these groups believe that they can engage in a dialogue fruitfully without knowing a word of their opponents' language and without the slightest understanding of their background and frame of reference.

Moreover, it seems that the main effort of a philosopher participating in a dialogue will be directed toward understanding what his partner really means. The dialogue will therefore not be a simple opposition of

divergent views. To a large extent it will consist of questions asked by the philosopher in order to make clear what his adversary means. Consequently, immanent criticism, mostly in the positive meaning of that expression, will be a further essential part of the dialogue.

Finally, it is well known that a deeper understanding of certain doctrines is impossible if the philosopher who studies them is unable to feel toward them at least a degree of sympathy. That does not mean that he should accept them at their face value and become uncritical. But the criticism should always follow understanding and the latter is not possible without a successful attempt to forget, for the moment, the negative criticism, and just follow the doctrine under examination with the greatest possible sympathy.

The necessary conditions of a philosophical dialogue on the side of the philosopher are in brief: the will to know, the knowledge of the opponent's language and frame of reference, an effort to understand what he means and what is entailed by the latter, a sort of sympathy for the doctrine in question.

V

If we turn now to the opponent, we find that several conditions must be present in him too, in order that the dialogue be possible.

First, the philosopher will discuss only with someone who is supposed to have something to say about the problems he is interested in himself. He may listen to or question biologists, politicians or engineers, but he will not discuss with them, if they do not happen to have something to say about philosophical problems. For as a philosopher he could not possibly gain anything from such a discussion.

Second, he will require in his opponent not only an interest in his own problems, but also a certain capacity for dealing with them, because what the philosopher expects from a dialogue is either to be convinced that his views are wrong, or to see their truth more clearly in the light of the objections. He usually hopes to clarify and strengthen his position by the dialogue. But a man who does not understand the problem or who is not able to think on a scientific level cannot possibly help the philosopher to achieve this. Consequently, he may be the object of a 'maieutic' conversation or of fun, but not a partner in a dialogue.

It seems that those conditions are not only necessary but also largely sufficient and that no other qualities are required in the opponent. However, it has been asserted that two further qualities are neccessary: first that he should be a rational philosopher, or (this expression being redundant) a man who, like the philosopher himself, seeks only understanding and nothing else; and second, that he should comply with the Platonic rules of dialogue, i.e. refrain from insults and arguments *ad personam*.

Now both of these requirements are to a certain degree justified. It is clear that a complete irrationalist cannot possibly be a partner in a philosophical dialogue, for he cannot supply rational arguments, which alone interest the philosopher. But assuming that he supplies at least some such arguments, a philosopher may discuss with him, even if his basic attitude is not that which the philosopher assumes himself. For even in that case the latter can learn something and consequently can engage in the dialogue profitably. This point has often been misunderstood under the influence of a position which is itself not philosophical, but rather mystical, namely that of illuminism ("les philosophes", said Whitehead, "were not philosophers").

The following instance may make this point more clear. Suppose the philosopher meets a partisan of the Advaita Vedanta, for whom monism is a religious dogma, i.e. a dogma accepted on non-rational grounds. Will it be possible to discuss philosophically with such a man? Of course it will, but only under the following condition – that the Vedantist be able to supply some rational arguments in favour of the monism and to do so on a sufficiently high level of insight and sophistication. Such a discussion may be very fruitful indeed. Only someone who has never had any contact with, say, Çankara, can deny that the profit may even be enormous.

The second condition mentioned above, namely that the opponent should keep to the Platonic rules of dialogue, also has some justification. It is a fact a man who insults his adversary renders the dialogue more difficult. The philosopher may get angry, and that is not a mood very suitable for speculative thought. So if there is too much abuse and *ad personam* argument, it may appear that the dialogue is useless or of little value. But this is an extreme case. Normally, as long as the opponent keeps within certain limits, and is able to come forth with interesting, rational arguments, the philosopher will be ready to suffer for the sake of knowledge some discomfort caused by his partner's barbaric attitude. So it

seems that the second condition suggested above is not essential, at least within certain limits.

In order to avoid misunderstanding, it will be good to mention that this kind of behavior may legitimately lead the philosopher to refuse personal relations with a man who behaves badly. The knowledge he is seeking can usually also be found elsewhere, and no one is condemned to discuss only with Mr. X or Mr. Y. If that is the case, it seems to be the right of the philosopher to refuse such a man personal relations and even discussion.

That is what many people seem not to realize. There are quite a number of writers who first grossly insult someone and then write him kind letters asking for books, personal help, etc. If they were forced to behave like that, one could perhaps consider their request. But usually they are not, as is shown by the fact that many of their colleagues, i.e. those of the same country and school, behave decently. It is suggested here that philosophers should show more character in refusing to talk to such uncivilized boors. They could by doing so help improve the general atmosphere of discussion and so contribute to making it more profitable.

However, a certain amount of this boorishness is not fatal to philosophical discussion if the ill-mannered participant at the same time offers some rational arguments which are worth considering.

To sum up: the philosopher will be willing to enter into a philosophical dialogue with every man who says something competently on problems the philosopher is interested in. These seem to be the main and fundamental conditions for a philosophical dialogue.

VI

It is possible to think of a type of a dialogue which we would call 'philosophical' in the fullest meaning of the word. This is a discussion between two philosophers who, while sustaining different and opposed views, are both pursuing the same aim. This would be the case when both are philosophers and both desire only to learn something by the dialogue. In order that such a dialogue be successful all conditions enumerated above will be required in both opponents. Each of them will consequently be obliged to know his opponent's language, frame of reference and basic assumptions. Each will try, above all, to understand the other and, while

doing so, will try to engender the greatest possible sympathy for the adversary's views. Each will have to be interested in the same problems and be able to deal with them in a competent way.

A dialogue of that sort is surely a most desirable thing for every philosopher. For it not only gives him the possibility to test his opinions against the arguments of another philosopher but the partner also helps him considerably in working out those opinions by asking him questions and trying to understand them for his own sake. Such a dialogue, however great the opposition between the views in question, may become a true collaboration in a common effort toward the solution of problems in which both philosophers help each other to reach a higher level of understanding.

Unfortunately, this ideal is very seldom achieved. Most of the instances known to the present writer are dialogues between members of the same philosophical school, where the discussion is concerned not with basic problems, but with questions of detail. There might exist other more deep-reaching discussions between representatives of radically divergent views, but they are rare and very difficult to obtain.

Yet the dialogue of a philosopher does not need to achieve this perfect form. Even if it is carried on with a man who does not aim solely at understanding, with an opponent who does not care to understand well what is said, the mere fact that it offers an opportunity to test our views in a clash renders the dialogue useful and sometimes even very fruitful. Of course, the adversary who does not carry on a dialogue in the ideal manner just described will gain less than the philosopher who does; but it must be recalled that the final aim of the philosophical dialogue is always egotistic: increasing the philosopher's own insight, not that of someone else.

VII

Let us apply our results to the problems of philosophical dialogue between Communists and non-Communists. This problem is of central importance for Sovietologists working in the area of philosophy. It is true that they might continue their research without any sort of dialogue with the Communists. They do, of course, desire personal contacts with their Communist colleagues, but this does not need to be a philosophical

dialogue. Up to now, such contacts consisted mainly in the Sovietologists asking questions, the aim of which was simply to learn about the views of the Soviet philosophers. In other words, the Sovietologists in philosophy usually functioned as historians of philosophy, not as philosophers.

However, a historian of philosophy is normally interested in theoretical, systematic questions. Therefore most students of Soviet philosophy would probably wish to enter into a dialogue with Communist thinkers, if only such a dialogue – namely a philosophical one – were possible.

But is it? In order that it be possible, a number of conditions must be present both in the philosopher himself and in his opponent. Let us begin with the former and ask if there are, among non-Communist philosophers, thinkers who satisfy the conditions formulated above.

One among these conditions is certainly present: there are many men in the free world who may be called 'true philosophers', i.e. men who desire nothing else than better understanding of philosophical problems. This may be asserted in spite of its denial by the Communists and also in spite of the existence of a minority of philosopheres who preach the so-called 'philosophie engagée', i.e. the necessity of pursuing some practical aims. It is simply a fact, that the vast majority of our philosophers are philosophers in the true sense of the term.

There is also often no lack of will to understand the Communist doctrines and to enter into a dialogue with them. Far more serious is the nearly universal lack of the special knowledge necessary for such a dialogue. The great majority of non-Communist philosophers do not know Russian, are not very informed about the historical background of their partners and often have little knowledge of their explicit ideological assumptions. Under such conditions the dialogue cannot be fruitful.

However, there exists a small group of philosophers who possess said knowledge. They are, indeed, very few – perhaps no more than two dozen. Those men could and, it is believed, should try to enter into a philosophical dialogue with the Communists – on the condition that the qualities required for it are present in their partners.

VIII

But are they? One might first think that this is not the case. Let us begin with the first condition. The partner in a philosophical dialogue should

be interested in the same type of problems as the philosopher with whom he is discussing, i.e. he should be interested in philosophical problems. Now when we consider what is often published in the official Soviet academic journals devoted to philosophy, we see that this condition is often absent. We find first, that the leading authors, the *peredovae*, treat mostly political and not philosophical questions. Here are a few examples from recent [1966] issues of the most important Soviet philosophical journal, the *Voprosy Filosofii*: Nr. 1 on the penetration of the Cosmos, by two cosmonauts[1]; Nr. 2 a dissertation on the 'Leninist Course'[2]; Nr. 5 an article by I. G. Kurakov on the efficiency of industry[3]; Nr. 7 another by G. O. Zimanas on the relations between socialist countries.[4]

Moreover, even if we leave aside the *peredovae* and consider the subject matter of the normal articles appearing in the academic journals, as well as that of many books, we find that many of them do not have anything to do with philosophy as it is understood outside the Communist world. Let us take another volume of the *Voprosy Filosofii*, that of 1965. We find there, among other articles, the following: H. V. Adfel, on the organization of the economy[5]; I. L. Andreev, on social processes in the liberated African countries[6]; G. S. Deborin, on the international impact of the construction of Communism in the S.U.[7]; V. N. Jagodkin, on the function of the material interests of the worker in the development of industry.[8]

Those few instances were quoted in order to show that the situation as represented, e.g. in the Fribourg Bibliography of Soviet Philosophy, did not change much in that respect during the last few years.

That is probably the reason why so many non-Communist philosophers feel that a dialogue with Communists is useless. They believe that Communists are not interested in their problems. However, those who share this view are simply wrong. Alongside of political, sociological and economic speculation, one finds in the Communist literature in general, and in the Soviet writings in particular, many items which are explicitly concerned with classical philosophical subjects.

But even when Soviet philosophers are considering subjects which, as such, are clearly philosophical, the type of problem they discuss is often very peculiar. They dedicate much time and effort to solving questions which would never arise if they did not presuppose the sayings of the 'classics' as established once and for all. One typical case is the truly

enormous amount of work and writing in the Soviet Union which has been devoted to the famous problem of *sovpadenie*, i.e. of the coincidence between dialectics, theory of knowledge and logic. This is a question which I believe would never bother any philosopher who is not a Leninist, not even an adherent of dialectics, not even a pure Marxian. Another similar problem is that which arises from Engels' statement that the unity of the world consists in its materiality. Or let us just mention the chapter titles of the recent report by Dr. H. Fleischer on Soviet philosophy in 1964–1965[9]: Opposition between matter and consciousness[10]; Universal and social dialectics[11]; One or more dialectics?[12]; On the 'Basic Contradiction' in Socialism[13]; The contradictory character of movement.[14] Very few non-Communist philosophers would consider such questions as philosophically interesting.

All that being true, one can understand the position of many non-Communist philosophers who after meeting such problems, decided that a dialogue with their Communist colleagues would not be useful since the latter do not seem to study the same kind of problems as they do.

IX

But that is not the whole story. Not all Soviet writings are about political or other non-philosophical questions; and not everything they are debating is so closely linked with their peculiar assumptions that it can be studied only by them. On the contrary, it is easy to show that Soviet and other Communist philosophers often discuss those very questions which are being debated by non-Communist philosophers. Here are a few instances: In Ontology, much work has been done in the Soviet Union on the categorical problem.[15] In theory of knowledge, the Communists always defend a strictly realist doctrine[16], which one may not accept but which certainly is one among the possible solutions of a generally recognized philosophical problem. They often study the problem of universals and of abstraction.[17] In logic, there exist now in the Soviet Union two mutually opposed schools, one which might be called more formal, the other more dialectical[18]; and whatever one may think about the solutions proposed by them, the problems of the foundations of logic, of general methodology, etc., which they discuss are again classical philosophical problems. In psychology the problem of the relation between mind

and body has repeatedly been the subject of considerable work.[19] The foundations of morality are perhaps examined in an unsatisfactory way, but they still are examined.[20] The same is true about the foundations of art and the theory of aesthetic experience. All these topics may be treated differently than they are by other philosophers, but the problems – and that is the point here – are very often the same.

If this is the case, it satisfies the first condition required of a Communist philosopher, in order that he might become a partner in a philosophical dialogue.

X

Now is the second condition also met? Do Communist philosophers work on these problems with sufficient knowledge? Is their level of information, insight and method sufficiently high, that a serious non-Communist philosopher might profit by carrying on a dialogue with them?

To this question also most non-Communist philosophers have given and still give a negative answer. Indeed, it looks as if the vast majority of them up to now considered the level reached by Communist philosophers as quite insufficient. The latter often seem not to realize this because their own press presents some unimportant writers, who do not have any noticeable influence in the philosophical world outside the Communist bloc, as the great thinkers of the West. But that is surely a mistake. The sore fact is that Sovietologists who try to persuade their non-Communist colleagues that there *is* something valuable in Communist philosophy have had as yet very little success. Most non-Communist philosophers of any importance refuse the dialogue because they are convinced that there is no one with whom to discuss.

It must be said in their favour that they could hardly be expected to have a more correct picture of the real situation. What is presented to them by the Communist side – mostly through local, insignificant and belligerent Western Communists – is usually below any acceptable level. Moreover, even when sympathetic and informed authors, like Fr. Wetter, report competently on the philosophical life in the Soviet Union, those reports are published late and are read – if they are, because mostly they are not – a number of years after they have been drafted, i.e. still later after the appearance of the writings on which the reports are based. On

the whole, non-Communist philosophers have at their disposal only an image of Communist philosophy which belongs to past years. But during those years an incredible amount of primitivism and nonsense was pruned out of Communist philosophical books and journals.

But even now there are serious reasons for disbelieving that among the Communist philosophers there are a number of men who move on an intellectually decent level. The Communist countries, and especially the Soviet Union, usually send abroad men who very often astonish their foreign colleagues by their lack of information and insight. This is a painful subject and the present writer would like to avoid mentioning names. But he might say that quite recently, at a large international meeting, there was a young man who was talking about Heidegger, Kant, the analytic school and various other things without the slightest knowledge of them, and when some people present told him that what he said was simply untrue, he could not even answer. Unfortunately that was no exception. The Communist countries seem to insist on preventing real philosophers from going abroad and on presenting to the non-Communist philosophers only a strictly limited group, which by no means represents the best in Communist thought.

The result is, as has been said, that the great majority of non-Communist philosophers disbelieve the possibility of a philosophical dialogue. Some of them will probably be ready to carry on a dialogue for other aims – political, religious, humanistic, etc. – , but this is not a philosophical dialogue, for this is regarded as impossible.

XI

The truth is that while many Communist philosophers still work on a low level, there are among the thinkers of the Soviet Union and the other Communist countries, many men who do not deserve to be judged as inferior to their colleagues in other countries. This is a contention which has constantly been made in the *Studies in Soviet Thought*, and an effort has been made to substantiate it by monographic studies. We are not going to repeat here what has been stated in those studies; a few examples will suffice.

Whoever read N. Lobkowicz's *Das Widerspruchsprinzip*[21] will know that some Soviet philosophers deal with the Zenonian paradoxes in a competent

and relevant way. The book by A. A. Zinov'ev on philosophical problems of many valued logic[22] might have displeased some reviewers, yet it seems to be one of the most significant books in the field. The studies of Birjukov on Frege[23] are certainly pieces of decent work. What K. Ballestrem brought out in his bibliography of Soviet translations of Western classical philosophers[24] shows that the level of information is perhaps not quite satisfactory, but still respectable. Ingarden's highly speculative and difficult essays have been edited in Russian with a truly excellent preface.[25] This only covers the Soviet Union. In Czechoslovakia, the name of Kosik alone will suffice to show that there *is* serious philosophy in that country. In Poland, even if we disregard those philosophers who are not Communists, Schaff stands out as worthy of respect, whatever one's views might be. One might perhaps list as a further example the Yugoslavian *Praxis*, which is a very interesting philosophical journal, even if it is claimed – not without reason – that the general status of philosophical thought in Yugoslavia is far from clear.

Moreover, it is a fact known to every Sovietologist interested in philosophy, that the level of information of method and of insight into problems is steadily rising in all Communist countries, above all in the Soviet Union. One phenomenon must be mentioned in this context, namely, the wide gap which separates the technical publications like the *Filosofskaja Enciklopedia* and the more official popular writings. While the former often attain an excellent level, the latter usually lag far behind them. And yet a clear improvement is visible even in those official and popular writings. To quote just one instance, the new *Philosophical Dictionary* is quite different from the (really scandalous and ignorant) old one.[26]

There is some competent philosophical thinking in the Communist countries and its level is improving.

XII

The conclusion is that also the second condition required of the partner in a philosophical dialogue is often found in Communist philosophers. And so, both conditions being satisfied, the dialogue appears to be possible.

Of course, the ideal type of truly philosophical dialogue will be far more difficult to achieve, because of the Communists' *partijnost'*. Yet it is perhaps not an over-optimistic estimation to say that even that type

of dialogue is not completely excluded at the present moment and the prospects for the future seem to be still better.

It is believed that philosophical dialogues with Communist philosophers could serve a special purpose for non-Communists. The fact is that Communist thinkers assume principles and methods which are often radically different from those used by their non-Communist colleagues. For one, they are as a group by far the most important representatives of metaphysics (of course in the non-Communist, not in the Engelsian meaning of the word). They belong also to the rather small group of present day philosophers who hold strongly to the doctrine of real essences. While there are also Hegelians elsewhere, it seems that the Soviet Union is the country where the influence of the German thinker is by far the most alive – with unexpected results, e.g. in methodology. Even in ethics, a part of philosophy which appears to be lagging behind other disciplines in the Communist countries, there is an unmistakable attitude which differs radically from that assumed by most non-Communist philosophers. Last, but not least, one is impressed by a completely new approach to the History of Philosophy, one which overcomes our own deplorable Eurocentric attitude.

It might therefore be expected that non-Communist philosophers, whatever their own standpoint might be, could greatly profit from a philosophical dialogue with their Communist colleagues.

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GUSTAV A. WETTER

FREEDOM OF THOUGHT AND IDEOLOGICAL COEXISTENCE

In recent years one could observe a number of occurrences within the Communist world-movement which aroused the impression that attempts were being made, if not to sever the bond between Marxism and *Weltanschauung*, then at least to loosen it considerably.[1] Previously the Communists had not only declared that Marxism represents a complete *Weltanschauung*, but they also made the claim, at least within the sphere of Soviet Communism, of leading the whole population, and not only the party members, to this *Weltanschauung*!

But this is no longer the case. For example, the Communist party of Italy declared at its last Party Meeting that it is opposed to "the state granting privileges to any one ideology, philosophy or religion or to any one cultural or artistic tendency to the disadvantage of others".[2] Soon after, the Communist party of France made a similar declaration and officially professed the principle of freedom of art and religion. Even within the CPSU such tendencies have allegedly been observed, although to a much lesser extent. For example, it is maintained that after the fall of Khrushchev, the new Soviet leadership showed a tendency towards pragmatism. And one points to the fact that Soviet ideology opened up several new sciences, such as empirical sociology, social psychology, information theory, etc. However, in the West, one is inclined to hope for similar tendencies in connection with the principle of peaceful coexistence. That is, whoever has only a superficial knowledge of this teaching of Soviet ideology is inclined to interpret it in the same way for all areas of its relevance, as a readiness to live together peaceably with the non-Marxist world.

However, anyone who is more closely acquainted with the Soviet interpretation of this principle is well aware that its validity is restricted to the political and economic sphere, while the realm of ideology and thus of *Weltanschauung* is expressly excluded. This raises the question: is thereby all freedom of thought basically denied? Is freedom of thought limited solely to the inner sphere of the person? Is the principle of the impossi-

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bility of peaceful coexistence in the province of ideology to be understood in the following way: you may think whatever you want but woe to you if you think too loudly or even seek to win from others recognition for your thoughts?

It is this question on which we want to concentrate in the present paper. It is not our intention to present a comprehensive study of the problem of freedom of *Weltanschauung* in Communism. We are limiting ourselves to the special point we have mentioned, namely the question as to whether the principle of the impossibility of peaceful coexistence in ideology restricts freedom of thought to the inner sphere of the person, in Marxist terminology to the sphere of individual consciousness, or whether, in spite of the rejection of ideological coexistence, freedom of thought is also possible in the realm of social consciousness. Since the question of ideological coexistence did not immediately become acute with the initiation of the politics of coexistence but began to come forward only at a later date, it would be appropriate to make some prefatory remarks about the genesis of the doctrine of coexistence.

In spite of its relatively young life, the Soviet doctrine of coexistence already has its history. When shortly after Stalin's death the new Soviet leadership instituted a policy of *détente* in the name of coexistence, Soviet ideology, in establishing the theoretical basis of the doctrine, placed the accent in a simple, undifferentiated way on the avoidability of war.[3] It was maintained that the principle of peaceful coexistence is a direct consequence of Marxist-Leninist teaching, the reasoning being as follows: It follows from Lenin's theory of imperialism that in the age of imperialism the chain of capitalistic countries exhibits stronger and weaker links. From this results the possibility for the militant working class to break the chain at its weakest link, and, from this as its base, to assault the entire front of capitalism. This means that Socialism will not be realized simultaneously in the whole world but only gradually, as one country after another 'falls away' from capitalism. Thus Socialist and capitalist countries will exist side-by-side during the course of an entire historical epoch, which means – to coexist.

With this we already have coexistence, but not yet *peaceful* coexistence. That this existence side-by-side of Socialist and non-Socialist countries will have a peaceful character supposedly follows from another basic thesis of Marxism. According to this thesis the transition to Socialism can

only be carried out if the necessary subjective and objective preconditions for its realization have fully developed within the particular country. The insinuation that Socialist countries could harbor the intention to bring about Socialism in non-Socialist countries by the use of military force is rejected with indignation. Socialism cannot be exported like a commodity from one country to another. This appeal to Marxist-Leninist ideology is supposed to render especially credible the sincerity of the Soviet offer of coexistence.

A new note in the Soviet strain of coexistence was heard at the twentieth Party Congress of the CPSU in 1956. Khrushchev, in his report, expressed opposition to those comrades who wanted to extend the principle of peaceful coexistence to the area of ideology.[4] He emphasized that peaceful coexistence applies only to the political and economic relations with the West, but not to the ideological relations. In the realm of ideology all that is possible is a constant struggle between Communist and bourgeois ideology.

It is well known that the Chinese very soon started to accuse Khrushchev of revisionism because of his doctrine of coexistence. In order to meet them half-way, he made an effort, beginning about 1959, to give this doctrine a more aggressive appearance. The thesis of the avoidability of war, which had formerly received the main accent, was now to some extent pushed into the background. Peaceful coexistence signifies only the renunciation of military means in the conflict with the capitalist world, and not the renunciation of the struggle altogether. On the contrary, peaceful coexistence is nothing else than a form of class struggle, more precisely, class struggle "in the international arena".[5] Since the October revolution in Russia, the working class has had at its disposal, in its battle against capitalism, a weapon which it had never possessed before – the state. Since that time the class struggle has extended beyond the mutual relations between classes within individual countries to include the area of international relations. But this international class struggle should not be conducted with military means but exclusively with the weapons of political, economic, and ideological warfare.[6] And just as the struggle between the working class and the bourgeoisie within the individual countries must necessarily end in victory for the working class, so also, on the basis of the same historical necessity, the global conflict between Socialist and non-Socialist states will end in a victory for Socialism on a world scale.

From this sketch of the genesis of the Soviet doctrine of coexistence it is apparent that the question of ideological coexistence arose only at a rather late date. Originally coexistence meant nothing more than the avoidability of a new world war. Only subsequently did Krushchev expressly limit the doctrine of coexistence to the political and economic sphere and exclude from it the realm of ideology. And then, at a still later date, the principle of class struggle was transferred back from the ideological sector to cover the political and economic sector as well, and coexistence was defined as class struggle in the international arena.

For the purposes of our discussion, we must first of all examine the more specific and detailed statements of Soviet ideology on the ideological class struggle. When in 1959 the doctrine of coexistence began to be propagated as a form of class struggle, the *Kommunist* (the theoretical organ of the CPSU's Central Committee), published a leading article (mentioned above) entitled 'Peaceful Coexistence and the Ideological Struggle', in which this tenet of Soviet ideology was more thoroughly substantiated.

The ideas presented in that article can also be found in subsequent Soviet publications on this subject; its contents can be shortly summarized as follows:

(1) The necessity of an ideological battle in spite of all peaceful coexistence results from the fact that the principle of coexistence concerns not only the relations of any states to each other but also the reciprocal relations of states with different social orders. Now, the state in the Marxist sense is a form of the political superstructure. It is a tool in the hands of the dominating class for the suppression of the other class. The states in the capitalist camp embody the domination of the capitalist class, the states in the Socialist camp that of the working class. The reciprocal relations of states with different social orders include more than diplomatic relations, as important as these might be. Since there is an inexorable struggle going on between the working class and the class of capitalists, this struggle is necessarily expressed also in international relations, and, like every class struggle, in the form of an economic, political and ideological battle.

(2) This struggle is an objective, social, law-bound necessity. It cannot be avoided by any kind of settlement, even if one wishes to do so. And it will end, following the same inexorable necessity, with the victory of the more progressive class, i.e. the working class. Even the strongest party

and the strongest government cannot put an end to this international class struggle. All that can be done, and this is the goal of the policy of peaceful coexistence, is to see to it that this struggle does not lead to a military conflict, but is replaced by a competition among the various systems to win the support of the popular masses. Not weapons, but the will of the people should decide which social order is better, i.e. which produces a higher standard of living for the workers, more freedom and greater cultural development. But such a struggle necessarily presupposes the continuation of the battle of ideas, since the capitalist and Socialist systems are wrestling with one another for the recognition of the people.

(3) For this reason, the only view which does justice to the real state of affairs is that which links peaceful coexistence with ideological struggle. To claim to put an end to the ideological struggle would necessarily be either an act of deception or a betrayal by the Communists of their own *Weltanschauung*. But it cannot be demanded of Communists that they make ideological concessions and thereby demonstrate their good will, and that they show tolerance towards bourgeois ideas. Communists themselves do not demand, by the principle of peaceful coexistence, that the bourgeoisie surrender any of their ideological principles. Compromises can be made on some political questions, but not on basic, theoretical issues.

(4) An alternative to the ideological struggle accompanied by peaceful coexistence could be found only in ideological uniformity or at least in a kind of ideological truce. But both are equally impossible. Ideological uniformity would entail that all countries have to accept either the capitalist or the Socialist ideology. But since neither of the two sides is ready to surrender its ideology, such a plan would not be a program for peace and international friendship but a program for a crusade for the 'true faith', that is, a program for war.

It would be equally impossible to have an 'ideological truce', which would require that both sides, while retaining their own social orders and ideologies, would in the future refrain from any ideological warfare. In a time when millions of men are involved in social upheaval and the eyes of the world are focused upon them and ready to draw comparisons between the Socialist and capitalist systems, words have less ideological significance than do achievements, i.e., the level of the workers' standard of living in the various countries, economic and social accomplishments

in the sphere of democracy, science and technology, etc. It is impossible to set up any insurmountable barriers between individual countries in such a way that what happens on one side remains unknown on the other.

(5) Of course, not everything which goes by the name of ideological struggle is compatible with the principle of peaceful coexistence. Ideological struggle is not synonymous with cold war or psychological warfare. It is one thing to carry on a struggle of ideas, a fight over the evaluation of this or that phenomenon or process in reality, over the ways and means of realizing the ideals which are recognized by the larger part of humanity, over the advantages and disadvantages of this or that social system; such a battle of ideas can present no obstacle to the betterment of mutual relations between capitalist and Socialist countries. But it is quite another thing to support slanderous propaganda, provocation, war-mongering, incitement to sabotage and the spreading of rumors which could cause confusion and sow discord among the population. Such propaganda is not a struggle of ideas, even if it touches ideological questions, but subversive activity and interference in the internal affairs of other countries. This is nothing else than 'cold war', understood as the employment of all means to prepare for and then to kindle a 'hot' war; and the same applies to constant meddling in the internal affairs of the opposing side, in order to promote the downfall of the prevailing social order.[7]

In view of our development of the doctrine of ideological struggle, one will certainly have to agree to the view that the principle of peaceful coexistence, originally proposed for the political realm, cannot be carried over, without more ado, to the realm of ideology. In the problem of 'ideological coexistence' two levels must be distinguished – the level of theory and the level of practice. On the level of theory it is impossible to have peaceful coexistence between two theses which formally contradict one another. The principle that truth and falsity do not have equal rights applies here. But the matter takes on a different appearance if we pose the problem in the practical order, i.e. with regard to the practical intercourse of men having contrary convictions. Here we need a few clarifications, which should be made with the aid of the basic law of materialist dialectics: the law of the unity and struggle of opposites.

As is well known, this law regards contradiction as the driving force of all development, not only in the realm of thought, but also in the realm of being, i.e. in nature and society. Of course, to speak precisely, one

would have to say that contradiction as such should not be regarded as the driving force; rather, as recent discussions by Soviet philosophers have also established, the contradiction is only the element which mobilizes and triggers the real, positive forces that push the development further. Nevertheless, it is very important to keep in mind that contradiction becomes a motive force only under the condition that one seeks to resolve it.

With regard to the actual conduct of two persons engaged in a discussion and faced with a contradiction, the following types of behaviour are conceivable:

(a) The contradiction is simply allowed to remain; one does not try to solve it, but the mutually contradictory opinions are simply left unreconciled, standing in a vacuum.

(b) One regards his own position as the only valid one, not even considering the possibility that he himself might be at least partially wrong; instead, he tries in some way to silence his opponent.

(c) An attempt is made to resolve the contradiction by allowing the arguments of the opponent to confront those which one brings forth in support of one's own position, being ready to correct that position if necessary.

Only this last attitude is worthy of man and only with it can there be an advance in the discovery of truth. The first of these three positions, i.e. that which simply allows the contradiction to stand, would imply that one had despaired of the possibility of settling the question of truth; but if the question of truth is insoluble, then, in the end, human activity is robbed of its meaning, and this position would unavoidably lead to nihilism.

To consider one's own position as exclusively valid and to try to get rid of the troublesome contradiction by silencing the opponent or, even worse, by physically annihilating him would indicate that one is not concerned about the truth but only about the effectiveness of his theory. Such a theory would become ideology in the bad sense of the word – one whose only purpose is to justify its own interests and to be able to make more effective propaganda.

Only the third attitude is worthy of man, who alone can let himself be guided by knowledge and the search for truth. And only this attitude can be designated progressive, since an advance in the knowledge of truth can only be attained by the resolution of a contradiction – which itself will prove beneficial to human practice.

Let us try, now, to apply these findings to the problem of ideological coexistence, particularly on the level of practice, the level of actual intercourse of men with opposing convictions.

The first attitude which we designated as erroneous was that which permits the contradiction to remain and does not strive for its resolution. This is an attitude which is frequently encountered in the West. The pluralism of world-views tolerated in the West, which is often regarded today as its spiritual foundation, is frequently misunderstood as meaning that differences in this area are irreconcilable. Thus, according to this view, to discuss the differences would be senseless; all that one can do is leave aside all areas of conflict in ideology and try to come to terms on practical problems. This is an attitude which I would like to designate 'lazy pluralism' – in Hegelian terms, one which avoids the 'strain of the concept'. It is in the Soviets' rejection of such a 'lazy pluralism' that one finds the core of truth in their view, i.e. that the principle of coexistence is inapplicable in the realm of ideology, since there can be no compromise between truth and falsity. But that does not rule out a correctly understood pluralism. Nevertheless, there must be at its basis an inner attitude which does not avoid the question of truth.

The second erroneous attitude which we mentioned is that which considers only one's own view as valid, without even entertaining the possibility of being partially or wholly in error, and thus attempts to keep the opponent from speaking (or even physically annihilating him). The error in this position lies in the fact that one passes by inference from the impossibility of peaceful coexistence between mutually contradicting *doctrines* to the impossibility of peaceful coexistence between mutually opposed *men*; also, theoretical differences are here settled by non-theoretical means. In the above-mentioned article in *Kommunist*, it is stated that no one can demand of Communists, in the name of ideological coexistence, that they renounce their principles and give up their *Weltanschauung*. No one can require them to embrace a different theoretical point of view, as long as they are not convinced of it. But dissenters can demand with the same right that Communists allow them their opinion as long as they have not become convinced of the contrary, and that the struggle against their convictions be carried out exclusively with intellectual weapons. Where dissenters have no access to publication media, where certain occupations, such as teaching, are inaccessible to them, and where students who profess

a religion are forbidden entrance to the university, it is undeniable that non-intellectual means are being used to wipe out intellectual differences.

The attitude which, in our analysis, proved to be the only one worthy of man and at the same time the only progressive one is that which attempts to solve the contradiction. By an examination of two contrary positions it can turn out that one's own position was right while the other side was wrong. But it can also happen that one's own view was wrong while the other side was right. Yet in the majority of cases, it will turn out that both parties were in one respect correct and in another respect wrong, and that each of the two could learn something from the other. But, in any case, a resolution of the contradiction can only be attained through dialogue. If, in dialogue, one of the parties realizes that his opponent is advancing a genuine truth which previously remained hidden from him, then in this realization he is carried forward in his knowledge of the truth and in its actual embodiment in life. Consequently, it is just the person who holds highest the banner of progress that must also be the most ardently in favor of having dialogues with representatives of other positions. It does not befit him to silence or eliminate his opponent.

What was just said leads us back to the problem of pluralism. We just saw that contradiction brings about a progression only under the condition that one strives for its resolution. But this does not oblige us to go so far as to maintain that *only* contradiction and its resolution can be the source of progress. There could perhaps be still other such sources. Thus, the possibility of progress even in non-pluralistic societies cannot be denied *a priori*.

But, on the other hand, it is a fact that there were always differences of opinion among men, and there is no reason to be seen why this should be any different in the future. In view of this factual situation, it follows from our previous considerations that it is not only unworthy of man but contrary to the interests of progress not to make use of contradiction as a forward-driving force. This ought to be noted by those who feel the inclination to reduce everything to an undifferentiated uniformity.

Also contained in these remarks is a very important consequence for the adherents of pluralism, namely that contradiction brings about a forward-progress only when one strives for its resolution and does not attempt to preserve forever the particular contradiction with which one is

presently faced. Perhaps there is a fear that resolving the contradiction could put an end to any further development. But this worry would betray a very low opinion of the truth, as if at any stage in the development of our limited human knowledge the truth could ever be totally exhausted, as if after the resolution of the particular contradiction tormenting us today there would not arise new ones, which would force us to search again for new solutions. To despair of ever solving the particular contradiction which faces us today and to let it stand unresolved is to assume that attitude which we designated above as 'lazy pluralism'. To this attitude we must oppose a 'dynamic pluralism', which does everything in its power to resolve the contradiction disturbing us today, knowing well that after its resolution new contradictions will again arise, but knowing also that precisely because of and through this continual resolving and reappearing of contradictions a higher stage of development will be achieved.

As a result of our previous considerations we can set down the following statements: The impossibility of ideological coexistence holds on the level of theory, since peaceful coexistence between two mutually contradictory *doctrines* is impossible; but between the *men* who adhere to different doctrines, peaceful coexistence is not only possible but is absolutely required. Of course, it necessitates a struggle between the two parties, but a struggle that is carried on only with intellectual means. The goal of this struggle can only be progress in the knowledge of truth, and not the elimination or physical liquidation of the opponent.

Perhaps one will object that all of this holds for the reciprocal behavior of individual men but not for the relations of classes and states. The principle of peaceful coexistence pertains to the relationship of states with different types of social orders. Just as there is an economic, political and ideological battle going on between the individual classes, so there is also a battle between the states which are governed and controlled by different classes.

There is much to be said against this theory; however, here we can only make a few brief remarks. First, it has to be noted that the theory rests upon the very problematic concept of class consciousness. As the different classes create for themselves their own political institutions, in the form of political parties and states, so in like manner the various classes also bring forth various and opposing types of social consciousness, in

the form of art, morals, social-philosophical doctrines, etc. All these different forms of social consciousness have a class character; that is, they express the interests and aspirations, of a particular social group at any given time. For this reason there is an opposition between the bourgeoisie and the working class, which is just as irreconcilable in the ideological sphere as it is in economics and politics.

Again, much could be brought forward in criticism of the concept of class consciousness. Nevertheless, even setting aside this very controversial concept, one must challenge the substantiation of the impossibility of ideological coexistence which bases itself on the ideological class struggle. It must be asked who it is that carries on this ideological class struggle. If the individual class members are considered the only and exclusive bearers of this ideological struggle, then no further difficulty arises. But in this case everything that was said above retains its validity, i.e. what was said about the mutual behavior of individual men faced with a contradiction, especially the demand that contradictions in the realm of theory be resolved only by intellectual means.

But since the principle of coexistence is applied to the conduct of states towards one another, the fear readily appears that the authors of the doctrine of coexistence regard the state as the bearer of the ideological class struggle. The state as the political organization of a class is without doubt the bearer of the political struggle; it is also the bearer of the economic class struggle in those countries where it has a monopoly on foreign trade. Now if the state is also considered as the bearer of the ideological class struggle, this means that even ideology, i.e. philosophy, art, literature, and to some extent the sciences (especially the humanistic sciences), would be subject to the control of the state, and that there must exist a state art, state philosophy, state science, etc.

However, we have here the view which we rejected above as an incorrect position, namely, that differences of opinion and contradictions in theoretical questions are not solved through dialogue but are removed by administrative means. It cannot be an affair of the state to settle scientific, philosophical, artistic and literary controversies. Also, one may not object that it is nevertheless an affair of the state to protect from unsettling disturbances the particular trends which 'prevail' in a certain nation. One of the leading Soviet philosophers once remarked that it could occur that one person was right while all of the rest were wrong; and in these areas

it is usually just those trends which initially experience almost universal opposition that become the wave of the future. If, in this case, the state wanted to support the 'prevailing' trends, it would thereby become reactionary. The state can only assume a neutral attitude in all of these areas.

This ideological neutrality of the state is called for first of all in its attitude in matters of internal policy. In many countries religion is allowed only freedom of practice; the right to propagandize is reserved for atheism, while it is forbidden to religion under the principle of the impossibility of ideological coexistence. Such an arrangement does not satisfy the demand for ideological neutrality on the part of the state. This means already that atheism is not carrying on its struggle against religion with purely theoretical weapons but with the help of the state's apparatus of force. What kind of a battle of ideas is it where one side can propagate its convictions freely and with the help of all types of modern mass media, while the other side finds itself in trouble with the police at the first attempt to do the same?

Now, the ideological neutrality of the state must logically also hold for the sphere of international relations. Truth is indivisible. If it cannot be an affair of the state to settle scientific controversies and other such disputes within a single country, then its competence in this area is not in the least increased by the fact that such questions are brought to it from outside.

In this connection the concept of 'ideological diversion' needs clarification. One must certainly reject the use of such methods as slander and provocation in the ideological dispute; and surely the states have the right to put up resistance when subversive activity is carried on under the pretence of ideological confrontation. However, if one understands by ideological class struggle the attempt to clarify for the people the advantages or disadvantages of this or that social system and to gain their acceptance, then the same right must hold here for everyone. And then Communists may not on the one hand call it 'ideological class struggle' to make propaganda in another country for their social system, and on the other, label as 'subversive activity', as 'interference in the internal affairs of other countries with the intention of overthrowing their social order' the propaganda effort of the other side in the Socialist countries for its own social order and cultural values.

In conclusion I would like to formulate the results of our considerations in the following theses:

(1) The Soviet doctrine of coexistence strictly excludes the possibility of applying the principle of coexistence to the realm of ideology. But upon closer examination it turned out, paradoxically, that this does not absolutely rule out real freedom of thought.

(2) Marxism rightly emphasizes the impossibility of peaceful coexistence in the sphere of ideology, if by that it means the reciprocal relationship between mutually contradictory theories. There can be no peaceful coexistence between truth and falsity.

(3) However, if we are speaking about men with different, mutually contradictory convictions, then it must be unconditionally demanded that their mutual relations take the form of peaceful coexistence.

(4) From these theses there follows a further demand, that the ideological contradictions between men with different convictions be resolved by purely intellectual means, and not by force. What is especially demanded is the strictest neutrality on the part of the state's apparatus of coercion; it is better not to entrust the solution of theoretical controversies to the police.

(5) It follows from what was said above that there is a certain parallelism between the application of the principle of peaceful coexistence in the political and ideological realms: just as in the realm of politics the principle of peaceful coexistence does not exclude all political struggle between states having different social orders, but only one carried on with military force, so also the very same principle of peaceful coexistence does not exclude all ideological struggle between men of different convictions; it must only be demanded that this struggle be carried on exclusively with weapons of a spiritual nature and not – as Georg Lukács once put it – with weapons borrowed from the Red Army.

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ERVIN LASZLO

THE SECOND SOVIETOLOGY

In his paper 'Why Studies in Soviet Philosophy'[1], Professor Bocheński advanced two premisses to substantiate the theoretical as well as practical import of philosophical Sovietology: "(i) not all Soviet philosophy is nonsense; on the contrary, much of it is philosophically interesting; (ii) Soviet philosophy is not irrelevant; it is an important factor in the phenomenon of Communism which, as everybody will agree, is important both theoretically and practically."[2] Among the additional reasons for engaging in Sovietology Bocheński gives overcoming that kind of philosophical sectarianism which makes Western thinkers unwilling to give serious consideration to the work of their Soviet colleagues.[3]

These are good and valid reasons for studying contemporary Soviet and other Marxist-Leninist philosophies[4], for they explicate why an up-to-date knowledge of their results may be valuable to the cause of contemporary thought. Sovietology, they imply, has the important task of obtaining and passing on information about current Soviet philosophy in Western philosophic circles.

I wish to suggest here that, if Sovietology is truly to advance the cause of contemporary thought, it has another and equally important task: that of obtaining and passing on information about contemporary *non*-Communist philosophy in *Soviet* philosophic circles. I shall call this type of endeavor 'second Sovietology' in distinction to the standard kind delineated by Bocheński, to which I shall refer as 'first Sovietology'. This paper is devoted to exposing the theoretical justification and the practical feasibility of *second* Sovietology.

I. THE JUSTIFICATION OF SECOND SOVIETOLOGY

A number of questions need to be considered. I shall formulate and try to answer each in turn.

(i) *Is information about Western philosophy of potential benefit to the philosophical concerns of Soviet thinkers?* Let us consider where Soviet

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philosophy stands at present in relation to the ensemble of schools and theories which make up the great complex of contemporary non-Communist thought.

The relative accomplishment of current Soviet work in philosophy has been emphasized by Bocheński in justifying his affirmation of its philosophical interest; but he had to admit that, aside from the classification of ontological categories, where the Soviets are ahead of the United States, even accomplished Soviet work (as in logic) is at best no more than comparable to that of Westerners. Other specialists make clear that practically all major fields of endeavor in Soviet philosophy are plagued by still unresolved problems. (Bocheński himself concedes cosmology, psychology, social philosophy, axiology, and the history of philosophy.[5]) The last 'special issue' of this journal, on 'Open Questions of Contemporary Soviet Philosophy' (1966,3) pinpointed and discussed open questions in Soviet ontology, epistemology, theory of social law, and philosophy of law and state. Specialists writing in this same journal have made the presence of such open questions clear as regards Soviet ethics[6], the doctrine of '*partijnost*'[7], the philosophy of physics[8], aesthetics[9], and even such special but basic concepts and problems as the notion of practice[10] and the problem of materialism.[11] In addition to difficulties on these fields, there are areas of investigation in Soviet philosophy which are, to use Buchholz's term, 'empty domains'. Buchholz listed these in 1961 as: the question of the meaning of life; the problem of death; intuitive knowledge; and all questions of the individual and his particular problems.[12] While since then some have been discussed and hence are no longer 'empty' (e.g. the questions of the individual, by Kołakowski and those Polish, Hungarian and Yugoslav thinkers who go back to the concerns of the young Marx), other fields, such as meta-ethics (in which S. Stojanovič is still something of a rarity), meta-philosophy in general, descriptive metaphysics and linguistic analysis are still underdeveloped, if at all cultivated. This is not to deprecate current Soviet philosophy. It is incomparably more accomplished than it was even in the 'fifties, and criticisms advanced of it in those days by such authorities as Bocheński and Wetter no longer fully apply – as these thinkers readily admit. It may be safely said, however, that, on the whole, Western philosophy is more accomplished than Soviet philosophy. Hence it stands to reason that information on accomplished Western work would be of benefit to Soviet

thinkers. This would be true *if* we could affirm that at least *some* of contemporary Western philosophy is directly relevant to current Soviet concerns.

(ii) *Is contemporary Western philosophy relevant to the philosophic concerns of Soviet thinkers?* To discuss this question I shall refer to what I called the "tentative list of the root-axioms of contemporary Marxist-Leninist philosophy in Eastern Europe".[13] This list seeks to include the basic (and axiomatically accepted) propositions upon which contemporary Soviet philosophy is constructed, and goes something like this: "*Realism*: 'the world exists independently of its perception and is objectively knowable.' *Materialism*: 'Reality reduces ultimately to an ontic stratum or substratum which can be denoted «matter».' *Dialectics*: 'The laws of thought as well as of objective reality may be analyzed into contradictory elements which do not mutually exclude each other, but which make up the true nature of the analyzed thing or process.' (Synthesis, and new opposition on a higher level, is no longer a universally accepted notion.) *Historicism*: 'The knowledge of the history of any natural or social thing or event is at least the sufficient (and perhaps also the necessary) condition of its true knowledge.' *Evolutionism*: 'Each thing evolves according to objective (and knowable) laws or principles, from lower to higher, from less perfected to more perfected forms.' *Sociologism*: 'History is the interaction («struggle») of groups («classes») rather than of individuals; the latter are comprehensible mainly in the context of the group.' *Historical subjectivism*: 'True knowledge is dependent on historically determined cognitive processes.' "

The list (I have said) could be extended at will. Yet, many further propositions could be analyzed into the acceptance of the above (e.g. optimistic social evolutionism into a combination of realism, historicism, evolutionism and sociologism; Marxist ethics into optimistic social evolutionism; Marxist-Leninist revolutionism into Marxist ethical value-judgements, and so on). Each of these axiomatic propositions is capable of a wide variety of interpretations, and if only one of them were to be analyzed in the work of diverse East-European philosophers, little agreement would be evident. But, the *combination* of these propositions, much as their specific interpretations differ, still gives something like an identifiable philosophic position, and that position, in Marxist-Leninist terminology, is known as 'dialectical materialism'. If this is true, then

dialectical materialism could also be characterized as a 'realist-materialist-dialectical-historicist-evolutionist-sociologistic-historically-subjectivist, ontological, ethical, social, economic and aesthetic doctrine'. It is evident that such a vast edifice, built almost entirely from elements shared with one or another of the Western schools of thought, is relevant in its entirety to *some* of the work done currently by Western thinkers.

This point was emphasized by Bocheński as well. "We say that Soviet philosophy is relevant to philosophy *tout court*. Whoever is interested in philosophical problems has an interest in what is being done on such problems in the Soviet Union."[14] Now, this relevance of Soviet philosophy to contemporary philosophy in general, entails, *mutatis mutandis*, the relevance of contemporary philosophy to Soviet philosophy. Hence we may paraphrase Bocheński in saying that "whoever is interested in the problems of Soviet philosophy has an interest in what is being done on such problems in the West". And we may add that, since what is done on such problems in the West tends to be more accomplished than what is done on them in Communist countries, whoever is interested in the problems of Soviet philosophy would most probably *benefit* from an acquaintance with work done on these problems in the West.

(iii) *Is the relevance of contemporary Western philosophy correctly assessed by Soviet philosophers?* Soviet philosophers, especially of the younger generation, show a pronounced and apparently still increasing interest in Western philosophy. This is not a guarantee, however, that their interest can be satisfied in a way conducive to the correct assessment of the relevance of that philosophy to their own problems. For one thing, Soviet philosophers cannot pick and choose the school about which they would like to be informed, but must restrict themselves to those which are made accessible in virtue of being deemed important to refute or to make some partial use of. For another, even within these selected schools the choice of source materials is restricted, with preference often given to those authors whose work is the most readily refutable. (This has resulted in Soviet authors playing up some rather lesser lights of Western philosophy as 'well-known' authorities.[15]) There are even official incentives to study Western philosophy these days, the refutation of the philosophical expression of the 'bourgeois ideology' being included in the philosophic planification at least of one, and very likely of all, Communist countries.[16] But while the outcome of all this is undoubtedly an awakening

of interest in Western philosophy, the possibilities for satisfying it do not seem to be conducive to the *objective* knowledge of Western work – a precondition of the correct assessment of its relevance to Soviet concerns.

(iv) *Are Sovietologists qualified to bring about the correct assessment of the relevance of contemporary Western philosophy to the philosophic concerns of Soviet thinkers?* In order to introduce into Soviet philosophic circles information on the relevance of contemporary Western theories, the following qualifications appear to be required: (a) a thorough knowledge of current Soviet work, (b) an equally thorough knowledge of at least the relevant portions of contemporary Western thought, and (c) an appreciation of the conditions under which information concerning the relevance of Western to Soviet philosophy would be given earnest consideration by Soviet scholars. The first two requirements are evident already because 'relevance' is a relational term, the use of which presupposes that one knows *what* is relevant and *to* what it is relevant, while the third has been made clear to all people who have attempted to put propositions to Soviet theoreticians: the latter appear to be willing to consider propositions if they are formulated from their own (Marxist-Leninist) point of view and not necessarily otherwise.[17]

Now, there are more than 2000 active philosophers in the USSR, perhaps as many again in the other Communist countries put together, and over 12000 in the Western world. But of all these a thorough familiarity with both Western *and* Soviet philosophy, as well as an appreciation of the conditions for acceptance of propositions on the Soviet side, can be said to be possessed only by the Sovietologists: Western philosophers who have a good academic knowledge of Soviet thought and had prolonged experience in communication with Soviet theoreticians. These scholars are few in number (perhaps no more than two dozen[18]), but they appear to be qualified to bring about the correct assessment of the relevance of contemporary Western philosophy to the philosophic concerns of Soviet thinkers.

(v) *Is it incumbent upon Sovietologists to bring about the correct assessment of the relevance of contemporary Western to contemporary Soviet philosophy?* I conceive of this as an ethical question, and not (or not necessarily) as a political one. Two things have to be clarified in answering it: (a) what, if anything, is incumbent upon a Sovietologist; and (b) is bringing about the correct assessment of the relevance of Western to

Soviet philosophy among the things that may be incumbent upon him?

(a) Let us try to sketch out an answer to the first question without entering too deeply into the problems of axiological ethics. We may assume that 'right' has not only an emotive meaning (as for Ayer), but that it may be defined as the meaning of the act which is conducive to the welfare of some individual or group. 'Welfare' can further be made dependent on 'value', so that right will be defined as the act which realizes values for some individual or group. If we assume that the Sovietologist is morally obliged to do the right thing, much as anybody else, we assume that he has to realize values for some person or persons. Inasmuch as he is a Sovietologist, the values he should realize are of those persons who read or listen to what he has to say. Lecturing and publishing is a matter of personal decision which is morally justifiable only in reference to the realization of value for the student and reader. It would follow then that realizing values for whomever attends their lectures and reads their publications is incumbent upon Sovietologists (as it is incumbent upon *any* scholar).

(b) Just what can be expected to result from the clarification of the relevance of Western to Soviet philosophy? As I said above, the improvement of that philosophy may result from this, as regards its still problematic questions to which relatively accomplished answers have already been proposed by Western thinkers. But this is not all. Since Soviet and Western philosophies are mutually relevant, if Soviet philosophy becomes more expert, the work of Soviet thinkers becomes of greater interest for Western philosophers. While one's sense of proportion must be kept, he may say that an eventual betterment of Soviet philosophy would open possibilities of improvement for certain branches and theories of Western philosophy (e.g. philosophy of physics). This comes down to affirming that whoever contributes to the technical level of Soviet philosophy *ipso facto* contributes to contemporary philosophy itself.

And this is still not all. A further, although more indirect, result of the clarification of the relevance of Western to Soviet philosophy may be the realization, on the part of Soviet thinkers, that there is nothing fundamentally wrong with Western philosophy, and that it cannot therefore be merely the outcome of the efforts of bourgeois thinkers to hypostatize their crumbling social order. The realization of facing similar or analogous problems and of the validity of similar or analogous solutions to

them could make for an improved understanding, and perhaps eventually lead to the approval of important elements of Western thought by the Soviet intellectuals. Since Marxism-Leninism claims to be first and foremost a philosophy, this would pave the way for the positive Soviet attitude necessary for a potentially fruitful East-West dialogue on a high theoretical level. Hence, in the last analysis, the result of the clarification of the relevance of Western to Soviet philosophy may well turn out to be a contribution to East-West understanding.

We may now relate the above points. First, we said that it is incumbent upon the Sovietologist to realize value for whomever hears or reads what he has to say. Second, we claimed that the clarification of the relevance of Western to Soviet philosophy may be of benefit to the cause both of contemporary philosophy and of East-West understanding. Therefore, if we assume that the progress of contemporary philosophy as well as of East-West understanding is of value to serious students and readers of Sovietology (and this is an entirely reasonable assumption), then we must affirm that it is incumbent upon Sovietologists to bring about a more correct assessment of the relevance of Western to Soviet philosophy.

II. THE PRACTICE OF SECOND SOVIETOLOGY

(vi) *Are there practicable ways and means by which relevant information about Western philosophy could be communicated by Sovietologists to Soviet philosophers?* This raises the problem of whether second Sovietology is a practicable discipline or merely a theoretical postulate. Before entering on its consideration one more point needs to be clarified: would engaging in second Sovietological work – assuming that one *could* do so – conflict with the important tasks of first Sovietology?

I believe that there need not be conflict between providing objective and relevant information about each other's work to philosophers East and West. Such endeavor merely demands the realization that the basic task of first Sovietology is not to criticize its subject-matter, but to point out how and why it is important for one to learn to know it. As in all fields, here too, overemphasis on negative elements is barren. Errors, while permitting one to learn from them, do not contribute more to his understanding if repeated. Objectivity demands reference both to failures and accomplishments, but does not determine relative emphasis. Reporting on

failure is necessary if failure is the case, but reporting on successive failures of the same kind is of limited value. If first Sovietology would consist primarily in such reports, it would not provide information of much value to Western scholars. It would merely reconfirm their suspicion that they are wasting their time with Soviet philosophy, and would thus be self-annihilating.

But, if the overwhelming majority of recent Sovietological work in philosophy is a good indication of the assessment of the real tasks of first Sovietology, providing objective and relevant information, and not mere criticism, is the aim of this discipline. Because of this, Sovietologists need not go back on any of their principles if engaging in second Sovietology. And, because their true aim is apparent, they can engage in it with chances of success: they are beginning to be taken seriously by the Soviet philosophers themselves, notwithstanding the persistent attempts of dogmatists to make them out as plain falsificators of Marxist-Leninist philosophy.[19]

Consequently there need not be either conflict in theory or incompatibility in practice between first and second Sovietology. But the question remains, whether the tasks of second Sovietology can be fulfilled at all.

A number of communication media are at the disposal of Sovietologists, including lectures and publications. Most of these, however, are designed for the attention of Western students and scholars. They are eminently suited to working in first, but not in second Sovietology. Very likely other media will have to be sought for the latter. What may these be?

First of all, there are the many international conferences, seminars and symposia attended by Soviet philosophers. These might provide occasions for fruitful discussions on the mutual relevance of the respective philosophical concerns. Unfortunately, their value is diminished by the fact that dogmatists and party-hacks may be sent to such meetings, and these are ideologically insulated against novel ideas.

Sovietologists cannot make sure of reaching genuine and sincere thinkers merely by attending meetings. They *can* make sure of this, however, if they themselves go to the academic centers of Soviet philosophy. There, a whole range of possibilities for intellectual contact opens up. Despite occasional fluctuations of ideological pressure as regards the 'struggle with bourgeois philosophy', there are more opportunities today than ever before for Western thinkers to visit the institutions of the

countries of the Soviet bloc and even to lecture and publish there. Some non-Sovietologist philosophers have made use of this opportunity[20], but it is evident that Sovietologists are the most interested in doing so. In fact, many of them make regular study trips to the USSR and elsewhere in Eastern Europe.[21] The primary purpose of such trips is to be better informed on Soviet and related philosophy through personal contacts and first-hand information. This aids in the first-Sovietological task of objectively reporting to the Western public on current Soviet philosophy. But fulfilling it does not exclude engaging in second Sovietology: one may at the same time as obtaining information, also provide it.

Providing information to Soviet philosophers is no longer a purely Quixotic adventure – if the information is formulated from the viewpoint of relevance to current Soviet concerns, it tends to be received with attention. Taking an active part in the philosophic activity of an East-European Communist country is becoming entirely possible for Western scholars: increasingly numerous and extensive cultural and academic exchange programs are currently operating and additional contacts readily open up upon personal acquaintance.

My own experience in Hungary over the past three years gives concrete support to this claim. My endeavors, although unexceptional, intermittent and modest, did succeed in catalyzing the *Auseinandersetzung* of Hungarian philosophers with phenomenology, meta-philosophy and Whiteheadian metaphysics. An account of them is given below.

III. A CASE-HISTORY OF SECOND SOVIETOLOGY

Hungary, 1963–1966

In the summer of 1963 the Hungarian thinkers with whom I had already been in contact through correspondence, invited me to give a talk in Budapest. I accepted. In planning my talk, my problems were first to discover in which field of endeavor of Hungarian philosophy there are stubborn problems or generally underdeveloped areas; and second, which elements of contemporary thought could best be used to successfully attack these problems and areas. After some consideration I came to the conclusion that the answer to my first problem could well be the Hungarian branch of Marxist-Leninist aesthetics, and that to the second the use of phenomenological analysis in describing the aesthetic object and

experience. As at that time I was working on the concept of Husserlian intentionality and was familiar with the latest results of Marxist-Leninist aestheticians, I set myself the task of introducing the phenomenological concept of intentionality as a tool of research within the framework of Marxist-Leninist aesthetics.

The outcome of my efforts was a paper entitled 'The Rôle of Intentionality in Aesthetic Theory'. It was delivered as a lecture in Budapest on November 15, 1963 and published in the philosophic-cultural journal *Valóság* (Budapest) in January, 1964. In it, I first discussed the necessity of the analytic approach to aesthetics through the consideration of the specific features of the aesthetic object, rather than of the opposite approach relying on deduction from prior doctrines; next I introduced the concept of intentionality and its rôle in the act of perception, emphasizing that perception is not a simple and direct process, but always involves an element of cognitive interpretation and that the latter has rational as well as emotive components; I then went on to outline the relevance to aesthetics of emotively determined perceptions, and ended by drawing a parallel between the rôle I assigned to intentionality in aesthetics and that assigned within Histomat to 'purpose' and 'the need for freedom' by the Soviet aesthetician Vanslov and the Hungarian Garai.[21] The decisive contribution of the paper was, I thought, the introduction of a heuristic concept into Marxist-Leninist aesthetics by means of which induction from the apprehension of specifically aesthetic phenomena could offset the suffocating reliance on deduction from basic extra-aesthetic doctrines. As using this concept demands a phenomenological suspension of judgement in the 'natural standpoint', I was rather curious to see what comments would be forthcoming.

The first comment to appear was by the aesthetician and poet István Eörsi, translator of many of Lukács' works on aesthetics. In his paper entitled 'On Intentionality'[23], Eörsi had two main points to make: one was his agreement with the proposed analytic method, the other his objection to my schematic separation of reason and emotion. My concern here is not to reply to Eörsi's objection, but to treat his paper as symptomatic of the reaction provoked by my 'second-Sovietological' endeavor in a Socialist country. Hence I shall merely remark that Eörsi evidently is unaccustomed to analytic methods, for he took heuristic concepts as part of the language of the conclusion when they in fact precede it and fulfill a

merely theoretical task which is instrumental in attaining the latter. Be that as it may, it is evident that Eörsi reflected on the drawbacks of what he called the Marxist-Leninist custom of 'concretizing' according to need such general doctrines as reflection theory, the relation of consciousness and being, etc., and realized that the unilateral deductive method leads to dogmatism and the senile decay of the special fields of research.[24]

This, I felt, was positive enough, although it did not satisfy my expectations as regards Marxist reactions to the phenomenological method. The next comment to be published, however, did so fully. Its author was Mihály Vajda, a young philosopher whose main concern had previously been with the epistemological problem.[25] His paper carried the title 'Intentionality and Reflection'.[26] After lightly dismissing aesthetics in the first paragraph, in order to give a critique of the 'theoretical basis' of my study, Vajda made the point that once the phenomenological premisses are fully accepted, idealist conclusions follow and, therefore, phenomenology and Marxism cannot be harmonized. His main difficulty with the concept of intentionality was that in Husserl's work it describes the relation of consciousness to the intentional objects to which it is directed and thus delineates an 'ego-world'. As a good Marxist, Vajda could not agree to this, but insisted that, due to the social nature of consciousness, all description must refer to '*our*-world'.[27] But because he held reality to be primary and consciousness a reflection of it, he could draw his own parallel between intentionality and reflection: both are activities determined by their relation to objects (although the objects are constituted by this relation for intentionality and are merely apprehended for reflection) and both shape our perceptions actively. (On the strength of this analogy Vajda was even led to conclude that intentionality was an implicit constitutive element of the Marxian concept of consciousness at a time when phenomenology was not even born...)

Now, as a competent Marxist, Vajda obviously could not accept the phenomenological reduction as a general method of investigation. Effecting this reduction requires the investigator to 'bracket out' practically the entire body of Marxist metaphysics – the independent reality of the objects of perception, the laws of objective dialectic, the categories, reflection theory, the social nature of consciousness, and so forth – and it is doubtful whether he could consistently recover any of it again. (In fact, I have argued elsewhere that no part of any metaphysics is strictly entailed by a

consistent application of the phenomenological reduction.[28]) Vajda's argument was cogent enough, but misplaced. I had not suggested the phenomenological reduction as a general method for Soviet philosophers, but as a special method for their aestheticians, designed to enable them to make use of a more concrete, analytical approach to their field and thus to fill out the gaps left by their wide-sweeping generalizations. Special methods are always permissible for special fields of investigation and this holds especially true of aesthetics. In fact, if the permissibility of special methods were denied to aesthetics, the greatest of Marxist aestheticians, Georg Lukács himself, would be stamped a through-and-through idealist: he posited namely that there is no object without a subject in aesthetics... But this is a digression. Important for the present purposes is to note that despite his objection to the use of the phenomenological method, Vajda made clear that he thought that Husserl's analyses of the activity of consciousness provide many insights which could be useful to the dialectical materialist conception of consciousness[29] and that Hungarian philosophers should be grateful to have had their attention called to Husserlian phenomenology in this connexion.[33] Thus Vajda's youthfully enthusiastic frontal attack, although overshooting the mark in criticism, did bring about the awakening of interest for phenomenology. Prior to this time not a single work either of Husserl or of any phenomenologist had appeared in Hungary, nor had there been any systematic critique of this important movement. After this time, however (and if this is a coincidence it is a remarkable one), the systematic critique of 'the phenomenological interpretation of the rational sector of the process of cognition' has been included in the official philosophic projects of Hungary, and Mihály Vajda was charged with carrying it out.[31]

After inadvertently provoking the *Auseinandersetzung* with phenomenology, I did not plan any further contribution to Hungarian philosophy, until the editors of *Valóság* made a suggestion themselves. In May, 1965, when I was in Hungary for a research on my *Handbook*[32], they proposed to me that I write something on the problem of making Western philosophers appreciate the aims and efforts of their Hungarian colleagues. In accepting I reflected that the problem cuts both ways: not only is it difficult to make Westerners give serious attention to Marxist philosophy; it is not easy, either, to cut through the ideological bias still obscuring the vision of many Soviet thinkers in viewing Western philosophy. Hence

after a brief introduction in which I outlined the project for which I was then in Hungary, I proposed a cautionary tale under the somewhat fanciful title 'Round-heads and Flat-heads'.[33] So denoted (I said) are two tribes, coexisting in peace except for a disagreement as to which system of explanation they should use to correctly interpret their experiences. The round-heads developed one system, the flat-heads another, both being internally consistent and working reasonably well. What arguments could either tribe advance to make the other accept its system of explanation? After analyzing each such system to entailed and basic propositions, I concluded that only a critical reexamination of the truly basic propositions of *both* systems would provide sufficient grounds for showing that the system based on one set is superior to that based on the other.

The editors swallowed rather hard on reading this excursion into comparative meta-philosophy, but accepted it on condition that I agree to having a suitable criticism of it appear in the very same issue. I, of course, agreed willingly. After spending considerable time in looking for a philosopher who would be both reputed enough to fulfill the task of furnishing this suitable criticism and willing to do so, György Tamás, a methodologist and author of the book *Scientific Definition*[34], came up with a paper wittily entitled 'And What is in the Heads?'.[35] He spent the first half of his paper on restating, without undue refinement, the doctrine on the noncessation of the ideological struggle with bourgeois ideology, philosophy included. He filled the second half with some rather obscure arguments drawing on the concept of practice and the historical perfecting of truth to prove that the basic propositions of Diamat (e.g. materialism) are evident and provable within the system of that philosophy.

Tamás did what was expected of him, even if at the expense of Gödel and by disregarding the preoccupations of those contemporary thinkers – both phenomenologists and analysts – who conceive their task to be to develop and perfect principles of verification of basic philosophical assumptions. But his was an ungrateful task, turned down, I suspect, by quite a few other philosophers before him, and his having fulfilled it made it possible for the cautionary tale to be published. I have received interesting comments on it in discussion, and look forward to seeing some of them in print.

There is one more event to be reported in this case-history. While talking with József Szigeti, director of the Hungarian Academy of Sci-

ences' Institute of Philosophy, and editor of the *Hungarian Review of Philosophy*, I spoke of the relevance of Whitehead's metaphysics to dialectical materialist ontology. Whitehead's metaphysical works are practically unknown in Hungary and Szigeti showed a cautious interest. On my return from Hungary I took the time to expose those aspects of Whiteheadian metaphysics which I believed to be of particular interest to Soviet philosophers, namely the doctrine of 'actuality' and the concept of 'eternal objects'. The former has a positive relevance to Diamat ontology since it is constituted by an 'extensive continuum' in 'creative advance', wherein each 'actual entity' mutually 'prehends' all others corresponding to their respective loci in the continuum and in virtue of the 'solidarity of the universe'. This doctrine has unmistakable analogies with that of Diamat ontology, for which the material world is dialectically interconnected, consists of material entities in motion and evolves toward successively higher forms of motion (categories). 'Eternal objects', on the other hand, are negatively relevant to the Diamat scheme, since they are real but not actual, relating to actual entities only externally, as they are merely 'conceptually prehended' by the latter. 'Eternal objects' are, in fact, modern counterparts of Platonic Forms and Ideas and introduce an idealist component into the otherwise realistic and science-conscious scheme. Through an analysis of the evolution of the concept of 'eternal objects' in Whitehead's thought, I endeavored to show that their function within the scheme is primarily heuristic (reconciling the flux of physical events with our recognition of persisting objects; providing a logical starting point for description in view of there being internal relations but merely finite truths; and accounting, by reason of their indeterminacy, for the human experience of freedom of personal decision) and that if these same functions can be fulfilled by non-idealistic concepts, Platonic 'eternal objects' are eliminable without harming the internal consistency of the doctrine of actuality. (I have argued this in more detail elsewhere.[36])

Szigeti published this study under the title (in Hungarian) 'Significance of the Idealistic and Scientific Components in Whitehead's Metaphysics' in the 1966/2 issue of the *Hungarian Review of Philosophy*, without considering it necessary to provide as much as an editorial comment on it, not to mention a systematic critique. This was the second time that a paper from a 'bourgeois' philosopher was accepted by the leading philosophic journal of Hungary on the same terms as that of a Marxist.[37]

This case-history was presented as evidence of the feasibility of second Sovietology. It gave an account of the introduction of relevant and potentially useful elements of Western thought into the philosophy currently promulgated in Hungary. The *Auseinandersetzung* these second-Sovietological endeavors provoked with Western philosophy may well result in a better appreciation of contemporary Western thought by Hungarian intellectuals. They may thus have contributed to bringing one Communist country's philosophy up to date and, through this, to a better basis for understanding between that country and those of the West.

Similar, as well as more extensive second-Sovietological work could be performed in almost all countries of Communist Eastern Europe. Engaging in a systematic pursuit of second Sovietology appears to be practicable. And if practiced, it may well result in a signal contribution both to the cause of contemporary thought and to the progress of East-West understanding.

REFERENCES

1. J. M. Bocheński, 'Why Studies in Soviet Philosophy', *SST* 1963,1.
2. *Ibid.*, p. 2.
3. *Ibid.*, p. 7.
4. Although in the above study Bocheński seems to refer exclusively to philosophy in the Soviet Union, he suggested in an earlier paper ('On Soviet Studies', *SST* **1**) that the term 'Soviet' in 'Sovietology' does not stand for the USSR alone but refers to any country from the point of view of Soviet influence (p. 1). Inasmuch as what I shall have to say about Soviet philosophy applies to the other Marxist-Leninist philosophies as well, I shall use 'Soviet' in the inclusive sense it has in 'Sovietology' and avoid the cumbersome suffix '... and other Marxist-Leninist philosophies'.
5. *Ibid.*, p. 3–4.
6. R. T. De George, 'The Foundations of Marxist-Leninist Ethics', *SST* 1963,2, and, by the same author, 'Marxist-Leninist Ethics: A Rejoinder', *SST* 1964,4, 305–307.
7. J. M. Bocheński, 'On Partijnost' in Philosophy I' *SST* 1965,1–2.
8. S. Müller-Markus, 'Soviet Discussion on General Relativity Theory', *SST* 1965,3, and by the same author, 'Die Komplementarität in der Sowjetphilosophie', *SST* 1964,1.
9. E. Laszlo, 'Recent Trends in Marxist-Leninist Aesthetics', *SST* 1964,3, and J. Fizer, 'The Theory of Objective Beauty in Soviet Aesthetics', *SST* 1964,2.
10. N. Lobkowicz, 'Is the Soviet Notion of Practice Marxian?', *SST* 1966,1.
11. R. Thomas, 'Bemerkungen zum Materialismusproblem', *SST* 1965,4.
12. A. Buchholz, 'Problems of the Ideological East-West Conflict', *SST* **1** 130.
13. E. Laszlo, 'Philosophy in Eastern Europe: An Introduction', *Inquiry*, 1966,1. Abstract reprinted in *SST* 1966,3.
14. *Op. cit.*, p. 4. Bocheński makes the very point I am making in 'On Philosophical Thought', pp. 253–254 above.

15. In reviewing current Soviet criticism of the 'bourgeois falsificators of Marxist-Leninist philosophy' P. Beemans asked in some perplexity, "where do the Soviets dig up these 'well-known American philosophers' whom they are perennially quoting in so many of their books?", *SST* 1965,4, 331.
16. This writer found that nine out of a total of 38 official research projects assigned to Hungarian philosophers are expressly devoted to the criticism of contemporary Western philosophy. Cf. E. Laszlo, 'The Planification of Hungarian Marxism-Leninism,' *SST* 1965,4, 284–286.
17. Cf. A. Buchholz, *op. cit.*, p. 130.
18. Estimate by Bocheński in 'On Philosophical Dialogue', p. 252 above.
19. Despite individual criticism directed at some specific Sovietological papers (e.g. De George's 'The Foundations of Marxist-Leninist Ethics', *op. cit.*) and wholesale criticism directed at the first-Sovietological endeavor as a whole (the latest one being *Protiv sovremennyx buržuaznyx fal'sifikatorov marksistsko-leniniskoj filosofii*, Moscow 1965) most Sovietologists visiting in Communist countries (cf. note 21) find their opinions being taken seriously there.
20. The most acute interest generated by such a visit was accorded A. J. Ayer in March, 1962. For an account of the contacts and controversies between Ayer and the Soviets, see D. D. Comey, 'A Positivist Among the Dialecticians', *SST* 1962,3.
21. E.g. G. L. Kline, R. T. De George, H. Fleischer, D. D. Comey, J. P. Scanlan, the undersigned, etc:
22. Cf. V. V. Vanslov, *Problema prekrasnogo*, Moscow 1957; L. Garai 'A szép pszichologiája', *Hungarian Review of Philosophy* 1962,4.
23. I. Eörsi, 'Az intencionalitásról (Hozzászólás László Ervin tanulmányához)', *Valóság* 1964,4, 47–53.
24. *Ibid.*, p. 47.
25. Prior to the time referred to, Vajda's major publication was his paper, 'Az evidencia problémája', *Hungarian Review of Philosophy* 1964,2.
26. Mihály Vajda, 'Intencionalitás és visszatükrözés', *Valóság* 1964,5, 48–58.
27. *Ibid.*, p. 53. Here Vajda follows Marx, for whom consciousness is historical, and a social product. Cf. Marx-Engels, *Deutsche Ideologie*, in *MEGA* **5**, p. 20.
28. In *Beyond Scepticism and Realism*, Nijhoff, The Hague, 1966, Part II.
29. *Op. cit.*, p. 51.
30. *Ibid.*, p. 57.
31. Cf. E. Laszlo, 'The Planification of Hungarian...', *op. cit.*, p. 285. Recently Vajda reported working on a large-scale work on the later Husserl's conception of science. Its first chapter will be devoted to the background of the conception of science exposed in Husserl's *Krisis der europäischen Wissenschaften*; the second will be a critique of Husserl's analysis of scientific crisis in the 20th century; the third will analyze the Husserlian conception of science as theoretical attitude (this has been published as a separate study in the *Hungarian Review of Philosophy* 1966,2); while the fourth chapter is to examine Husserl's standpoint as regards the history of science.
32. E. Laszlo, *The Communist Ideology in Hungary: Handbook for Basic Research* (Sovietica, Monographs of the Institute of East European Studies), Dordrecht 1966.
33. E. Laszlo, 'Kerekfejüek és laposfejüek', *Valóság* 1966,11.
34. First published in Hungarian as *A tudományos meghatározás*, Budapest 1961; later also published in English and German.

35. György Tamás, 'És mi van a fejekben?', *Valóság* 1966,11.
36. In *Beyond Scepticism and Realism, op. cit.*, Part III.
37. The first time was when Mario Bunge's paper on 'Do Calculating Machines Think?' appeared in 1958. (Even that, however, may be explained by Bunge's popularity with the Soviets.) Since then the journal published two major papers by Westerners: Jean-Pierre Vigier's 'Nature's Theory of Levels and Dialectics' (1962,5) and J. N. Findlay's 'Contemporary British Philosophy' (1964,6). Both papers were provided with editorial explanations: the former to the effect that Vigier's article is published in order to be debated, and the latter that Findlay came to Hungary under the auspices of the British-Hungarian cultural exchange program.

NOTES AND COMMENTS

A FIVE-VOLUME HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY IN RUSSIA AND THE U.S.S.R.

The Institute of Philosophy in Moscow is preparing a five-volume history of philosophy in Russia and the U.S.S.R., to be published in 1967 and 1968. An announcement will appear in *Novye Knigi SSSR* 1966, No. 36.

The first volume will cover the philosophical and sociological views, including aesthetic and ethical ideas, that were current from the 4th century through the first half of the 18th century among those peoples living in ancient Russia. The volume will compare these views with those of other lands, and will also include the philosophical traditions of the Ukraine, Belorussia, the Caucasus, Central Asia, and the Baltic countries. The first volume will conclude with the philosophical views of Lomonosov.

The second volume will cover the period from the late 18th century through the first half of the 19th. The Decembrists, Belinskij, Gercen, Ogarev and other 'precursors' of contemporary Soviet philosophy will receive the most attention, but the volume will also deal with other philosophers that Marxism-Leninism sometimes ignores: Čaadaev, Stankevič, Bakunin, Granovskij, and others.

The third volume will cover the period from the late 1850's to the middle 1890's. The materialistic Revolutionary Democrat philosophers will be dealt with in detail: Černyševskij, Dobroljubov, Pisarev, Šelgunov, Serno-Solov'evič, and Antonovič. Space will also be given, however, to writers and philosophers whose work has been given very little critical analysis in the Soviet philosophical literature: Vladimir Solov'ev, Tolstoy, Dostoevsky, and various idealists and neo-Hegelians.

The fourth volume will take up the period from the middle 1890's until the 1917 Revolution, and will deal principally with the philosophical ideas of Lenin and his polemics against idealism and metaphysics in philosophy and revisionism in the revolutionary movement.

The fifth volume, which will cover the post-1917 period, is evidently going to be devoted more to a history of the Communist Party's attempts to adapt Soviet society to the tenets of historical materialism and to enter into disputes with revisionists and other 'dogmatists' in the inter-

national Communist movement, than to a history of the development of essentially philosophical ideas in logic, ethics, epistemology, ontology, or the philosophy of science. This is a pity, for even though a few starts have been made in this direction (such as the 1965 volume *Marksistsko-Leninskaja Filosofija i Sociologija v SSSR i Evropejskix Socialističeskix Stranax*, reviewed in *SST* 1966,1 44–46) there still is no authoritative Soviet history of *philosophy* in the Soviet Union since 1917 that would answer the world's curiosity as to what developments really took place.

D.D.C.

ALIENATION: NEW THOUGHTS ON AN OLD PROBLEM

The problems of contemporary alienation do not cease to occupy the minds of Marxist-Leninist philosophers, particularly in Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, and Yugoslavia. The latest contribution to this problem-syndrome comes from the moral philosopher Ágnes Heller (Hungary) and shows the unmistakable influence of Georg Lukács. (Lukács told this writer last June that, in his estimation, nobody – including Heidegger – has yet succeeded in developing a satisfactory philosophy of everyday life, and that this may well be the next problem for Marxist philosophers to tackle. Lukács himself is already tackling it: he is working on a voluminous 'ontology of social being', of which the first part – some 1000 pages of typescript – is already finished.) Miss Heller's study, 'Outline of the Structure of Everyday Life' (*Hungarian Review of Philosophy*, 1966, 4) treats alienation from the new Lukács viewpoint of daily existence, rather than from the customary ones of class-struggle, economic structure, party-policy, and so on. But not only the angle, also the content of her paper is new. It contains the remarkable assertion that it is not impossible for an individual to eliminate alienation for himself, regardless of the economic-social conditions in his society.

The above conclusion is reached through a schematic view of everyday life in which the individual is handled without direct reference to his social position. The structure of his everyday life is said to be characterized by the unity of spontaneity and inflexible regularity. Actions are based on an estimation of probability and are economic and pragmatic in character, uniting thought and practice. Everyday thinking overgeneralizes, it is prejudiced, and is characterized by the 'harsh' treatment of other individuals. (The latter are always subsumed under the heading of a general

concept, standing for some situation or requirement.) Due to this 'structure', everyday life tends to produce alienation. However, the individual can surmount the societal conditions which surround him: everyday life is not *neccessarily* alienated. It manifests a spontaneous hierarchy, and this is determined by social factors. However, this hierarchy affords various positions for the individual. Ever since the beginnings of bourgeois society, the individual's freedom within the spontaneous hierarchy has been extended. Every man now has the possibility to construct a *purposive* hierarchy for himself, corresponding only to the dictates of his own personality. Thus, everyone has his own life. It is not impossible to work out a relatively perfected conduct of life (*életvitel*) even when economic-social conditions favor alienation. Under such conditions, an unalienated conduct of life is 'representative' (rather than typical), transforming the organization of daily existence into a moral and political activity.

And it is in this individualistic vein that Miss Heller concludes her new thoughts on an old problem.

E.L.

A BOOK BY REVESZ

Ideologie und Praxis in der sowjetischen Innen- und Aussenpolitik (Schriftenreihe des Instituts für staatsbürgerliche Bildung in Rheinland-Pfalz, Mainz), a recent work by Professor Laszlo Revesz, is a valuable study of the relation between theory and practice in Soviet Communism. It demonstrates, in a direct and concrete fashion, the significant and extensive influence which ideology and practice exert upon each other.

In presenting a general treatment of Soviet internal and foreign policy the author analyzes the central concepts which dominate this policy, showing how they must be understood both within the framework of Communist ideology and in their adaptation to current exigencies of Soviet politics. Some of the key concepts analyzed are: people, state, democratic centralism, politics, democracy, peaceful coexistence, national self-determination, etc. An examination of their usage in Soviet pronouncements brings to light two principles of Marxism-Leninism which, Professor Revesz insists, must always be kept in mind by the Western observer: (1) that all basic ideological concepts are class-concepts, and (2) that they must be (and are) applied dialectically, i.e. according to the varying conditions of time and place. Only if these principles are consciously employed

in the interpretation of Soviet pronouncements is it possible to grasp the unique meaning, often substantially different from accepted Western usage, which may be given to such concepts, and to reconcile the seemingly contradictory application of the same concept in different frames of reference.

Since one cannot begin to understand Soviet Communism before grasping the central doctrine of the unity of theory and practice, Professor Revesz's book presents an excellent introduction for the beginner as well as a valuable contribution to Sovietological research.

J.O'R.

S. B. CERETELI

The director of the Institute of Philosophy of the Georgian Academy of Sciences, Savle Benediktovič Cereteli, died on August 12, 1966. Cereteli was a specialist in dialectical logic, and believed that a dialectical logical calculus could be created, even though he was unable to achieve positive results himself in this direction. He was a very modest and immensely fair man who defended the rights of philosophers with whom he did not agree. He acted as the editor-in-charge for K.S. Bakradze's controversial textbook on logic in 1951 even though Bakradze denied in the book that dialectical logic was really a logic. In his own work on the history of philosophy, Cereteli did not hesitate to initiate new approaches to the classics of Marxism-Leninism, and when his own doctoral dissertation at the Tbilisi institute in 1952 was accused of being anti-Marxian, Hegelistic and Scholastic, his original treatment of the classics was in turn publicly defended by Bakradze. In 1957, Cereteli received his doctorate from the Institute of Philosophy in Moscow for a dissertation on the dialectical nature of logical relations. Under his guidance, the Institute of Philosophy in Tbilisi became one of the liveliest and most progressive research centers in philosophy in the Soviet Union. His own later work was centered on the problems of deduction and the dialectical nature of truth.

D.D.C.

FOUR WESTERN BOOKS ON COMMUNIST PHILOSOPHY

It does not often happen that four scholarly books on Communist philosophy are published by competent authors at practically the same time; yet this has recently been the case. The first among them has been pro-

duced by a scholar who does not belong to what might be called the 'Fribourg Group': it is Eduard Huber's *Um eine "dialektische Logik"*, Pustet, Salzburg and München, 1966 (259 pp.). The three other works have been written by philosophers connected with this journal and with the Fribourg Institute. They are: Helmut Fleischer's *Philosophie in der Sowjetunion 1964–1965* (Berichte des Osteuropa-Instituts an der Freien Universität Berlin), Berlin 1966; Richard De George's *Patterns of Soviet Thought*, University of Michigan Press, Ann Arbor, 1966; and Ervin Laszlo's *The Communist Ideology in Hungary* (Sovietica), Reidel, Dordrecht, 1966.

J.M.B.

NEUE BEITRÄGE ZUR 'PHILOSOPHIE DES MENSCHEN'

In der Reihe philosophischer Symposien, die in letzter Zeit in der Sowjetunion stattgefunden haben, tagte im März 1966 in Moskau auch eines, das dem 'Problem des Menschen' gewidmet war. Kurz zuvor hatten sich sowjetische und japanische Philosophen (Moskau, Januar 1966) zu einem Symposium über die nämliche Thematik getroffen (Berichte über beide Symposien in *FN* 1966,4). Außer den mündlichen Vorträgen von L. N. Mitrochin, 'Aktuelle Probleme der marxistisch-leninistischen Konzeption der Persönlichkeit', und von M. I. Petrosjan, 'Sozialismus und Persönlichkeit', gab es auch einen vom Akademie-Institut für Philosophie in kleiner Auflage (400) herausgegebenen Sammelband mit 16 Abhandlungen: *Čelovek v socialističeskom i buržuaznom obščestve. Simpozium (Doklady i soobščenija)* [Der Mensch in der sozialistischen und in der bürgerlichen Gesellschaft. Symposium – Referate und Mitteilungen]. Hier die Titel der Beiträge: O. G. Drobnickij: 'Der Mensch, sein Verhältnis zur Umwelt und das Wertproblem'; T. I. Ojzerman: 'Persönlichkeit und Freiheit'; I. F. Balakina: 'Individuum und Persönlichkeit'; L. N. Mitrochin: 'Das Problem der Persönlichkeit im Protestantismus'; P. E. Krjažev: 'Das Problem der Formierung der Persönlichkeit in der marxistischen Soziologie'; L. M. Archangel'skij: 'Das Problem der sittlichen Entwicklung der Persönlichkeit'; G. Glezerman: 'Die Vereinigung von gesellschaftlichen und persönlichen Interessen und die Formierung des neuen Menschen'; A. A. Zvorykin: 'Die sozialen Bedingungen und das Problem der Entfremdung der Arbeit'; R. Gabitova: 'Das Problem der "Ganzheitlichkeit" des Menschen und seine existenzialistische Interpretation'; V. G. Podmarkov: 'Der Einfluß der Arbeit auf die Entwicklung der Persönlichkeit im Sozialismus'; V. A. Malinin: 'Die Marxsche Konzeption des Menschen im "*Kapital*"'; A. G. Myslivčenko: 'Das Problem der inneren Freiheit des Menschen'; A. G. Batiščev: 'Das tätige Wesen des Menschen als philosophisches Prinzip'; A. K. Možeeva: 'Zur Frage des Subjekts des historischen Prozesses'; K. K. Platonov: 'Die Psychologie der Persönlichkeit'; P. M. Egides: 'Die Persönlichkeit als soziologische Kategorie'.

Das Symposium über den Menschen bildet zusammen mit dem voraus-

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gegangenen über das Wertproblem (Tbilisi, Oktober 1965) einen wichtigen Schritt in der verstärkten Hinwendung der marxistisch-leninistischen Philosophen zur anthropologischen Reflexion. Demgegenüber ist es von ganz untergeordneter Bedeutung und es braucht den Fortgang dieser Reflexion nicht wesentlich zu hemmen, daß die führenden Vertreter der sowjetischen Philosophie es weiterhin für unangebracht halten, die philosophisch wesentlichen Aussagen in einer philosophischen Anthropologie als besonderer Disziplin zu konzentrieren. Die Ortsbestimmung des Menschen, so heißt es immer wieder, ist nicht Sache eines besonderen Ressorts, sie hat vielmehr alle philosophischen Überlegungen, welches auch immer ihr Thema sei, zu durchdringen (Batiščev, 245). Oder noch radikaler: für die marxistische Philosophie, meint Drobnickij, ist der Mensch als das tätig-praktische und historische Subjekt, das sich die Welt materiell und geistig aneignet, aus einer 'besonderen Frage' zum *einzigen eigentlichen Gegenstand der Philosophie* geworden (15). Diese Forderung geht vielleicht zu weit, vor allem aber muß man feststellen, daß die sowjetische Schulphilosophie des dialektischen und historischen Materialismus in ihrer tatsächlichen Durchführung noch recht weit hinter jenem Maß an anthropologischer Durchdringung und Zentrierung zurückgeblieben ist, das man rechtmäßigerweise postulieren darf. Und wenn man jetzt öfters hört, die marxistische Lehre vom Menschen sei eben der historische Materialismus, so ist darauf zu erwidern, daß er in seiner traditionellen Darstellungsform eben doch bloß eine *implizite* Anthropologie ist; und sie explizit zu machen bedeutet nicht nur eine simple Transkription, sondern auch eine beträchtliche Ausweitung in den Richtungen des Konkreten wie des Allgemeinen. Es geht hier m.a.W. nicht nur darum, ein 'Haben' zu aktivieren, sodern auch ein 'Soll' beizubringen. Vor allem sind die menschlichen Individuen deutlicher als solche zu artikulieren, und alles, was zur 'Welt des Menschen' gehört, ist in jenem Modus zur Darstellung zu bringen, den es als Moment und Konstituens des Lebensprozesses der Individuen hat.

Ich möchte aus verschiedenen der Symposiums-Abhandlungen einige der Gedankengänge herausheben und kurz würdigen, die mir besonders bemerkenswert erscheinen. Das erste Interesse galt den Aussagen, die jeweils etwas vom 'Wesen des Menschen' zu erfassen suchen; die meist spezielleren psychologischen und soziologischen Beiträge blieben ebenso wie die kritischen und historischen unberücksichtigt.

1. *Kritik an den Ansätzen zu einer marxistischen Axiologie*

Ein großes Hauptreferat, das die philosophische Problematik des Menschen in den wesentlichsten Aspekten synthetisch zur Sprache gebracht hätte, gab es in dem Symposium und gibt es auch im Sammelband nicht. An die erste Stelle hat man den Beitrag von Drobnickij gesetzt, dessen Überschrift – 'Der Mensch, sein Verhältnis zur Umwelt und das Wertproblem' – zwar etwas derartiges erwarten läßt, der faktisch aber einen engeren Zweck verfolgt: die Zurückweisung der Versuche (V.P. Tugarinov's und anderer), auf marxistischem Boden eine philosophische Axiologie zu begründen. Er hatte diese Kritik bereits im Tifliser Symposium vorgebracht, erneut hat er sie in einem Aufsatz formuliert (*VF* 1966,7). Im Operieren mit Wertprädikaten sieht Drobnickij ein Charakteristikum des oberflächlichen, vorwissenschaftlichen Alltagsbewußtseins, und in dem Versuch, das 'Wertverhältnis' in die philosophische Theorie einzuführen, eine Gefahr für deren Wissenschaftlichkeit (was, fragt er, bleibt dann noch vom *wissenschaftlichen* Kommunismus übrig?) (6). Die philosophische Wertlehre betrachtet er gänzlich als eine Sache der bürgerlichen Ideologie. Der hier eingebürgerten (und jetzt auch von manchen marxistischen Autoren verfochtenen) Ansicht, daß wissenschaftliche Erkenntnis für die Wahl von Endzwecken nicht kompetent sei, setzt er diese Konstruktion entgegen: "Die streng objektive Wissenschaft, welche die natürliche und die gesellschaftliche Welt in ihren immanenten Gesetzen erforscht, muß auf alle Fragen der Weltanschauung, der gesellschaftlichen Orientierung und der subjektiven Motivation in der Tätigkeit der Menschen die Antwort geben. Die allseitige Kenntnis des Gegenstandes, 'wie er ist', enthüllt, indem sie auf seine universell-praktische Aneignung gegründet ist, nicht nur das Material, die Hindernisse oder die Mittel der menschlichen Tätigkeit, sondern auch ihre Endziele. Denn dieser Gegenstand ... gibt nicht nur das Material für die Befriedigung von Bedürfnissen ab, sondern er erzeugt diese Bedürfnisse auch" (16). Dahinter steht bei Drobnickij eine betont ganzheitlich-integrative Sicht des Welt- und Gesellschaftsprozesses. "Der Mensch tritt in seinem Verhältnis zur Welt als ihr Schöpfer (*sozidatel'*) auf; indem er die Natur zu seinen menschlichen Zwecken umgestaltet, entwickelt er sie zugleich nach ihren eigenen, inneren Gesetzen. Diese Identität des Subjektiv-Menschlichen und des Objektiv-Natürlichen ist nur möglich dank der Universalität der mensch-

lichen Tätigkeit, die indes keine ihr von Anfang an gegebene Charakteristik ist, sondern nur auf dem langen und widerspruchsvollen historischen Weg des Aufbaus der 'vermenschlichten' Natur und der menschlichen Gesellschaft ihre Realisation findet" (15). "Die Freiheit ist folglich die bewußte Verwirklichung der universellen (universalgeschichtlichen) Notwendigkeit, sofern diese Notwendigkeit auch das Gesetz der Selbstentwicklung des Menschen ist. Die Erkenntnis der objektiven Gesetze der Geschichte hilft die Weseninteressen des Menschen zu erhellen, und umgekehrt, wenn der Mensch sein subjektives Verhältnis zur bestehenden Gesellschaft und zu ihrer historischen Entwicklung zum Ausdruck bringt, so bildet dies ein Moment in der Verwirklichung der objektiven Logik der Geschichte. Bei einer solchen Stellung des Problems bleibt kein Platz mehr für irgendeinen besonderen Wertaspekt der Wirklichkeit und für dessen spezielle Betrachtung unter diesem – dem axiologischen – Blickwinkel" (16). "Der historische Materialismus, der in sich nichts anders enthält als wissenschaftliche Erkenntnis, bedarf dennoch keiner axiologischen Ergänzung – eben darum nicht, weil die Ideale und Ziele der Menschen hier in die Struktur des historischen Prozesses selbst eingeschlossen sind" (19).

Es ist hier nicht der Ort für eine detaillierte Kritik an der Konzeption von Drobnickij – die von ihm kritisierten sowjetischen Kollegen werden das Recht ihrer begrifflichen Distinktionen schon zu verteidigen wissen und dabei auch zu manchen noch ausstehenden Präzisierungen gelangen. Die tatsächlich bestehenden Unklarheiten dienen Drobnickij nur als Gründe für seine prinzipielle Ablehnung, so die Gefahr einer falschen Hypostasierung, der die Rede von 'den Werten' so leicht unterliegt. Mit Recht konstatiert er eine Unstimmigkeit, die darin liegt, daß man den Menschen selbst als etwas Wertvolles deklariert (höchstes Gut u.ä.), daß aber andererseits etwas seinen Wert nur durch seine Bedeutung für den Menschen hat (6). Diese Kritik könnte in konstruktiver Absicht zum Ausgangspunkt einer Klärung des 'über-axiologischen' Charakters der menschlichen Selbstaffirmation und der menschlichen Würde werden. Drobnickij spricht ferner sehr richtige Worte gegen psychologische Manipulation in der Volkserziehung und für die Anerkennung des Menschen als Subjekt der Geschichte und als Schöpfer der Gesellschaft (nicht als Objekt äußerer Einwirkung und als Konsument von Gütern, die ihm die Gesellschaft 'gibt') (21–22), doch es leuchtet nicht recht ein, wieso

diese Gefahr nur im Gefolge eines Operierens mit 'gefühlsdurchtränkten' Wertprädikaten akut wird – ist Manipulation nicht etwa auch in den Formeln einer sich 'objektiv-wissenschaftlich' gebenden Rationalität möglich? Die von Drobnickij befürwortete Totalitätsbetrachtung könnte ein Korrektiv gegen die fetischistisch-verdinglichenden Konstruktionen eines 'objektiven Prozesses' über den Individuen und unabhängig von ihnen sein, wenn man jeden Menschen erfahren läßt: *l'état, la société, l'histoire – c'est moi!* Doch die Gedankengänge von Drobnickij weisen nicht in eine solche Richtung, wenigstens nicht eindeutig genug. Vielmehr operiert er selbst mit den fragwürdigen Formeln der 'objektiven Logik', der 'objektiven Notwendigkeit' und der 'Bewegung der Geschichte', statt diese 'objektive Logik des historischen Prozesses' in den Logos des Handelns menschlicher Subjekte zurückzuholen. Umgekehrt, er löst die distinkten Innenaspekte dieses Handelns (zu denen auch der Wertaspekt gehört) in der Hypostase des universalen Prozesses auf und gelangt so in jene 'Nacht, in der alle Kühe schwarz sind'.

2. *Der Mensch als das aktive Subjekt*

Die Abhandlung von G. S. Batiščev über das 'tätige Wesen des Menschen' ist nicht nur mit 40 Seiten die umfangreichste des Bandes, sondern meines Erachtens auch die wichtigste. Sie führt genau das aus, was ich eben in der Kritik an Drobnickij postuliert habe: er macht es zum Prinzip, zur methodologischen Maxime, die ganze sogenannte objektive Logik des historischen Prozesses (und alles, was man darüber in den Termini von Faktoren, Korrelationen, Zuständen, Institutionen und Gesetzlichkeiten zu sagen pflegt) in den Logos des Handelns der Subjekte zurückzuholen. Und das ist genau das, was für eine Weiterentwicklung der Gesellschaftslehre und Anthropologie des historischen Materialismus in seiner sowjetischen Form heute das Entscheidende ist. Es bleibt bei Batiščev unausgesprochen, aber es dürfte auf der Hand liegen, welche kritischen Implikationen sein Ansatz für die konventionelle Darstellungsweise des historischen Materialismus hat. Nicht von ungefähr hat er seiner Arbeit ein Motto von Fichte vorangestellt.

Von dem Marxschen Satz ausgehend, daß die Menschen ihre Geschichte selbst machen, sucht der Autor jene 'fetischisierende' Auslegung zu überwinden, die der andere Marxsche Gedanke vom menschlichen Wesen als dem 'Ensemble der gesellschaftlichen Verhältnisse' nicht selten

findet. Der Mensch ist das, wozu er sich selbst macht; die Menschen schaffen selbst ihr Schicksal, alle und jegliche Normen ihres Lebens. Dies ist, wie Batiščev betont, keine elegant klingende Phrase zum Lobe der Menschen, sondern eine These, die zu vielem verpflichtet (247). Man kann nun nämlich nicht mehr so tun, als wären neben den Menschen noch irgendwelche 'Umstände', 'Bedingungen', 'Faktoren' und ähnliche 'Kräfte' in der Geschichte am Werke; nicht die Menschen *und* die Umstände machen die Geschichte, sondern die Menschen *unter* bestimmten Umständen (248). – Wer erinnerte sich hier nicht der zahllosen Ausführungen sowjetischer Theoretiker über die Rollenverteilung zwischen 'objektiven' und 'subjektiven Faktoren', über den Menschen (seine Bedürfnisse, Ideen u.a.) als ein 'Produkt der Gesellschaft' oder der 'materiellen Lebensbedingungen', über allerlei 'Triebkräfte' des sozialen Prozesses, über die Dialektik der Produktivkräfte und der Produktionsverhältnisse, und vor allem immer wieder über die 'objektive Notwendigkeit' und die 'objektiven Gesetze der gesellschaftlichen Entwicklung'; auch in den Beiträgen zum Symposium findet man eine Reihe solcher Ausführungen (z.B. die Deduktion der 'Interessen' bei Glezerman). Diese ganze Kategorialität steht in Frage, wenn man Ernst macht mit dem 'pragmatologischen Rekurs' – und es geht dabei kaum nur um Äußerlichkeiten der sprachlichen Darstellung.

Die sozialen Gesetze, so führt Batiščev aus, "in welcher Transformation immer sie auftreten mögen, bleiben stets Gesetze der menschlichen gegenständlichen Tätigkeit. In der Gesellschaft, in der Geschichte gibt es keine anderen sozialen Gesetze als Gesetze der menschlichen Tätigkeit. ... Es gibt *keine* sozialen Gesetze, die 'Gesetze der Dinge', 'Gesetze der Umstände', der 'Kräfte' u.a.m. neben und außer der menschlichen Tätigkeit wären." Gleiches gilt auch von den 'Produktivkräften' und 'Produktionsverhältnissen' (252).

Selbst das vielberufene 'Bedingtsein' der menschlichen Tätigkeit seitens des jeweils schon Vorhandenen löst sich 'pragmatologisch' auf: nicht nur ist das Bedingende selber Resultat verflossener Tätigkeit, sondern auch sein Bedingen ist kein von außen kommendes Einwirken der 'Umstände' auf die Menschen. Vielmehr bedingen diese sich in ihrer Tätigkeit selbst, indem sie die Resultate verflossener Tätigkeit in den Prozeß ihrer eigenen Tätigkeit hineinziehen und als die ihren reproduzieren. "In diesem Sinne ist die menschliche Tätigkeit eine echte *causa sui*..., enthüllt sie sich als

eine nur eben komplizierte, indirekte Form des Sichselbstbedingens der menschlichen Tätigkeit mittels ihrer gegenständlichen Verkörperungen" (249).

Der Autor gelangt so zu einer prinzipiellen Kritik aller milieutheoretischen Vorstellungen vom Menschen als einem 'Produkt'. Der Mensch ist in der Tat das Ergebnis der Geschichte, aber einer von Menschen selbst gemachten, und in der Weise, daß er selbst in den Schaffensprozeß einbezogen wird und darin aktiv als seine eigenen Charakteristika reproduziert, was viele Generationen vor ihm geschaffen haben. "Das bedeutet, der Mensch ist *niemals* einfach *Produkt* der 'Umstände, 'Bedingungen' u.a.m...." Man kann den Menschen als 'Kulturwesen' und Individuum überhaupt nicht 'machen', 'hervorbringen' und 'formen', sondern nur seine eigene Aktivität hervorrufen, in der er sich kommunikativ mit anderen Menschen formiert (254).

Von solchen Prämissen ausgehend entfaltet Batiščev eine Sozial- und Kulturkritik der bürgerlichen Gesellschaft (in den Marxschen Kategorien der Verdinglichung, Veräußerlichung, Fetischisierung, Entpersönlichung und Entfremdung. Hervorgehoben sei, daß er die kapitalistische Entfremdung (die man oft als eine Sache der 'Eigentumsverhältnisse' ansieht) konsequent-pragmatologisch auf einen Urgrund in der Ordnung der Tätigkeiten zurückführt, nämlich auf die sozial antagonistische Teilung dieser Tätigkeiten (261). Sie besteht darin, daß die zur essentiellen Einheit menschlicher Tätigkeit überhaupt gehörenden Momente (Zwecksetzung, Mittelwahl, materielle Realisation) auf verschiedene Individuen und Gruppen verteilt sind, so daß ganze Gruppen gar keine Tätigkeit im anthropologisch vollgültigen Sinne verrichten (263). Der Kritik unterliegt unter anderem auch das 'Nützlichkeits- oder Benutzungsverhältnis', in welchem die kapitalistische Produktion dem Produzenten und im weiteren auch der ganzen Natur gegenübersteht: die Welt erscheint hier als ein Arsenal bloßer Mittel ohne eigene innere Ordnung – "das Nützlichkeitsverhältnis kennt im Grunde keine Natur als solche – die Natur in ihrer eigenen Gesetzmäßigkeit und Harmonie..." (280).

A. K. Možeeva tendiert mit ihrem Beitrag in die gleiche Richtung. Sie knüpft an den Marx-Engelsschen Satz aus der *Deutschen Ideologie* an, daß den Ausgangspunkt der Theorie die wirklich tätigen Menschen bilden (292). (In Parenthese sei vermerkt, wie G. Glezerman bereits an dieser Stelle in eine schiefe Antithese gerät, indem er erklärt, der Marxsche Aus-

gangspunkt sei nicht der einzelne Mensch, sondern 'die Gesellschaft', 138, 140.) Možeeva artikuliert eine Reihe wichtiger geschichtsanthropologischer Probleme. Den Platz des konkret-individuellen Menschen im Geschichtsprozeß betreffend stellt sie die Fragen: ist der Mensch 'Täter' oder bloß 'Getanes', Individuum oder bloß Träger einer 'Allgemeinheit', Schöpfer oder Geschöpf, Subjekt oder Objekt einer äußeren Notwendigkeit? (291). Was ist Prinzip und Quelle der historischen Bewegung? (287). Wo entsteht praktisch das 'Neue' in der Geschichte – und wie könnte es überhaupt entstehen, wenn der Mensch den Rahmen eines gegebenen Sozialen nicht überschreiten, wenn sich das Individuelle nicht über das Soziale zu erheben vermöchte? (291). Wenn die menschliche Geschichte nicht 'an sich gegeben' ist, sondern durch menschliche Tätigkeit erzeugt wird – "woher schöpft der Mensch dann den Inhalt seiner Tätigkeit?". "Ist das menschliche Wesen ursprünglich vorgegeben?" Und nochmals die Frage, wie das Neue entsteht – etwa im Schoß der menschlichen 'Natur', die sich im Prozeß der menschlichen Tätigkeit lediglich 'entfaltet'? (303). Die Fragen finden auf den 18 Seiten begreiflicherweise keine ausführliche Erörterung, und die Antworten sind nur Andeutungen. Hier z.B. die Antwort auf die zuletzt gestellte Frage: "Jede menschliche Generation vollzieht in bezug auf die Welt eine *neue Tätigkeit*, die zwar durch die vorhandene Welt der menschlichen Kultur vorgeschrieben war, aber dennoch nicht in ihr enthalten war. ... Das 'Neue' ist somit vorher weder im 'Objekt' noch im 'Subjekt' vorhanden; es entsteht im Prozeß der menschlichen Tätigkeit – aus dieser Tätigkeit selber" (304). – Wichtig ist es aber schon, daß mit solchen Fragen das Augenmerk auf die Elemente der Subjekt-Spontaneität im historischen Geschehen hingelenkt wird. Bemerkenswert ist, daß Možeeva (anders als Batiščev, der sich an die 'klassische' Milieutheorie adressiert) auch einige Äußerungen sowjetischer Zeitgenossen als Beispiele dafür kritisiert, wie man gelegentlich immer noch versucht, eine von aller Subjektivität entblößte Grundlage der menschlichen Geschichte zu finden. Die Gedankengänge eines Autors, S. M. Permjakov, führt sie auf die Konsequenz hinaus: das wirkliche Subjekt ist die sich selbst entwickelnde Wirklichkeit, der Mensch nur Objekt ihrer Einwirkung, Funktion ihrer Bewegung (293).

3. *Mensch, Individuum, Person*

Aus der Reihe der Beiträge, die sich mit dem Status und dem Werdegang

der menschlichen Person bzw. Persönlichkeit befassen, möchte ich nur eine Polemik herausheben, die P. M. Egides' gegen V. P. Tugarinov. Dieser hatte in seiner Schrift *Ličnost' i obščestvo* (1965) die Persönlichkeit des Menschen mit mehreren Hauptmerkmalen – Vernünftigkeit, Verantwortlichkeit, Freiheit, Individualität, Würde – zu charakterisieren versucht und diese Charakteristik zu einem, wie er selbst bemerkt, deutlich normativen Begriff ausgeformt. Dagegen zieht Egides mit großer Heftigkeit zu Felde, gegen die Normativität und gegen die einzelnen Bestimmungen; er wirft Tugarinov dabei nichts geringeres als Unwissenschaftlichkeit, Moralisieren, diverse Verwechslungen und sogar eine Primitivierung des Problems vor. Da die aufgezählten Merkmale allesamt eine Gradation aufweisen und jeder Mensch erst nach und nach zu ihnen heranwächst – ja manche Individuen infolge psychischer Krankheit garnicht dazu gelangen –, erscheint es jedesmal als fraglich, 'von wann ab' ein Mensch als Persönlichkeit zu gelten habe. Egides bemerkt in seinem polemischen Eifer gar nicht, daß die strittigen Merkmale als solche der *Persönlichkeit* durchaus zutreffend bezeichnet sein können, daß es vielleicht nur darauf ankommt, dazu noch einen anderen fundamentalen Sinn von '*Personalität*' zu erschließen. In dieser Richtung geht er dann in der Tat einige Schritte voran.

Er hat, vom Inhaltlichen des Personbegriffs abgesehen, auch ein Augenmerk auf den formalen Status der hier ins Spiel kommenden Begriffe: er unterscheidet zwischen der 'Personhaftigkeit' und der 'Person'; die Personhaftigkeit (*ličnostnost'*) ist ein relationaler Charakter, ein bestimmtes *Verhältnis* zwischen Mensch und Gesellschaft, Person (*ličnost'*) hingegen ist der Mensch als substantiell existierender Gegenstand (nicht eine Eigenschaft dieses Gegenstandes), aber eben der Mensch in einer bestimmten Relation, in einem personalen (*ličnostnyj*) Verhältnis zur Gesellschaft (329). Personhaftigkeit erweist sich als Maß der Autonomie, der Selbstbestimmung, der Freiheit, des Spielraumes, den der Mensch als Einzelperson gegenüber der Gesellschaft hat. "Die Person – das ist ein autonomer Mensch..., der seine Individualität in so gearteten Beziehungen zwischen ihm und der Gesellschaft entwickelt hat, daß ihm die Gesellschaft relative Selbstbestimmung in wichtigen Sphären der Lebenstätigkeit gewährt" (331).

Individualität hat jeder Mensch, Personalität in diesem Sinne jedoch ist ein historisches Ergebnis. Sie hat, wie Egides ähnlich anderen sowje-

tischen Autoren ausführt, im Laufe der Geschichte eine dreistufige Entwicklung von einem 'apersonalen Kollektivismus' zu einer Phase des 'personalen Individualismus' durchlaufen und führt nunmehr in eine Ära des 'personalen Kollektivismus' (oder der 'kollektivistischen Personalität'), die für die kommunistische Gesellschaft charakteristisch sind (331–332). Wieder gerät der Autor mit Tugarinov in Streit: dieser hat es nämlich für wahrscheinlich gehalten, daß es auch in der Urgesellschaft schon ein gewisses Maß an personaler Artikulation gegeben hat. Egides mißt dieser Frage sogar praktische Wichtigkeit bei: wenn es in der Urgesellschaft schon personale Existenz gegeben hat, dann sind die 'Dogmatiker', die 'Anhänger des Kasernen-Sozialismus' im Recht. "Die Dogmatiker wollen die unbedingte Unterordnung konservieren..." (327, Anm.).

Es wird schwerlich einleuchten, daß eine *quaestio iuris* bezüglich unserer Zukunft im Rückgang auf die Urgesellschaft ihre Entscheidung finden könnte. Im übrigen aber ist es wohl berechtigt, die größere oder geringere personale Autonomie als ein erstrangiges Kriterium gesellschaftlicher Ordnung gelten zu lassen. Damit ist ein Status bezeichnet, innerhalb dessen die an bestimmte 'Fähigkeiten' geknüpften Persönlichkeitsmerkmale erst ihre Bedeutung erlangen. Will man es terminologisch fassen, so kann man sagen: es ist der Übergang vom Begriff der Persönlichkeit zum Begriff der Person vollzogen – das russische Wort *ličnost'* hat allerdings keinen Raum für diese Distinktion. In der hiermit eingeschlagenen Richtung wäre dann noch der weitere Schritt zu tun, neben der gegenseitigen Selbständigkeit auch die gegenseitige Anerkennung und Achtung von Personen in einem Personenverband in den Begriff aufzunehmen.

4. *Personalität und Freiheit*

In den beiden Texten, die speziell der menschlichen Freiheit gewidmet sind, ist davon die Rede, daß die (von Engels geprägte) Formel von der Freiheit als der 'eingesehenen Notwendigkeit' unzureichend ist. Sie könnte so auch auf bloße Unterordnung unter das Geschehende hinauslaufen, auf eine bewußt-freiwillige wie bei den Stoikern (29) oder gar auf eine erzwungene (238). Es bedarf also zusätzlicher Bestimmungen.

T. I. Ojzerman berührt in seinem Text mehrere Aspekte des Freiheitsproblems, auch die politische Freiheit in der sozialistischen Gesellschaft. Er tritt jenene Kritikern entgegen, die dem Marxismus unterstellen, er lasse die Einzelperson völlig im sozialen Kollektiv aufgehen (39-40). Von

den drei Freiheitsbeziehungen, die Engels herausgestellt hatte – Herrschaft der Menschen über die äußere Natur, über sich selbst und über die gesellschaftlichen Verhältnisse –, fordert insbesondere die mittlere zu einigen weiterführenden Überlegungen heraus. "Eben diese Herrschaft des Individuums über sich selbst nennt der Marxismus, im Unterschied von der vorausgegangenen Philosophie, die *Freiheit des Willens*" (33). Wer herrscht hier über wen? Nicht, wie Spinoza gemeint hat, die Vernunft über die Gefühle; denn auf der Seite der Gefühle gibt es durchaus auch solche, die der Vernunft und Freiheit nicht entgegenstehen, die sogar entgegen einem nüchternen Verstand vom Menschen Besitz ergreifen dürfen (34). Die Willensfreiheit besteht auch "keineswegs in einer inneren Unabhängigkeit des Willens von den Motiven (Indeterminismus). Wenn der Wille die Fähigkeit besitzt, diese oder jene Antriebe zu überwinden, so geschieht dies nur darum, weil der Willensakt durch andere Antriebe bestimmt ist. Der Wille ist weder Eigenursache noch Herr seiner eigenen Akte. Es sollte darum nicht einfach vom Willen die Rede sein, der eine der menschlichen Fähigkeiten darstellt, sondern von der menschlichen Person im ganzen; ihr sind die mannigfachen Gefühle, Bedürfnisse, Wünsche und Bestrebungen eigen, die sie in gewisser Weise lenkt, kontrolliert, vollzieht usw. Der Marxismus ... setzt an die Stelle der metaphysischen Abstraktion des 'freien Willens' den konkret historischen Menschen, der die Fähigkeit besitzt, ... auch über sich selbst, über seine eigene Natur zu herrschen. ... Doch woher erlangt das Individuum diese Fähigkeit, über sich selbst zu herrschen? Es ist doch nicht irgendein sagenhafter Baron Münchhausen, der sich an den eigenen Haaren aus dem Wasser zieht. Die Grundlage dieser individuellen und bei verschiedenen Individuen (wie auch in verschiedenen historischen Epochen) unterschiedlich entwickelten Fähigkeit ist die reale Kommunikation der Menschen..." Aus ihr erwächst eine "Fähigkeit, über der eigenen individuellen Begrenztheit zu stehen, sein Persönliches im Gesellschaftlichen zu finden, seiner gesellschaftlichen Pflicht als persönlicher Angelegenheit bewußt zu werden, wogegen die rein individuellen Probleme und Bedürfnisse ... auf die zweite Stelle rücken. Diese geistige Freiheit ist nicht Selbstaufopferung, obgleich dies in bestimmten Fällen ihr notwendiger Ausdruck sein kann. Das Wesen der geistigen Freiheit besteht vielmehr darin, daß die progressiven sozialen Motive zu den dominierenden Antrieben in der Tätigkeit des Individuums werden" (33–35).

Der andere Autor, A. G. Myslivčenko, entwickelt seine Konzeption der inneren Freiheit in Auseinandersetzung mit dem existenzphilosophischen Motiv, daß der Mensch sich selbst frei zu wählen habe. Die Kritik geht dahin, daß hier das 'Was' der Wahl zu formal gefaßt sei, abseits aller gesellschaftlichen Inhalte und der 'Wahrheit der historischen Bewegung'. Doch ungeachtet dieser Betonung, die auf dem 'Was' der Wahl liegt, zweifelt der Autor nicht daran, daß der Mensch in seinem Bewußtsein eine Wahl vollzieht und daß sich eben darin seine innere Freiheit manifestiert (241). Im politischen Raum, der hier am meisten interessiert, heißt dies: für den Menschen "besteht immer die Möglichkeit einer bewußten (und nicht irrationalen) Wahl einer bestimmten Position in bezug auf die kämpfenden Klassen und Parteien, woraus denn auch eine Verantwortlichkeit des Individuums erwächst". Doch von dieser 'Freiheit diesseits der Wahl' (und damit auch diesseits von Gut und Böse) geht Myslivčenko sogleich weiter zu einer wertpositiv gefaßten Freiheit im Banne des Guten, des sozial Richtigen: "Eine wahrhaft freie Wahl wird nur diejenige sein, die sich auf die Erkenntnis der objektiven Notwendigkeit gründet, so und nicht anders zu handeln..." (d.h. im Sinne der "herangereiften Bedürfnisse der gesellschaftlichen Entwicklung") (242).

Kritisch wäre hier unter anderem zu sagen, daß es den sowjetischen Theoretikern wohl ernst darum zu tun ist (und dies verdient volle Anerkennung), mit der (faktischen und normativen) sozialen Gebundenheit eine unaufhebbare Autonomie der menschlichen Individuen zu vereinigen, daß ihnen dies bis jetzt jedoch noch nicht in einer genügend einstimmigen und durchsichtigen Weise gelungen ist. Was hier noch deutlicher herauszuarbeiten ist, das ist ein Urgrund menschlicher Spontaneität – in Sachen gesellschaftlicher Bindung und Freiheit des Menschen wäre zu erhellen, wie und unter welchen Bedingungen das sogenannte 'Gesellschaftliche', aus welchem das 'Individuelle' schöpft und welchem es ein- und unterzuordnen ist, selbst einer essentiellen 'Gesetzgebung' unterliegt, an der die Individuen unmittelbar teilhaben. Nur so nämlich kann es sein, daß sie in jenem 'Gesellschaftlichen' auch ihr Eigenstes wiederfinden. Die Richtung weiteren Voranschreitens der anthropologischen Reflexion der marxistisch-leninistischen Philosophen ist so mit dem Augustinischen *Noli foras ire, in te redi, in interiore homine habitat veritas* vorgezeichnet.

HELMUT FLEISCHER

REPORT FROM THE INSTITUTE

Personnel: Dr. S. Müller-Markus and Dr. K. Ballestrem have recently left the Institute to take up appointments elsewhere. Dr. Ballestrem has been appointed professor at the University of Notre Dame, Indiana. Mr. Ervin Laszlo has been appointed Visiting Fellow in the Department of Philosophy at Yale University. Mr. J. O'Rourke has been named as a junior assistant to the Institute.

Physicists' Program: Program 'P' which was begun in 1962 has been discontinued, having completed the prescribed four year program of study and research. Nine students, all fully qualified physicists, completed the courses.

Students: During the summer-semester 1966, 63 students enrolled for course at the Institute.

Publications: Mr. Ervin Laszlo has just published a book in the 'Sovietica' series of monographs on Soviet Philosophy, entitled: *The Communist Ideology in Hungary. Handbook for Basic Research*, Reidel, Dordrecht, 1966 (VIII+352 pp.). This new work, which is no. 22 in the 'Sovietica' series, is a companion to the volume on Marxist-Leninist philosophy in Yugoslavia published earlier by L. Vrtačič.

Radio: This year the Institute has undertaken to deliver a series of lectures on Sovietology over Radio Bern. These lectures–some fourteen in all–will be given as part of the series of 'university hours' regularly broadcast by Bern radio.

Teaching Program: The following lectures and seminars are being offered by the Institute during the winter-semester 1966/1967:

Bocheński: Histoire de la philosophie contemporaine: Philosophie Soviétique;

Bocheński: Doktorandenseminar;

Bocheński: Discussion Group on current Soviet Philosophy;

Heidenreich: Proseminar in General Sovietology;

Kemball: History of Russia;

Kemball: Russian Revolutionary Thought in the 19th Century;

Kemball: Russian Language for Beginners;

Nyman: Langue Russe pour débutants;

Nyman: Langue Russe pour avancées;

Payne: Idéologie Communiste;

Payne: General Introduction to Communism;
Payne: Psychology in the Soviet Union;
Revesz: Geschichte und Organisation der Kommunistischen Partei;
Revesz: Sowjetische Rechtsphilosophie.

In addition, the Institute is offering a special intensive course in Russian language for beginners. This course is intended to enable students beginning Soviet Studies to acquire a working knowledge of Russian in a short space of time. It is hoped that this course will become a regular feature of the teaching program of the Institute.

CHRONOLOGY

1965:

Aug. 24–31 International Congress on the History of Science, Warsaw University in Poland. (*VF* 1966,5, 154–157; *FN* 1966,3, 149–152.)

Dec. Second All-Union Conference on Bionics, Moscow; organized by the AN SSSR and other governmental and scientific institutions. (*FN* 1966,5, 169–172.)

1966:

Jan. Symposium: 'Man under Socialism and Capitalism', Moscow, Institute of Philosophy (AN SSSR); organized by IF and the Japanese Society for the Study of Materialism. 14 papers were presented (7 Japan, 7 Soviet); among the Soviets are G. E. Glezerman, M. B. Mitin, M. I. Petrosjan, and T. I. Ojzerman. (*VF* 1966,9, 127–130; *FN* 1966,4, 161–164.)

Jan. 5–7 Scientific conference: 'The changes in the social structure of the Soviet society', Minsk; organized by the Section of social science of the AN SSSR, the Institute of Philosophy and Law of the AN BSSR and the All-Union Society '*Znanie*'. Among the speakers were V. S. Semenov, K. P. Buslov, G. E. Glezerman, V. G. Podmarkov, and A. S. Friš. (*FN* 1966,3, 133–138; *VF* 1966,5, 143–154.)

Feb. Congress of the Soviet Sociological Association, Moscow, Institute of Philosophy (AN SSSR). (*VF* 1966,6, 157–159.)

March 3–5 Symposium: 'Man in Socialist and Bourgeois Society', Moscow, Institute of Philosophy (AN SSSR); taking part in the Symposium were M. B. Mitin, L. N. Mitroxin, M. I. Petrosjan, V. P. Tugarinov, and F. V. Konstantinov. (*FN* 1966,4, 155–160.)

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